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M. R M C T 
Much as I heard and read about the causes of partition, the 
pre-partition politics, a much discussed issue o€ our day, became 
a subject of my sole interest. I felt that the more it is --abated 
the more it gets blurred. A conceptual assessment transformed my 
instincts to make an in-denth study in this issue. This study would 
perhaps, benefit,besides the scholars and academicians, also to 
knowledgeable masses by musterina the factual details and events 
during the period and giving them en objective meaning and interpre-
tation. However, since the roli-^ics of partition emerged in the 
nineteenth century, a alimpse of social, political, cultural and 
religious tendencies o-P the Hindus p.nd the Muslims has also been aiven. 
This contextual perspective has brouaht into focus eminent '^ indu 
and Muslim leaders and the British attitude towards the demand for 
independence. The simplistic exclanation that the Muslim League 
caused partition and that the Congress could not reconcile with the 
League's demand; or that the British played an intrinsic role in the 
politics of partition have been found to be only limited facts of 
the complex nroblem o-^ partition. Vfhat v/as the real cause and what 
v;as the "ole of the Congress and the Muslim Leaaue in the partition 
politics has been analysed as also the complex nature of the issue 
with its rolitical, social, psychic anri leadorshio ambitious dimensions, 
The method of srudy is inductive. Facts and figures have been 
collected and under the Guidance o'^  loaic and analytical aporoach, 
conclusions have been derived. Though the language adopted is that 
of scientific presentation of nolitical material, the form is narrative 
and historical. In viev; of the conflicts of opinion, special care 
has been taken to avoid temptations of bias and preferences. 
Varied available sources ann material have been utilized. A 
particular mention needs to be -^lado o-^  Sir Sve^ Archives and the 
Research Section of the ".A. librar^^, AMU, Ali-'arh, the Scpru House 
Library, the National Archives o-^  India, the Nehru Memorial Museum 
and Library, the Gandhi Museum Library, and the Jamia Millia Islamia 
Library at New Delhi. References to Mountbatten Papers have been 
consulted in Manmath Nath Das, Partition and Independence of India. 
India Office Records, transferred to the NAI, have also been checked. 
The published materials, includina Memoirs and Autobiographies, 
Docviments and Speeches, Contemporary and Secondary books and materials, 
Articles, Periodicals and Newspapers (English and Urdu) have been 
made approoriate use of in our thesis. Hovever, the subject-matter 
covers a long period from 1857 to 1947, v'ii:h parcJcular details -^ or 
the Deriod from 1937 to 1947. 
During the course of '-writing a larae number of questions creot 
in mind, but a fev very important ones have been answered, though at 
every step due consideration has been qiven that no a single aspect 
of the freedom struggle remain untouched. 
The politics of partition of India v;as a longdra\<m and longwided 
history o-P comnunal differences between the Hindus and the Muslims. 
Uov! the differences rrupted, maligned the poliLictal atmosphere and 
disintegrated the tv70 major comriunities and created a gulf between 
them is what is sought to be rerearched in this thesis. An attempt 
has been made to bring out the varied complexities in formint^ the 
problem of partition which appeared to be deriving from a variety 
of reasons and factors. 
Chapter I, entitled,'Pootr of the Partition Psychosis', deals 
with political and constitutional de'^ 'elopments up to 1913. The main 
events of this period are the Hindu and Musli^^ rcA'ivclism during the 
•thirst half of the nineteenth century, which accentuated their dif^^erenc 
The 1857 Revolt destroyed the Mughal d;^ Tiasty and the Hindus came in 
power and in office, while the Muslims suffered the British suppression, 
Sir Syed emerged as their deliverer. He ODOosed the joint electorate 
and the Congress, as he thought that the Muslims being in minority 
would be unable to v/in elections and wield influence in the legislative 
asse-rblies. This concertion and approach oave rise to the demand "f^or 
separate electorate, v/hich accelerate'^ the process of alienation 
between the two communities. 
An observation of the Hindu an-" ^ 'us]im leaderrhio reveals their 
patriotic viev; instead of their enemity to the .Mother India. But their 
tho-'^hts and action drifted by the rellaious and nolitical winds. 
The Muslim Leaoue came into being in 1906 and stood for the 
protection of the rights of the Muslims, v;hile the Congress claimed 
to represent all the Hindus and the 'Muslims and other minorities 
in India. The period between 18°2 and l'^ 13 vos vcw stormy due to 
the partition of Bengal. The Indian Council Act, 1909, granted 
separate electorate for Muslims in the Provincial Legislative Councils 
and reserved seats in thp Imperial Leaislative Council. The Conaress 
opDOsed it. In 1910, the Conaress and the leaaue leaders met at 
Allahabad and discusser" a number of problems of Hindu-Muslim contro-
versy, but no solution could be found. The Hindu-Muslim dif-Terences 
became more oronounced. The Muslims began to abuse the Hindus loudly 
in meetings and press. The All-Indif Hindu Sabha v/as established soon 
after the Conference. The Sabha begpn to convert the followers of 
Islam to Hinduism. On the other hand, the. "u-ll-ic founded Soci'-'tics 
of'Pering pan-Islamic solutions an'-'' ^ osterina communal consciousness. 
The Hindu an'^  Muslim organii.ational con^'lict and irreconciliatory 
attitudes backed by their communities isolatory stances strenathened 
the feeling that the Hindus an^ Muslims cnnnot live in a unitary state 
o-^ India and an idea of partition act germinated. 
Chapter II relates to'The Grov/th o-^  the Idea of Partition' 
d'-'ring 1914-1936. Various DolitiC''l de^'elopments and statements O"F 
leaders regarding the vivisection o"^  India sho\7'~. that the Hindu-Muslim 
differences deep-rooted the idea o-F r-n rtition. Tho Lurknov Fact, 1916, 
brought the Conaress and the Leanur' almost to a -Final settlement, 
but the Gove-'nr-ent's declaration in 1917 o-^  the gradual develo-oment 
of sel-F-govemment institutions an^ the Government o-F India Act, 1919, 
left the Pact pending. The Act -orovided for separate Muslim electorate' 
1'he Conaress demanded responsible aovernm,ent. Gandhiji at the Bombay 
Home Rule league meetina on October 3, 1920, proposed to secure 
complete Swaraj for India, '^he Moplah's rebellion in 1921, sharpened 
the Hindu-Muslim dif-^erences. Sx-'ami Shradiianand, released -^ rom the 
jail in December, 1922, started Shuddhi Movet-ient and Moonje launched 
Sangathan Movement and the Hindu Sabha was refounded as the Hindu 
Mahasab^na towards the end of 1922, to counter the Tabligh and Tanzim 
Movements. The Arya Samaj reconverted four and a hal:^  lakhs of 
Malakhana Rajputs and between 1<523 and 1927 about 112 major communal 
riots broke out. Gandhiji in May, 1924, said: "The Mussalman as rule 
is a bully and the Hirdu is a co'varrl", I'hicli ac^ r'or' ^ uel to tho fire 
of comfrunal entanglement. Jinnah joined and revived the Muslim 
leacue in 1925. Jinnah held a conference at Delhi on March 20, 1927, 
and agreed to foreqo the demand for separate electorate if his -rour 
demands were accepted. Jinnah opposed the Nehru Committee Re^^ort of 
August, 1928, which rejected tho Muslim league's demand for reserva-
tion of seats in the Punjab and Bengal. As th3 All-Parties Conferences 
failed to settle the Congress-Ieaaue dispute, Jinnah put fort'^ -ard 
his famous 14-point demand in March, 192"^. The League opposed the 
Civil Disobedience Movement launched by G^^ndhijl in 19 30, as it 
considered that it v^ ould be 'suicidal' to the Muslims. The Round 
Table Conferences (1929-1932) failed as the Hindus wanted their 
maioritv in some provinces with a strong centre, ^^ hile in certain 
other the Muslims wanted to dominate. During the RTCs, Pahmat Ali 
and Tqbal proclaimed th-^ i^r ideas o-^" Pakistan. The Government of India 
Act, 1935, recommended secaratp electorates for Mi^slims. Accordina 
to the Act, elections held in 1937, which shocked the Muslim Leaaue 
as they ha^ no ef-^ertive majorities. Therefore, they propospd an 
al]-India federation, that i^, the MUG]^m-majority states and the 
^'i'-du-majority s-etes j'--ned 1n a "cderation. Ho^'evei, th-- Conores? 
formed ministries in six orcvincos. "^ ho I eaoue made a prooaganda of 
Conaress atrocities to win favour of tho Muslims. The Second World 
War ensued in 1939. The Conaress-Leaaue differences became very ardent, 
Consequent to the Conaress minitries resignation in October, Jinnah 
observed the 'Day of Deliverance' in December, 1939, 
Chapter III deals with the 'Pakistan Resolution'. The Congress 
VJardha Session, 1939, demanded an independent country, democracy and 
the principle o-^  sel "-determination and re-^ u'^ od +-0 roonerate with 
t"he British war aims. There-^ore, the British took to an appeasement 
of the Muslim Leaaue. Takinr advantage of this British oosture, the 
League resolved that the British Government should not approve of any 
constitutional development v/ithout the consent of the Leaque. Jinnah 
raised the slogan, "Islam in danger" and at tho AIJH Session, 1940, 
read the famous resolution, v/hich demanded autonomous, sovereian and 
independent states in the Muslim majority regons in the north-v/estem 
and eastern zones in India. Jinnah advoc-ted his ' Tvro-^ •'ation theory'. 
T>^ e leaders expressed their views on tho rieman-^ . Miost notably, iMaster 
Tara Sinah at Luc'kno'-' on Anril 15, 1Q40, vmrned: "If the Muslim 
leccue wants to establish Pakistan, they vdl] have to pass through 
an ocean o-^  Sikh blood". The nev.'spaners ci^ lled it a Pakistan Resolution, 
though the demand novhere used the vord 'Pakistan'. 
With Dassaoe o-f time concent o"f Partition was gainina its 
S'Tpporters and c^oonents. Position o^ the British rulers lent further 
credibility to this debate. MUS1'''T, Le^ -^ -uP leadership had succeeded 
in mouldino the attitude of thp Colonial Power to its advantaao and 
in this sense shov.'ed a oroater ccm^etence to manoeuvre and tune its 
moves. Conaress appears to suf-^ er by comparison in this context all 
through the Pre-Fartition nolitic?:. 
Chapter IV describes 'The War and the Demand for Pakistan'/ 
during the period -^ rom 1937 to 194 2. The league membership from 
43,920 in 1938 increased to 3,30,000 in 1944. linlithcow reiterated 
that Dominion Status v:as the oorl of the British nolicy and aareed 
to give full weicht to the opinions of th^ ^ ninr^ritier. 'T'he Concress 
and the Hindu papers continued to denounce Jinnah for his intransiaence. 
In November, 1939, the Manzilgah riotc embittered communal relations 
in Punjab. The Arya Samajist instructed its volunteers to get a lathi 
and a knife for sel-^ -de-^ ence and were distributed short iron dandas. 
Cn the other hand, the Khaksars i"7ere organised in order to re-establish 
Muslim rule in India. Further, the Congress and thp> league did not 
change their policy. The constitutional impasse remained. The Conaress 
was aarinst the coalition ministries as an interim settlement during 
the Vlar. In November, 1939, Jinnah put forward five points before 
the Congress for an interim settlement, which widened the aulf between 
them. To break the r^olitical deadlock, Linlithgow, on August 8, 1940, 
issued a statement on 'India and the -^far', which declared that no 
constitutional development would be acceptable unless and until 
agreed to by the Muslim League. The Conaress being disappointed, 
launched the Civil Disobedience .Movement in November, 1940, v'hile 
Jinnah pushed the idpa of Pakistan deep into the Muslimi minds.Jinnah 
charaed that the Conaress objectivp '-'as to establish a Hindu °.aj . 
-'.oonje an~ Savarkar said that Musli-^s v.'ere like Je'-7S in Germany and 
should be treat'^ d^ as such. Jinnah apprelicnded t'nat th^ Congress aired 
c-t the domination ani destruction o"^  th.p Muslims in al] --/a^ s^. Based 
on these fears, Jinnah became more an^ ^ more determined to fight 
for Pakistan. Jinnah toured India for caininq support of Muslim masses 
for the creation of Pakistan. He said the Hindu Mahasabha, the All 
India Hindu I eaoue and the Liberation Federation v/ere minor offshoots 
of the Ccnc-ress. Meanwhile, Crlp-ps issued the 'Draft Declaration' 
in March, 194 2, saying that the Constituent Assembly could start 
with the declaration o"^  Inde-^en'^ence, giving the right tc the non-
acceding provinces to form their o'^ n Union v;ith complete sel-*^-govemment, 
while the Defence v-as to continue under the British control. But the 
Criprs Mission failed. An interesting, though loqical development of 
this ne-iod was Rajagopalachari's acceptance of the demand of Pakistan. 
Quit India Movem.ent failed due to oonosition of the Muslim League. 
Chapter V deals <^ath the 'Demand ^^ or Creation of Pakistan' from 
1°42 to 1944. Most of the Congress leaders were iporisoned. Rajaji 
renewed his plea for accertance of Pakistan, but neither the Leaaue 
nor the Congress, for their o^-m reasons, encouraged him. Gandhiji v.'as 
also arrested. Sikandar Hyat resicned from the League on May 29,1942, 
as he believed that the Leaoue' s demand '-'ould make the partition of 
Punjab inevitable. During the period o"^  I'^ ar, the breach betv:een the 
Congress and the Government v/as effectively exploited by the Muslim 
Leacue. In April, 1943, the Muslim majority -nrovinces - Assam, Sind, 
Bengal, NV'FP and Punjab - v:ere under control of the league. Jinnah 
said that he would be happy i-^  Gandhi ji I'ould like to have a settlement 
on the basis of the creation of Pakistan. However, the Congress in 
August, 1943, agreed to make some concessions to the League, v/hich 
could not satisfied the latter. Gandhiji was released from jail on 
February 22, 1944. VJhile in jail, Gandhi ji had expressed his full 
approval of Rajaji's formula, which conteined six clauses forming the 
basis for terms of settlement. Rajaji sent the formula to Jinnah on 
April 8, 1944. Jinnah rejected th^ -f^ ormula sayim^ "it offered a 
shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated and moth eaten Pakistan". 
Gandhiji on May 4, 1943, desired to have a face-to--^ace talk with 
Jinnah. Gandhiji re'fused to accept th= Lahore R''>co]ution and Jinnah 
demanded the division of India into two sovereign states - Pakistan 
and Hindustan. The proposal of R. Shiva Rao, Sacru formula and Desai-
Liao-uat Pact could not solve the communal nroblem. 
Chapter VI deals v;ith the 'V/avel] Plan and SirrJa Conference' . 
V7avel] called a rolitical conference at the Viceregal Lodge in 
Simla on June 25, 1945, attended ^y tventy-one invited leaders of 
different shades of ooinion. I.S. ATiery, tho Secretc^ r^ ' of State, 
on June 14, 1945, declared that the Viceroy v^-.r o;"^ -ov.'ered to nalce 
oroposals on coTiposition of interim Government in India. On June 27, 
1945, the Viceroy asked the Conoress to submit names for selection 
to the Executive Council. On the sane day, Jinnah demanded that the 
Council should constitute •f'ourteen members (5+54- 1 Sikh, 1 SC and 
2 others), vrhile the Congress cloined to nominate members of al] 
communities including the Muslims. The Viceroy felt that the Concress-
Leaaue con'"rontatJ on in the Council v.'ould not help to solve the 
oroblems. Due to Jinnah's terms, the Con-Perence failed. Azad and 
Rajaii held the learfuo resoonsible -^ or it. Jinnah stated that the 
lea'^ue's demand "^ or P=-kistan and t>^'^  Congress demand -^ or a united 
Indie were quite contradictory and Ilusalm.ans o^ India were determined 
to have Pakistan. Azad blamed the British for giving the loar-ue t^; 
pov/er of veto. 
By the end of December, 1945, elections held to the C'^ntral 
Legiclative Assembly. The Congress von an overwhelmina success in 
the General const: tu-^ncies, '--hile the Muslim I eaque v;on even/ ^ ''u^ l^im 
seat. Elections to the eleven Provincial legislatures lasted for 
three months. The Congress v7on 930 seats v.'ith ="'-'-o''^--^o majc-)ricy in 
eight pro\d.nces, '-'hile the league ca'n'-urer' 4 28 seats, vvhich indicates 
its increasing in-p] uence in Inr'ian nolitics. "eanwhile, the Delegation 
intr^rvieved eminent leaders. Mehru aqreed to the creation of Pakistan 
subject to plebiscite in bordei- districts to con'^irm it. Attlec's 
declaration on March 15, 1946, assured the Indians that the Inder-endenc--
O"^  India \'as certain. Attlee also made it clear that they cannot 
al]ow a minority to veto the advancement of the majority. All the 
oarties welcomed Attlee's declaration to send th'^  Cabinet Mission. 
Chapiter /^II explains the recommondatJ ons c^ " th."^  Cabinet 'lisrion 
and the Interim Government o"^  1*^ 46. '"h^ ^ Mission landed in Karachi on 
March 23, 1946, to -^ ind out means for transfer of power. In April, 
the Mission interviev/ed 742 leaders in 182 sittings. Azad sugnested 
a federation "with a limited number o^ comnulsory federal subjects 
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such as de-Fence, com-nunicat ions anr^ f o r e i a n a f - ^ a i r s , and a i i tononous 
p r o v i n c e s i n \ /h ich \ 'Onld v e s t th-= res-^ duar^^- p o w e r s " , Gandhi j i denounced 
f^^ t w o - n a t i o n t h e o r y an^^ daman"^ed •''or c r e a t i o n o-P P a k i s t a n . He 
s a i d t h a t J i n n a h s h o u l d be asked t o -^orm t h e f i r s t QOvernTient ^^ith 
t h e m i n i s t e r s ci-^osen ^rom a'^ '^^ ^ngst t'-^c e l rc tO '^ members of t h e l e a i s l a t u r e , 
J i n n a h propo'onded t h e tv70-nat ion t h e o r y and r e j e c t e d G a n d h i j i ' s 
o f f e r . Ambe'^kar o^nc^ed f^c -Pormation of a r o n - ^ r i t u ^ n r a s s e m b l y , v^hich 
v'ould be domina ted by ' " a s t e Hindus ann r l a i r r e d r o n s t i t u t i o n a l G u a r a n t e e 
•^or t h e SchP(' 'uled C a s t e s . J a g j i v a n "^ am s u o o o r t e d Dr . Ambedkar. G i a n i 
X a r t a r S ingh deman^^ed I l aa l i s i zan . M a s t e r "^ara S i n r h and Harnam S in ih 
demanded s e p a r a t e s t a i - e s -^or th<'^  S i k h s w i t h t h e r i g h t t o f e d e r a t e 
e i t h e r w i t h H i n d u s t a n o r P a k i s t a n , ^ a l d e v S inoh demanded a u n i t e d 
I n d i a w i t h 45'^ s e a t s t o Muslims anr^ t h e r e s t d i v i d e d betv/een t h e 
'^ indus and t h e S i k h s . J i n n a h o r - o r ^d t-h^ Union C e n t r e w i t h s u b j e c t s -
d e f e n c e , -Foreign a-^-^airs and communica-'-ion. The Government oooosed 
J i n n a h ' s demand f o r P ^ k i s t n i n c i J d i n c s i x --^rovirc'^'' -^ nd C e l ' ^ u t t a . 
Four r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s each of Cona re sc and t h " ] eanuc v e r ? m ^ ' i t e d by 
t h e Secr-~t::r^' o^ S t a t e a t S imla in " a y , 1945, b u t t h e t a l k s f a i l e d . 
Hence, t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e publ i she-^ h i s ovm sc'-eme on Mav I S , 1346, 
which i s kno^.Ti as t h e C a b i n e t M i s s i o n P l a n . 
The P lan r e j e c t e d t h e r-laim o^ rakis+-an and re-ommender' S h o r t -
t e rm and l o n g - t e r m p l a n s . The M i s s i o n announced t h a t i f any p a r t y d i d 
n o t a c c e p t t h e P l an of May 16, i t vou ld be e x c l u d e d from t h e I n t e r i m 
Government . The P l an a c c e p t e d t h ^ ^on'^r-^ss demand of a Uniter" I n d i a 
and t h e l e a g u e ' s dem^-nd o^ rompuli:oi"y a r o u ^ i n n n-r t h ^ i-^rovinres on 
'-om^'-'unal l i n e s . Gandhi j J wro t e t o ^ ' rep ' ' thi^ ^ r o u p s o"^  P r o v i n c e s an^ 
s a i d t h a t t h e C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly could n o t be a s o v e r e i g n bor 'y . 
J i n n a h compla ined t h a t t h e Mis s ion had n o t made t h e p r o v i s i o n f o r 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a comple t e sove ' -e ign s t a t e of P a k i s t a n and had s imply 
a p p e a s e d and p l a c a t e d t h e Congr-^s- . The C o n g r e s s members j o i n e d t h e 
I n t e r i m Government . ITehru, who become P r e s i d e n t i n Jxme, 1925, d e c l a r e d 
t h a t he har" e v e r y i n t e n t i o n o"^  mod i fy ing t h e P l a n . He s a i d t h a t t h e 
pr-Qblem of m i n o r i t i e s v/a^ d o m e s t i c . J i n n a h c r i t i c i s e d N e h r u ' s s t a t e m e n t 
and wi thdrev; from j o i n i n g t h e I n t e r i i ^ G o v c n m e n t a t "il"". '"fcrever, t h e 
l e a g u e j c n e d t h e I n t e r i m Co^'ernmi-^nt, b u t t h e M i s s i o n Ian f a i l e d . Menon 
'-iroposed t h a t fhe c o u n t r y s h o u l d be r l i ^ ided and sugr-es-^ed Dominion 
S t a t u s t o b o t h I n d i a a n ! P a k i s t a n . 
Chanter VIII outlines the t^olantbatten Plan and traces the 
principles of partition of India vhich had by nov; become an in thing. 
Churchill c-lled the Nehru Gove^nrrent a "comDlete disaster". In 
March, 1947, the C"-1C, in viev; o" oray o" murder and arson, reluctantly-
agreed to the division o~ Eenga] and Punjab to separate the v>re-
dominantly ;ius]irn part •f'rom thr^  non^Muslim part. On January ?0,1947, 
Attleo declared to ef-er^ t the trans-^er of power not later than 
June, 1948. In March, Lord Wavell vas replaced by Lord Mountbatten 
as Viceroy. Attlee made it clear that the British Government "cannot 
allovr a minority to place a veto on the advance of the majority". 
On March 22, Mountbatten reacherT rev Delhi. The Congress was demanding 
"Quit India" and the league proclaimed the watchword, "Divide and 
Quit". 
Mountbatten discussed the is-^ ue wi-^ h the Conaress and the 
league leaders, Mehru pleaded -^ or partition o-^  Bengal and Punjab, 
while Gandhiji opposed it. liamaat Ali said that in vie'-' of the extreme 
com^^unel strife there was no chance to implement the Cabine-^ Mission 
Plan. Dejectedly, he said that the league would acce'^ t even the Sind 
Desert -^ or a separate Muslim state instead of living in bondage to 
the Congress. Sardar Patel and Hehru agreed to the partition of India, 
hut Asad opposed it till last. Gandhiji sai^ to the Viceroy that 
Jinnah should be aiven the option o'^ -^ormino a i^^bjnet an^ "', i-f he 
rejects, the same of^er should be made to the Con''ress. In this case, 
Jinnah v/as to be<"ome Prime Minis-i-er. Mence, Nehru an--'' Patel impres^^ed 
uPon Gandhiji to v;ithdrav7 this of^er to the great disappointment of 
Azad. On April 8, Jinnah proposed to the Viceroy for accepting the 
demand for Pakistan and the spUtcinn of the Defence Forces. The 
Viceroy, on this principle, said that Punjab and Bengal should also 
be partitioned. Jinnah appealed to r'.ountbatten "not to destroy the 
unity of Bengal and the Punjab" and on April 9, appealed to him "not 
to give hin a moth-eaten" and "truncated" Pakistan. Jinnah also lost 
all hopes o-^  becom.ing F^ im.e Minister, eccording to the -n^ -oposal of 
Gandhiji. Thus, Jinnah's high hopes o-^  a grand Pakistan were raised 
to the around. 
In view of the dramatic c'-ange in the le^aue's attitude and 
the Congress accer^tance o^ Pakistan on April 11, Mountbatten devised 
a Plan, which divided the Legislative Assemblies of Punjab and Bengal 
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into t^ '^  parts: pre-dominantly Hindu areas and pre-dominantly MusJ im 
areas. On April 20, Nehru declared that the league should not ta\e 
away other r)arts of India v/hich do not wish to jodn Pakistan. Menon, 
aoorshensive o-^  I'arachi beconinc a bia TTS navol and air base, nrorosor= 
"Dominion Status ^or India'' instead o^ a "ron-^lecely indeT:^ endent 
sovereign State", "'eanvhile, Suhra^ '^ardy bea n to "-^ -nond ?"Un:ted 
Bengal", tlie Sikhs asriir-d for a ""hr-listan" and Pakhtoons for a 
"Pathan State" in T^VIF. Serious --cTiiTiunal outbreaks and inci-^ents o^ 
stabbing and arson continued durinn this period. The Muslim Leaaue 
continued civil disobedience. The Viceroy, therefore, decided to 
transfer power as soon as possible. Mountbatten revised his plan. 
The British Cabinet approved thr i-^lan v'i th some modifictions, that 
ir, to break up India into several units. Nehru resented as it could 
convert the major princely stat'^" into independent kingdoT'.s. ?le 
consi'^ erer' it an ourrinht favour to the lea^ 'U'^ , Hcever, tho Conaress 
r-nd the league ?aroed to Menon's dra'^ t "Agreement", v/hich advocated 
Dominion Status to India and Pakistan. Jinnah's demand for a Corridor 
to link West and 2ast Pakistan was strongly opposed by the Congres^. 
Mountbatten, on June 2, 1947, held a conference of seven top 
leaders of all the parties and gave them the draft of the Partition 
Flan, to which, they ultimately aareed. On June 3, Mountbatten 
broadcast the partition of India, followed by the Indian Irai^ers. Two 
Interim Governments with the Congress and the Leanue Mere created. 
Mountbatten was appointed Hovernor-G neral o"" Indi? and Jinnah of 
Pakistan. Mountbatten inauouratr-^ d the Dominion o-^  Pakistan on Auourt 
14, 1947, and the Dominion of India on August 15, 1947. As suocested 
by Jinnah,Radcliffe demarcated the boundary of India and Pakistan. 
Pakistan thus came into being as an embodiment of a social 
and '^oliticl ethos which obtained in Colonial part of Eritish India 
evolving in the wake of historical and nolitical developments in 
this country primarily in the rontext O-P its asniration -Fo^  "^reedom 
and the response thereto by the ^cl-inia] Fo^ -'er. The course O-P this 
national movement happened to be determined by rhe leadership- styles 
and organisational ter-h.niaues o^ th leaders of the freedom movement 
and response of the Muslim minority thereto came to be informed by 
their perception o^ historicnl past, of the prospects of their being 
accommodated by most o-^  the leaders o"^  National Movement an'^  '^ y the 
manoeuvres an-^  stance taken by ph^ British rulers vis-a-vis their 
aspirations. 
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As an episode of history of far-reaching implications, partition 
of Indian sub-continent occurred as a result of a series of complex 
and chaotic societal and political events and factors. Indian 
leadership could not gauge the depth of the problem of Hindu-Muslim 
differences and failed to foresee its far-reaching consequences and, 
therefore, develop effective response to cope v^ ith this problem. 
Constitutionalism, based on secularism and democracy, made the Hindus 
believe in ultimate and inevitable Hindu-majority government, v/hile 
the Muslims after the fall of the Mughal Empire, had still pangs and 
desire deriving from their 'ruler complex'. The power politics became 
the object of the parties - Congress and Muslim League, with a 
pronounced backdrop of religion, aiding comnxonalism. The comnunal 
ideas of Hindus and Muslim leaders paved the v.'ay for the politics of 
antagonism and alienation. The Hindus had a strong and the Muslims 
had a weak leadership. Gandhiji rebuked Jinnah and Nehru refused to 
cooperate with the League, Jinnah on his part did not agree in effect 
to any thing short of Pakistan, Jinnah may not be held solely respon-
sible for it. The Muslim politics had germinated the seeds way back 
in history. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the first Muslim Leader, led the 
Aligarh Movement, but failed to bring the Mussalmans to the same 
cultural level as the Hindus, In the twentieth century, Moham-nad Ali, 
the other Muslim leader of stature, propounded an ideology of an 
extreme type of l^ ullaism. Dr. I'.A. Ansari and Maulana Azad, the 
hundred per cent Congressmen, believed in secularism and democracy, 
but could not anticipate the force of partition psychosis as a reality. 
Dr. Mohammad Iqbal was not a "system builder". Although he had 
identified that 'the medieval spirit of Islam had rendered it useless 
to the modem man', he lacked the couraae 'to break with traditional 
Islam completely and accept the spirit of modem science and socialism' , 
The spectre of fear ot Hindu domination made the Muslims mad the 
Hindus did not make any serious effort to remove their apprehensions 
as a result riots in almost all parts or India broke out and became 
a recurring feature of our polity. 
In this tumultous political situation, Jinnah emerged as the 
only leader ot the Muslims, v:ho devoted his lite for their cause. In 
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his private/personal life he ^ 'es most secular of all Muslim leaders 
and v.'as least interested in Islamic theology. He believed in the 
principles of 'nationalism, democracy^ secularism and the unity 
of the country' . There v;as no fanaticism in his social or political 
lite. He also advocated that Muslims should separate religion from 
politics, Ke was supported by minor politicians - Khaliquezaman, 
Firoz Koon and i'azlul Haq etc. and v;as opposed by reactionary 
fanatic organizations - the Ahrars, the Khaksars and Maudoodi. The 
antagonism and hostility between the Congress and the League 
leadership caused Jinnah to demand a separate Muslim State i.e. 
Pakistan, 
This thesis is an attempt to discern the facts and their 
contexts with a view to go into the genesis of Partition objectively. 
It has been observed that the events had a certain inevitability 
and spontenity about themselves rooted into history, tradition and 
thriving upon ambitions and ego of leadership, manoeuvres of British 
rulers and compulsions of colonialism and l-iestemizatlon. Had the 
Congress taken a stem position vis-a-vis Hindu Mahasabha as they 
took against Maulana Abdul Bari, the leader of the Khilafat Movement, 
the course ot history might have been different. 
During the days of partition politics, it X'ras difficult for 
any author to write the history of those days. Whatever has been 
vrritten is not free from biased expression, Mountbatten avoided to 
write anything as he did not like to be cvirsed by India or Pakistan. 
'The evidence ot the partition period are available in the form of 
parliamentary and official/private records, party renorts,biographies, 
documents and speeches and contemporary publications. The most 
important are Mountbatten papers, which we have consulted from 
Manmath Nath Das, Partition and Independence of India. For other 
source material, the researcher consulted libraries in New Delhi 
and Aligarh. Fortnightly Reports, Home Political Files, Viceroy's 
Private Papers and their Microfilms were consulted at the National 
Archives of India; the Congress conferences proceedings and m.eetings 
records, Indian leaders papers v^ ere perused at the Nehru Memorial 
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HuseiJin and Library; Gandhian papers and collections vrere gone through 
at the Gandhi Memorial Museum and Library and at Gandhi Smarak 
foTindation; and a large number of books which v;ere not available in 
the Maulana Azad Library/ Aligarh, vrero studied at the Sapru House 
Library, Nev; Delhi, 
The books v;hich ve have extensively referred to include the 
• Memoirs and Autobiographies', such as, Khaliquzzaman's Pathway to 
Pakistan (vrhich v/as provided by Prof. M.K. Kidwai), Azad's India 
Wins Freedom, and writings ot Hali, Gandhi, Campbell-Johnson, 
P.N, Chopra and Ispahani. Among the documents and speeches consulted 
are the v/orks of Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Durga Das, Z, Paruqui, G,K.Gokhale, 
Ram Gopal, Gwyer and Appadorai, Jain, Jinnah, Kansergh and Lumby, 
Menon, Iqbal, Nehru, Pandey, Philips, Pyarelal, Sitaramayya,Tendulkar 
and Zaidi, The contemporary books and materials have also been 
consulted both at Delhi and Aligarh. These are mainly the records of 
Rahmat Ali, Banerjee, Coupland, Mushirul Haq, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, 
Syed Mahmud, Mehta, Noman, Kunshi, Rajendra Prasad, Darbara Singh etc. 
The secondary sources are numerous. The ones which have been found of 
pronoxinced utility are v/orks of Agarwalla, Aziz Ahmad, G. Allana, 
K,K, Aziz, Eamford, Hector Bolitho, Broomfield, Brown, Sandhya Chaudhri, 
D.C, Gupta, Hushirul Hasan, Siddiq Ali Khan, Wali Khan, Francis Low, 
Kajumdar, Kalhotra, Mehrotra, Pendarel Moon, !'!oore, Sharif Al Mujahid, 
J,J, Pal, Ishwari Prasad, Prasad and Subedar, Qadri, Matiur Rahman, 
Francis Robinson, Moin Shakir, L.A, Shert/ani, V,P, Singh, Spear, 
Tarachand, Hugh Tinker, Stanley Wolpert and Rafiq Zakaria. Besides 
these a nimiber of periodicals and ne^ 'sp^ pers have also been consulted 
for collection of the evidence. 
The approach of study is historical and analytical and a 
sincere effort has been made to unravel the complexity of the factors 
leading to partition. 
I am deeply indebted to Professor A.P, Sharma, my Supervisor 
and Teacher, for his fatherly treatment and sparing of his valuable 
time out of his very busy schedule for guiding this research. 
i v 
• I am a] so behol 'Vn to Prof^Gror A .^ . Us-nanl; Chairman, 
Department of P o l i t i c a l Sc ience , A]i'-'-ir]i misJim Univerr . i ty ,Al i - rarh , 
for p r o v i d i n g mc necesr^nrv' f a c i l i t i e r , for n u m n i n a t b i s r e sea rch 
work. 
I am very much indebted to rro^''-r,ro'- n.A.!^, Tlaqqi, Ex-Head, 
Department of P o l i t i c a l Sc ienc^ , A:'.'I, Ali-rr '^i, -Por h i s very k ind 
and generous adv ices and nrovi '^ ina mo S'-TTD ' '" ' ide] ines ^ 'h i l e '.writing 
t h i s t h e s i s , 
I'-Y thanks a r e a l so due to P r o ^ . ( : i r s . ) Kish^'ar Shabbi r Khan, 
Ex-Dean, F a c u l t y of Soc in l Sc i ences , Dr. (: ' iss) l a b n l Khanam, 
Dr. (Mrs.) Naheed I 'u r taza , Professor- Sh-'Ti rohamma \ P r o f e s s o r C.Hasan 
Ahmad, Dr.K.A. Nizam.i, Dr. I s h t i a ^ Ahnc"\ Dr . : ' .A. ! : i shore and 
Dr. B,, Rahamathulla of t he Denartmcnt o^ Po l i t i c^ . ] Sc i ence , for 
t h e i r encouraaement. 
I am equa l ly than^tf-'l t o th^^ sta-f^f o^ tho 5a r ru House l i b r a r y , 
t he Na t iona l Archives o-P I n d i a , t h e !''ohru T'emor'a] T'useum and L ib r a ry , 
t he Gandhi Smara^-, Jamia ! : i l ] i^- Ir,]nmia l i b r ' i r y and Zak i r Husain 
L ibra ry of Hev; Delhi , ^or t h e i r kind coo ro ra t l on d'^rinn the course 
of my v'ork in t h e s e l i b r a r i e s . 
riy o b l i g a t i o n s a r e due a l s o to I'r-^. and Hr. !Toman, Delh i , 
Mr. Abul Qasim, Seminar l i b r a r i a n , Depar^m'-'nt o" P o l i t i c a l Sc i ence ; 
Dr. Zaheer Ahmad Khan, Deputy L i b r a r i a n , '^r. J 'ashal lah ^:han '^arooqui, 
Mr. Akhtar A l i , r^r. Afzal Ahmad Sid^^iql and I r . r^ajid A l i of t h e 
Maulana Azad l i b r a n / , AH", A l i m r h ; ''r.s.H Sin^-rh, Sec t ion Off icer 
and Mr. S. Qamar riahdi. Dean 's Off ice , F a c u l t y o-^  Socia l S c i e n c e s ; 
and Hr. Mehboob Beq, Hr. Qamarudri^'n and !!r. Sulaiman o^ t h e Department 
of P o l i t i c a l Sc ience , AHH, A l i - r r h . 
I am deeply inr 'obtc^ t o "^ b r o t h e r r and s i s t e r s and e s p e c i a l l y 
to my beloved p a r e n t s ; Hr r . and Hr. Ha i^mood Hasan ITian and T ' r . S a r ' a t 
Al i Khan, ^'ho encnuranrri anr* surrorf-nd r e ^or t h i s s t udy . 
V 
I must thank I'r, Abdul Aleem Ansari, Senior Personal 
Assistant/ Dean's Office, Faculty of Science, AMU, Aliqarh, 
for excellent and precise typlna of the mapjuscript, 
February . 1989 (Miss) Syeda Sabiha Nazli Maqvi 
APPENDICES 
S.yo. Particulars Chapter/ Page 
Footnote 
I Salient Features of Scheme Outlined 
by Sikander Hyat Khsn in 1937 III/I6 445 
II Salient Features of Scheme Outlined 
by Syed Abdul latif of Hyderabad III/I6 447 
in 1939 
III Salient Features of the Aiigarh 
Scheme Proposed by Syed Zafrul 
Hasan and MoharuTad Afzul Hussain 
Qadri in 1939 III/I6 448 
IV Extract from M.A.Jinnah's 
Presidential Address at the Twenty-
seventh Annual Session of the All-
India Muslim League, Lahore, 
March 22-24, 1940. III/57 450 
V Kis Majesty's Government's Draft 
Declaration on the Future of IV /205 453 
India (March, 194 2) 
VI Cripps Mission Scheme(March,194 2) IV /235 455 
VII Resolution of the Muslim league 
Working Committee on the Draft 
Declaration Announced by Mr.Churchill, 
the British Prime Minister in the IV /254 457 
House of Commons on 11 April 194 2. 
VIII Resolution of the Mus]im Leaaue 
VJorking Committ-ee on the Connrnss 
'Quit India' Resolution of IV /297 460 
August 8, 1942(Aunust 20,1942) 
IX Suggested Points for Agreement 
between the Congress and the Muslim 
League Put Forward by the Cabinet VTi/43 462 T Mission (May 8, 1946 
X Terms Offered by the Muslim League VII/47 464 
as a Basis of Agreement (May 12,1946) 
XI Terms O-^ fered by the Congress as a 
Basis of Agreement (May 12,1946) 
XII The Cabinet 'Ussion Plan 
(May 16, 1946) 
XIII Proposal for the Immediate 
Transfer of Pov/er (June 3,1947) 
XIV Sir Cyril Radcliffe's Boundary 
Awards(August 12-13,1947) 
VI1/4 8 
VI1/49 
VTIl/182 
VII1/245 
465 
466 
474 
479 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AICC 
A I ! a 
AIKC 
AMUA 
BEITITR 
BNNR 
C - i n - C 
CKC 
CP 
cwc , 
EUP-
FR 
HE 
INA 
INC 
IbTCD 
IC 
LCA 
MAO 
MAR 
ML 
Nvrp 
NWFP 
PAR 
PP 
UPLC 
P o l ] . 
RTC 
UPS 
UPSA 
All India Congress Committee 
All India Muslim Leaoue 
All India Khilafat Committee 
Aligarh Muslim University Archives 
Report on Native Newspapers in Bengal 
Report on Native Newspapers in Bombay 
Commander-in-Chief 
Central Khilafat Committee 
Central Provinces 
Congress Working Committee 
European 
Fortnightly Report 
His/Her Excellency 
Indian National Army 
Indian National Congress 
Indian National Congress Document 
Legislative Council 
Archives of the Comm.issioner of Lucknow 
Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental 
Municipal Administretion Report 
Muslim League 
North-'-Testern Provinces 
North-'-rest Frontier Provinces 
Police Administration Report 
Parliamentary Papers 
Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council 
Political 
Round Table Conference 
Uttar Pradesh Secretariat Archives 
Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Lucknow 
CHAPTER I 
ROOTS OF PARTITION PSYCHOSIS 
(UP TO 1913) 
It is not vmusual that till date many politicians and scholars hold 
that the cause of partition of India was the direct consequence of the 
Congress-League confrontation. This logic can be explained in the background 
of the religious ^ and socio-political relations between the Hindus and the 
Muslims during the pre-partition davs. The causes of partition are spread 
over a span of centuries when the seeds of Hindu-Muslim feelings were sown 
by the rulers and the saints in distant history. The orthodox Hindus and 
the Muslims, spiritually attached with them, enshrined them In their mind 
and soul and expressed their preference wL th distinctive qualities of 
their religious leaders, rulers and saints, which sometimes engulfed the 
Hindus and the Muslims in communal riots resulting in disregard and hatred 
against each other. 
According to Dr. Tara Chand, the Aryans came to India-between 2,500 BC 
and 2000 BC. The Aryans' religious book, Ved, divided the Hindu community 
into four groups - Chatrl, Brahman, Vaish and Shudra, who prayed the idols 
of various gods and goddesses, while the Prophet Muhammad (570^63 2) gave 
Muslims the Holy Qur'an, which teaches that all Muslims are equal before 
God and only One God - the Almighty, should be worshipped. This basic 
difference between the Hindus and the Muslims had alwavs been a cause of 
strife between them. Despite religious difference, there was great coherence 
between the two communities and others. 
Coherence between Communities 
In the 19th century, the Europeans and Hindus might regard Aurangzeb 
as the orthodox and short-sighted ruler. Bipan Chandra's claim that he 
destroyed "many of the Hindu temples in the north", without instance, is 
baseless. He never ordered to dismiss Hindus from the Imperial service. 
His Chief Secretary (Peshkar) was Wali Khan, who was ver^ ;^  much liked by the 
Emperor. He never ordered to demolish any temple, as is charged. Original 
1. Dr. Tara Chand, Ahle-Hind Ki Mukhtasar Tareekh (Urdu), (Delhi: Union 
Printing Press, 1968), p. 56. 
2. Bipin Chandra, Modem India (New Delhi: NCERT, 1971), p. 10. 
farmans of Aurangzeb are available with the mahants of the temples of 
Someshwar Nath Mahadev, Mahakaleshwara (Ujjain), Balaji (Chitrakut), 
Umanand (Gauhati), Jangum Badi Shiv (Varanasi) and Shatranjia temples 
and temples of Abu in Gimar (Ahmadnagar) . He conferred jagirs on temples 
for puj^ and bhog. In fact, a Rani was dishonoured in a basement just below 
the statute of Ganesh. Hence, Aurangzeb ordered to move Lord Vishwanath 
(Varanasi) as the sacred precints were despoiled. 
Shivaji, who was refused •regional autonomy', is said to be a great 
enemy of Aurangzeb. All the historians have praised Shivaji for his 
generous religious policies towards the Muslims and the Holy Qur'an. He 
fought against Aurangzeb for certain rights - the right to collect Chauth 
and the right to mint his currency. Till his death, the Hindus, Muslims 
and Sikhs lived in perfect harmony in his territory. A Muslim saint Baba 
Yakut of Kalsi was his preceptor; Mulla Haider was his confidential 
Secretary; Ibrahim Khan Daulat Khan and Siddi Mlsri were his naval 
commanders. He bull; a mosque in front of his palace at Raigarn. 
It is alleged "Three thousand Brahmins committed suicide as Tipu 
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wanted to convert them forcibly into the fold of Islam", which is quite 
xmtrue. Professor Srikantia reported to B.N. Pandey that the episode is 
nowhere in the Mysore Gazetteer, from which the author had stated to have 
taken. The Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of Tippu Sultan were 
Brahmins, named Pumea and Krishna Rao respectively. The Sultan used to 
3. These farmans were issued from 1065 AH (1659) to 1091 (1685). Result 
of personal investigation by B.N. Pandey (M.P.) in collaboration with 
T.B. Sapru, as stated at a Seminar at Aligarh in March, 1981. See for 
details B.N. Pandey, Islam and Indian Culture, Part It The Confluence 
of Islam and Hinduism (Khuda Baksh Memorial Annual Lecture (Patna; 
December 19, 1985), (Cuttack: Orissa Government Press, 1985), p. 41. 
4. Qaumi Awaz (Delhi), March 27, 1988. 
5. B.N. Pandey, M.P., Seminar Lecture, n. 3. at the Department of Political 
Science, AMU, Aligarh, in March, 1981, organized by Prof.S.A.H.Haaqi, 
the then Head of the Department. 
6. O.P, Sharma, 'Shivaji: A Great Warrior', The Hindustan Times (New 
Delhi), April 8, 1986. 
7. Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Har Prashad Shastri, Head of the DepartJiient of 
Sanskrit, Calcutta Universitv, Calcutta (A Textbook of Historv), 
referred to by B.N. Pandey at the Seminar Lecture in March, 1981, 
n.3. 
pay annual grant to 156 temples, Tippu Sultan, as was customary with the 
rulers of Mysore, dally visited the temple of Lord Ranganatha located 
inside the fort of Srirangapatnam before taMng his breakfast. In fact. 
Prof. Srilcantia had based his information on the so-called "History of 
Mysore" by Col. Miles, who claimed to have translated his "Historv of 
Tipt>u Sultan" from a Persian manuscript which was said to be in the personal 
Q 
library of Queen Victoria, but there is no such manuscript in the Library. 
However, Dr. H.P. Shastri's book was put out of course by the Government. 
It is said that Muhammad bin Qasim (713-715) massacred all men 
(Hindus) above seventeen after capturing Debal to terrorise the populaee, 
which showed his cruelties. This is quite incorrect in view of the fact 
that he was supported by Buddhists, Jats, Merhs, Brahmins and Roval 
officials of Dahir. Actuallv, he gave religious freedom to all and 
protected the temples, and accorded full social equality and religious 
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toleration to all, 
Mahmud of Ghazni, who invaded Somnath with the help of Hindu mercena-
ries and officers, in 1025-1026, has defamed himself as Butshikan 
(destroyer of idol). He did so to correct money for building up a large 
central Asian empire. His real object was not proselytisation, but to 
achie-^ e military glory and acquisition of wealth. He ransacked the treasures 
of temples and idol-breaking as a part of contemporary warfare. However, 
Mahmud's fanaticism did much damage to Islam and left for Muslims an 
abiding hatred in the minds of the Hindus, 
Akbar's war at Haldighati against Rana Pratap was a battle between 
a Central Power and a Regional Power. It was not a battle between Islam 
and Hinduism. Akbar's army included also 40,000 Rajputs, and Rana Pratap's 
army was joined by contingents of Hakim Khan Sur and Taj Khan, the Pathan 
Raja of Jalaur. Further, while admirlng^Ashoka, the role of Akbar in 
1 ? 
creating "harmony between many different groups within his large empire" 
8. B.N. Pande'', n,3. Seminar Lecture. 
99. Tara Chand, n. 1, pp. 153-54. 
10. The Times of India (Sundary), November 30, 1986. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Tulsi Vatsal, A New Illustrated History of India (Delhi: Oxford 
University PreisT 1983) , p, 53. 
cannot be overlooked. 
The Sikhs say that Aurangzeb converted Sikhs to Islam, which is 
unfoundecl. In fact, Sikhism was founded by Guru Nanak (1465-1538) , Guru 
Angad and Guru Amardas had friendly relations with Akber. Guru Arjun, the 
Fifth Guru (1582-1607) wrote the Adi Granth. He helped Khusro against the 
Mughals, who killed him. Guru Hargobind (1606-1645) transformed the Sikhs 
into a militant community, made his own fort, opposed Jahangir and, hence, 
was arrested. When released, he went to live in mountains and died in 1644. 
His successor, Girdhar Roy was a friend of Dara Shikoh. After his death, 
his sons, Harkishan and Ram Roy fought for successorship. Later, Guru Tegh 
Bahadur in 1668 fought on the side of Mughal army in Bengal and Assam and 
when he revolted, he was executed in 1675. Guru Govind Singh, the Tenth 
and the last Guru (1664-1708), who was subdued by Aurangzeb, was appointed 
by Bahadur Shah in 1708 to war against Maratha, but he was killed by a Pathan 
at Nander. Guru Govind Singh's two sons were killed by decision of a Regional 
Council without influence of Aurangzeb and despite opposition of the Nawab 
of Malerkotla. The other two members were the Nawab of Sirhind and his 
15 Hindu Vazir Suchanand Khursidar. The whole affair was politically motivated 
and there was no religious prejudice. 
The above historical instances were adversely exploited by the politi-
cians in the 20th century. They did not expose the absolute equality 
between the Hindus and the Muslims during the reign of Muslim kings between 
the llth and the first half of the 20th centuries. The instances are so 
numerous that these cannot be encompassed within this limited study. 
Hindu Religious- Movements 
However, the differences between the Hindus and the Muslims were 
sharpened by the Hindu and Muslim religious movonents during the 19th century, 
The leaders of the Hindu religious movements were, among others: Ram Mohan 
13, Tara Chand, n. 1, p. 318. 
14. Ibid., p. 321. 
15. B.N. Pandey, n.3. Seminar Lecture. 
16, T.W, Arnold, Preaching of Islam t A History of Propagation of the 
Muslim Faith (Delhi: Renars"sance Publishing House, 2nd edn., 1913) . 
See also for contribution of Muslims to Arts and Sciences, Sir Thomas 
Arnold and A. Guillaijm, The Legacy of Islam (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 
1931). 
Roy, Debendranath Tagore, who initiated Brahmo Samaj in 184 3, Keshab 
Chandra Sen, who founded Sangat Sabha in 1860, Sure'^ dra Nath Banerjea, 
the uncrowned king of Bengal, Raj Narayan Bose (1826-99), who founded the 
Society for the promotion of Nationalist Peeling with the objective of 
"physical improvement of youth through Indian gymnastics, the developnent 
of Hindu music, medicine, Sanskrit language ..." and started Hindu Mela 
in 1867, and foijnded 'National Society' to popularise Indianisation; 
Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar (1820-91). 
Bankim Chandra Chatterji (1838-94) combined in his person nationa-
listic fervour and religious devotion. Religion for him was the instr\iment 
for the moral and political regeneration of society and it could not be 
separated from Utilitarianism. His motto was: "Patriotism is religion and 
religion is love for India". Ramakrishna Paramahansa (1836-86), who was 
brought into the fold of Islam by a sufi, saw in all forms of worship the 
adoration of One Supreme being. His disciple, Vivekananda, who vowed to 
devote his life to the propagation of Ramakrishna's Message" was in favour 
of political agitation, and the building up of a strong, brave and dvnamir 
nation. He wrote: "The only hope of India is from the masses. The upper 
1 R 
classes are physically and morally dead". He said that liberty in thought 
and action is the only condition of life, growth and well-being, and 
encouraged to achieve the independence. Vishnu Sastri Chiplunkar (d.l882) 
declared: "... the greatest evil of foreign rule is our moral degradation 
resulting from the loss of freedom. ... Our character is completely 
demoralised". But the attack of Dayanand (1824-83) on Christian and Muslim 
religions sharpened communal differences, and the Cow Protection Associa-
tion (1882), which carried on activities in an aggressive manner, offended 
Muslim theologians and their followers; consequently, Hindu-Muslim riots 
began to occur and created ill-will between the two communities, which 
lasted until the partition of India, 
Muslim Religious Movement 
There was no reformer or Muslim leadership during the first half of 
17. Tara Chand, History of Freedom Movement in India, Vol, I (Publication 
Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of 
India, 1957), p. 399. 
18. Ibid., p. 417. 
19. Ibid,, p. 420. 
the 20th century. Bahadur Shah Zafar was a petty ruler of the Red Port 
of Delhi and its neighbouring areas. All the Nawabs and Rajas had yielded 
to the British in one way or the other. All the Indian wealth was being 
drained to England through them. While the Nawabs had extravagent courts, 
the "Families, which had never before been outside the Zenana, us4d to 
go out at night and beg their bread" and "some warded off starvation by 
selling their shawls and trinkets". During this period of anarchy, the 
Muslim saints, who did some beneficial work for the Muslims were, among 
others: Shariatullah, who founded Faraidi Sect in 1804, and declared the 
British territories as Dar-ul-Harb; Syed Ahmad of Rae Bareilly, who in 
1820-21, led the Wahabi movement and preached the Muslims "to perform 
Hij rat or flight from the country governed by Mushriks", and also urged 
a crusade against the British, 
In short, both the Hindu and the Muslim reformists, in general, 
"realised that in a country of many races, languages, cultures and religions, 
a free Indian polity could only be built on the foxjndations of secularism", 
but the rulers and the Hindu conservative'revivalists, like Dayanand, 
nourished the commvinalism as a result the Hindus began to think and speak 
of Hindu nationalism and the Muslims of Islamic nationalism, encouraging 
the two-nation theory, but, in spite of the rise of communal forces, 
nationalism continued to develop through the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. 
Cbnstitutional Development (1773-1833) 
As the roots of the partition lay also in the struggle of the Hindus 
and the Muslims for achieving power through constitutional means, it would 
be worthwhile to mention, in brief, the foundations of reconstitutional 
reforms, which led to the election of members to Central and Provincial 
Legislative Council and Assemblies, 
After Lord Clive got the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa from 
Shah Alam in 1765, the British Parliament questioned the right of trading 
Company to acquire on its own accotint pcwers of territorial sovereignty. 
20. R.c. y^jumdar. The Sepov Mutiny and Revolt of 1B57 (Calcutta: Firma 
K.L.-Mukhopadhyay, 1957), p. 13. 
21. Ibid., p. 37. 
22. Tara Chand, n, 1, p. 428, 
According to Ilbert Report (1773) on the Indian Constitutional Reforms, 
"The Company's peril of bankruptcy was the immediate cause of Parliament's 
first intervention". Accordingly, the Government passed the Regulation 
A,ct of 177 3, which was the first landmark in the constitutional development 
of India. The Act gave the right of vote for the election of Directors 
of the Company to shareholders, and attempted at securing good government 
in the Company's territory in India. It opened the door to change and 
regulate the Government of India. The Judicature Act (l78l) recognised 
the right of Hindus and Mahomedans to be governed by their own laws and 
usages. Supporting the Fox India Bill (1783), which proposed to abolish 
the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors and to set up seven 
Commissioners or Directors, Burke described the Government of the Compajiy 
as "one of the most corrupt and destructive tyrannies that probably ever 
existed in the world". While the Fox India Bill ensured permanency of men, 
the Pitt's India Act (1784) meant a permanency of the system. The Charter 
Act (1793) of the Company, renewed in 1813, empowered the local Governments 
to impose taxes on persons and punish those who did not pay them* The 
Charter Act of 1833 brought about the legislative centralisation of India 
and made Tjniform laws for all persons in British India, A Commission had, 
however, to enquire and suggest laws keeping in view "the distinction of 
castes, differences of religion and the manners and opinion prevailing 
among different races and in different parts of the said territories". 
The Charter Act of 1853 alJowed the Provinces to send one representative 
each to the Central Legislative Council headed by the Governor-General and 
discussion of measures, which had already begun, was thrown open to public. 
Vacancies were to be filled up by competitive examination. The Act marked 
the beginning of a Parliamentary svstem in India. "Discussion became oral 
instead of in writing; bills were referred to Select Committees instead of 
to a single member; and legislative business was conducted in public 
instead of in secret". 
23. V.D, Mahajan, Modem Indian History; From 1707 to the Present Day 
(New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd., 16th edn., 1986), p. 248, 
24. Ibid., p. 256. 
25. Ibid., p. 263. 
26. Ibid., p, 265. 
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British Favour of the Muslims 
In 1835, Sir Charles Metcalfe took steps to free the Press, as a 
result between 1835 and 1857, more than a hundred papers saw the light 
of day, which covered almost every field of thought and action. The 
papers published the idea of Ram Mohan Roy, who "argued that the authority 
of the Government was derived from the people and that, therefore, the 
people had a right to participate in the fxmctioning of the Government, 
27 through a representative legislature". Ram Mohan followers organised 
meetings and submitted petitions and memorials for participating in Goverp. 
ment policies. But they were not being encouraged,as the British were 
patronising the Muslims to win their favour and they were mostly employed 
even though there was no dearth of Hindu educated people. In 1845, 13,699 
Hindus, 1,636 Muslims, 236 Christians, 1,789 students of other faiths 
totalling 17,350 were receiving instructions in institutions maintained 
at public expense in British India, As a result, the Muslims enjoyed 
position and power. In the subordinate judicial and executive services in 
U.P., in 1857, the Muslims were 202, Hindus 76 and others 38, 
The Great Revolt 
The revolt was due to political grievances, aqrarian discontent, 
economic gravity and religious frenzv. By the Inam Commission (1852), the 
British confiscated more than 20,000 estates, converted Indians en masse 
to Christianity, and made the traders and artisans suffer from unfair 
competition with the British interests causing the universal discontent 
and resentment. The English "regarded the Indians as barbarians, and the 
Christian Missionaries held in open contempt the idolatorous practices 
of the Hindus", The other grievances, according to Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, 
were the ill-treatment "more offensive to Muslims who for centuries past 
3 p have received special honour and enjoyed special immunities in Hindusthan". 
The Indians had realised the British determination of establishing their 
27. Ibid,, p. 264, 
28. Ibid,, p, 210. 
29. Agra Civil List, Report, Appendix VIII, 1916, VII, p. 604. 
30. See for details R.C, Majumdar, n, 20, pp. 16-20, 
31. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
32. Ibid., p. 22. 
rule in India permanently. They did not li)ce the foreign rule. The Rajas 
and Nawabs in the past, like Sirajuddaula of Bengal, Shah Alam of Delhi, 
Shujauddaula of Lucknow, Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan of Mysore, Sindhia of 
Gwalior, Bhonsle of Nagpur, Holkar of Indore, Chait Singh of Benaras, 
Wazir Ali of Avadh, and many others in the Southern India had realized 
the danger of British rule in India and had tried to overthrow the British 
but were defeated. 
The Muslims were particularly held responsible for the uprising 
because the sepoys from Meerut reached Delhi on May ll, 1857, and Bahadur 
Shah Zafar took the lead and was proclaimed Emperor^ while Bakht Khan 
led the forces of mutineers. In Lucknow, the Begum of Avadh and Maulvi 
Ahmadullah raised the standard of the Prophet, inspited the sepoys and 
beseiged Lawrence on the ;bank of the Gumti river in June, 1857, Further, 
the Nawab of Banda, Khan Bahadur Khan of Bareilly, Nawab Mahmud Khan of 
Nazibabad, Nawab of Faruckabad, Nawab Tafuzzal Husain Khan ot Sitapur, 
HikmatulJah of Fatehpur, Muhammad Hasan of Gorakhpur were the many others 
who plundered the Government treasure. The Hindu Rajas also like Nana 
Sahib of Kanpur, Rani of Jhansi, Kunwar Singh and Amer Singh of Jagdishpur 
(near Arrah), Rajas of Banpur and Shahgarh, Beni Madho of Azamgarh, Narpat 
Singh of Ruya, Tantia Topi, Rao Sahib and many Rajas fought against the 
British, but all were killed. 
British Hostility Towards Muslims 
The vThole brunt of the Revolt was laid by the British on the Muslims. 
A military officer who took part in the siege of Delhi writes: "The 
Mohammedans were generally hostile to us, the Hindoos much less 56".Sir 
Alfred Lyall said: "Put the whole rebellion down to the Muhammadans".Sir 
Syed Ahmad Khan indirectly also admitted It. This notion has come up in 
36 
view of Sir Syed's five proposal of the causes of the 1857 mutiny. Harry 
33. C, Raikes, Notes on the Revolt in the N.W. Provinces of India. (London; 
Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans and Brothers,1858), p,156. Also see 
Ashoka Mehta and Achyut Patvrardhan, The Communal Triangle in India 
(Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1942, 2nd rev.edn.), p^ r~86; for "the prime 
movers in the rebellion ... were Mussalmans". 
34. C, Raikes, Ibid., p. 156. 
35. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Causes of the Indian Mutiny (Benares: Medical 
Hall Press, 1873), p. 9, MAL 
36. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Asbab-e-Baghawat-e-Hind (Urdu), Foreword by 
Dr. Abul Lais Siddiqi (Karachi: Urdu Academy, Mission Road, 1957), 
pp. 117-203. 
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Johnstone observed that the Great Revolt was a "definite attempt by the 
Muslims to establish a Muslim empire at the expense of Englishmen and 
the Hindis". Therefore, the British began to treat the Muslims as funda-
mentally hostile to them and adopted a policy meant to reconclllate the 
Hindus. The'Muslims lost all their pride and position and the Hindus, who 
38 
previously "stood in awe of them", consequently, "dropped their courtesy 
also". T^ey joined the Arya Samaj and decried against cow-slaughter and 
promulgated ' Suddhi Movement', which became almost a chronic feud betvreen 
the Hindus and the Muslims and riots began to occur in different parts of 
India from time to time. Sir Syed said: "If the giving up of cow-slaughter 
will establish amity and friendliness among Hindus and Musalmans, then 
40 please do not sacrifice cows". 
However, the Hindus demanded recognition of Hindi as the second 
official language of the then N.W.P.(now U.P.) and to replace Urdu by Hindi 
and the Arabic script by Nagri. For the Hindus, the Nagri script had a 
religious significance, in which Sanskrit was written and for Muslims Urdu 
was better being in Arabic script. Sir Syed's proposal to establish a 
'Vernacular University' made the Hindus think that Hindi rather than Urdu 
was their real vernacular. Raja Jai Kishen Das, the acting Secretary of 
the Aligarh Scientific Society, who campaigned for the establishment of 
a Sanskrit University, resigned from the Aligarh Scientific Society and 
43 
became Secretarv of the Indian Sanskrit Association at Hathras, By 1863, 
44 there were 23 Urdu newspapers and 4 Hindi papers, but after the Hindus sent 
Memorial to the Government to introduce Nagri as the court script and they 
agitated vigorously for it, a string of Hindi newspapers came up. Thus,the 
Hindi-Urdu question contributed much to the growth of communal politics. 
On the other hand, as the Muslims were heavily crushed by the British, 
with the deterioration of their economic position, there v/as a downfall in 
37. Mohammad Noman, Muslim India; Rise and Growth of the All-India Muslim 
League (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1942), p. 23. 
38. R.M. Sayani, Presidential Address, 1896. 
39. Ibid. 
40. S i r Syed Ahmad Khan, Akhir i Mazamin (ed. Moulvis Imam-ud-Din and Ahmad 
Babu Makhdiimi), (Lahore: Mansur P r e s s , 2nd edn . , 1924), p . 70 . 
4 1 . R.C, Majumdar, n , 20, p . 434. See a l s o Ashok Mehta and Achyut 
Patwardhan, n , 33, p . 87 . 
42 . A l iga rh I n s t i t u t e Gazet te (Al iga rh ) , A p r i l 23, 1869; Apr i l 30, 1869. 
4 3 . F ranc i s Robinson, Separat ism Among Indian Muslims: The P o l i t i c s of the 
United Provinces Muslims, 1860-1923(Delhi: Vikas Pub l i sh ing House,1975). 
44 . MWP Admin is t ra t ion Report , 1862-63, p . 9 1 . 
11 
Muslim education also. The Muslims were gradually ousted from their 
lands and the Hindus came into lands and offices. The exultation of 
Hindus knew no bounds and they trod upon their heels of their former 
masters (Muslims), because they Muslim power had diminished, 
FuFther, the Muslims were orthodox in religion. Shah Wali Ullah 
persuaded the Muslims to lead a life in accordance with the Qur'an and 
Hadith, to acquire their lost position, as a result the Muslims hated 
to learn English and they fell behind the Hindus in education, economic 
condition and political knowledge. 
Constitutional Development (1853-59) 
The Charter Act of 1853 did not associate any Indian element with 
the Legislative Council. The Government had lack of knowledge of local 
conditions outside Bengal for making laws for other provinces, "The 
terrible events of the Mutiny brought home to men's minds the dangers 
arising from the entire exclusion of Indians from association with the 
45 legislation of the country". The Legislative Council developed into an 
Anglo-Indian House of Commons, questioning the Executive and its acts, 
forcing it to lay even confidential papers before it and refusing to pass 
any legislation required by the Court of Directors before 1858,Meanwhile, 
there was a lot of agitation in England against the continuation of the 
Company's rule in India, which objective was profit and not to administer 
a sub-continent like India. Therefore, the British Government decided to 
abolish the East India Company and in spite of its opposition, the Act 
was passed by the Parliament in 1958. 
The Government of India Act (1858) 
The Act declared that henceforth "India shall be governed by and 
46 in the name of the Queen". The Government of India was to be carried on 
by the Viceroy on behalf of the Queen, The powers of the Board of Control 
and the Court of Directors (abolished) were given to the Secretary of 
State for India and his Indian Council, Rules and regulations made in India 
or by the Secretary of State were to be placed before the House of Commons. 
The Governor-General and the Governors of the Presidencies were to be 
45, V.D. Mahajan, n. 23, pp. 265-66. 
46, Ibid,, p. 266, 
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appointed by the Crown. The Secretary of State for India took the place 
of President of the Board of Control and the India Council took the place 
of the Court of Directors. Thus, the Secretary of State exercised his 
large powers without any control. 
Queen's Proclamation (1858) 
On November 1, 1858/ Lord Canning held a Darbar at Allahabad and 
read out the Queen's Proclamation assum.ing the Government of India by 
the Crown, which, more importantly, placed the Indians on an equality 
with the subjects of the British Crown,assured the Princes that their 
territories will not be annexed by the British, ordered not to interfere 
in the religious affairs of the Indians, and envisaged that in framing 
and administering law, due regard would be shown to the customs, ancient 
rites and usages of the Indians. This policy remained the basis of Indian 
administration up to 1917, when a new declaration was made. The Proclama-
tion sealed the unity of Indian Government and opened a new era. 
The Proclamation encouraged the Indians to send their sons to 
England for higher education. The Rajas, Nawabs, Diwans and big businessmen 
anticipated bright future and prospects in the field of country's political 
development. They mainly embarked upon their stud^ '^  of the law in prepara-
tion for a political career. The earliest leaders emerged were Justice 
Badruddin Tyabji (1844-1906), Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-98), Sarojini 
Naidu (1879-1949), Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), Sir Pherozeshah Mehta 
(1845-1915), Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915), Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-
1920), Bipin Chandra Pal (1858-193 2), Lala Lajpat Rai (1865-19 28), 
Surendranath Banerjea (1848-1926), Satyndra P. Sinha (1864-1928),Mrs.Annie 
Besant (1847-1933), Bankimchandra Chatterji (1838-1894), Rash Behari Ghose 
(1845-1921), S. Subramania Iyer (1842-1924), Ram Mohun Roy (1772-1633), 
Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869-1948), M.A. Jlnnah (1876-1948), Bhupendra Nath 
Basu (1859-1924), Mazahar-ul-Hague (1866-1921), C.R. Das (1870-1925), 
W.C. Bonnerjee (1844-1906), Maulana Hasrat Mohani (1875-1951), B.C. Pal 
(1858-1932) and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875-1949) and others, most of 
whom were either educated in England or visited the country and very much 
influenced by the political upsurge in different comers of the world , 
were determined to fight for India's independence. The persons, who took 
the lead, were M.K. Gandhi and M.A. Jinnah, who represented their own 
co-religionists and worked for the safeguard of the interest of their own 
communities. 
13 
Indian Councils Act^ 1861 
The Act helped the Governor-General to associate non-official 
Indians for purposes of legislation and, thus, it began the representative 
institutions and legislative devolution in India. 
As Sir Charles Wood proposed, the Governor-General had to summon, 
in addition to the ordinary members of the legislative Coxoncil "not less 
47 than six nor more than twelve additional members"; one-half did not hold 
office under the Government and were either Europeans, persons of European 
extraction or Natives. Sir Bartle Frere observed in 1860, that the purpose 
of addition of the native element was to learn what the natives think of 
the British measures and how the native community would be affected by 
them. But these non-official members of the Council were nominated by the 
Viceroy and "not elected" by the people. They were either the Indian 
princes or their Diwans, big Zamindars or retired officials. As the powers 
of the Legislative Councils were very much restricted, they had least 
interest in the meetings. Further, as the non-official members had no say 
in the matter, the system failed, but it made the beginning of representa-
tive institutions. Moreover, as the Act vested legislative powers to the 
Governments of Bombay and Madras and made provisions for the institution 
of similar legislative Councils in other provinces, it laid the foundation 
of the policy of legislative devolution which, in 1937, resulted in the 
grant of almost complete internal autonomy to the provinces leading to 
the partition of India. 
Political BacTcwardness of Muslims 
Due to advancement in education, Hindus were much advanced and 
"... In this vast country no progress is possible unless both Hindus and 
48 Mahomedans Join hands together". Political independence was one of the 
.JPirst objective*- o£;Dayanandaj, Indeed^he' was ,the f4.rsk;man^ „jtP-s,use4!^ l:\e 
term Swaraj, he was the first to Insist on people using only Swadeshi' 
things manufactured in India and to discard foreign things. He was the 
first to recognise Hindi as the national language of India". Keshab 
47. V.P, Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Delhi etc.: Orient 
Longmans, 1957), p, 4. ~~ 
48. Tara Chand, n. 17, p. 224, 
49. R,C. Majumdar, The History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol,I 
(Calcutta: Firma K.L, Mukhopadhyay, 1972), p. 298, 
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Chandra Sen and his followers "openly proclaimed loyalty to the British 
Government as an article of the creed of his Churcn", as a result Keshab 
was lionised both in India and England, On the other hand, Muslims were 
qiiite ignorant of politics due to illiteracy. "Bliint had a talk with 
Maulvi, A.M., "The Maulvis of Calcutta were terribly ignorant of politics, 
and of all that was going on in the world. At the time of the Egyptian 
War (1881-82), they had not known whether Egvpt lay North or South or 
East or West". 
Emergence of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan 
In the seventies of the nineteenth century, the Hindus developed 
political ideas and ambition and the Government scented danger and began 
to favour the Muslims. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan exploited this situation and 
emerged as the saviour of the Muslims. As a Munsif in Bijnor, he had 
saved the life of British people during the Mutiny, He had held the 
Government responsible for the uprising in his pamphlet. The Causes of 
the Indian Revolt, and had demanded that the Indians should be admitted 
to the Legislative Council to remove the misconceptions of the British 
Government. He knew that the British could not be driven by sword, but 
by political emancipation. Therefore, his motto was "Educate, educate, 
educate". He believed that "All socio-political diseases of India may ... 
be cured by this treatment". Therefore, he adopted the policy of Keshab 
Chandra Sen and extracted as much benefit as possible from the Government 
for the Muslims. He founded the Scientific Society at Ghazipur City in 
1864. He was transferred to Aligarh in April, 1864, where he founded 
The Aligarh Institute Gazette. In 1869 and 1870, Sir Syed visited England. 
In 1875, he set up an independent small school at Aligarh, which a couple 
of years later was named as Muhammadan Anglo-OrientaJ College. In Tahzibul 
Akhlaq, foxinded in 1870, he advocated that Western learning was compatible 
with Islam and progress. On account of this he was opposed by ulema and 
was called dehriya (materialist) if not a heretic. Sir Syed, however, won 
sympathy of the British and the Muslims began to progress educationally 
and economically. 
50. Ibid., p. 293. 
51. Ibid,, p. 418, 
5 2, G.F.I, Graham, The Life and Works of Syed Ahmad Khan (London: Blackwood, 
1885), p. 48. 
53, Sir Syed Ahmad*s speech on the occasion of laying the foundation of 
the New Ghazipur College, RDPI (NWP, 1863-64, Appendix B),MAL/AMUA. 
This College now exists as 'Chashma-i-Rahmat Oriental College", where 
some documents of Sir Syed were available unutilised. 
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Sir Syed, kniqhted himself in 1870, devoted his mature li^e to 
the British Empire and was appointed by the Viceroy to his Imperial 
Legislative Council. Prom this powerful platform. Sir Syed, in 1883, 
argued against "the introduction of the principles of election, pure 
and simple" into the body politic of "India, where caste distinctions 
still flourish, where there is no fusion of the various races, where 
religious distinctions are still violeni t^' 
Sir Syed's Opposition to the INC 
In 1885, the Indian National Congress, fotonded at the Gokuldas 
Tejpal Sanskrit College, Bombay, claimed to represent all the Indians. 
The cow protection movement and Hindi-Urdu controversy strengthened 
doubts and apprehensions of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, who opposed the Congress, 
which, he opined, if successful, would lead in the Councils, while the 
Muslims would have a small chance of securing seats in them. Therefore, 
Sir Syed, who was once a great advocate of Hinda-Muslim unity and treated 
them as two eyes of a beautiful bride, was much dejected to observe that 
"the two communities would not be able to participate in any work with 
a sincere heart". Therefore, he preferred to side with the Government 
so that maximxam benefit could be derived for the College and for the 
uplift of the Muslims. 
To counter the effect of the Congress, Sir Syed, in 1886, founded 
the Muhammadan Educational Congress with the aim "to discourage popular 
political agitation among Mahometans", In 1890, its name was changed to 
"Muhammadan Educational Conference" and in 1895, to "Muhammaden Anqlo-
57 
Oriental Educational Conference". Sir Syed aimed to educate the Muslims 
54. G, Allana (ed,), Pakistan Movement: Historical Docxments (Karachi: 
Department of International Relations,University of Karachi,1967),p.1. 
55. Altaf Husain Hali, Hayat-i-^awaid (Urdu),(Lahore: Lahore Academy, 
1957), p. 142. 
56. Rules of the Defence Association, Rule No. 2(ii), enclosed in 
T. Beck to H.S. Fowler, Secretary of State for India, January 2,1885, 
L/P&J/6/110, 1895, lOR. 
57. M.S, Jain, The Aliqarh Movement; Its Origin and Development, 1858-1906 
(Agra: Sri Ram Mehra & Co., 1965), p. 79. The Conference s t m 
exists and its office is located at the Sultan Jehan Man2il,AMU, 
Aligarh. At the same time the Duty Society came into existence to 
assist Sir Syed in his great endeavour of spreading modem liberal 
education amongst Indians in general and Muslims in particular. 
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as many and as early as possible so that they may join the Congress 
in the struggle for independence or may, in future, fiqht for the 
safeguard of the interest of the Muslims jn India, 
Sir Syed realized that the traditional social order needed to be 
broken down in order to permit men to build their own destiny. He, as 
58 
a votary of secularism and unity, observed: 
"So long as religion and caste are the chief props of the Indian 
social system electoral machinery based upon the western pattern 
would lead neither to equality nor to fraternitv. It would enable 
the more advanced sections of the population to hold their less 
fortunate countrymen in tradition. Cultural differences, caste 
dimensions and religious wrangliness would be more pronounced 
than ever. Inequalities would sink deeper into the structure 
of Society". 
Sir Syed opened his political campaign against the Congress on 
December 28, 1887, with a speech in the Kaiserbagh Baradari in Lucknow. 
He said: 
"The Congress is in reality a civil war without arms. The object 
of civil war is to determine in whose hands the rule of the 
country shall rest. The object of the promoters of the National 
Congress is that the Government of India should be English in 
name only, and that the internal rule of the country should be 
entirely in their own hands". 
Joint and Separate Electorate 
Beck, the Principal of the N5A,0 College, Aligarh, took Sir Syed 
under his influence and founded the United Indian Patriotic Association 
at Aligarh in 1888, including big Hindu and Muslim landholders, and 
opened its branches in England. Its main objective was to persuade the 
British that the Congress demands were unrepresentative. In 1889, Charles 
Braudleugh moved a Bill in the British Parliament for the establishment 
of a responsible government in India and, on behalf of the Congress, 
recommended joint electorate. Beck got signed a representation from 20,735 
58. V.S. Rekhi, 'A.M.U.: Retrospect and Prospect: Vision of Sir Syed', 
Duty Sdciety, A.M,U., Aligarh, Souvenir, 1986, 
59. Syed Ahmad Khan, On the Present State of Indian Politics (Allahabad: 
Frontier Press, 1888), p. 27. " —— 
60. Zafar-ul-Islam,'Documents on Indo-Muslim Politics (1857-1947): The 
Aligarh Political Activities(1888-1893)', Journal of the Pakistan 
Historical Society, XII, Part I, January, 1964, pp. 17-18, 
61. I. Prasad and S.K. Subedar, Hindu-Muslim Problems(Allahabad; Chuge 
Publications, 1974), p. 15. 
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Muslims with the help of the College students and sent the same to the 
62 
British Parliament in 1890^ urging for separate electorate. In 1892/ 
Coxincil Reforms were granted and/ consequently, the United Indian 
Patriotic Association was abandoned. 
Since the Muslims "did not have any political bodv to voice their 
63 
needs and aspirations"/ Sir Syed came forward to, at least, brino about 
some degree of solidarity among the disintegrated masses of Mohammedan 
society. He denounced the "aims and objects" of the Congress, charging 
that it was "based unon iqnoranee of his+-ory and present-day realities; 
they do not take into consideration that India is inhabited by different 
nationalities; they presuppose that the Muslims like the Marhattas, the 
Brahmins, the Kahatrivas ... can all be treated alike and all of them 
64 belong to the same nation". This v/as the earliest articulation of the 
two-nation theory/ which became the ideological basis for Pakistan. 
Indian Councils Act, 1892 
This Act gave opportunities to the members o£ the Council to indulge 
in a full/ free and fair criticism of the financial policy of the Govern-
ment/ to address questions to the Government on matters of public interest, 
to elect non-official members through elections/ as pressurised by -t-he 
Indian National Congress, although the m<^mbers so elected could take 
their seats only after being nominated by the Government. Of the 24 
members at the Centre, 14 v;ere officials, 4 were elected non-officials 
and 5 were nominated non-officials. The non-official members could not 
ask supplementary questions. The rules of election were unfair. In Bombav, 
of the 6 seats, 2 were given to the European merchants, but nothing vas 
given to the Indian merchants. Similarly, 2 seats were given to Sind, but 
nothing was given to Poona and Satara. According to Gokhale, of the 8 
seats given to the Bombay Presidency, 2 seats were given to the University 
of Bombay and Bombay Municipal Corporation, 2 seats to the European 
Merchantile commvmity, one to the Sirdars of Deccan, one to the Zamindars 
6 2 . I b i d . 
6 3 . Mo in Shakir , K h i l a f a t to P a r t i t i o n : A Survev of _maj_qr p q l i t i c a j . 
t r e n d s among Indian"Muslims dur ing 1919-194T~TNew"Delhi: Ajanta 
P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1983), p . 26. 
6 4 . G. A l l a n a , n . 54, T5. 3 , 
18 
of Sind and"2 seats to the general public". Thus, the public represen-
tation was almost negative, S.N, Banerjee, in his Poona Presidential 
Address in 1895, demanded increase in the number of elected members, 
and removal of restrictions in putting questions, which defeated the 
very pumoso of a beneficial legislation. Under the circumstances, the 
debates in the legislatures were a mere formal ceremony. Sir Barnes 
Peacoc>: criticised that "instead of being a high and honourable office, 
it was one which no man, who had a regard for his own honour and indepen-
dence, consent to hold" and "would rather resigft ,..", In 1893, Dadabhai 
Naoroji at the Lahore Session, said that \mder the Act of 1892, "we are 
to all intents and purposes under an arbitrary rule". W.C. Banerjee 
taking a strong view declared: "V7e must go on with our agitation and not 
stop until we get what we all think and we all believe that what we have 
a right to get". The Act though aave right to discuss budget, but gave 
no right to vote, M.M, Malaviya observed that l-he Indians were left 
without any real voice in the administration. However, as the Act conceded 
to the Congress demand i.e. the principle of election and some control 
of the Legislative Councils over the Executive, it cautioned the Muslims, 
who, disappointedly, decided to "devise measure to secure their full 
fi8 
share in the constitutional reforms". 
Reaction of the Muslims 
Now Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was of eighty and Beck was the chief 
organiser of the College, In 1896, the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental Defence 
69 Association of Upper India demanded separate communal electorate i.e. 
Muslims voting for Muslims. Syed Ahmad died in 1898 and Beck in the 
following year. After them, Syed Ahmad's followers - Syed Mahmud, 
Samiullah Khan, Nazir Ahmad, Zakaullah, Chiragh Ali, Shibli, Hali, 
Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqar-ul-xMulk formed a nucleus of Muslim leadership. 
Government's special concession to the College encouraged them to operate 
in politics for Muslims as a result the Congress stood against them. 
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The Muslims demanded equal number of seats for Hindus and Muslims 
in the legislative councils and in the towns where Muslims comprised 
one-fourth or more of the population, because, in 1890 elections based 
on joint electorate, the Muslim candidates were defeated in Kanpur and 
Meerut. The Najmul Akhbar wrote: Hence, "it v/ill be perceived that if the 
elective system was extended to the legislative Council/ an entire 
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exclusion of Muslims from the Councils would follow". The Muslims realized 
that there would be five Hindus to every single Muslim in the Imperial 
or Provincial assemblies as a result nobody would ever pay heed to them. 
Stuck to this belief and logic, the Muslims boycotted the Poona City 
Mxinicipality elections in 1895, as even not a single Muslim candidate was 
sure to win. The Congress leaders, like Tilak, Pal, Malaviva and Lajpat 
Rai, were not agreeable to leave any quarter for the Muslims and, being 
confident of their domination on the Indian politics, they openly identi-
fied their nationalism with Hinduism and associated themselves with the 
72 
cow protection societies, which affected the Congress position so much 
that Tyabji felt dejected and frustrated. 
Emergence of Jinnah 
When Sir Syed was speaking,in 1893, of Hindus and Muslims as 
"different nationalities", Jinnah was a fellow barrister of Bombav's High 
Court. A contemporary Bombay advocate noted that Jinnah was "a great 
pleader. He had a sixth sense: he could see around corners. That is where 
his talents lay ... he was a very clear thinker ... But he drove his 
points home - points chosen with exquisite selection - slow delivery, 
word by word". Jinnah's heroes were Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), the 
Grand Old Man of national politics, and Sir Pherozeshah Mehta (1845-1915), 
the'Parsi "Uncrowned King of Bombay". In 1890, Mehta labelled the "supposed 
rivalry" between Hindus and Muslims nothing more than "a convenient decoy 
70. Najmul Akhbar (Etawah), March 24, 1890. See also Jubilee Paper 
(Lucknow) , April 1, 1890; Azad (Lucknow), April 1, 1890; Mihlr-i-
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75 to distract attention and to defer the day of reform", Jinnah attended 
for the first time the 20th session of the Congress in December, 1904, 
in Bombay, presided over by Mehta, who proposed to send Jinnah and Gopal 
Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915) to London, Jinnah admired and was impressed 
by Gokhale's wisdom, fairness and moderation, and became "the Muslim 
Gokhali". 
Jinnah involved in politics, fired with the liberty-loving ideals 
of British literature, depressing condition of Indians, unemployment, 
political dependence and abysmal poverty. The partition of Bengal,in 
1905, led violent anti-partition agitation, spread fires of national 
protest, boycotted British goods, heralded anti-government speeches 
and activated actions of Bengal's revolutionaries. The Congress new 
anthem, Bande Mataram (Hail to Thee, Mother) politicized millions of 
Indians, who were untouched by political demands. Jinnah was through 
77 
personally impressed, but he "voiced no traceable reaction". 
Partition of Bengyal (1905) 
Fuller, exploiting the conflict between the Hindus and Muslims, 
adopted the policy of 'Divide and Rule'. Fuller's policy was followed by 
Lord Curzon, who induced the Nawab SaUmullah of Dacca, in 1904, "to 
declare himself in favour of the Partition" of Bengal, while a few members 
of the Nawab family opposed the partition and the Muslims joined the 
Bande Mataram song and carried Bande Mataram flags. The shouts of Bande 
Mataram and Allah-o-Akbar intermingled at meetings addressed by Hindu 
leaders. However, the group of Muslims led by Nawab SalimuHah intensified 
the anti-Partition and Boycott movement in East Bengal, which culminated 
in a series of communal riots - the most serious were at Comila and 
Jamalpur. Under these circumstances, the Congress backed the Hindus of 
East Bengal for annulment of the Partition and supported the Swadeshi 
Movement. The Muslims to counter their effect, founded the Muslim League. 
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Hindi-Urdu Controversy 
As the Hindus were demanding replacement of the Persian script by 
Nagri/-a-Nagri resolution on April 18, 1900, was passed, which cautioned 
the Muslims and Mohsin-ul-Mulk organised the Urdu Defence Association 
and at a meeting,presided over by Nawab of Chhatari, it was resolved to 
send a memorial to the Lieutenant-Governor. Karamat Husain (Allahabad), 
Hamid Ali Khan (Lucknow), Nawab Fateh All Khan Qizalbash (Lahore) held 
meetings. Kavasths and Kashmiri Brahmins joined the Muslims and a conference 
was held attended by 400 delegates including Muslim Congressmen, Pandit 
Amar Nath and Pandit Kedar Nath launched protest movement against Hindi 
in Allahabad and Benaras, as they had to lose much from the upgrading of 
81 
Nagri as the Muslims, 
During 1903 and 1906, the"Hindus began to try to eliminate all words 
of Persian or Arabic origin", Butler remarked. He criticised that "our 
text-book committee has got under the influence of the ultra-Hindi section 
and are writing primary textbooks in Sanskritized Hindi which the people 
cannot understand". The Hindus intensified the Nagri agitation and the 
Government seemed to accept their demand. The Muslims reacted and threatene( 
the government to join the Congress; as a result, from Aligarh, Tufail 
Ahmad and Hasrat Mohani attended the Congress session held at Benaras in 
1905 and the Aligarh College Students' Union passed resolutions in favour 
of joint action by the Hindus and the Muslims in politics. The Muslims 
realized the need of their own political platform "to ensure a democratic 
83 
way of lire"and observed that if they will not protect their interests 
they would be completely wiped out. 
In 1905, Lord Curzon resigned and Lord Minto succeeded him. In 
December, 1905, Lord Morley became the Secretary of State for India.Minto 
79. A Lalkhani Rajput, related to Pahasu and educated at Aligarh College 
(Bom in 1888 and died on June 6/8 2 in Aligarh at his residence at 
Marris Road, and burried in the University graveyard) . 
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deemed it expedient to appease the Indians by introducing reforms. 
John Morley, to check the rising 'National' demands, suggested to Minto 
"the extension of the Native element" in the Legislative Coxmcil as 
84 
also in the provincial coiincils with greater powers. Sir Dennis Fitzpat-
rick doubted "whether in a province (Punjab) where the antagonism of 
different races and sects is so intense, it would be expedient to form 
8S 
any scheme expressly based on the idea of choosing class representatives". 
Gokhale, then the Secretary of the Sarvajanik Sabha, pleading for 
territorial electorates, said: "The principle of recognizing races and 
creeds stand in no need of encouragement from Government, as the division 
86 
of interests caused by it has already been the bane of this country". 
Noting these attitudes, Mohsin-ul-Mulk, assisted by Imad-ul-Mulk and 
advised by Viqar-ul-Mulk, prepared a Memorandum and presented it to 
the Viceroy, Lord Minto in Simla on October 1, 1906. 
Simla Memorial, 1906 
Thirty-five Muslims of noble birth, wealth and power, from every 
province of British India and several princely states, were introduced 
by The A.ga Khan to the Viceroy and presented to him their adrlress,which 
87 Lord Minto read aloud. The address contained a warning: 
"...recent events have stirred up feelings, especially 
among the younger generation of Mohamedans,which might, in 
certain circiomstances and xander certain contingencies, 
easily pass beyond the control of temperate counsel and 
sober guidance". 
The address continued: 
"We hope your Excellency will pardon our stating at the 
outset that representative institutions of the European type 
are new to the Indian people; many of the m.ost thonohtful 
members of our comm\anity in fact consider that the greatest 
care, forethought and caution will be necessary if they are 
to be successfully adapted to the social, religious and 
84. John Morley to Lord Minto, J\ane 15, 1906; Minto Papers, Vol. I, 
No, 67 (National Library of Scotland); Private letters; in 
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Minto that he viewed it as "nothing less than the pulling back of sixty-
two millions of people from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition". 
Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta) on October 4, 1906/ wrote about the 
deputation and its reception as "a got-up affair ... fully engineered 
by interested officials ... to whitewash their doings ... the authorities 
wanted a few simple-minded men of position to give them a certificate 
of good conduct. They knew the Hindus would not do it, so they began 
92 
operation among the older classes of Mussalmans". 
However, the deputation won "separate electorates" for Muslims, 
which proved a major historic landmark on the road to partition of India. 
Foxindation of the Muslim League, 1906 
Lord Curzon, who came to India in 1899, as Governor-General, opposed 
the conviction that it was the will of the 240 millions of Indians to 
decide whether the British rule will or will not continue in India.Imbued 
with an ImperL al mission, he initiated new measures,which roused great 
resentment and opposition, such as, partition of Bengal in 1905, which 
was meant to strengthen a sense of distinction among the Muslims and 
the Hindus. The division was .made to separate the Hindus and the Muslims 
in the East and the West to create a sense of conflict and, thus,weaken 
their political aspirations. The Government had sensed the danger of 
Congress demand for more and more political power in view of the coopera-
tion of Muslims also. In Punjab, there were Congress Muslims, such as, 
Muharram Ali Chishti, Syed Nadir Ali Shah, Hakim Ahmad All, Munshi Nabi 
Baksh, Shaikh Umar Baksh, Shaikh Nabi Baksh and Khan Mohammad Khan. The 
most prominent were also Abdul Rasul, Abdul Kaseem and Abdul Halim 
Ghuznavi. Muslim journalists also joined the Congress, such as, Maulvi 
Aqlab Mohani, Fazlul Husain, Maulvi Abdul Kazim and Maulana Shaukat. The 
Congress sessions,held from 1885 to 1901, were attended by 14,320 delegates 
93 
of which 1,547 were Muslims, who were mostly from U.P., Bengal, Punjab 
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and Maharashtra. From Madras and Oudh came the former roval families; 
from Bombay came wealthy Khoja and Bohra merchants; and from Bengal and 
Punjab came the lawyers, pleaders, journalists and a few landowners. The 
other Muslims reviewed their situation. 
Despite opposition of The Aga Khan and Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Nawab 
Salimullah, the aristocrate, naturally signed to and conventionally 
supported by the Government, decided to found a 'Muslim All-India Confe-
95 deracy' and invited al] Muslim associations to assemble at Dacca to detract 
them from the Congress. As there was all possibility that the Muslims, 
who were being emancipated from the Congress propaganda of unitv, would 
join the Congress if they were not provided with a political platform, 
the All-India Muslim League was founded on December 30, 1906, under the 
Chairmanship of Viqar-ul-Mulk at Dacca, on the resolution proposed by 
Nawab Salimullah and seconded and supported by Hakim Ajmal Khan, Zafar 
Ali Khan and Mahomed All. Viqar-ul-Mulk in his inaugural address said 
that a separate political organisation was far-sighted by Sir Syed Ahmad 
97 
more than a decade ago. Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqar-ul-Mulk, appointed Joint 
Secretaries of a provisional committee to frame a constitution of the 
98 League, formed the organisation of "Men of Property and Influence". At 
the Aligarh Session (March 16-17, 1908), Major Syed Hasan Bilgrami was 
elected Secretary and Haji Musa Khan as Joint Secretary, and The Aga Khan 
as President. Between 1907 and 1909, Provincial Muslim Leagues, supported 
by feudal interests, were founded in all major provinces and its branches 
established in London as well. 
The first President of the Muslim League, Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk 
Mushtaq Hussain (1841-1917) of Hyderabad sa2§:-
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"... it is manifest that it at any remote period the British 
Government ceases to exist in India, then the rule of India 
would pass into the hands of that community/ which Is nearly 
four times as large as ourselves ... If such a situation Is 
created in India. Then, our ]ife, our property, our honour, 
and our faith will all be in great danger ... And to prevent 
the realization of such aspirations on the part of our 
neighbours, the Musalmans cannot find better and surer means 
than to congregate under the banner of Great Britain, and to 
devote their lives and property in its protection". 
The President admitted: 
"It is through regard of our o\-m lives and property, our own 
honour and religion, that we are Impelled to be faithful to 
the Government .,. our own prosperity Is bound up with, and 
depends upon our loyalty to British rule In India". 
The Aga Khan, who did not attend the Dacca inaugural session 
wrote about Jinnah that he "came out in bitter hostility toward all 
that I and my friends had done and were trying to do. He vras the only 
well-knovrn Muslim to take this attitude ... He said that our principle 
of separate electorates was dividing the nation against itself". Jinnah 
initially rejected the 'separate electorates' on grounds of national 
principle, but it raised "his personal consciousness of Muslim identity". 
The Muslim League remained firmly committed to its founding principle, 
proposing names of Muslim candidates for every important official 
vacancy, and the Congress viewed this League policy as "anti-national 
and undemocratic". 
League's Real Objectives 
The League was founded as Lord Minto did not mention in his 
statement the Muslim University and Civil Service and High Court appoint-
ments for Muslims, The purpose of the foundation of the League v^ as to 
prevent the Muslim masses from joining the Congress, The League drew 
the attention of the Muslims and they were impressed that it was for 
protection of their rights. But, in fact, it was just a deceit to 
Muslim masses, who were too illiterate and poor to \inderstand the impact 
101. H.H. The Aga Khan, The Memoirs of Ag;a Khan (New York: Simon and 
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of the League's policies. The fo^ inders actually meant to protect their 
own interests. They were men of land and property and the Congress 
aimed democracy and secularism with the object of creation of Legislative 
Coxmcil, social reform and national unity, which could harm the MusDim 
landlords. The Congress aim was not to please the British Government 
but to fight for national interest. On the other hand, the League in 
1906 laid down its object "to promote among the Musalmans of India the 
feeling of loyalty to the British Government" ... "to protect and advance 
the political rights and interests of the Musalmans of India ..." and 
"to prevent the rise among the Musalmans of India of any feeling of 
hostility towards other communities ...". 
As the Government patronised the Landlords, who were the British 
agents, to exploit the Indian wealth for the British treasury, and 
Salimullah of Dacca for launching anti-partition of Bengal movement, it 
may be said that the British supported the foundation of the League to 
strengthen their position and continue their influence over the Muslim 
masses, who were in the princely states. The league did not represent the 
intelligentzia of the Muslim masses as it prevented the membership of 
poor Muslims by imposing conditions i.e. 400 elected even/ five years 
(70 for U.P.) - 25 literate in an Indian language, with annual income 
of more than Rs.BOO and yearly subscription of Rs,25 and entry fee of 
106 the same amount, which was not possible for the poor Muslims to pay.Hence, 
at that time, it could not be said a true representative of the Muslims 
all over India, 
The Lai Ishtihar (Red Pamphlet) 
, The partition of Bengal ignited the Muslim political consciousness 
and the establishment of the Muslim League sharpened the Hindu-Muslim 
differences. The Lai Ishtihar added fuel to the fire propagating anti-
107 Hindu feelings, A few extracts of which are given below: 
"The Hindus, by various stratagems, are relieving the Mahomedans 
of nearly the whole of the money earned by them". 
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•'Among the causes of the degradation of Mahomedans is their 
association with the Hindus", 
"Among the means to be adopted for the amelioration of 
Mahomedans, is boycotting Hindus". 
"Ye Musalmans arise, awake'. Do not read in the same schools 
with Hindus. Do not buy anything from a Hindu shop. Do not 
touch any article manufactured by Hindu hands. Do not give 
any employment to a Hindu. Do not accept any degrading office 
under a Hindu. You are ignorant, but if you acquire knowledge 
you can at once send all Hindus to Jehannum (Hell), You form 
the majority of the population of this province. Among the 
cultivators also you form the majority. It is agriculture 
that is the source of wealth. The Hindu has not wealth of his 
own and has made himself rich only by despoiling you of your 
wealth. If you become sufficiently enlightened, then the 
Hindus v;ill starve and soon become Mahomedans". 
These inflammatory teachings wore, most probably, the result 
of a clandestine plot of Curzon, who induced the Nawab Salimullah of 
Dacca to create a rift between the Hindus and Muslims. This thought 
finds strength in view of the fact that the Hindus formed the majority 
in India and if the Hindus had adopted the same teachings, the Muslims 
had to suffer in all walks of life. 
Surat Conferenpe;. 1907 
There happened a rift between the Congressmen. The Surat Conference 
108 held on December 24-27, 1907, and ended amidst an uproar, as the Moderates, 
led by Gokhale, Malaviya, Ganga Prasad Verma, Dada Bhai Naoroji and 
Sir Firoz Shah Mehta wanted to achieve the unity of Bengal through 
109 
constitutional means, and the Extremists, led by Lala Lajpat Rai, Tilak 
and Rash Behari GhoSn, wanted to use fo Later, the Extremists, 
including Hasrat Mohani were arrested and prosecuted. Tilak, referring 
his closest associates as a small party, said: "Certainly there is a 
very small party which talks about abolishing the British Rule at once 
and completely'^ . 
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The Indian Council hot, 1909 
The reforms, came to be known in August, 1907, proposed an Imperial 
Legislative Council of 53 officials and non-officials reserving 4 seats 
for Muslims (2 chosen by separate electorate and 2 nominated), but the 
Muslim League demanded ten reserved seats (one for each province and one 
for the Aligarh Trustees) and, for Provincial Government, a fixed number 
of reserved seats in each Council and, at least, one Muslim representative 
for each division, with addition of separate electorate of Muslims, The 
Government Reforms Scheme (October 1, 1908) accepted the demand recommend-
ing separate electorate for the Muslims on the basis of their being a 
separate community, distinct by marriage, food, custom and race; and 
considering the fear of Muslims that they would not secure the represen-
tation being in minority and that the richer and better-organised Hindus 
would put up Muslim candidates of their own choice and liking. The Muslims 
had demanded that the "scale of their representation should be not their 
114 
wealth of their nxmbers, but their political importance'. Thus, the 
Muslims demanded for separate representation in Councils at all stages 
by themselves and a number of seats in excess of their numerical strength. 
Morley, the Secretary of State for India, suggested (Despatch, 
115 November 27, 1908) mixed electoral college, reserving seats for Muslims 
on the basis of their n\imerlcal proportion and ignoring the 'separate 
electorate* and 'political importance', which forced the Muslims to 
agitate and meet at Amritsar (December 30, 1908). They treated it the 
betrayal of Lord Minto, who had promised to meet the Muslim demands to 
the Simla deputation. However, when the London League presented an Address, 
Morley declared that the mixed electoral system was practically dead, and 
on February 23, 1909, accepted the two demands of the Muslims, This was 
the League's first great victory. 
Lord Minto in the House of Commons declared: "These two demands 
(of Muslims) we are quite ready and Intend to meet in full", but it was 
disapproved on April 1, 
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Sapru suggested to get Muslims "wherever they are in minority 
of 14 per cent or less (in local boards) up to 20 or 21 per cent of the 
seats provided the same consideration is shown to the Hindas,..". Sapru 
was severely rebuked. 
119 
The Muslim League on April 28, 1909, declared: 
"No system of Muhammadan representati.ve in the provincial 
and imperial councils will be either effective in itself 
or acceptable to them that does not provide for an adequate 
number of seats in excess of their niomerical strength, and 
for all such seats to be filled by election by exclusive 
Muhammadan electorates". 
Ali Imam, in an extra-ordinary meeting on May 23, 1909, demanded: 
"a separate electorate composed entirely of Muhammadan electors" and 
hinted that the Muslims' good behaviour could not be guaranteed if the 
120 government went back on its promises. Lord Morley agreed that if there 
is a Hindu on the Viceroy's Executive Council, there should also be a 
Mahometan. With this background the Minto-Morley Reforms were launched 
and the Indian Council Act of 1909 was passed on May 25, 1909. Further, 
the members of the Reforms Committee impressed by demand of more seats 
and the Government on June 26, 1909, offered to compromise and despite 
Minto's opposition, Morley made The Aga Khan to accept a compromise in 
which the number of seats,reserved for Muslims on the Imperial Legisla-
tive Council, was raised from six to eight, and the Muslim League 
submitted reluctantly. 
The period,between 1B92 and 1909, Wf\s very stormy; firstly/ due 
to antagonism between the Congress and the Sir Syed group, the partition 
of Bengal, the establishment of the Muslim League and demand of separate 
electorate by the Muslim League. The agitation against the partition of 
Bengal was so widespread that the Government resorted very harsh measures 
118. Indian People (Allahabad), April 15, 1909 and May 30, 1909, 
119. Indian Daily Telegraph, April 29, 1909. 
120. Matiur Rahman, n, 98, p. 136. 
121. B.N. Pandey, n. 84, p. 33. 
122. F ranc i s Robinson, n , 43, p . 161; see a l s o K.H. Q a d i r i , Hasra t 
Mohani (Delhi : I d r a h - i - A d a b i y a t - i f - D e l l i , 1985), p . 164. 
123. I b i d . See a l s o Matiur Rahman, n . 98, p . 148; K.H, Qadi r i , I b i d . , 
p . 166. 
31 
to put down the nationalist movement. The Government, with the aim of 
weakening the agitation, the Congress and the Extremists' demand for 
immediate self-government, supported the Moderates. The Moderates wanted 
to enter the Government. Therefore, the Government to win over them 
and also to calm down the Muslims, passed the Indian Councils Act in 1909. 
The additional members of the Governor-General's Council were 
increased up to a maximum of 60, those of Madras, Bengal, U.P., Bombay 
and Bihar and Orissa up to 50, and those of the Punjab, Burma and Assam 
to 30, To retain substantial official majority, the Imperial Legislative 
Council consisted of 37 officials and 3 2 non-officials (5 to be nominated 
by the Governor and 27 were to be elected). Thus, there were 42 nominated 
and 18 elected members. In the Provincial Legislative Councils,though the 
majority of the members were to be non-officials, but due to nominated 
members, the Government retained majority of its faithful members. For 
instance, the Madras Legislative Council consisted of 21 officials and 
26 non-officials (5 nominated and 21 elected), Thus, the majority of 
Government loyal members were 26 and elected non-officials were 21, 
Further, the Act provided for separate or special electorates for 
the due representation of the different communities, classes and interests 
distributing the non-official seats among them, called "general electo-
rates". For instance, of the 27 elected members of the Imperial Legisla-
tive Council, 6 were allotted to the landlords, 5 to the Mohammadans, 
one to the Mohammedan landlords, and one each to the Bengal and Bombay 
Chambers of Commerce totalling 14, The remaining 13 seats were filled 
by the non-official members of the Provincial Legislative Councils.Thus, 
Muslims were given separate representation, in Madras, Bombay, Bengal, 
the United Provinces and in East Bengal and Assam and raised the Muslims' 
reserved seats in the Imperial Legislative Council from six to eight. 
Jinnah was one of the elected members from Bombay. 
The financial statement was first referred to a Committee of the 
Council with the Finance Minister as its Chairman. Half of its members 
were nominated by the Government and the other half were elected by the 
non-official members of the Coxoncil. However, the members had right to 
move any resolution, to ask questions and supplementary questions, but 
the Member-in-Charge had right to refuse answer to the supplementary 
questions, and the President could disallow any resolution without giving 
any reason. No questions could be raised affecting the relations of the 
Government with a foreian power or a native state. 
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The Act raised the number of the members of the Executive Council 
in Bombay, Bengal and Madras to 4, and empowered the Lt. Governor's 
state to constitute an Executive Council. 
124 125 
The Reforms failed to satisfy both the Congres's and the League, 
as its motive was to prevent development of political principles. The 
people demanded 'responsible government', but the sacted heart of the 
reform was "benevolent despotism". Lord Morley had, while introducing 
the Bill in the Parliament, declared that he had no intention to give 
to the people of India responsible government. The reforms introduced 
a change not of kind but of degree. The minor additions were unsubstan-
tial; The reforms led to a lot of confusion as no parliamentary 
responsibility was given. The number of voters were very small and in 
some constituencies 9 or 10, which could be bought. Women were excluded 
from voting. The system of election was indirect, that is, the people 
elected members of local bodies, which elected electoral college, which, 
in turn, elected members of the provincial legislature, who elected 
members of the Imperial Legislature, who, thus, had no responsibility 
towards the people. There was official majority in the Imperial Council. 
The decision of the non-official majority in the Provincial Councils 
could be revoked by the Imperial Council; hence, the practical result 
was nothing* 
Lionel Curtis, who started the Round Table Group in South Africa 
after 1906, to add a chapter in the second voliome of the Commonwealth 
of Nations, came to India in 1916, for study of Indian situation. He 
concluded that no further advance on the road to "responsible government" 
could be made on the basis of the Mlnto-Morley Reforms, If an attempt 
i26 er". The Rotmd Table Movement 
suggested to give responsible government to India, 
Opposition of Muslim Leaders to the Act 
Though the Muslim gain from the Reform was considerable as they 
124. See for details Tribime (Lahore), January 4, 1910; For Surendranath 
Banerjee's statement see Mushlrul Hasan, n, 93, pp. 66-67. 
125. See for details Azlm Husain, Fazl-i-Husain; A Political Biography 
(Bombay? 1946), p. 78; also see Mushlrul Hasan, n. 93, p. 68. 
126. V.D, Mahajan, n. 23, p. 293. 
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secured representation in six out of seven councils in excess to their 
proportion of the jxDpulation, but the professional men were dissatisfied. 
They received inadequate representation in the Imperial LegislatL ve 
Council and the Provincial Legislative Councils since only two out of 
eight Muslim seats were filled by them in the U.P. Legislative Council. 
They criticised that the electoral qualifications favoured the rich, 
the title-holders and pensioned government servants. After the Municipal 
elections (1910), the Muslims demanded separate electorates on the ground 
that they were unlikely to be returned from the mixed electorates. Thus, 
the Reforms were "hopelessly inadequate" and "curious mixture of concess-
429 ns^\ The motive behind such a deliberate division 
(General and Class Electorates) was to prevent the development of political 
principles and organised opposition against the Government, However, 
"Povrer remained with the government and the Councils were left with no 
functions but criticism. The non-re.sponsj ble form of government continued 
till under the Act of 1919 Dyarchy and along with it partial responsible 
130 government were introduced into the provinces", 
Muslim League Third Annual Session, 1910 
The Muslim League held its Third Annual Session in January, 1910, 
at Delhi, H,H, The Aga Khan, in his presidential address, observed: "Now 
that we have secured it (separate electorate), I hope it will result in 
a permanent political sympathy and a genuine working entente cordial 
(relations) between the members of the two great communi till". 
Allahabad Hindu-Muslim Conference, 1910 
There were some Muslim leaders, who were convinced that separate 
electorate or weightage would be against the Interests of the Muslims. 
On the othpr hand, G.K, Gokhale had spoken: "It was a commonplace of 
Indian politics that there can be no future for India as a Nation unless 
127. Francis Robinson, n, 43, pp, 222-23. 
128. See Ibnl Ahmad to Mohamed A] J, June 10, 1911, and lln.'ifln Al:i to 
Mohamed All, May 14, 1912, Mohamed All Papers, JMI 
129. I, Prasad and S.K. Subedar, n. 61, p. 45. 
130. A.V, Krishnamoorthy, Freedom Movement in India, 1858-1947 (Hyderabad: 
A. Aruna, Basheerbagh"^ 1977), p.83. 
131. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Vol. I, n. 94, Introduction. 
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a durable spirit of cooperation was developed and established between 
i32 es". Thus, the Hindu and the Muslim leaders were 
in a state of great dilemma and both wanted to come closer together. 
The Muslims disheartened by the impracticability of the Reforms and the 
Hindus by the partition of Bengal, banishing their mutual dislike and 
distrust, assembled at Allahabad in 1910. The most imDortant, among others, 
were: S.N. Bannerjee, Gokhale, Sunder Lai, Pandit M.M. Malaviya,T.B.Saprii, 
Pandit M.L. Nehru, Lord Sinha, the Maharaja of Darbhanga, H.H. The Aga 
Khan, Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk, Ibrahim Rahimtolla, M.A. Jinnah and Hakim 
Ajmal Khan. The points discussed were Hindi-Urdu controversy, national 
education, the Arya Samaj movement, music before mosque, cow slaughter 
m. Though no substantial result came out, the very fact of appointment 
of a Committee for holding Unity Conferences proved that the differences 
were not unsurmountable. 
The Birth of Hindu Sabha, 1910 
Morley caused split between the Hindus and the Muslims by promising 
separate electorate to the Muslims. As the Hindus agitated, the Muslims 
began to abuse the Hindus loudly in their meetings and in the press. 
Motilal Nehru wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru on April 1, 1909: "The position 
is getting worse every day. Out of evil, however, comes the good. The 
Arya Samaj has given the best answer to Mohammedan pretensions by quietly 
converting the followers of Islam to Hinduism. Reports arrive every day 
of their conversion. Sometimes whole villages are converted in a single 
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day". The Hindus had become antagonistic towards the Muslims. Thev saw 
the Muslim League as a separate institution fighting for the interest of 
the Muslims. Hence, they formed the All-India Hindu Sabha in December,1910. 
Motilal Nehru tried to water down the establishment taking round to his 
view men like B.N. Bose and S.N. Banerjee, as it could hamper the vrorking 
of the Hindu-Mohamedan Committee, recently formed to solve the Hindu-
Muslim problems, but the "great majority of the so-called leaders in 
Upoer India, specially those of the Punjab, all worked themselves to a 
135 high pitch and could not be made to listen to reason". Motilal Nehru 
13 2, Gokhale's Speeches (Madras: Natesan and Co., 3rd edn., 19 20), 
pp. 1137, 209. 
133. I. Prasad and S.K. Subedar, n. 51, p. 49. 
134. Nehru Papers, NMML; in B.N. Pandev, n. 84, p. 18, 
135. Ibid. 
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refused to join it. The Saona continued to work in close collaboration 
with the Congress, 
Reaction of Muslims Against the Hindu Sabha 
The Hindus founded the Provincial Hindu Sabha to do for the Hindus 
137 
as the Muslim League was doing for the Mohammedans. In February, 1910, 
Syed Karamat Husein published .'A Scheme for the Progress of Muhammadans', 
to foster the communal consciousness. In April, 1010, Mushir Husain 
Kidwai formed a 'Central Islamic Society' offering a pan-Islamic solution. 
Jinnah introduced legislation validating Muslim waqfs into the Imperial 
Legislative Council and successfully comoleted it in 1913. The Muslim 
League demanded that separate representation should be extended to all 
elected bodies. In April, 1010, the league Secretary at Budaun demanded 
that Urdu should be introduced into the Allahabad University Examination; 
and in the 1911 Census, Urdu-speaking people should be returned as a 
141 
speaking Urdu alone. 
Change of British Policy Towards India 
In viev; of the restlessness among the masses. Lord Hardinge wrote 
14 2 to the Secretary of State in his despatch on August 25, 1911, as under:-
"The maintenance of British rule in India depends on the 
ultimate supremacy of the Governor-General in Council, and 
the Indian Councils Act of 1909 itself bears testimony to 
the impossibility of allowing matters of vital concern to be 
decided by a majority of non-official votes in the Imperial 
Legislative Council, Nevertheless it is certain that, in the 
course of time, the just demands of Indians for a larger share 
in the government of the country will have to be satisfied, 
and the question will be how this devolution of power can be 
conceded without impairing the supreme authority of the Governor-
General in Council. The only possible solution of the difficulty 
would appear to be gradually to give the provinces a larger 
measure of self-government ...". 
136. Hindu Sabha was founded in 1910 and "later to become'Hindu Mahasabha" 
see B.N.Pandey,n,84,p,4; "The League held its first session in 
December, 1906" and "the Hindu Mahasabha was established in the same 
year", V.P, Menon, n, 47, p, 10. 
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The Indian politicians anticipated that the British Government 
would declare self-government for the Indians soon. But the failure of 
the pan-Islamic movement in 1912 and the rejection of the Muslim 
University scheme and the Kannur Mosque incident in 1913, proved that 
the British were not inclined to give any concession to the people. The 
people aimed at forging a united front against the British Government. 
•Further, the attitude of the Government manifest in the Reform Bil3 and 
the notorious incidents changed the mind of the Muslim Leaguers. A new 
group of professional men and ulema emerged and cooperated with the 
Congress. They were; Maulana Abul Xalam Azad, Maulana Shibli romani/ 
Maulana Mohamed Ali, M.H, Kidwai, Sir Ibrahim Rahimtullah and Mohammad 
Ali Jinnah. They at the Lucknow session in March, 1913, brought the 
14 3 ^ , 
League in ]ine with the Indian National Congress, The position of the 
Muslim League became so bleak that it was suggested to wind it up. The 
Aga Khan resigned from the League's Presidentship and the Nawab of Rampur 
resigned from the Visitorship of the Aligarh College coming under 
increased influence of Mohamed Ali and Zafar Ali Khan. 
Jinnah's Joining the Muslim League, ,1913 
Jinnah, 35 years old, was the youngest to join the Viceroy's 
Central Legislative Council in 1910. The legislative centre, first in 
Calcutta, and Simla,and later in Delhi, soon became Jinnah's most power-
ful stages. On March 7, 1911, he introduced the first legislative measure 
i.e. the Wakf (tax-exempt Muslim endowments) Validating Bill. Jinnah 
attended the annual meeting of Congress as v/ell as the Muslim League, 
both held in Bankipur in December, 1912. Jinnah had not yet joined the 
League, but was permitted to speak at its Council. Jinnah sunported a 
resolution regarding expansion of the League's goal to include "the 
attainment of a system of self-government suitable to India" to be 
brought about "through constitutional means, a steady reform of the 
existing system of administration; by promoting national unity and 
fostering public spirit among the people of India, and by co-operating 
, 144 
with other communities for the said purposes". 
143. See for details the proceedings of the Council of the All-India 
Muslim League held on December 31, 1912. For leaders' statements 
^®® Al-Hilal, October 9, 1914; Maqalat-i-Shibli (Azamgarh:1938), 
Vol.8, pp. 148-84; Tribune(Lahore), January 21, 1911; Comrade 
(Delhi), December 30, 1911. 
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At the League's Lucknow session (March, 1913), the League's 
President, Sir Muhanmiad Shafi, presenting a new more liberal constitu-
tion, said: "I am in entire accord with my friend the Hon'ble Mr.Jinnah 
in thinking that the adoption of any course other thai? the one proposed 
145 
by the Council would be absolutely unwise", and in a resolution congra-
tulated "the Kon. Mr. M.A. Jinnah for his skillful piloting" of the 
Wakf Validating Act through the Imperial Legislative Council, and 
renewed appeal to Jinnah to join the Muslim League. Earlier, the league's 
permanent Secretary, Syed Wazir Hasan (1874-1947) and Maulana Mohammad 
Ali (1878-1931) had pressed unon Jinnah to join the Muslim League.Jinnah 
agreed to join the League in 1913, laying a prior condition that his 
"loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way 
and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national 
146 
cause to which his life was dedicated", 
Jinnah and Gokhale sailed together from Bombay for Liverpool in 
April, 1913, to meet with Lord Islington. Jinnah returned to India in 
September, 1913, and attended fhe Conqrpss Karachi session. He seconded 
the Karachi Congress resolution, congratulating the League for adopting 
"the ideal of Self-Govemment for India within the British Empire". 
From Karachi, Jinnah v/ent to Agra to attend the League' s session on 
December 30-31, 1913, He v/as seeking a formula to bring the Congress 
and the League on a single national platform. His position was unigue. 
At Agra, Jinnah proposed to postpone reaffirmation of faith in the 
principle of "communal representation" for another ^^ear, suggesting 
that special representation "would only divide India into tv;o water-
148 
tight compartments", while the Congress had just deferred action on that 
question. The Muslim League rejected Jinnah's first formal appeal 
because for them the principle of 'separate electorate' was "absolutely 
necessarv" to the League's Immediate future. 
Jinnah saded again for London in Apri], 1914, and returned home 
in January, 1915. 
145. I b i d . , p . 272. 
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Conqress-Leacme Rapprochement 
The new group of Muslims dominated the Muslim League, but lost 
all favour of the Government,which appeased the earlier landed 
aristocrates leading the Muslim league. Therefore, some nationalist 
Muslims resigned from the League. Maziruddln Hasan, Khwaja Abdul 
Majid and Tassaduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani, associates of Sarojini Naidu, 
were of national idealism. Hyder Mehdi, Kamaluddin Ahmed Jafri 
(Allahabad Bar) and Wazir Hasan and Azhar All (Lucknow Bar) worked 
with Motilal Nehru, A.P. Sen, Tej Bahadur Sapru and Jagat Naraln Mulla, 
The 1912 Congress session (Patna) "recognized the expediency of 
adoDting communal representation for Muslims", but it was ignored in 
the 1913 session (Karachi). The Congress and the League leaders 
assembled to attend the Allahabad Elementary Education Conference in 
1913, holding identical viev;s and asoirations, Radha Kishen Das 
(Moradabad), Lala Lajpat Rai (Allahabad), Pandit Bishen Narayan Dar 
(Banaras) and Bhagwan Das hailed the Muslims and the League for their 
success. 
Conclusion 
The Hindu-Muslim equat'^on of co-existence based upon historical 
and traditional factors continued up to the Great Revolt of 1857. It, 
however, begarj to deteriorate vn th the emergence of revivalist and 
insurgence movements amongst the Hindus and the Muslims and surfaced 
in the form of establishment of the Congress and the league. Though 
the leaders did endeavour to reconcile their political differences, 
but their religious and traditional orientations rendered the?e 
attempts futile. These nosturen of isolation and exclusiveness gave 
birth to the Hindu Mahasabha and Tabligh and Tanzeem organisations. 
Their differences could not be solved through the Lucknow Fact and 
the Nehru Report only appeared to create more differences. They ronld 
not settle the nolitic-'l 'problems even at the Round Tabic Con'"erenc^r. 
and the Cormiunal Avarrl and thr- Gov rnment of India Act of 1935 onlv 
lent a st^ .mp of credibility on the romrnunal politics. 
149. Renort of the Proceedings of the 20th Indian National Congress 
held at Bankipur, December 26-28, 1912 (Bankipur, n.d.),p.l9. 
CHAPTER II 
THE GROWTH OF THE IDEA OF PARTITION 
(1914-1939) 
The Renaissance of Hlndu-Musljm DlfJ'erencqs 
The demand and emergence of a separate homeland of a particular 
community, distinguished by its religion, culture, language and geogra-
phical conditions, is not very uncommon in the political history of the 
world. India as a subcontinent of different races, languages and cultures, 
has alvjays been regarded a country of different sub-nationalities, such 
as, the Bengalees in Bengal, Punjabis in the Punjab, the Marathas in 
Maharashtra, the Tamils in the South and the Muslims scattered all over 
India, They are recognised by their distinctive culture, language, dress, 
manners and behaviour and patterns. In East Bengal, Sind, N.W.F.Province 
and Kashmir, there were mostly Muslims. In U.P,, Bihar, Orissa and South 
India, there was a mixed population of the Muslims and the Hindus; the 
Sikhs, particularly living in Punjab, Christians in South India and the 
Parsis in West Maharashtra and Gujarat being in the least minorit'^ '-. The 
Hindus were in majority in almost all the states except the four stated 
above. In spite of all these diversities, all the Indians^'had a bond of 
love and goodwill for each other and, thus, they remained united. This 
was a xinity in diversity. The "European writers as a rule have been more 
conscious of the diversity than of the unity of India", The British 
imperial interests prompted thom to adopt a policy of ' Pi vide et Impera' 
and highlight the factors of diversity. For the Hindus, the most 
important uniting bond v;as provided by their religion - the Hinduism, 
which cemented their relations in North and South, East and West, despite 
cultural and linguistic differences. All Hindus regarded India as the 
Holy Land. Their sacred places are spread from Setubandhu-Rameswaram 
in the extreme south to Badrinath in the bosom of the snow-capped 
Himalayas in the north. Contrary to this, the Muslims in India had 
scarcely any native cultural, linguistic or religious moorings. 
The Islamic culture is that of Arabs, which the Muslims in India 
had imbibed as faithful Muslims, but, si de by side, they had also adopted 
1.- Vincent A. Smith, The Oxford History of India (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1961), Introduction, p. 10^ . 
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and continued to "knit many customs and rituals of India also. The Islamic 
language was Arabic but their language had become Urdu or Hindustani 
written in Persian script in India. Urdu is in reality an emergence of 
intermingling of Persian and Sanskritized Hindi spoken in the 17th and 
18th centuries in India. Thus, Urdu is not the language of Muslims but 
of the Indians. The British politicians, to gain their political ends, 
through the Fort William Colleqe, Calcutta, created two distinct languages 
- Hindi and Urdu, which had been a matter of controversy even during 
the days of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan on the question of Nagri-Persian script. 
The Hindus adopted the Sanskritized Hindi having aliance with their 
religious books - Ramayan, Ved and Gita, v;hile the Muslims preferred the 
Urdu language with Persian and Arabic words, as their holy book - Qur'an -
is written in the same script. Thus, Hindi became the language of Hindus 
and Urdu the language of Muslims. Thus, from 1867, Urdu, the lingua franca 
of the larger part of India began to collapse and two separate languages 
- Hindi and Urdu, began to sow seeds of differentiation between the 
Hindus and the Muslims. The differpncos intensified v;hen Hindi became 
a highly Sanskritized language, which could not be understood by the 
Muslims. On the other hand, Urdu, v/hich included words of almost all the 
languages, was being ignored. This resulted in carving a great hatred 
of Muslims towards Hindi and the Hindus and it also stamped on the Muslim 
minds that Hindus v;ere orthodox in their behaviour. Further, there were 
"33 major tongues along with a host of minor languages and dialects". 
This led to the growth of separatism. 
Sir Syed took the Hindi-Urdu controversy, culminating to the 
Mosque-Temple differences, very seriously. He realised that any attempt 
to impose'Hindi on Muslims or Urdu on Hindus would undermine the composite 
culture of India. It was, undoubtedly, to him was "a svmbol of the 
3 
beginning of communal consciousness and revivalism among the Hinc^s". 
The third factor is the religion. The Muslims pray to one God and 
the Hindus many god and goddesses. Their method of worship is different. 
Likev;ise, they differ in dress, food and manners and civilization as 
well. The ethnic differences, thus, being poles apart could not reconcile 
the Hindus and Muslims to settle their differences and instead led to 
parting-wavs. 
2. Mario Pei, The Story of Language (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1952), p. 288. 
3. Moin Shakir, Khila^at to Partition (New Delhi:Ajanta,1983),p.20. 
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It is argued that most of the Muslims in India are local converts 
and are of the same race as the Hindus; hence, there was no question of 
their differences. But this contention finds no ground in view of the 
fact that the new immigrants, who cniru^  to India w1 th invaders' forros 
or as followon of Muslim r.?»ints ]oft a permanent community of Islamic 
thoughts. Thus, on the one hand, the Muslims 1n India are of two stocks 
while the Hindus are of only one. Thus, India was inhabited by two races. 
If we account the pre-historic times we find, there were four races as 
has been disclosed by the archaeologists during excavations at Mohenjodaro* 
They were the proto-Australoid, the Mediterranean, the Mongolian branch 
of the Alpine stock and the Alpine. Of the many ethnic groups, the Aryans, 
the Scythians, the Kushans, the Huns and the Semite came to India. 
Professor Dixon says that this racial diversity is the very root of 
4 
caste system in India, Evidently, the caste groups differ from each other 
racially. Thus, caste system came into existence in Hinduism and, Hindus 
were divided into many groups, especially into high caste Hindus and the 
low caste Hindus i.e. Scheduled Castes. Likewise, the immigrant Muslims 
considered themselves as the 'high born Muslims' and the converts as 
'low born Muslims'. The separatism in societv plaved a major role in 
partition of India. 
Politically also India was not united in the true sense of the word. 
From 500 BC to 273 BC, we find disintegration and wars among the 
different races in all parts of India. India was united only in the davs 
of Ashoka and Alauddin Khalji, whose general, Malik Kafoor, subdued the 
whole region of south India. The Mughal rule, though had a strong centre 
but had also the enemies - the Rajputs, Sikhs and Marathas, 
After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the provincial governors 
became independent. When the British took over reign of the Red Ford, 
India was divided into a large number of states, ruled by Rajas and 
Nawabs. The division of India after the Great Revolt until Independence 
gave an idea of partition of the sub-continent. 
Idea of Partition in the 19th Century 
The idea of a separate Muslim homeland may be traced back to the 
4, Roland B. Dixon, The Racial Histor-/ of Man (London, New York: 
Charles Scribners Sons, 1923), p. 269. 
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political and psychological effect since the British occupation of Delhi 
in 1803 and Subsidiary Alliances with Hyderabad in 1798, Nawab of Awadh 
in 1901 and Peshwa Baji Rao II in 1802, when they merely served as a 
political front for the British. By 1818, except Slnd and Punjab, the 
v;hole of India had come under the British Rule. John Briqht, a British 
statesman in 1817, v;as tho fi rfJt, vho " rpcommended tlie format-Ion of five 
semi-independent Indian presidencies with capitals at Agra, Bombay, 
Calcutta, Lahore and Madras. They were to be ... controlled by Britain". 
The British adopted a policy of suppression for complete control and the 
people were ps-^ '^ chologically attached to their past rulers. The Marathas 
in Maharashtra, Sikhs in Punjab, Kols in Bihar, Muslim Nawabs in Awadh, 
Nizam in Hyderabad and Amirs in Sindh came under direct British control 
by 1857. They each represented a particular community and gave sense of 
the Hindu State and the Muslim State. This sowed the seed of separatism 
in India. 
The masses were influenced by the political change. Their attitude, 
specially between Hindus and Muslims, became uncooperative and they 
began to look at each other with suspicion. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the 
prophet of Hindu-Muslim unity, disgruntled by the Hindu-Muslim differences 
due to many reasons, changed his views from one-nation theory to two-
nation theory, that is, Muslims and Hindus are two separate communities. 
Sir Syed imagined that the two, being different, would conflict like 
the minority and majority groups on the Issues of race, religion and 
language as in Europe and would not live in hearty communion with each 
other. These doubts of Sir Syed proved true with the rise of idea of a 
separate homeland for Muslims in future. A famous pan-Islamist Afghani 
proposed establishment of an Indian Muslim state comprising of North-
West India, Afghanistan and the states of Turkistan, Wilfred Scawen 
Blunt suggested to divide India into a Northern Indian Muslim state and 
a Southern Indian Muslim state both largely self-governing within the 
British Indian Empire, 
5. George Treveleyan, The Life of jJohn Briqht (Boston: Houghton Miffin, 
1913), p, 266. 
6. I.H. Qureshi, 'The Development of Pakistan', The Journal of World 
History, Vol. 4,(l958),pp, 1009-1030. 
7. W.S, Blunt, India Under Rippon : A Private Diary (London: T.Fisher 
Unwln, 1909), pp. 107-108. 
43 
S.R. Mehrotra says that the historians traced the "idea of Pakistan 
back to Sir Sved Ahmad Khan in the ninetcnnth century", to "Shah 
Waliullah and Shah Abdul Aziz in the eighteenth century, and even to 
Muhammad bin Qasim, the first Muslim invader of India early in the 
Q 
eighth century". Truly, Sir Syed's 'two-nation theory' is the landmark 
of Pakistan, but it is quite untrue that the latter three expressed ideas 
of a separate Muslim homeland as there is no clear statement but whatever 
Mehrotra refers is based on assumptions. Neither it may be admitted 
that the Muslims inherited the idea of a Muslim state from the insurgents 
during eighth to the eighteenth century. The reign of Muhammad bin Qasim 
9 (713-715) "was an insignificant event in the history of Islam", which 
did not help much in the establishment of the futute Muslim Empire in 
India and, hence. Lane Poole characterised it as an episode in the 
History of India and of Islam, a trixjmph without result". Shah Waliullah 
and Shah Abdul Aziz were mainly religious leaders. In fact, the earliest 
Muslim rulers and their followers intermarried with the local people and 
produced a mixed race. They became part of India as the Hindus and 
advocated their movements against the British to Inflame the Indian 
conscience. Thus, they laid the foundation of freedom struggle. For 
insLan'^ o, in 1799, Agn Muhammad Pnr.a nr.r.wmcd the rhnrachRr of n propVi^ t 
and styled himself Immaun Mahadrl. Sharlatullah, In 1804, founded the 
Faridi sect and turned it into political entity. He appointed denuty 
or Khalifa to establish a Islamic rule. In 1810, Abdul Rahman proclaimed 
himself the Imam Mehdl in Surat. In 1820-21, Syed Ahmad of Rae Barellly 
(U,P.), who led the Wahabl Movement, preached "to perform Hijrat or 
flight from the country'- governed by MushrlRs" and aimed to fix his 
headquarters at Slttana in NWFP, which was a Muslim dominated state. In 
Bengal, Tltu Mir of the Wahabl sect "claimed the soverei^ n^ power as the 
8. S.R. Mehrotra, Towards India's Freedom and Partition (New Delhi: 
Vikas Publishing House Pvt.Ltd,, 1979), p, 197, 
9. Ishwari Prasad, History of Medieval India (Allahabad: The Indian 
Press (Publications) Priva'te Ltd., 1966) , p, 67. 
10. Lane Poole, History of India and of islam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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hereditary right of the Muslims which had been unjustly usurped by the 
EuropeanI", He wanted to overthrow the British and to establish an 
Islamic kingdom in India. There may be called the people with religious 
frenzy, but their aim to establish an Islamic regime in India was but a 
dream. 
The province of Bengal, since the promulgation of 1874 constitution, 
comprised of besides Bengal proper, Bihar, Orissa and Chota Nagpur, which 
was difficult to be administered as a single unit. Risley considered 
various schemes of territorial adjustment in order to achieve the follow-
ing objectives: 
"(1) To bring all the Oriya-speaking people outside the 
territorial limits of Orissa, under the administration 
of Bengal. 
(2) To separate the whole of Chittagong Division and the 
Districts of Dacca and Mymensingh from Bengal and to 
incorporate them with Assam, and to transfer portions 
of Chutia Nagpur to the Central Provinces", 
By the end of the nineteenth century, a large number of daily news-
papers came in circulation. They embodied opinions of different political 
groups, particularly the Muslims and the Congress. The papers are full 
of apprehensive feelings of Muslims and their fear of being treated as 
grass-roots by the Hindus in future. They anticipated the solution of 
this problem. For instance, Abdul Halim Sharar, a novelist and editor 
of Muhazzib, in 1890, observed: 
"If both Hindus and Muslims cannot live together in peace 
and mutual respect, then it is better for them to divide India 
into Hindu and Muslim provinces and exchange their population". 
Idea of Partition in the 20th Century 
The East Bengal had great Muslim population and their domination 
through election was sure. The Maharaja Manindra Chunder Nundi lamented 
that in East Bengal, the Bengali Hindu will be in a minority and shall 
14. Ibid., p. 38. 
15. Ibid., p. 18. 
16. A.S. Khurshid, 'Alehada Islami Watan Ka Takhaiyyul',Mawa-e-Waqt 
(Lahore), March 23, 1963. See also S.S. Pirzada (ed.), Quaid-e-Azam 
Jinnah's Correspondence (Karachi: East fU West Publishing Co., 
3rd edn., 1977), p. 58. 
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become strangers in their own land. Bankim Chandra's song, 'Vandematram', 
led the Vandemataram Movement. Tilak organised Ganapati festival and 
brought many people into the political field and Aravindo Pal and Lajpat 
Rai brought a large nunber of peoole into the national movement. On 
September 5, the Durga Puja Day, thousands of people took religious vow 
at the Kali temple that they should boycott British goods, adopt Svradeshi 
and make every effort to overthrow the British yoke. Minto enacted 
several repressive laws. Tilak was imprisoned for six vears, Arvindo 
was arrested. Lajpat Rai went into voluntary exile. On the other hand, 
the partition was supported by a small group of Muslims led by Nawab 
Salimullah of Dacca as induced by Lord Curzon, while a few members of 
family of the Nawab opposed the partition and joined the Swadeshi movement. 
However, the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911 by King George V, 
caused deep frustration of the Muslims and an occasion of great jubilia-
tion for the Hindus. The partition of Bengal left a permanent imnression 
on the Indian's mind anticipating the possibility of India's partition. 
The guestion of separate electorate and reservation of seats for 
Muslims, an important stand of the Muslim League, could not be solved 
at the Allahabad Conference in 1910. Further, the birth of Hindu Mahasabha 
and establishment of Muslim communal institutions embarked Hindu-Muslim 
antagonism. Sapru's suggestion was opposed by orthodox conservative 
Hindu leaders. The Muslim leaders began to severely think to solve the 
communal oroblem with safeguard of their interests. 
In 1913, Maulana Mahomed Ali suggested that North India mav be 
assigned to the Muslims and rest to the Hindus to solve the Hindu-Muslim 
problem. Similar idea was expressed by Abdul Jabbar and Abdul Sattar 
at the International Socialist Conference at Stockholm in 1917. A Pathan 
chief, Mohammad Gulkhan, suggested a separate Muslim homeland in the 
20 North-West extending as far as Agra. 
On August 3, 1911, Harcourt Butler said that the establishment of 
17. R.C, Majumdar, n, 11, p, 18, 
18. Moin Shakir, Radical Humanist (Calcutta), February 4, 1968; quoted 
in Moin Shakir, Khilafat to Partition (Few Delhi: Kalamkar 
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the Muslim University "would ... tend to keep alive the Hindu-Muslim 
feelin^i". Montagu opposing t>io CoundiLlon of a flonomi mtrlonal Mnn]1m 
University said: "those,v;ho accused the government of a policy of 'divide 
and rule', would have a strong case". "The Secretary of State and some 
members of his Council objected to the term "Muslim" in the nomenclature 
of the University". Since the Aligarh Muslim University Plan included 
•Muslim religion', there was a counter-move amongst the Hindus to found 
a Hindu University teaching Hindu religion. The Government encouraged 
both the plans to develop separatism among the Hindus and the Muslims, 
which deepened mistrust, created new misunderstandings and made the path' 
of national leaders difficult. In 1915, the Banaras Hindu University 
Act was passed. The Muslim University Act v/as passed in 19 20. The estab-
lishment of the two universities obviously created a gulf between the 
Hindus and the Muslims and the idea of being tv/o-nation got much strength. 
Political Developments during the First World War 
Great Britain declared war against Germany on August 4, 1914. The 
United States of America sided with the former and Turkey joined the 
latter. The Congress and the Muslim League expressed loyal'ty to the 
British and helped the British war aims. Henry, in February, 1915,pleaded 
for the grant of 'political autonomy' to India and the Indians began to 
look towards a great advance in self-government. In January,1915, 
Gandhiji returned to India after spending twenty-two years in South 
Africa and became a leading force in the Congress. The British attacked 
the holy places of Muslims in Hedjaz, which enraged the Muslims in India. 
The Congress joined hands with the Muslim League to solve the communal 
problem, Gokhale, Mrs. Annie Besant, Surendranath Banerjea$c Wazir Hasan 
prepared their schedule of demand, which were almost identical. The 
Special Provincial Conference held at Allahabad on May 30, 1915,manifested 
wholehearted cooperation between the Hindus and the Muslims. 
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Congress-League Conferences 
In July, 1915/ the U.P. Government introduced a Municipalities 
BllD into its Legislative Council, as a result of Jinnah's proposal to 
increase non-official participation. The conservative Hindu politicians 
were opposed to granting of a separate representation to the Muslims, 
and when the Congress made its polics^ to grant concessions to the Muslims, 
the orthodox Hindus resisted. The Congress and the League prepared 
their 'Reforms Scheme', but the Congress scheme excluded the separate 
representation. After much heated discussions, at the Joint Reform 
Committee meeting held on November 17-18, 1916, the Hindus agreed to 
separate representation of Muslims orovided the Muslims had no vote in 
the general electorates, which the Muslims accepted. The proportion of 
representation in five provinces were settled, but in the case of Benaal 
and U.P., matters wore postponed to be settled, which were agreed upon 
at the Congress-Leaoue Joint Session mr>t from Df^rember 25-28, 1916, at 
Lucknow iMider the Presidentship of Jinnah, v;ho drafted the scheme, known 
as 'Lucknow Pad ?!•. 
The Lucknow Pact, 1916 
The scheme postulated representative government and Dominion Status 
and direct election by the people on as broad a franchise as possible 
and recognised separate electorates for Muslims with a weightage of 
seats in excess of their proportion of the population in areas where 
they were in minority. According to the scheme, the question of alloca-
tion of seats in the Legislative Co^mcil was almost dead and the Congress 
28 
and the League felt satisfied, and welcomed the scheme. But in U.P, and 
the Punjab, the Hindus resented. The Al]-India Hindu Mahasabha and the 
local Hindu Sabhas denounced the Pact due to the excessive representation 
given to the Muslim minorities. On the other hand, the conservative 
Muslims in Bengal demanded 52% instead of 40?4 seats and in Bombay they 
25. Syed Ali Nabi to Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, October 19, 
1915, Municipal 1915, 230 E No. 58, upS. 
26. S.S. Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan : A13-India Muslim League 
Documents, 1906-24 (Nev; Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co., 1982), 
Vol, I, p. 378. 
27. See for details of proportion of Muslim representation, Mushirul 
Hasan, n, 23, p. 72. 
28. The Tribune (Lahore), December 29, 1916. 
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demanded 36% of the sears. The ulema of Deoband demanded: (a) an Alim to 
be appointed to each Legislative Council; (b) the Wakfs and the mosques 
to be placed under the charge of the Sheikhul Islam; and (c) the dismute 
amongst Muslims to be settled in accordance with Muslim Personal Law, 
Due to these differences, the Memoranda,submitted to Montague and 
Chelmsford, indicated no common political demands and communal interests 
varied from class to class and region to region. 
Dr. Lai Bahadur stated: 
"The fact was that in regard to communal adjustment the 
Congress/ generally speaking suffered from self-delusion. 
Nothing could be done more head-strong than to hope for 
the disapnearance of separate electorate after 10 years of 
its birth. The evil could easily be nipped in the bud, but 
it v/as allowed to grow till it served an easy stepping stone 
for the demand of Pakistan". 
He holds that the Pact v;as the evidence of the tactful bankruptcy 
of the Congress leaders and their helpless lack of shrev:dness as they 
could not visualise that the concession would tear the nation for ever 
into two communities and the division of the country would be inevitable. 
He concludes that "The Lucknow Pact demanded a heavy toll of the 
country's sacrifice and thp price was naid in the formation of Pakistan". 
Non-Brahmin and Sikh Movements 
The non-Brahmin movement began in 1916-17, under the leadership 
of Dr, C. Sankaran Nair (1857-1934), vrho was President of the Indian 
National Congress in 1897; Judge of the Madras High Court during 1908-15; 
and was then a Member of Governor-General's Coxmcil (1915-19), The 
"non-Brahmins demanded soecial representation either through separates 
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or through reservation of seats in joint electorates". Further, the 
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Sikhs, who formed only 11 per cent of the population in Punjab claimed 
special representation and weightage in the Councils "on historical, 
34 
political and economic grounds", as they were the rulers of Punjab for 
seventy years and had stood by the British in 1857, These demands also 
strengthened the idea of separate homeland. 
Keith observed that the idea of a separate Muslim homeland vas in 
the air even long before as early as 1919: 
"Among the Muslims also there war, propagated a wild but not 
negligible scheme for the creation of a Muslim State based on 
Afghanistan and embracing all those North-Western areas where 
the faith is strong. Such a State would inevitably form a 
permanent source of danger in India", 
British Declaration of Self-Government, 1917 
In November, 1916, Lord Chelmsford, who had assumed the office of 
Governor-General on April 5, 1916, in his despatch to the Secretary of 
State, accepted self-government as the goal for India and enlarqcd the 
powers of the provincial councils by extending the electorate and increas-
ing the elective element. Edwin Samuel Montagu, on August 20, 1917, 
became the Secretary of State for India 1n place of Lord Chamberlain, 
who had resigned. Montagu, on August 20, 1917, announced in the House 
of Commons: "The policy of His Majest-^ '^s Government ... is that of the 
increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration 
and the gradual development of self-government institutions" and "resnon-
36 
sible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire", 
which realised the infinite divisions of India. The people believed that 
if Parliamentary government would be formed "the electorate will be at 
the mercy of a small coterie of politicians who will use their power to 
37 
exalt themselves". Therefore, Montagu left Indians "to tr\r to set things 
right for themselves, and to learn by suffering from their own mistakes". 
Montagu visited India and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report saw the light of 
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t he day on Apr i l 12, 1918 (publ ished in J u l y , 1918). The Report d id 
n o t s a t i s f y any coinmunity. However, i t i n t e n s i f i e d t h e e f f o r t s of t h e 
Congress and the League t o acqu i r e t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s . Three months 
l a t e r , t h e F i r s t World V7ar came t o an end. 
Gandhi and Kh i l a f a t Movement 
During the per iod from 1916 t o 1921, t he Hindu-Muslim un i ty 
cont inued . On September 21 , 1919, an A l l - I n d i a Cen t r a l K h i l a f a t Committee 
(AICKC) was founded and Local Khi l a fa t Comm-ittecs and D i s t r i c t Kh i l a f a t 
Comm-ittees were organised throughout the coun t ry . In November, 1919, 
Jamia t -u l -Ulema- i -Hind (The Socie ty of Ind ian Theologians) was founded 
under the i n f l u e n c e of Maulana Abdul Bar! of Luclcnow. Gandhi j i was 
e l e c t e d P r e s i d e n t of t h e AICKC on November 24, 1919. As t h e B r i t i s h 
planned ha r sh terms on Turkey, aiming i t s dismemberment, Hasra t Mohani 's 
r e s o l u t i o n for boyco t t of B r i t i s h goods was adopted in s p i t e of G a n d h i j i ' s 
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formidable opposition, Gandhiji, to make the new Reforms Bill a success, 
did not liXe to create any hinderence in furtherance of the Congress 
policies. Therefore, at the Amritsar Congress session by the end of 
December/ 1919, Gandhiji got passed a resolution to cooperate with the 
Gove mmen t. 
The Government of India Act, 1919 
On the basis of renorts of the Franchise Committee, the Function 
Committee and the Committee on Home Administration, th"^  Government of 
India drafted a Bill, which received the Royal assent on December 23, 1919, 
which is known as the Government of India Act, 1919. 
In each of the nine provinces, the Governors had an Executive 
Council and a Legislative Council. The members of the Executive Council 
were nominated by the Governors and the members of the Legislative Council 
were chosen by the Governor from amongst the members of the Legislature. 
The 'Reserved Subject' were dealt by the Executive Council and the 
'Transferred Subjects' were administered by the Legislative Council, 
There were two houses: the Central liegislative Assembly and the 
Council of State. The former consisted of 145 members (103 elected + 4 2 
nominated (25 officials + 17 non-officials) - 51 elected by general 
39. Indulal Yajnik, Gandhi As I Know Him (Delhi: Danish Mahal, 1943), 
p. 151. 
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constituencies + 32 commxonal constituGncies (30 by Muslims and 2 by 
Sikhs), 20 by special constituencies (7 by landholders, 9 by Enropf^ans 
and 4 by Indian Commerce). The latter consisted of 60 members (33 
elected and 27 nominated by the Governor-General), 
The Constitution was based on the Montagu-Chelmsford Report and 
•orovided for separate Muslim electorates, as envisaged in the Lucknow 
Pact of 1915. As Montagu was personally opposed to the principle of 
communal representation and regarded it a "great mistake" of Morley and 
Minto in 1909, the ' communal representation v/as not accorded in any 
42 province where Muslims formed a majority of the voters. However, the Act 
introduced responsive government in the Centre. The Congress demanded 
' responsible government' . The new Assembly recommended for r^ v^ising the 
Act. The Conaress and the Muslim Leaoue boycotted the elections in 1920 
as a result the Moderates captured the seats. C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru 
entered the Assembly to adopt method of "wrecking legislatures from 
within". 
Jinnah's Resignation from the Muslim League 
At the AIML Session at Amritsar in December/ 1919, the Muslim League 
censured the Government for its atrocities at the Jalianwala Bagh, 
expressed strong resentment at the proposed dismemberment of Turkey, 
showed unflinching loyalty to the Sultan of Turkey, demanded the recall 
of the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford from India and decided not to sacrifice 
cow on the occasion of Id-ul-Azha. The Muslim League was dominated by 
the Khilafat leaders and the country was echoing with shouts of "Ali 
Bhaion Ki Jai" and "Gandhiji Ki Jai". Jinnah supported the non-cooperation 
programme of Gandhiji but he was apprehensive of Gandhiji's influence. 
Gandhiji chaired the Home Rule League (Swaraj Sabha) Bombav meeting 
on October 3, 1920, and proposed "To secure complete Swaraj for India". 
Jinnah argued that "Attainment of self-government within the British 
Commonwealth ... by constitutional methods" remained the Sabha's best 
goal, which only he could accept. Gandhiji remarked that those opposing 
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the majority's decision were "free" to "resign" from the Sabha as a 
r e su l t Jinnah with his 18 members l e f t the meeting and on October 27,1920, 
43 
resigned from the Muslim League "with great sorrow", because the league 
members were euloging Gandhiji more than the Hindus for his participation 
and cooperation in the Khilafat Movement. This v;as Jinnah' s first "shudder" 
of apprehension which caused him to uproot his faith in Gandhiji or his 
judgment to save India from being "shattered" and which led to the 
partition of India. 
Jinnah's Resignation from the Congress 
GandhiJi at the Nagpur meeting of the Subjects Committee on 
December 28, 19 20, amending the Congross creed, proposed "the attainment 
of Swaraj by the people of India by al] legitimate and peaceful means". 
Jinnah immediately objected that it was impractical and thought it 
drTngerous to the Muslim 1nterep;ts lo dlnsolve "the British connection" 
without greater preparation for independence, but Jinnah was shouted 
and voted down the next day. When he mounted to the dias, he was "howled 
45 down with cries of 'shame', 'shame' and 'political imposter'. He, however, 
appealed and argued, but the irate audience, mostly Hindus, and Gandhiji 
did not answer his appeal and drove him from the platform. This was 
Jinnah's most bitter humiliating experience of his public life. He left 
Nagour by the next train and his hopes of National leadership w^re buried 
that day. The memory of his defeat always emblazoned on his brain, which 
forced him to wait and stand exclusively for the cause of Muslims, if 
required. Thus, Gandhiji's humiliating attitude may be held responsible 
for making Jinnah determinant to achieve Pakistan. However, Jinnah, as 
a protest against the 'pseudo-religious approach to polities', resigned 
from the Congress. He warned the futility of the Gandhi-Khilafat express, 
which became manifest when Gandhiji, after the Chauri Chaura episode, 
on February 5, 1922, called off the Non-Cooperation Movement and Abdul 
Bari at Ajmere on March 5, 1922, charged Gandhiji for not laijnching the 
Non-Cooperation Movement and Dr. M.A. Ansari called the Maulana a 
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release, he launched a Shuddhi Movement and Moonji started Sangathan 
Movement. The Hindu Sabha was refounded as the Hindu Mahasabha towards 
the end of 19 22, to counter the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, which campaigned Tabligh 
and Tanzim Movements. In 1923, the Arya Samaj reconverted four and a half 
lakhs of Malalchana Rajputs, which caused 112 major 'communal riots'between 
19 23 and 19 27. The Kohat riots broke out in August, 19 24. Gandhiji 
49 
"considered the Muslims the prosecutors and the Hindus the prosecuted". 
He refused to settle the Hindu-Muslim disputes,even when the Ali Brothers, 
Dr. M.A. Ansari, Maulana A.K. Azad and Dr. Mahmud, approached him. Instead, 
in May, 19 24, he said: "The Mussalman as a rule is a bully and the Hindu 
is a cowar§", which added fuel to the fire of commional entanglement. 
The riots strengthened the impression among the Muslim masses that 
their life, land and property v7ould not be safe in Congress ruled India 
with a massive Hindu majority. This feeling naturally made them think of 
a better solution of their anticipated dangers and they appeared to find 
it readily in the proposition of a separate homeland for the Muslims. 
However, on September 18, 19 24, Gandhiji announced a fast of 21 days 
appealing for Hindu-Muslim accord. 
Bengal Pact, 19 23 
In the 1923 elections, the Swarajists formed ministries in the 
Central Provinces and secured substantial number of seats in Bombay, and 
U.P. Legislative Councils as also in the Central Legislative Assembly. 
In Bengal, they were able to prevent formation of any ministry. 
In December, 1923, the Bengal Swarajya Party formulated the 'Bengal 
Pact', which "provided inter alia for separate rerresentation to Muslims 
in the Bengal Council on a population basis; for representation on local 
bodies in the proportion of 60:40 accordingly as their community was in 
a majority; and for the grant of 55 per cent of Government appointments 
to Muslims", but the Congress Coconada Session rejected the Pact and 
drafted the "Indian National Pact". In early 19 24, the Punjab Muslim 
League drew up a third pact. These pacts, instead of bringing about 
communal harmony made the situation worse. 
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Lala Lajpat Ral ' s Pa r t i t i on Proposal^ 1924 
52 
Lala Lajpat Rai wrote in 1924: 
"Punjab should be par t i t ioned into two provinces, the 
VTestern Punjab with a large Muslim majority, to be a Musli 
Qovemed province; and the Eastern Punjab, with a large 
Hindu-Sikh majority, to be a non-Muslim governed provinco". 
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R.C. Majumdar wr i t e s : "Lala Lajpat Rai 'suggested the creation of 
Moslem provinces in the nor th-eas t and north-west of India . . . to se t 
a t r es t the ceaseless Hindu-Muslim bickerings and jea lous ies in some 
provinces". 
Communal Ideas of Hindus 
The Shuddhi and Sangathan Movements, the Arya Samaj, the Hindu 
Mahasabha and the Swaraj Party were i^roud of Hindu ^ nationalism and 
openly worked for Hindu domination, but the Congress was somewhat better 
than them in viev; of its proclamation of secular ideas. It v;as tragic 
that the Congressmen did not condemn the anti-Muslim propaganda carried 
out by the conservative Congress leaders. For instance, Lala lajpat Rai 
at Ambala sale: 
"0 Hindusl do not bother if such and such a man is an agent 
of the Government ... We need men now who in the interests 
of the Hindus will cooperate with the Government". 
55 
Bhai Parmand, in his book, Hindu Sangathan and Arya Samaj,wrote; 
"They (Hindus) should join wi+-h the Government to weaken 
the Muslim.s, and so enhance Hindu strength; and after we 
have increased our power in this v/ay, then we try to get 
Swaraj". ^^ 
C.S. Anka Ayer at Nagina said: 
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"Swaraj means the rule of the majority. It follows that the 
greatest service to Hindu solidarity that can be rendered is 
to strengthen the Indian National Congress, in which Hindus 
predominate". 
Likewise, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Swami Shradhanand,Dr.Moonje, 
Savarkar and others were engaged in anti-Muslim activities. In contrast, 
when Dr. Kichlev/ started similar Muslim movements, the League and the 
Khilafat leaders stood aloof. Mahomed Ali complained that Motilal Nehru 
said: "at election times he could in no circumstances be expected to 
oppose the Hindu Maha Sabha's unseemly activities". Rajpal, who wrote 
Ranqila Rasul (The Colourful Prophet) was, by Justice Dilipsingh, in 
July, 1927, acquitted of the charges aaainst him. None of the Hindu 
leaders, even Gandhiji, said nothing. Motilal Nehru saids "I have nothing 
to say". 
Lord Birkenhead's Declaration, 1925 
The Congress refused to cooperate in the working of the reforms, 
lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State, on July 7, 1925, declared: "let 
them produce a constitution v;hich carries behind it a fair measure of 
general agreement among the great people of India". He thought that 
Hindu-Mus]im agreement on a common constitution would not be possible, 
and, thus, the British rule would continue, 
Jinnah's Revitalisation of the Muslim League 
The Muslim League due to fall of the Khilafat Movement had become 
leaderless as their leaders had lost their influence so much so that one 
of its meetings was adjourned for lack of a quorum. At this juncture, 
Jinnah, who was elected member of the Legislative Assembly in September, 
1923 elections, had drafted a "national demand",minority report by the 
end of 1924 and alwavs spoke in defence of invididual rights and equal 
justice, full religious liberty to all communities, began to advocate 
separate electorates for Muslims, since joint electorates were deemed 
a "source of discord and disunion" as well as "wholly inadequate to 
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achieve the object of effective representation". Jinnah was appointed 
by the League to frame a scheme for a constitution for the government 
of India. He came forward to fight for the cause of Muslims and revived 
the Muslim League in 1925 "for the art\r.alation of Muslim political 
demands such as commxHial representation in the legislative bodies, 
extension of separate electorates to local bodies, and reservation of 
seats In public service". Jinnah aimed to regain the influence which he 
had lost during the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements. He was elected 
permanent President of the Muslim League in 1924 for three years. 
Jinnah' s Conference, 1927 
The Conference, presided over by Jinnah, was held in Delhi on 
March 20, 1927, and was attended also by Dr. M.A, Ansari, Mahomed Ali, 
H, Yaqub, M. Ismail, Ali Nabi and the Raja of Mahmudabad besides Muslim 
leaders from the Punjab, Bihar, Delhi and Bombay. Jinnah still had faith 
in the Congress dominated by Gandhlji, The Conference agreed to forego 
separate electorates if their following four demands were accented by 
6 3 
the Congress, in toto:-
1, That Muslim representation in the Bengal and Punjab Legislative 
Councils would be in pronortion to their population; 
2, That Muslims would be allowed one-third of the seats in the 
Central Legislature; 
3. That Sind be separated from Bombay Presidency and constituted 
as an i\ndependent province; and 
4. That Reforms be introduced in the NWFP and in Baluchistan on 
the same footing as in any other province in India", 
The demands were later endorsed by the All-India Muslim League, 
the All-India Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. 
Motilal f^ehru and Srinivas Iyengar persuaded the All-India Conaress 
Committee and the Congress Working Committee to adopt Jinnah's proposals 
at its Bombay session to be held on March 15, 1927, in order to maintain 
Hindu-Muslim unity. Hindus bitterly condemned the Congress for"accepting 
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the Muslim demand for representation in the Legislatures in proportion 
to their population", and "for recognising tho nn" nciple of partition 
along the 'permanent lines of religious cleavages'". 
lord Birkenhead' s Declaration^ 1.927 
The Congress at its Madras session in 1927, resolved to boycott 
the Simon Commission and proclaimed indenendencc as its goal and to 
place a draft constitution before a Special Convention. Lord Birkenhead, 
in November, 1927, repeated his challenge that Indians should put forward 
their own suggestion for a constitution. Consequently, the INC authorised 
the Working Committee to draft a Swaraj constitution for India. 
Rift in the Muslim League, -1927 
As Mian Mohammad Shafi (ex-Law Minister) and Firoz Khan Noon, the 
landed aristocrates, backed by a small group mostly from the Punjab, 
voted at Lahore to welcome and coooerate with the Simon Commission, most 
of the members of the League's Council joined 'Jinnah Group' In Calcutta 
on December 30, 1927, and New Year's Day, 1928. Annie Besant and Sarojini 
Naidu were the honoured guests. The Aga Khan was to preside, but he 
withdrew at the last moment, Mohammad Yakub delivered the presidential 
address. It resolved that "the Musalmans throughout the country should 
have nothing to do v;ith the Commission at any stage or in any form", and 
re-elected Jinnah as permanent President of the League for another three 
years. The Shafi Group Manifesto v/as signed by the Punjab Muslim leaders 
- Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, Abdul Qayyum, Mian Abdul Haye and 
Maulvi Mahomed Ali. Jinnah's Manifesto was signed by Mohammad Alam, 
Hissam-ud-Din, Chaudhuri Afzal Hag, Mazhnr Ali Azhar and Mohammed Sharif. 
All-Parties Conference, 19 28 
Cn February 12, 1928, at the Delhi Conference, G.B. Pant and Madan 
Mohan Malaviya rejected Jinnah's Delhi proposal regarding the principle 
of reservation of seats in favour of any majority commvinity in any province 
and "cleared that it considered separate electorates a lesser evil than 
64. MUShirul,Hasan, n. 23, p. 268. 
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66 the creation of new p r o v i n c e s " . Daulat Ram, Moonje and l a j p a t Rai 
s t rong ly opposed the Congress reso l i i t ion r e l a t i n g to t h e c r ea t i on of an 
67 independent Sind p rov ince , and, backed by the Nehrus and o t h e r Congress-
68 
men, demanded that the issue of Sind be reviewed again, to which Jinnah, 
Hasrat Mohani and Mahomed Ali argued that as the Jinnah's proposals 
(March, 19 27) were once agreed upon by the Congress leaders, they had 
no right to change their opinion, and, henc^, they decided to boycott 
the All-Parties Conference. 
All-Parties Conferenc/', March, 1928 
The Conference held in Delhi on March 9, 1928, considered the 
league's resolution and opined to devise "a svstem of election on the 
principle of proportional representation by a single transferable vote 
or some other similar method", and appointed two committees - one to 
investiaate into the whole matter of communal representation and the 
second to enquire into the financial aspect of the separation of Sind. 
However, the prospects of the All-Parties Conference became quite 
gloomy and Motilal Nehru criticised the Hindu Mahasabha and the .Muslim 
League equally. He declared that he would stand by the Madras resolution!, 
which accepted Jinnah's proposals and in order to achieve this end, he 
expressed desire even to dissociate some of the communal parties like 
the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha "if they were dissatisfied v/ith 
It". Jawaharlal Nehru was hopeless to find a "common formula", and the 
League refused to attend any Conference unless the Delhi proposals were 
accepted by all the political parties. 
All-Parties Conference, June, 19 28 
The Conference,held in Delhi on June 22-24, 19 28, appointed a 
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Committee of ten members under the Chairmanship of Motilal Nehru to draw 
up a constitution for India. 
Informal Conference^ July, 1928 
Motilal Nehru called on an Informal Conference on July 1, 192R, 
which accepted reservation of seats for Muslims in majority provinces 
for ten years, but on July 8, the resolution was modified by "only the 
reseirvation of seats for minorities in both central and provincial 
legislatures was permitted", 
Motilal Nehru and Sapru observed that separation of "Religion" 
from "Politics" was the only remedy of the communal tangle and favoured 
separate representation for Muslims, due to which they were opposed to 
the Hindus, 
Nehru Committee Report, August, 19 28 
The Report, submitted on August 10, was published on A'lgtJist 15,1928, 
It recommended "Full responsible government on the model of tl;ie constitu-
tion of self-governing Dominions" and acceded to the Dominion Status; 
federal constitution inviting Indian States to join, retaining their 
position in the new "Commonwealth of India as they occupied at present 
in the Indian EmpirS", The All-Parties Conference met at Lucknow from 
28 to 30 August, 19 28, The Conference, aoproved the Report but a group 
of Congressmen, including Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose,opposed 
the 'Dominion Status' and advocated 'Complete Independence', 
The Report annexed Sind to the -NWFP but rejected the Muslim demand 
for reservation of seats in the Punjab and Bengal, The Report in the 
Hindu-majority provinces reserved seats for Muslim minorities in propor-
tion to the population both in the central and the provincial legislat\jr es 
and the principle of weightage and separate electorates were done away 
with. The Muslims divided into two groups. The first group of the 
Nationalist Muslims (Azad, Dr. Ansari and T.A,K. Sherwani) supported the 
Report wholeheartedly. The second (Sir Mohammad Shafi and his followers) 
74, Rerxjrt of the Committee Aptxpinted by the Conference to Determine the 
Principles of the Constitution for India ( Nehru Report ),TAllahabad; 
All-Parties Conference Publications, 1928), p. 50, 
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adopted a non possunrus (we cannot) . The third (led by The Aga Khan) 
opposed and held that the Hindus were determined to secure power for 
themselves. The fourth (led by Jinnah) rejected the Report. Jinnah had 
left for England in May, 19 28, and v;hen he returned after six months, 
he expressed indignation and disapproved of the Report. In U.P., the 
Congress faced stiff opposition, because leaders like Hasrat Mohani,Azad 
Subhani, Shafi Daudi and the Ali Brothers "considered 'Dominion Status' 
76 
inconsistent with the spirit of Islam". 
All-Parties National Convention, December, 1928 
A Convention under the Presidentship of Dr. M.A. Ansari was held 
in Calcutta on December 28, 19 29, to consider the Nehru Report and the 
proposed constitution. Jinnah, on behalf of the Muslim League, and 
Tassaduq Ahmad Khan Sherwanl, on behalf of the CKC, put forward six 
77 
amendments to the Nehru Report, as follows:-
"1, A majority of four-fifths of the two houses first sitting 
separately and then together would be necessary for the amendment 
or alteration of the constitution by Parliament; 
2, the Punjab pact regarding communal representation should be 
incorporated in the Nehru Report". 
These two amendments were adopted by the Convention, but the later 
four amendments regarding one-third of the elected representatives, 
reservation of seats in the Pimjab and Bengal, residuary powers to the 
provinces and separation of Slnd were rejected, as a result Jinnah left 
the Convention in protest. Jinnah "joined the groups of Muslims led by 
78 The Aga Khan and Sir Mohammad Shafi, and organised a united opposition", 
and, founded the 'All-Parties Muslim Conference'. 
All-Parties Muslim Conference, December, 19 28 - January, 19 29 
The Conference held 1n Delhi on December 31,1928 - January 1,1929, 
79 
and accepted the Jinnah's five-point proposal, as follows:-
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1. The only form of Government suitable to Indian conditions was 
federal s^ 'Stem with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested 
in the constituent status. 
2. Muslims should not be deprived of their right to elect their 
representative through separate electorates without their consent. 
3. Muslims should continue to have weJghtage in the Hindu majority 
provinces and they were willing to accord the same privilege to 
non-Muslim minorities in Sind, the NWFP and Baluchistan. 
4. Muslims should have their due share in the Central and Provincial 
cabinets. 
5. Muslim majority in all Muslim majority provinces should in no 
way be disturbed. 
Fcindation of the All-India Muslim Conference, March, 19 29 
At the ML Co'incil meeting on March 3, 1929, under the Presidentship 
of The Aga Khan, the All-India Muslim Conference (AIMC) v;as founded, 
which was joined by Jinnah, Shaukat Ali, Shafi Daudi, Iqbal and Sir 
Mohammad Yaqub. 
Jinnah's Fourteen Points, March, 1929 
At the AIML Council meeting he]d on March 28, 1929, it was emphasised 
that no scheme for the future constitution of the Government of India 
will be acceptable to the Muslims until and unless provisions were 
embodied therein to safeguard their rights and interests. Jinnah accommoda-
ted the various yiewS" in his fourteen points,which" were adopted by the 
80 
Council. These points were as follows:-
"1. The form of the future constitution should be federal, with the 
residuary powers vested in the provinces. 
2,' A uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all provinces. 
3. All legislatures in the country and other elected bodies shal] 
be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective 
representation of minorities in every Province without reducing 
the majority in any Province to a minority or even eauality. 
4. In the Central legislature, Mussalman representation shall not 
be less than one-third. 
5. Representation of communal groups shall continue to be, by means 
of separate electorates as at present, provided that it shal3 be 
open to any commionity, at any time, to abandon its separate 
electorate in favour of joint electorate. 
80. Ibid., pp. 245-47. See also The Indian Annual Register, Vol.1, 1929; 
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Sw Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary 
shall not in any vay, affect the Muslim majority in Punjab, 
Bengal and N.W.F. Province. 
7. Full religious liberty, i.e. liberty of belief, worship and 
observance/ propaganda, association and education, shall be 
guaranteed to al] communities. 
8. No bill or resolution or any pnrt thereof shall be passed In any 
legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the 
members of any community in that particular body oppose such a 
bill, resolution or part thereof, on the ground that it would be 
injurious to the interests of that community or in the alternative, 
such other method is devised as mav be found feasible and 
practicable to deal with such cases. 
9. Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency. 
10. Reforms should be introduced in the N.W.F. Province and Baluchistan 
on the same footing as in other provinces. 
11. Provision should be made in the constitution giving Muslims an 
adequate share along v;ith the other Indians, in al] the services 
of the State and in local self-governing bodies having due regard 
to the requirements of efficiency. 
12. The Constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the 
Drotection of Moslem cu]ture and for the nrotection and Dromotion 
of Moslem education, language, religion, personal lav;s and 
Moslem charitable institutions and for their due share in the 
grants-in-aid given by the State and by local self-aoverning bodies, 
13. No cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be formed without 
there being a proportion of at least one-third Moslem Ministers. 
14. No change shall be made in the constitution by the Central 
Legislature except with the concurrence of the states constituting 
the Indian Federation", 
Zaruri Allan (important Declaration) 
The All-Parties Muslim Conferonce released Zaruri Allan urging 
the Muslims to abstain from the Congress participation. The nationalist 
Muslims also carried on a vigorous propaganda against the Nehru Report. 
Dr. M.A. Ansari, Jinnah and Mahomed Ali "regarded the settlement of the 
communal problem as the sine qua non for India's participation in the 
freedom strugale". Jinnah stressed: "unless the majority community and 
their leaders grasp that elementary principle (political demands of 
.Muslims) and deal with it in that spirit it will not be nossible to get 
82 
the minority community' into line with any national programme". 
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Attitude of Hindu Politicians Towards Jlnnah's Demands 
Saroiini Naidu tried to arrange a meeting between Gandhiji and 
83 
Jinnah. Jayakar wrote to Gandhiii not to yield to Muslim demand.Malaviva, 
Lajpat Rai and Moonje though paid lip-service to the Congress ideals 
but used "communal olatform as a means of rallying public support and 
84 „ 
made concessions to commnnal feelings which were already running high" 
in vie'-' of recurring riots. They "assumed the nationalist garb and 
85 freely sailed between the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress", and created 
a wedge between Hindu and Muslim Swarajists, Malaviya, Lajpat Rai and 
Moonje "moved in and out of communal politics with remarkable ease". 
They had strong links with religious and revivalist bodies throughout 
India and the Congressmen had to rely on their support. Hence, Motilal, 
Jav7aharlal, Gandhiji and Sapru comi^letely succumed to their pressure 
and ceased to negotiate v;ith the Muslims. The Muslim League "could find 
87 * 
no way of reconciling their fears of Hindu domination". Maulana Azad 
remarked: "The Muslims v/ere fools to ask for safeguards and the Hindus 
88 
were greater fools to refuse them". However, Hindu-Muslim differences 
grew stronger leading to the demand for partition of India. 
Civil Disobedience Movement, 1930 
Gandhiji launched the Civil Disobedience Movement in March, 1930, 
but as Shafat Ahmad argued it would be 'suicidal' to the Muslims and 
at Lucknow he asserted that the movement without the cooperation of 
the Muslims would not be successful, the Muslims in the Leaoue-fold 
did not participate. As no fruitful result came out, the movement 
gradually died like a door-nail by August, 1933. 
Round Table Conferences ' 
On October 31, 1929, Lord Irwin announced that H.M. Government 
intended to confer Dominion Status uoon India and called upon all the 
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parties to assembly in London to express views before proposals for 
the future constitution of India was placed before the British Parliament. 
The First RTC commenced on November 12, 1930, the second on September 7, 
1931, and the third on November 17, 193 2. The Congress and the leaoue 
proposals for settlement of communal problems'v/ere put fonvard but the 
question could not be solved. Hindus and Sikhs did not agree with the 
Muslim demands. The main problem was that the Hindus wanted their majority 
in some provinces with a strong centre, while in certain other the 
Muslims wanted to dominate. 
As all the parties consented, the Prime Minister came forward 
with his A^ 'ard on the communal problem, and announced the 'Communal 
Award' on August 16, 1932. 
ML Session, Allahabad, Docomber, 1930 rlgbal's Idea of Pakistan 
Jinnah and his leacue leaders on their return from England after 
attending the First RTC, met at Allahabad in December, 1930. Iqbal 
emphasised the "Muslim nationality, and rejected the notion that India 
was a social lanit-/". He said: "India is an Asia in miniature, India is 
a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking 
90 different languages and professing different religions". Thus, he 
proclaimed the 'two-nation' theory, on the basis of which he put forth 
his pl=in for a separate State for tbo Muslims a^ a solution of the 
Hindu-Muslim deadlock. He sain:-
"I would like to see the Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan 
amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the 
British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation 
of a consolidated North-VJest Indian Muslim State appears to 
me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of Morth-
West India, I, therefore, demand the formation of a consolidated 
Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam". 
Observing that "the Hindus anc* the Muslims had diffe'-ences based 
on culture, caste and religion and as such the tvo comrunities could 
92 93 
not live in harmony", Iqbal in his presidential address said:-
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"If the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full 
and free development on the lines of his own culture and 
tradition in his ovm Indian homeland, is recognised as the 
basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will 'be ready to 
stake his all for the freedom of India". 
This was the occas-'on when Atlee, as stated by him, heard of 
Pakistan when he v;as a member of the Simon Commission. 
Iqbal's contention was to create Muslim majority areas within India 
v.'here Islamic culture could flourish and he certainly did not advocate 
a separate sovereign state for Muslims •'•'ithout political or administra-
tive connect'-'on with India as advocated by the Muslim Leanue and Jinnah. 
94 
"He did not envisage the partition of India". He advocated "Muslim 
95 
India-within India" by the creation of an autonomous state based on the 
unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic 
interest,which was desired also by Jinnah, Mahomed Ali, Shaukat Ali and 
Muhamma-^ Shafl. However, he "undoubtedly orovided the Muslims v/ith an 
ideological weapon which was used by tho Muslim leadership as the basis 
for (the demand of) a separate Mus]in Homeland". One can agree that what 
Iqbal, in effect,had done was to state the proposition of I.ajpat Rai(l924) 
in his own intellectual manner and provide it with a scholar's logic and 
reasoning. Lajpat Rai had proposed partition of Punjab; and Bengal 
(according to Majtimdar), but Iqbal suggested creation of a Muslim state 
in north-west India only. Howeveir, labal's address "gradi:allv led to the 
98 idea that India is not one nation". Iqbal's idea, hov/ever, v/as later 
given more elaborate shape by Rahmat Ali and thus, Jinnah> a^ve credit 
to Iqbal for initiating the move for an inde^^endent sovereign state in 
QQ 
the Indian sub-continent. 
Dr. Iqbal is said to have sngqested the creation of a separate 
Muslim state, on the basis of his letter written to Jinnah on May 28,1^9?: 
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"But the enforcement and development of the Sharlat of Islam 
is Impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or 
states. This has been my honest conviction for many years 
and I still believe this to be the only way .,, It is necessary 
to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim 
stater, with absolute majorities. Do not you think fhat the time 
for such a demand has alread^r arrived?" 
He wrote to Jinnah again on June 2\, 
"In this connection, it is obvious tha'- the only way to 
peaceful India is a distribution o^ the countrv on the ]ines 
of racial, reliaious and linouis-t-ic af-Pinities". 
Iqbal, criticisino the Governnont of India Act, 1935, condemned 
102 
the idea of a single Indian Federation:-
"A separate federation of Muslim 'provinces reformed on the 
lines I have suggested above is the only course by which we 
can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the 
domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of 
North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled 
to self-determination just as other nations in India and 
outside India are? ..." 
Dr. Iqbal emphasised that " t-he life of Islam as a cultural force 
in this country very largely depends on its centralisation in a 
specified territon/ and in "possessing full opportunity of development 
within the body politic of India, the North-West Indian Muslims will 
prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion". He did 
not, however, envisage an exislicit partition of India, He only professed 
the League's demand for an Indian federation comprising Muslim majority 
provinces. Rahmat Ali writes: "By the vrord 'state', he meant not a 
separate or sovereian state but a big province within and as a part of 
104 
the proposed Indian federation". Iqbal's proposition was given shape by 
Rahmat Ali, who pioneered the partition scheme and coined the v?ord 
'Pakistan' in 1933. 
101. S.S. Pirzada, Ibid., Letter from Iqbal to Jinnah dated June 21, 
1937, pp. 140-41. 
102. Ibid. 
103. Shamloo, n. 93, p. 11. 
104. C. Rahmat Ali, Pakistan; The Fath^rl^nd of the Pak tiation 
(Cambridge: The Pak National Li be ra'tio'n "Movement, 3rd edn.,1947), 
pp. 219-20. 
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Probable Sources of the Ideas of Iqbal 
Iqbal was a poet and a philosopher and had a great intellect of 
deriving inspiration from the realities of the day-to-day life. Being 
studious, he might have learnt about the ideas of other leaders. In 19 21, 
Nadir Ali of Agra had written a pamphlet in which he discussed the 
partition of India and suggested the principles on which the Hindu-Muslim 
problem could be settled in India. In 1923, Mohammed Gul Khan, a tribal 
chief "suggested the establishment of separate homelands for Muslims in 
the North-West extending as far as Agra". In 1924, Maulana M.ohammed All 
said that if the Hindu-Muslln problem is not settled India will be divided 
into Hindu-India and Muslim-India". In 1925, Lala Hardyal said that "a 
joint Hindu-Muslim State is sheer nonsense, which under no circumstances 
can exist". In 1928, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi spolce something of Pakistan 
or the Islamic State criticising the government that it was foreign 
109 
and un-Islamic in character. On August 21, 1931, Madina, a nationalist 
paper, quoting a letter from Ploden, stated that there v/as only one 
solution of the Indian problem: "it should be partitioned into Muslim-
India and Hindu-In Who were responsible for such ideas.'' Pandit 
111 Sundcrlal, quoting' in"Unpardonable Crime of Jinnan", replies: 
"The truth may be unplatable to you, but it may be admitted 
that the Hindus themselves are responsible for the cry of 
Pakistan raised by the Muslims, The Pakistan scheme is not 
the scheme of Mr. Jinnah. It is the Hindus who started Pakistan; 
you have a Pakistan in each Hindu household. If a non-Hindu 
comes to your house for water you refuse to give him your 
vessel", 
Rahmat All's Idea of Pakistan 
Rahmat Ali belonged to an orthodox Muslim family. His father's 
teaching that the Muslims should be treated as a distinct nation and not 
105. Ch. Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (lahore: Longmans Green 
& Co,Lt-d,, 1961), D. 237. 
106. Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Cnlture in the Indian Environment 
(London: 1964), p, 257'. 
107. Ch, Khaliquzzaman, n, 105, p, 207. 
108. K.L, Gauba, Consequences of Pakistan (Lahore: 1946), D, 14, 
109. Abdul Majid Daryabadi, Hakimul Ummat, n. 23; quoted in Mo^ 'n Shakir, 
lOiilafat to Partition, n. 18, p.^igO, 
110. Moin Shakir, Ibid. 
111. Ibid,, p. 204, 
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as a minority belonging to Indian nation always influenced his thinking 
and of this feeling, Rahmat Ali write: "I grew with it and it grew 
with mi;" He, from his early childhood, believed that "Muslims are a 
Millat distinct from the caste Hindoo Jati, that our destiny lies in 
integration with other Muslims and not vith the caste Hindus; that among 
other territories the north-western provinces of present day 'India' 
belong to us". His thoughts and arguments found expression for the first 
time in his inaugural address at the Dazm-i-Shibli. He said: 
"North of India is Muslim and v/e will keep it Muslim. Not 
only that, we will make it a Muslim state. But this we can 
do only if and when we and our North cease to be Indian. 
For that is a prerequisite to it, so the sooner v/e shed 
'Indianism' the better for us all and for Islam". 
Rahmat Ali deprecated the "activities of other Muslim leaders" 
115 
as leading to "Indianization of our nation and our lands". He condemned 
the federal ideas, which, according to him, involved the "renunciation 
of Pak nationhood" and the Muslim's acceptance of Indian nationhood. He 
believed the':' absorption by the caste Hindus (of the Muslims)' a 
certainty and its acceptance by the Muslims an act of self-immolation. 
But when in 1933, "the scheme of an all-India federation became a reality 
he became m c e vociferous in his condemnation of this development , 
because, in his viev;, "it portended an immediate peril to the life and 
1 i Q 1 1 Q 
liberty of our nation". Explaining his reaction, he writes;-
"I warned the Muslim delegates, I knew that their action 
had obliterated the twelve centuries of our history, destroyed 
the very foundations of our heritaae and crippled all hopes 
of the fulfilment of our mission. I begged them to realize 
their resoonsibility before Allah and His Rasool and to 
withdraw their demand for the Indian Federal Constitution 
and ask for a separate federation of our north-western 
homelands". 
But when his consuls were not heeded to, he assumed that "Allah 
112. Ibid., p. 214. 
113. Ibid. 
114. Ibid. 
115. Ibid., p. 213. 
116. Ibid., p. 245. 
117. Uma Kaura, n. 69, p. 153. 
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120 had assigned that fateful task to me", and directed his full attention 
for propagating the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims i.e. 
Pakistan. He, in 1933, along with Mohammari Aslam Khan, Shaikh Mohammad 
Sadique and Inayatullah Khan drafted a four page pamphlet entitled, 
"Now or Never", in which he proclaimed "the freedom of the Muslims 
from the British-Bania domination, the release of our nation from the 
sm". He denounced and condemned the activities of the 
deleaates at the Round Table Conference for their stand or the demand 
and supDort to the creation o^ an all-India federation. He derranded 
'recognition of our distinct nationhood in Pakistan', on the one hand, 
122 
and a separate creatiori oi "a ?et?;eratiori of IriOYa" , o-n tV^ e otV.er. Pe 
123 
explained the term 'Pakistan' in the following woras:-
"Pakistan is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is 
composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands 
- 'India' and 'Asian', that is, Punjab, Afghania (North-
West Fronti?r Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sind (including 
KaChch and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan and 
Balochistan. I^ means thp land of the Paks - the spiritually 
pure and clean. It symbolizes the religious beliefs and 
the ethnical stocks of our people and it stands for all 
the territorial constituents of our original Fatherland; 
It "has no other origin and no other meaning; and it does 
not admit of any other interpretation". 
The authors of the 'Pamphlet', explaining the need for the 
establishment of a separate Muslim State in the North West ot India, 
stated - P stands for Punjab, A for Afghanistan, K for Kashmir, S for 
Sind and Tan for Baluchistan. 
Rahmat A]i founded the Pakistan National Movement in 193 3 and 
during 1935 and 1937, established propaganda centres all over the 
proposed regions o-^ Takistan. When the 1935 Act was being discussed, 
Rahmat Ali issued a circular letter on July 8, 1935, from Cambridge, 
which emphasised that "Government of India Bill, based on the Indian 
Federal Scheme has created an acute crisis in the national life of 
Pakistan and has raised a supreme issue - an issue of life or death for 
120« See for details Ibid., pp. 305-306. 
121. Ibid., p. 269. 
122. Ibid., p. 227. 
123. Ibid., p. 225. 
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its national future" and hoped for ful] supnort to the "inexorable 
demand of Pakistan - a demand based on justice and equality - for the 
recognition of its sacred riqht to a separate national existence as 
1 "^S 1 Ifi 
distinct from Hindoostan. He vrote: 
"The very basis and content of our national life is 
foxinded on fundamentals essentially different from those 
on which Hindooism lives and prospers. Our age long 
social system and our ancient national tradition have 
given us a civilization with a philosophy - culture, 
language, a literature and an art basically and funda-
mentally different from that of Hindoostan. This is not 
all. We do not interdine; we do not Intermarry. Our 
national customs and calenders, even our diet and dress 
are different". 
Rahmat Ali emphasised that "geographically also the lands comprising 
Pakistan form a separate and distinct Unit and viewed that "Jumna 
127 
should flow as 'boundary river' between Pakistan and Hindoostan". He 
treated the Tndo-Pakistan nrobi em not ar5 an inter-communa] issvae but 
as an international problem. 
The ideas of Rahmat Ali were brought home by the league delegates, 
who, in their speeches propagated Iqbal's and Rahmat All's views. The 
Indian Muslims in large numbers, siding with the Muslim League, began 
to urge that they "were a 'nation' by themselves, totally different 
from the other 'nations' in India, and as such entitled to exercise 
their right of self-deterTnination and to establish a homeland for them-
selves where they could work out their destiny according to their own 
129 ideas of Islamic culture and polity". It would be worthwhile to conclude 
that Iqbal favoured the 'creation of Muslim India (with-)in India' and 
Rahmat Ali advocated the idea of separation of 'Muslim India' from the 
rest of India. 
A f t e r t h e 1937 e l e c t i o n s were h e l d , I q b a l , on Jxine 2 1 , 1 9 3 7 , w r o t e 
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to Jinnah that 'the idea of a single Indian federation' was 'completely 
hopeless' and that Muslim leaders 'ought at present to ignore Muslim-
minority provinces' and instead concentrate on the creation of a 'separate 
federation of Muslim (-majority) nrovinc-s' in thr north-west and the 
north-eai^? As stated, he vranted a state with enactment of Islamic 
laws (Shariat). This is called 'Pan-Tslamism'. Iqbal's Pan-Islamism was 
thus "based unon the totalitari'-in character of the State in which there 
131 132 
is no distinction between its spiritual and secular domains". Iqbal says:-
"I confess to be a Pan-Islamist. The mission for which Islam 
came into this world will ultimately be fulfilled, the world 
will be purged of infidelity and the worship of false gods, 
and the true soul of Islam will be trixomphant ... Thi-s is the 
kind of Pan-Islamism which I preach". 
Iqbal says that as the Hindus and the Muslims had shown no inclina-
tion to sink their respective individualities in a lar^ jer whole and each 
group is intensely jealous of its collective existence, the unitv of an 
Indian nation "must be sought, not in the negation but in the mutual 
133 harmony and co-operation of the many". But he observed that "attempts to 
discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far fai and 
said that a unitary form of Government is simplv unthinkable to self-
governing India, 
The Government of India Act, 1935 
After the end of the Second RTC, Macdonald had issued the Communal 
Award, which recomm.ended separate electorates for Muslims. It raised a 
storm of opposition of Hirdus. Afte-- the end of the Third RTC, the 
Government cut forth its proposals in March, 1933, which is known as 
the White Paper. A joint Parliamentary Select Committee, appointed to 
discuss the enactment of the Paper, published its R-^ oort on November 11, 
1934, which was redrafted in the form of a Bill, which received the 
Royal assent in August, 1935, and came to be known as the Government of 
130. A llama Muhammad Iqbal, Letters of Iqb-.l to Jinnah (Lahore: Sh, 
Muhammad Ashraf, 1943), r^ p. 17-19. Sec also Riaz Ahmad, Iqba 1' s 
Letters to Quaid-i-Azam (Lahore: Friends Eriucational Service, 
1976) . 
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Ind ia Act/ 1935. The Act envisaged supremacy of t h e B r i t i s h pa r l i ament , 
f edera l form of government/ p r o v i n c i a l autonomy, dyarchy a t the Centre , 
safeguards to B r i t i s h pov;er In tho hands of the Governor-G'^neml and 
the Governors and enumeration of 59 i t ems , v/hich def ined powers o^ both 
135 the Centre and the U n i t s . As tho ComrGS'j and the league both r e j e c t e d 
the Federal scheme, t h e Governor-Goneral on September 11, 1939,suspended 
i t for ever , but e l e c t i o n s on the b a s i s of ' P r o v i n c i a l Autonomy' was 
he ld in 1937. 
Idea of Pakistan after i937_ Slectiqns 
The results of the 1937 elections shocked the Muslim League. In 
the tv^ o Muslim-majority provinces - Bengal and Punjab, they had no 
effective majorities and depended on the sum^ort of non-Leaaue '^ arti'^ s. 
V^hen the separate electorate, which thev consi-^ered to be their "I^ g^na 
Carta, could not -orove effective to vrin the p^lections, they, u] timatelv, 
proposed an all-India federation, that is, the Muslim-majority states 
and the Hindu-majority states should be indenendently joined in a 
federation. It is surprising that labal, on May 28, 1937, wrot-"^  to v"''innafi: 
"... the enforcement and development o^ the Shariat of 
Tslom i^ Impos-.lble Ln tlid ^  countrv without a free Muslim 
State or States ... It is ner-o^sar' to redistribute the 
country and to provi'^e one or more Muslim Statics with 
absolute majorities. Don't •^ o^u think that the -t-ime for 
such a demand has already arrived". 
Iqbal wrote to Jinnah again to make the idea of a Muslim state 
public, but ^ -^ innah, being not a visionary like Iqbal, decided to wait 
137 
until the Muslims "were s'lfPiriently organized and disciplined". Jinnah, 
as a practical and shrev;ed politician, had realized that before demand-
ing the creation of Muslim federated state or states, the Muslim Leaoue 
should have a control of the governments in the Muslim-majority provinces 
at the time the withdrawal of the British was definite, 
Rahmat All, endorsing the viev/s '^f Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and ' 
describing the social and religious di-F-^ erpnc^ s^ between the Hindu-m== jority 
135. Jawaharlal NJehru, The Discover-/ o^ ^ Indira (New ^ ^ork: John Day S^  
Co., 1946), p. 10. ^~ 
•^^ *^ Letters of Iqbal _to_J_innah/ n. 130, pp. 17-19. 
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and the Muslim-minority/ said:-
"Therefore for us to seal our national doom in the interest 
of one Indian nationhood v/ould be a treacher^/ agiinst our 
posterity, a betrayal of our history"- and a crime against 
humanity for which there would be no salvation". 
Til] this time the Muslim I eT'Uf^  hr]r^ not endorsed the i^ ioas of 
Iqbal and Rahmat Ali. 
Jinnah, hov;ever, war. not no Car con f^i dent that India wonld acVii eve 
its independence in that near a future. He was still hoping that the 
Congress and the Muslim league v/ould settle their differences and reach 
an agreement. For the purpose of this settlement, the Congress and the 
league, both tried to come to a settlement on the question of Federation. 
It would appear that partition philosophy was apparently going to 
hurt both the Hindus and the Muslims. Besides, it was also too radinl. 
It would have necessitated shifting of both Hindus and I^ ijslims, in larqe 
numbers, from their native places and environment; it meant starting 
life anew also and problems of big split arising from ones own linqnistic 
'and cultural moorings an^ i environment. The idea of partition, therefore, 
was not hepded to either by the Hindus or by the Muslims. It had to be 
gradually made popular and th'^  scheme of Hindu and Muslim states in a 
federal India with weak centre v/as just a step in that direction. Two 
other effective means which helped to make the idea of partition gradual!" 
poDular were communal hatred fanned by frequent riots and introduction 
of religious factor - a nromisr> o^ a theological polity comina into vogue 
after partition. As .-? predicament, while the use of religious factor 
involved large number o-P Hindu mas'^ es in Conoress movement, likewise a 
large number of Muslims v;ere involved in suoTTort of the idea of partition. 
Federal „Plan 
As was evident from the 1937 election results, the Congres'. ^omed 
ministries in six provinces and the League failed to form ministrv even 
in the five Muslim-majority provinces. The Muslims were ver\r apprehensive 
of the Congress atrocities after the formation of Congress ministries 
in spite of Congress assurances for justice. The Congress, under the 
leadership o^ Gand^^iji, '''as utterly una'-'are o^ the trends of Muslim 
138 R.C. Majumdar, n. 31, p. 537. 
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opinion qoing devastatingly against the Hindu-Muslim unity. Further, 
the Congress was "becoming increasingly metiphysical/ having lost all 
touch with reality, thereby also losing its primary purpose which was 
meant to be political". Moreover, the extremist Hindus also pronounced 
with emphasis on Hindu-Muslim differences. In 1937., V.D. Savarkar 
cle--irlv said: "India cannot be assumed todav to be an uncertain and 
homogeneou? "ation; but on the contrary, there are t'-'o rations in the 
140 „ in, the Hindus and Muslim m India." ma 
Raiendra Prasad wrote to Vallabhbhai Patel on October 11, 
"....we have been wasting, all,ou^. time, and energY^and trying to win over people or doubtrul integrity by douDtfnl means. "^  
This has had its reactions and created prejudice a'^ainst our 
organisation. Even a good suggestion from us apt to be looked 
upon with suspicion and has hardly any chance of being accepted". 
14 2 
He wrote also:-
"The Mussalmans as a body have bec^ n cilionated and in spite 
o^ all that the Congress ministries have been doing to be 
just and even generous to them, there is not only no recognition 
but positive opposition to e"&en a good scheme like the Wardha 
Scheme. I think if we had not baon enga'fed in breaking, or 
at least discrediting, Muslim ministries in non-Congress 
provinces the position v;ould have been dif-Cerent. The Muslim 
propaganda has gained much strength on account of this 
attitude of Congress in Muslim provinces ..." 
Obviously, the Congressmen had realised that the Conaress ministries 
were not com-nitting some wrongs intentionally with the Muslims. 
Rajgopalachari riahtl^ wrote to Kher on November 20, 1938, in a secret 
143" letter as follovrs:-
"T am afraid we are go^ng the vrong way to deal with these 
communal attacks (league charges). The Muslims who refuse, 
without sufficient thought, to join the Congress now see 
that there is no way to political influence and pov/er. They 
are desperate. If we only allow them to work off their anger, 
I believe that large bodies of them will join the Congress 
at the next elections". j 
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In ^act. the Congress ministries "demonstrated by nositive 
144 
evidence that most of the charges had no foimdation in fact". They were 
there for many years. However, the Congress tended to remove the grievan-
ces of the Muslims by removing the first two stanzas of the Bande Mataram 
".cna, ihat rr«ferred to a Hindu r;odr1<>n'- fvc-n ( hounh this ar-tion V/,T3 
14 5 
strongl^^ "re-ented b^ / the Hindus". S-'r llarrv Haig, the Governor of the 
United Provinces, x-'rote at the end of 1939: "In dealin'^ "1 th rommunal 
issues the Ministers, in my judgment, normally acted with impartiality 
146 
and a desire to do what v/as fair". 
Bv the end of 1938, the leaaue concluded that complete indenendence 
of India on Federal basis would provide a strong hold to the Conaress 
Hindus at the Centre and, thus, the Federal Muslim States, as envisaned 
in the 1935 Act, would be dominated by them and they would live on their 
mercy. Therefore, deciding that the Federal system was detrimental to the 
Muslims, the Muslim leadership beg=Hn to search for an alternative scheme. 
Alt e rnn t i ve _S rhemes 
In October, 1937, the alternative scheme was referred at the 
Lucknow session of the Muslim League. By then Linlithgow had realised 
that "an all-India Federation was the only line of constitutional advance 
147 
and a corollary to provincial autc-iomy" and he v;as looking fori^ rard to an 
early implementation of the federal scheme. 
Linlithgow met Gandhiji and the latter extended v^ -^ rious concessions 
to the Leanue on the Hindu-Muslim auestion. "^ he \'•icoro^ ' conve^ e^^ l^ those 
DroDosals to S'lltan Ahmed, Feroz Khan Noon, '^'awab of Chbatari -^ nd ^ 'azimu-
ddin to let them know the concessions to which Gandhi •'"i was nrenared to 
148 
make. Their proposals were as follov/sr-
"(1) Population proportion or else weiohtage in minority provinces 
for appointments in all branches of the services. A corresnonding 
arrangement to be made in resnect of rro'^ i^nces in which the 
Hindus were in a minoritv. 
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(2) A committee to be set up consistinq of equal numbers of 
Hindu and Muslim philologists to prepare a dictionan' of 
Hindustani and to meet the difficulties which had arisen 
over the Hindi-Urdu question. If the Muslims attached 
importance to the retention of Urdu, he would be ready to 
agree to the amount spent in the case of Muslims on education 
in Hindu majority provinces to be handed over to a Muslim 
body entirely outside the Ministrs^ of Education, on the 
understanding that a similar arrangement would be introduced 
in respect of Hindus in provinces in which they were in a 
minority". 
However, Gandhiji's proposal could not bring the Congress and the 
league to a conclusion, but it could have oaved the way of reconcilia-
tion if the leaders had taken up rapprochement more seriously. VThether 
they really wanted a rapprochement 'knov/s thoir heart. 
In February, 1939, certain Muslims in the Punjab advocated for 
"a federation of the North-West comprising of the Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P. 
149 
and the Punjab States". Sir Sikander had placed this scheme before the 
Viceroy but was dissuaded to drop it. Jinnah met the Viceroy on February 
28, 1939, and proposed "in any federal scheme, the government should 
ensure an adequate equiocise betv/een the Hindu and Muslim votes. In 
order to secure that ... 'manipulation' of territorial voter and the 
adjustment of territorial divisions" should be maintained. Jinnah also 
advocated that India was not "competent" to run a democracy and the 
151 
League misjudged "the capacity of India to run such a system". He 
complained also the Congress atrocities in the Hindu-majority provinces 
where the Hindus considered the institution of Congress ministries as 
establishment of the Hindu Ram Raj. 
In March, 1939, Khaliquz?-,aman and Abdur Rehman Siddiqi exr^lained 
Zetland about the proposp.l for establishment of three or four -federations 
of provinces and states, v;hich woulc be co-orr'inated by a sr>al] central 
body giving equal measure of control to the Hindus and the Muslims, and 
which would comprise a federation of Bengal and Assam, a federation of 
Bihar and Orissa, a federation in the North-West India, and the rest for 
the whole of India, i.e. the federation of Hindu provinces and stares. 
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On March 20, 193^, Zetland wrotr- ho Mnlithqow tbnt "we should 
probably have greater difficulty in bringing the Muslims into a federa-
tion than the Congress". Though Linlithgow was sympathetic to the Muslim 
grievances, he did not give any importance to these proposals and 
remarked that "any of the schemes that have so far been ventilated have 
154 
the least chance of surviving critical examination", and treated them 
155 
as a "formless apprehension". Zetland wrote to Linlithgow to give due 
•ICC 
weightage to the Muslims, who had no "adequate mouthpiece" in view of 
the widening gulf between the Congress and the league, and also exhorted 
the Congress to accede to the Muslim demands and placate them, But as 
the tv;o parties could not settle their dif-Ferences, it led to the idea 
of partition of the snta-rontinent on the basis of Parli amentar^' system 
$nd democracy. 
Parliamentary Democracy 
The provincial sections of the Government of India Act, 1935, had 
an approach to the transfer of power through adoption of the parliamen-
tary system, which envisaged the Congress and the league to demonstrate 
their popular support in electoral terms and to form governments. The 
Congress after its massive victor\' in the 1937 provincial elections 
formed one-party governments in provinces, while the Muslim Ieaaue 
expected coalitions, making themselves as partners. But the league's 
failure had proved that the Congress represented all-India. Thus, there 
was no need to the Congress to make concessions to the League. The 
Congress conviction that only those Muslims would be in the government 
who had renounced the league and joined the Congress. Therefor^, both 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajender Prasad stated that if there woulc. be 
league members in the government, the 'collective responsibility-' wo"i]d 
be memirglesn. Rnifndra rrnnnr^ r.nid: "Cnnqresrmen thought it rontr-irv 
to the spirit of Parliamentary democracy to appoint any outsider in 
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their Ministrv^". This conviction frustrated the League members and they 
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declined to cooperate with the- Conaress. Sir Penderel Moon argued that 
"the Conaress leaders 'vere reSTX)nsible, though quite unv/ittingly' for 
the critical change in Muslim sentiment from readiness to contemplate 
co-ooeration in an all-India -Pederafion to insistence unon separation'. 
The differences grew and the Congress passionately continued to preserve 
the unity of India, while the Ieaaue acted to ensure the partition of 
India i.e. formation of Pakistan, on communal issues. 
Communal Problem 
The communal differences were deep rooted in the past history of 
the majority and minority commionities which had strong hold on the 
Congress and League mentalities. Gandhiji opined that comniunal differences 
were insoluble as long as the British remained in India. On the other 
hand, the British maintained that they could not leave India until the 
communa] problems v;ere solved, v/hich thp-^ - kne\j v;ould be impossible.Thus, 
they meant that they v/ould stay in Indi=i for ever. The Congress emphasired 
that it was a domestic problem and it would be solved after the British 
would leave India. At the Round Table Conference the Princes and the 
Muslims had proclaimed that they did not like to create 'Ulsters in India'. 
Gandhiji complained that it was the traditional policy of Great Britain 
"to prevent partios from uniting". The CongresF convictir^n war that the 
British had followed (for some forty '^ears before partition) the Polic^^ 
of 'divide and rule'. Had the British Government decided to transfer 
pov/er, they could have preferred to transfer power to a single party 
preserving India's unity. This fact v^ as realised by both the Congress 
and the leaoue, v/ho realised that the British had their own interest in 
dividing them. To remove this obstacle, wittingly or unwittingly^ both 
the parties began to think over the auestion of partition of India. 
The V/ar Aims 
The Second v:orld War ensued when Germany invaded Poland on September 
1, 1939, and Britain declared v;ar ap-'inst Germany on September 3, 1939. 
The British Government "declared India a belligerent country without 
159 
consulting the Indian people" on "the same day that Britain declared 
158. I b i d , , p . 50. 
159. Rajendra Prasad to l o rd Linl i thgow, November 3, 1939, Rajendra 
Prasad Papers , FAI; quoted in B . " . Pander' ( e d . ) . The Indian 
N a t i o n a l i s t Movement, 1885-1947 - S e l e c t Documents (New Delh i ; 
Macmillan Press L t d . , 1979), rp. 135-36*: 
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160 r on Germany. The Vicerov issued an orrMnance, which contained "the 
most stringent powers for the suppression of internal disorclef". Subhas 
Chandra Bose, the leader of tho Forward Bloc, addressing a gathering 
of abotit two hundred thousand peoo] e on Sept-^mber 3, 1939, on the sea-
162 „ beach in Madras considered the wa^ as the "golden opportunity to w m 
freedom, which cautioned the Govemnent that the Congress would not be 
supporting Great Britain in her war aims. Therefore, Linlithgow sought 
help of Jinnah for securing favour of Muslims towards the war aims 
promising to treat the Muslim Leaaue on terms of eguality with the 
Congress. He reminded Jinnah on September 4, 1939, that he had told 
him "again and again that he regarded the influence of the British in 
India as essential to the survival of his own communitv", and told Jinnah 
that as per his desire, the British Government had decided "in view of 
164 „ 
the onset of war, to suspend the v;ork in connection with the Federation . 
Sir Sikandar expressed loyaltv and cooperation of Bengal and Punjab 
with the British in the war and Jinnah also agreed to 'share those 
sentiments' saying that "he vras a public man and had to think of his 
follow^f-i". A linlithaow's letter to Zetland reveals that Linlithgow 
wanted to strengthen the hands of Jinnah and romr.lete overhauling an<3 
reshaping of the constitution as the Congress nrovinc^ -'S v;ere doing 
iniustice with the Muslims and that Jinnah has said that the Congress 
ministries should be turned out". Linlithgow asked Jinnah that "if 
democratic government was unsuitable to this country, how was she to 
obtain her goal of self-government. Was such a policy not to condemn 
India to a perpetual condition of communal strife?'.' Jinnah renjied 
169 
that "an escape from the impasse ... lay in the adoption of Partitior". 
Conseguently, the British Government, on September 11^ 1939, announced 
that "the inauguration of the federal constitution under the Act of 
1935 was postponed for the duration of the war". 
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On SeptG^ m>>er 14, 1939, at Wardlia the Congress WorV:lng Committee 
issued a lenathy resolution invitina the Government to declare in 
unequivoca] terms what their war aims v/en^  in regard to democracy and 
imperialism and "how those aims were going to apply to India ...". 
The resolution also declared that i-P India v/ere granted freedom, then 
"a free and democratic India vdl] gladly associate herself with other 
free nations for mutual defence ag-^ .inst agoression and for economic 
1-72., 
cooperation . 
At the rni Working Corarritte'- meeting held on S^ eritember 18, 19 39, 
Jinnah declared that Muslim India was "irrevocably opposed to any 
'federal objective' which must necessarily result in a majority-comrunity 
rule under the guise of democracy and a parliamentary system of govern-
ment. Such a constitution is totally uns^iited to the genius of the 
peoples o^ this co'-intry which is comnosed of various nationalities and 
173 
does not constitute a national State". 
Further, the Committee resolved that the Viceroy's declaration 
suspending the Federation v;as in favour o-*^  the Muslims and demanded 
for its complete abandonment without further delav and the future 
174 175 
constitution should be considered 6e_ riovo. The Comr^ i ttee pointed out:-
"It had hoped to occupy an honourable place in the national 
life, government and administration of the country and work 
for a free India with -Free and independent Islam in which 
they could play an equal part with the major coironunity vrith 
a complete sense of security ... but the developments that 
have taken place and especially since the inauguration of 
the provincial constitution based on the so-called democratic 
parliamentary system of government and the recent experiences 
of over two vears have established beyond doubt that it has 
resulted wholly in a pemn.anent comnunal majority and the 
domination of the Hindus over the Muslim minorities v/hose 
life and liberty, propert-'^  and honour are in danqor and even 
their religious rinhts and culture are being assailed and 
annihilated ever\^ day under the Congress government in various 
provinces". 
171. Rajendra Prasad to lord Linlithgow, November 3, 1939, Rajendra 
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linlithgow reif^r^t-^d f'^t "Dominion Status was the natura] 
isr-ue o^ India's proaress" and announC'>fl that after the V/ar a2] parties 
\;ou]d be consulted "with a view to secure their aid and cooreration 
in the framing of such modifications in the details of the plan embodied 
in the Act of 1935" keeping in mind the communal differences, which 
encouraged Jinnah. After their support to Britain in the war, the 
Muslim League further strengthened its credibHity in the eyes of the 
British. 
Dr. Rajendra Prasad approached Jinnah and Nehru to break the 
communal impasse. He wrote to Nehru that the communal question was 
dominant because "not only the decision of the British government but 
anv future line of action that «^'o may der'ide u^ o^n denends to a large 
179 
extent uoon its satisfactory solution". He stressed to Jinnah that the 
tales of Congress atrocities were unfounded and based on "misapnrehen-
sions" and "one-sided reports" and of •( ered to get the charges of 
atrocities on Muslims investigated hy Sir Maurice Gwa-^ 'ei", the Chief 
Justice of th'^  Federal Court, but Jinnnh tiirned down the proposal and 
replied that His Excellencv' was "the proper authority to take such 
action and adoot such measures as vrould meet our requirements and ^ -'ould 
181 
restore cc^^lote -^ ense of security and satisfaction among the Muscalmans" 
Refusal of Jinnah to have the atrocities perpetrated by Congress 
ministries inspired by a British Chief Justice and his insistence on 
the role of Viceroy as arbiter is significant. Also one has to see the 
wordings of his tv^ o conditions placed before Gandhiji. They confirm 
to the sophisticated British traditional clever coating apnlied to 
manipulate^ v-^ sted interests. Congress under Gandhiii co^ l^d come to 
ethical norms but he co\ild not afford to take that kind o^ manii-inl t''^'^f^  
stance. It apnears that after giving Gandhiji a ponular chance,Congress 
leadershin just got fed up of the '-'^'ole drama of pretences an'^  may be 
beliefs and bec-^ -me a party to partition. Gandhij i apoear-^ ri to believe 
176. Speeches and Stat'^ -ments of linlithgow, October 1"^ , 1939, 
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the ultimate victor^/ of good and truth but/ unfortunately/ his disciplec 
exhausted their patience an'^i placed into the side of the British and 
the Leaoue. 
Jinnah said to Gandhiji, in Delhi, October, 1 m-. 
"(1) that so lonq a^ the Congre;--- "nn not prepared to treat the 
Muslim Leaoue as the authoritative and representative 
organization o'^  the Mussalmans of India it vas not possible 
to carry on tal<s regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement; and 
(2) that the league would not endorse the Congress demand for 
the declaration of British war aims till the tv/o organiza-
tions had reached an agreement with regard to the minority 
problems". 
The AICC on October 10, 1939, asked the Government to declare that 
the war aims "would not countenancr^ the country being made a part" to 
the V7ar unless India v;as treated as an independent nation whose nolic"-
18 3 
would be guided in accordance with the '-'ishes of the neople". 
Jawaharlal Nohru persuaded Jinnah to forge a united front to 
oppose the war aims of the Government and wrote to Jinnah in a rnther 
apologistic wav:-
"I entirely agree v/ith you that it is a tragedy that Hindu-
Muslim prohlpTi bar not •'o fn r bp'"^ n nottjod "^ n a frienn]"' wav. 
I feel teTiblv ^^ istresseri about it and ashame^ o^ myself^ 
in so far as I have not been able to contribute anythina 
substantial towards its solution. I must admit to you that 
in this matter I have lost con-^ i^dence in mvself though I am 
not usually given that way. But the last two or three years 
have had a powerful effect on me". 
The Congress prepared a draft statement to settle the diffei-enc-^ s 
under signature of Rajendra Prasad, Nehru and Jinnah. Though the 
statement had much in common, but there v/as no solution o-^  the communal 
question, which was left for future discussion, to which Jinnah did not 
agree and the statement could not be ipsued. 
18 2. Jinnah to Nehru, December 13, 193^ 5, Nehru Papers, NAI 
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MAI. 
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On October 11, 1939, the Viceroy, in reply to the Wardha resolu-
tion of September 14, 19 39, issued a statement, which was published in 
London as a White Paper. The Viceroy -nronosed to 'establish a "Consulta-
tive Group", including Indian representatives, which would advisf^ the 
Viceroy on questions pertaining to the vjar. He also reaffirmed the 
pledge of Dominion 3t.it n". at some future date, which had been first 
made ten years ago by the then Viceroy, Lord Halifax (l n)". This 
statement infuriated the Indians in viev; of the fact that v/hile the 
British were fighting for the sake of "freedom and democracy", they had 
adopted totally an adverse policy'- suspending the credibility of the 
1935 Act and its Federal scheme, thereby concentrating all powers in 
the hands of the Viceroy, restricting personal liberty, prohibiting all 
public meetings and demonstrations and sentencing without trial etc. 
The CWC on October 22-23, 1939, considered the Linlithgow's 
declaration on British war aims. As the Congress had extended uncondi-
tional help to Britain during the First Vforld War (1914-1918), but 
after the V7ar, the national leaders, including Gandhiji, were disillu-
sioned, the Congress did not like to be fooled again. Its demand for 
immediate transfer of power was not acceded to by the Government. There-
fore, the CVJC "categorically declined to admit any necessit-"' for prior 
agreement with the Muslim leanue as a condition precedent to the fulfil-
ment of its demands. Its contention -^/as that the Constituent Assembly 
would adequately secure protection for the Muslims. To express its 
disapproval of the Viceroy's statement (October 17, 1939), the Committee 
called upon the Congress ministries to tender their resignations'^. 
Therefore, the Congress ministries resigned in October, 1939, adopting 
a resolution in the Provincial legislatures on the War aims and condemn-
ing the way in vjhich the Government was treating sentiments of Indians. 
Gradually, the Muslim League, v;hich in 19 37 could not form a Ministry 
even in one province, swept over the seats, consolidated its position 
and established its sway in five nrovinros - Assam, Bengal, the Punjab, 
Sind and N.W.^?P.". 
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Jinnah's Day of Deliverance 
Jinnah*s position by then became rather politically sound. He 
unfurled the League's flag at Bombay on November 13, 1939, at Esplanade 
Maidan, and, on December 2, 1939, called upon Muslims, in a statement, 
to observe December 2?., as 'Day o^ Deliverance', since the Conaress 
governmenta had ceased to function. Jinnah was surprised at the 'sudden 
conversion' of Gandhiji to the idea of a Constitutional Assembly. On 
December 9, Jinnah reiterated his statement about observance of the 
Day of Deliverance. On December 13, Jinnah demanded the appointment of 
a Royal Commission to investigate into the grievances of the Muslims 
in the Congress provinces and repeated his appeal for observing the 
Dav of Deliverance. 
Demand for a Roval Commission and refusal of an enquiry by the 
Chief Justice again is indicative of the desire of Jinnah to have 
this matter treated by politicians and bureaucrats and not by judicial 
personnel. 
189 In reply to Nehru's letter of December 9, Jinnah said:-
"So long as the Con'^ress is not prepared to treat the Muslim 
league as the authoritative and renresentative organization 
of the Mussalmans of India, it vas not possible to carry on 
talks regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement". 
To Jinnah the problem of Hindu-Muslim conflict obviously appears 
to be subservient to his concern to have Muslim League declared as 
thGir sole rt^nrosentative of Muslims of India. 
In reply to Nehru's letter of December 14, Jinnah, on December 15, 
refused to talk with Nehru on Hindu-Muslim issue as the Congress did 
not recognise the League as a rapre<^entative of the Indian Muslims. 
Ultimately, Jinnah rejoiced the dissolution of the Congress ministries 
by observing December 22, 1939, as a "Dav of Deliverance" from the 
Congress "tvranny, suppression and injustice during the last two and 
190 
a hair vears", which aggressiveness caused Nehru to gasp and leave the 
Leaguers in surprise as they felt that "Jinnah had overshot his bolt. 
1Q9. Sharif Al-Mujahid, Quai<3-i-Azam Jinnah: St^^dies in Interpretation 
(Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1985), p. 590. 
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191 
and that his extreme tactics might even cause a split in the League". 
In an apoeal to the Muslims, Jinnah, ridiculing the Congress 
192 
High Comnand, accused it of the "wrongs that had been done to Muslims", 
for destroying Muslim culture and interfering with the religious and 
social life, Jinnah said if his 14-Doint demands had been accepted, 
193 
the Congress ministries had not been dis-olved. These statements closed 
the door of further negotiations betwenn Jinnah and Nehru. Linlithgow, 
v.'ho v/anted to keep the Congress under effective control and v/as 
determined not to give Government ministry to it, encouraging Jinnah 
assured 
"His Majesty's Government are not under any misapprehension 
as to the importance of the contentment of the Muslim 
community to the stability and success of any constitutional 
development in India". 
Thus, the Jinnah's Day of Deliverance created a wider and new 
gulf between the Congress and the league. Therefore^ Nehru set his 
heart on political independence and a socialist society through a 
constituent assembly. Jinnah said that the proposal of the Constituent 
Assembly was wholly Utopian and Nehru' s "all talks of hionger and poverty 
is intended to lead the oeople to socialistic and communistic ideas 
195 for which India is far from prepared". 
Encouraged by the new developments, Jinnah demanded that "no 
new oronouncement or new constitutional departure should be made 
196 
without the approval of the League", to v/hich Linlithgow agreed to 
197 
and thus gave it the recognition O"*^  an arbiter of future policy. 
V7ithout any agitation, impoverisViraentG and punishments, the 
League leadership acquired a position from v;here they cou]d, by playing 
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their cards carefully, get all that the Conqress was forcing the 
British to part with. 
As Linlithgow was determined not to hand over the Government 
machinery to the Congress, he vjrote to Zetland that the main nroblem 
of constitutional progress in India was the "finding of sho\ilders 
broad enough to carry the burden which he should relinquish" and, in 
other words, he conveyed that he had found the "broad shoulder" of the 
Muslim League for the purpose during the war when the British were 
struggling for their own existence. Zetland, on the other hand, though 
considering the Congress an anathema,- was not as averse as linlithgow. 
The realization that the widening gulf betv^een the Congress and the 
League might result in a civil war prompted him to take some measures. 
It was neither accurate nor dignified on the part of Linlithgow to 
sav again and again that "communal di-^ficulties were the biggest hurdle 
19q 
in the way of constitutional development". 
By the end of 1939, the Congress and the league stood poles 
apart and both had concluded that any settlement of the communal issue 
was impossible between them. The matter could have been decided if the 
Hindu Mahasabha had not had a dominant hold on the working of the 
Congress, They were orthodox Hindus and they were not agreeable to 
relinquish any concession to the Muslims. At this stage, Jinnah was 
"thinking only of how to realise bis plan o-P Pakistan (division of 
India) with the help of the Bri On the other hand, Savarkar 
"seemed to be oblivious of the international situation and was only 
thinking hov/ Hindus could secure military training by entering Britain's 
201 
anny in Indxa". In this circumstance, it was quite a hopeless view 
that either the Muslim league or the Hindu Mahasabha or the Indian 
National Congress could do much for the unity and independence of India. 
All the parties came down to prepare drafts of plan for partition 
of India. 
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Conclusion 
The Hindu-Muslim comm\anal antagonism led to political impasse 
and Jinnah's Fourteen Points. Jinnah opposed the Civil Disobedience 
Movement. Due to communal tension and riots, the Muslim League at the 
Round Table Con-f'erences demanded safeguards for the Muslims and claimed 
itself as the sole representative of thn Muslims, to which the Congress 
expressed its pronoiinced opposition as there were thousands of Muslims 
in the Congress fold. As the Congress and the League could not reach 
an agreement, the British Prime Minister announced the Communal Award, 
which reserved considerable seats for. the Muslims in the Central and 
Provincial Legislative Assemblies. At the elections held in 1937, under 
the Government of India Act of 1935, the Congress was returned to power 
with overwhelming majority, Jinnah to w'n the by-election of 1'937, used 
the slogan of 'Islam in Danger' and charaed the Congress ministries with 
committing atrocities on Muslims. The Congress challenged the charges 
and called for arbitration, but Jinnah declined. The league leadershin 
appeared to have realized that by purs-'-^ ng a politics of isolation and 
exclusiveness vis-a-vis the Con^'ress v^ ith its overhauling Hindu leader-
ship; and with the explicit support and patronage of the British^ who were 
obliged to seek the cooperation of the Muslim League in the flight against 
the nationalist movement xinder the auspices of the Indian National 
Congress the Muslim League could place itself in a position of immense 
advantage. It could achieve a lot of political objectives and have a 
lot of its demands conceded by the British in view of the then existing 
nationally over-charged political situation in India. 
CHAPTER III 
t^ AKISTAN RESOLUTION 
("194 0) 
Although the idea of rakistan '-^as tiding shape in the Mus"'im 
majority states, East Benga], J^WFP, Sind and Punjab, amongst proselytized 
Muslim aristocrates and educated men, a larre majority of Muslims 
supporting the Congress had denounced Jinnah's demand for a Muslim home-
land. After the lucknow session o-F tho leanue (Aoril, 1936), Jinnah von 
"^ avour of S-ik^ndar f'yat I-Tnnn, 1ef\''>cr oF the Unionist Partv and premier 
of Punjab, and on October 17, 1937, at the league Lucknov; session 
declared the Iranue's creed channcd from "•fn]] Rennonsible Goverrment-" 
1 
to "full Indenendence" and resolv'^ 'd as folDov/s:-
"Resolved that the object of the All-India Muslim Leaaue 
shall be the establishment in India of full Independence 
in the form of a federation o^ free democratic states in 
which the rights and interests of the Musulmans and other 
Minorities are adeguatelv and effectively safeguarded in 
the Constitution". 
The Muslim League emphatically disapproved the federal scheme of 
the Government put forth in the 1935 Act, and also opposed the Congress 
plan o-*" a 'constituent assembly', describing these "detrimental to the 
2 
interests ... of the Muslims in particular", as Mehrotra rightb' observed, 
the "League rank and file were pressina for it". He does not write that 
the v;holc of Muslim India v;as pressino '^ or it because there v?as a large 
number of Muslims in the Congress ^olc also. 
Jinnah and other speakers "breathed fire and sword against the 
Conaress and the Hindus" and "accused the British of aidina the Conaress 
"• n its desian of establishing Hindu raj and perpetrating 'atrocities' on 
the Muslims". The^' "denied that India v'=in a nation and talked of 
1. The leader (Allahabad), October 19, 1937. See also for details K.K.Azic, 
Muslims Under Congress Rule, 1937-1939: A Documentary Record 
(Islamabad: Naticial Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 
1978). See also Muslim Freedom Movement Collection, Archives of the 
Freedom Movement^ University of Karachi, Pakistan. 
*^ The Ieader(A]3ahabad), October 20, 1937. No definite conclusion was 
reached on the question of an alternative to federation. 
3. S.R. Mehrotra, To^'ards India' s Freedom 3nd Partition (New Delhi: 
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establishing 'Muslim raj' in opposition to 'Hindu rlj' . 
Dr. .".ahmuc'ullah June vrote:-
"The '^octrine o^ aloofness v;as -orc-^ rhed a_d nauseam in a most 
unrestricted and irresponsible language. Out of the clouds of 
circumlocution and confusion arose the cr^'- of Islam in danger. 
The Muslims vrere told that they wore disunited and vjere about 
to be crucified by the Hindus ... In the name of Muslim 
solidarity, Mr. Jinnah wants to divir'e India into Muslim India 
and Hindu India". 
Pandit Jav/aharlal Nehru reacted sharply. He commented:-
"The league and its supnorters stand clearly and definitely 
today for the division of India, even on the political and 
economic planes, into religious rrroups. Whatever it may be, 
it is the antithesis of the nationalist idea of the unity of 
India. It is a reduction to absurdity of modern life and its 
problems. It is mediaevalism in excelsis'*'. 
Evidently, the division of India, emr^hasised above, had become as 
common as the independence itself. The root of the growing differences 
goes deep in the soil of political achievement endeavoured by the Hindus 
and the Muslims sacrificing others interest followed by accusations and 
manipulation of charges against each other. The confidential report on 
the Political Situation for the first half of November, 1939, relating to 
Bengal, says that the Congress and Hindu papers had been denouncing Jinnah 
for his "intransigence" and "constant]v expanding demands" and proclaiming 
7 
the problem of minorities as "entirely factitious". 
Jinnah toured the whole of India to propagate the league's stand. 
The Hindu-Muslim antagonism culminated into riots during Holi and Iloharram 
in 1938, and Jinnah's letter of October ^, 193S, at last, closed all doors 
of a settlement and the rupture grew v/ider and vrider. Gandhiji also failed 
to win over Jinnah. These circumstances, inevitably, led to the clear 
demand of Pakistan by the Muslim Leaaue in Lahore on October 10, 1938. 
However, the enthusiasm ^or dem-md of a Muslim Homeland became 
4. Ibid. 
5. The Pioneer (Allahabad), November 7, 1937. 
6. Ibid., October 19, 1937. 
7. Mss - National Archives of India, Government of India (First half of 
November, 1937) . 
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parallel to fanaticism a" the Muslim T c> mue loaderr. lost all brain to 
talk in parliamentary terms. At the Sind MI Conference held at Karachi 
in October, 1938, which vas presided over by Jinnah, the leaders delivered 
fien' speeches, v-rhich was suf-Ficient to excite the mostly innocent and 
illiterate Muslim audience against the Conqress and the Hindus. Shaukat 
Ali remarked; "If the Congress will not allow the Muslim League to have 
ministries in the four provinces whe^ -e the Muslims are in a majority, 
vaaabonds like me will run amuck". Jinnah, accusing the Congress of 
attempting" to divide the Muslims, warned: "This will result in India being 
divided". Sir Abdulla Haroon, the Chairman of the Reception Committee of 
10 
the Con-Ference, spoke of "an independent federation of Muslim States". 
Fa7lul Haa was cheered by the audience v.'hen he said, "If Muhammad bin 
Qasim, an eight year old lad, with lo soldiors ronld conquer Sindh then 
surely nine crores of Muslims can conquer th-^  '-'hole of India". Sheikh 
Abdul '•^ 3jid threatened that if the Muslins ''O'-o not granted their riahts, 
the" would "Fall back upon the 'Pakistan srheme', and that 'nothing v/ould 
prevent Muslims, -Prom Karachi to Calcutta, to march to thsir own self-
12 
detemination". The Muslim leaaue, anal^sina the sins of the Conqress and 
13" 
the Hindus, tabled the -FollovTing resolution on October 10, 1938:-
"The Sindh Provincial Muslim league Conference considers it 
absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of 
the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered 
cultural development, the economic and social betterment and 
Political self-deterrnination of the t^ 'o nations, known as 
Hindus and Muslims, that India may be -divided into two federa-
tions, namely, the federation o-T Muslim States and the 
federation of non-Muslim States. 
"The Conference therefore recommends to the All-India Muslim 
league to devise a scheme of constitution under'whirh Muslim-
majority provinces, Muslim Indian States and areas inhabited 
by a majority of Muslims may attain full in^ienendence in the 
^orm o"F a federation o-F their ov/n v/i th nermission to admit any 
o^her Muslim State be^ o^nd the Indian -Frontiers to join the 
•^ednration and with such safp-quirds for non-Muslim minorities 
as may be conceded to the M^uslim minorities in the non-Muslim 
Federation of India". 
8. The leader (Allahabad), October 11, 1938. 
9. Ibid. 
10, The Times O-F India (Bomba^) , October 10, 1938. 
.'^%^^Hf^n?^^^=••^^ ^1^^ ^^ ^^^ '"''^"^^ ^^^ ^000 cavalry and camel :h and 3p00_camels for transppr+v, ^ 
man iCalcuttaJ, October"iZ' 19jH. 
11. Ibid., October 11 
TtTTSTs each  
12. The Statesman 
1 3 . I b i d . , O c t o b e r 11 , 1938 . See a l s o The Times of I n d i a (Bombay), 
Oc tobe r 5 and 10, 1938; A.II . A l b i r u n i , .Makers ~of P a k i s t a n and Modern 
^ \^;[Sl,im I n d i a (Lahore : Sha ikh Mohammed Ashra f , 1950T^^ p^ ^ 2T8.~ 
92 
I t i s verv/ murh Fel t that- the Muslim I en quern spoke so vehemently 
t h a t the Hindu popula t ion qot comnlotely d i s t r a c t e d from t h e federa l 
srheme, as thf-^  r- ikistnn scheme rlnimed the i r e a from Karachi to CilruLL-i. 
T' e outcome i s t r a ced by some to the orthc-loxr,' of the Congress, which 
did not concede the I oai^ue demmd o^ rorminn r o a l i t l o n m i n i s t r i e s In the 
Muslim m.inority s t a t e s . I t i s contended +-hat Jawa^^r la l >"'ehru accepted 
J i n n a h ' s scheme -For Muslim s t a t e s and the Hindu s t a t e s with a weak c e n t r e , 
t h e r e '-'as no harm to the countrv , as the ^^ederal s-'-stem adopted by o the r 
c o u n t r i e s l i k e the USSR, USA and Switzer land has nroved workable . In f ac t , 
the Congress and the league l e a d e r s v/anted a country pure ly dominated 
by them so t h a t t h e i r r e l i g i o n , c u l t u r e and language could f l o u r i s h 
without any c o n f l i c t with the o t h e r s . Fu r the r , as has been po in ted out 
e a r l i e r p r o t a g o n i s t s O-F Congress- league rapnrochment assiune genuine urge 
on the p a r t of Congress- league to come t o g e t h e r -^or and in a f ree count ry . 
These p o s t u l a t e s annear to be n o n - e x i s t e n t in r ea l p o l i t i c of the country 
and so one can never be sure t ha t any c o a l i t i o n could have a -^air chance 
of being t r i e d in t h i s coun t ry . 
In December/ 1938, the AIMI Patna se s s ion re i to raLed tiH' oppos i t ion 
to the Federal scheme nnr'" au tho r i s ed J innah to ex^-^lore a s u i t a b l e a l t o r n - ' -
14 t i v c scheme "which woulri ^oFoq\i-ird the i n t e r e s t s of the Mnsllms". Cn 
.March 26, 1939, the MI Working Committee apro- 'nted a committee, headed 
by J innah , t o examine and r e p o r t on the va r ious d r a f t schemes, "a l ready 
expounded b^ ^ those vjho a^'e f u l l y versed in the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development 
of Ind ia and o t h e r co^intries and those t h a t may be submitter ' h e r e a f t e r 
to the Presi.-^ent and r epor t to the Working Committee t h e i r conc lus ions 
a t an e a r l y d a t e " . 
In March, 1939, the Muslim league appo'^nted a small committee to 
submit report on various constitutional schemes. Until August, 1939, there 
were only two schemes those of Muhamma'^ Iqbal and Rahmat Ali. T\<'o League 
leaders, Syed Abdul Latir and Sir Mohamped Shah Mawaz Khan, drew up 
schemes for a separate sta+-e -For the Musulmans, Two other schemes devised 
14. The Statesman (Calcutta), December 29, 1938. 
15. The Pioneer (Allahabad), March 28, 1939. 
I'S. See -For details of schemes, M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches and 
Documents on _the _Indi an Constitution, 19 21-1947 (London: Oxford 
University Fres-;," I957r, Vol. IT,~ no. 444-4S. For salient features 
see Appendices I, II and III. 
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by Sikandar Hyat Khan and a joint scheme of Sayyid Zafrul Hasan and 
Muhammad Afzal Husain Qadri were put foir-'ard for consideration of the 
Committee, The r-lL Working Committee examined the "several schemes in the 
17 field including that of dividing the country into Muslim and Hindu India", 
but yet the league had not finally come to a conclusion in favour of 
devising a scheme of its ovm -Por separation o'F India. But as the schemes 
were not acceptable to the Congress, th^ last efforts for settlement, 
inevitably, failed and Jinnah, very seriously began to think over the 
possibility of creation of a separate sovereign Pakistan exclusively for 
the Muslims. Rahmat Ali proclaimed in enthusiasm: "We are Muslem, not 
Hindu, Pakistani, not Hindustani, and Asian, not Indian". He spoke of a 
federation of three Muslim majority states viz, Pakistan (Punjab, Afghanis-
tan, Kashmir, Sind anr' Baluchistan), Bang-i-Islam (Bengal and Assam), and 
19 20 
Usmanistan (Hyderabad and Deccan). He wrote:-
"For this alone would set the final seal at our separation 
from India, inspire the Millat and impress the world as 
nothing else would". 
Evidently, the demand for Pakistan had become a major issue during 
the first half of 1939, and all the leaders had been thinking about the 
possibility of creation of Pakistan, which continued to widen the gulf • 
between the Congress and the League. 
Muslim Organizations 
Besides the All-India Muslim league, there were a number of Muslim 
organizations playing their role in different parts of the country. The 
Jami.it-ul>-Ulema-e-Hinrl, founded by Maulana Mahmud-ul-IIasan In 1919, was 
a group of conservative ulema , with its headquarters in Delhi and the 
Deoband School was the centre of its activities. The Jamiat formed the 
17, N.N. Mtra (ed.). The Indian Annual Register (Calcutta: Annual 
Register Office, 1930-1947), 19"3"9, Vol. I, p, 374. 
18. Rahmat Ali», The Millat of Islam and ^he Menace of Indianism (Cambridge; 
W. Heffer and Sons, 1940^7" p. 7. 
^^ » I^i^"* quoted in Rajendra Prasad, India Divided (Bomba^ M Hind Kitabs, 
1946), p, 184. 
20. Ibid., p. 185. 
21. See for details Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the 
Demand for Pakistan (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963) . 
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Azad Muslim Conference against the league. The Ahrars, a combination of 
lower middle-class Muslims, v/as operative in Punjab with aggressive 
outlook. The Momins, especially in the eastern U,P,, consisted of the 
weavers, who were not vrell-organized. The Shias, a religious group of 
Luctoiow, supported the joint electorates for all. The Kisans of Bengal 
organized the Krishak Sabha, All these organizations opposed the Muslim 
League and the Leaaue's demand for Pakistan. However, they joined the 
Azad Muslim Conference for the safeguards of Muslim interests in India. 
Non-Muslim Organizations 
There existed a number of political and politico-religious organiza-
tions with varied aims and objectives, which fomented differences 
between different grqups of politicians and peoples,, whose path was 
separate but the goal of independence and after was the same. The Forward 
Bloc,founded by Subhas Chandra Bose in Julv, 1939, when he resigned in 
protest from the Congress Presidency due to differences with Gandhites 
on the question of sanction of Satayagraha to be adopted by the Provincial 
Congress Committees concerned, was n radical and progressive part". It 
was not a purely Hindu organization as it included Muslim volxjnteers also. 
However, the Bloc brought the entire left-wing under its banner. 
The Comm\inist Party of India, banned by the Government, was v;orking 
underground. M.N. Roy, v;ho had escaped any how from India in 1915, went 
to Java and contacted with German agents. In 1917, he met Lenin, who put 
him on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. After the 
victory of Stalin, he went to Germany in 19 29, and returned to India 
and v/as imprisoned for six years. After his release, disgusted with the 
Congress policies, Roy became a staunch critic of Gandhi and NehTO. In 
1934, the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) was formed, which, favouring 
the British War aims and opposing the Congress, added to the disruptive 
22. See for details of activities and British repression J,M. Deb, 
Blood and Tears (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1945), p. 666. See also 
R.S. Vidyarthi, British Savagery in India (Agra: Shiva Lai Agar\''al 
Sc Co., 1946), p, 263. ~ ~ 
23. See for details Subhas Chandra BoSf=, Indi an Struggle, 1920-1942 
(Bombay: Asia Publications, 1964). 
24. Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom (New York: The John Day Comnany, 
1941), p. 414. Also see Wm. Theodore de Bar^ / and others. Sources of 
Indian Tradition (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1958), pp. 807-08, 
95 
tendencies within the national movement. The Kisan Party was more radical 
with positive action. All these parties were causing weakness to the 
Congress and national movement/ but there was most importantly the 
Hindu Mahasabha which was playing no less important a role in poisoning 
the stream of Indian politics. The Mahasabha emphasised Hinduism, 
Hlndutva and Hindudom. Its President, V.D, Savarkar, at the annupl session 
of the Hindu Mahasabha, declared the aim o^- the organization as mainte-
nance, protection and promotion of the Hindu race, Hindu culture and 
Hindu civilization and "-he advancement o^ the glory of Hindu rashtra. 
The President called ur>on the Hindus to boycott the Congress and not to 
vote for the Congress candidates in the elections. There was also the 
Arya Samaj, which emphasised Hindu Raj, Hindu culture and Hindu civiliza-
tion. The Arya Samaj was a response to Muslim fanaticism. The Samaj 
launched a satyagraha against the Nizam of Hyderabad in protest of 
atrocities against the Hindus. This move was supported by the Hindu 
Mahasabha and the Congress could not keep itself alianated from the 
connivance, which encouraged the Hindus so much so that they proved them-
selves no less fanatic than the Muslims. EaJdev observed: "There should 
be no trace of Muslims in India; there should be Hindu raj. V^^ have to 
secure the throne of Nizam within six months"'. Further, the demand of 
making Hindi as the lingua -Pranca of India assured the Muslims that the 
Congress rule would "prevent the proaress of Urdu language and obliterate 
the religious traditions and cultures of Musalman", as a result they began 
to go out of the Congress fold. Jinnah concluded that the salvation of 
27 
the Muslims lay only "in getting rid of the Hindu majority". 
The Hindus, Sikhs and even the Christians had realized that there 
v/ere^  essential differences between the Hindu and Muslim outlooks of life 
and, henco, the Britons urged that future constitutional and other develop-
ments in India should be decided ensuring the consent of both the communitiej 
But it was opposed by the Hindus and the Sikhs, who urged that "the league 
claim that the Muslims formed a nation separate from the other Indian 
communities was fallacious and that, in spite of different religions, all 
Indians formed one single nation and therefore the League case for a 
25. Mohammad Noman, Muslim India (Allahabad: 1942), p. 304. 
26. Ibid., p. 380. 
27. Jinnah's statement at the lucknow sess'-'on O-P the Muslim League, in 
Jamilud Din Ahmed (ed.). Some Recent Speeches and V7ritings of Mr.Jinnah, 
1946, Vol. I (lahore: Sh.Mohammad Ashraf, 1942), pp. 30-38. 
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separate State for the Muslims v/as untenable". 
Congress and league Towards the Har Alms 
On September 3, 1939, the war broke out between Britain and 
Germany. Soon the world was divided into two military blocs. Germany 
occupied luxembourg, Be]gium, Hoi]and and France in quick sucession and 
attacked England on August 8, 1940. The British Dominions and India also 
joined the fight. 
Soon after the War was declared on September 3, the Viceroy declared 
that "India was at war" and began to despatch Indian troops to SingeTXDre 
and the Middle East for the defence o^ the British Empire and designed 
a number of Ordinances "to equip the Indian bureaucracy with stringent 
powers to suppress "internal disorder" as also took steps to amend the 
1935 Act so as to concentrate all powers of the Provincial Government 
into the hands of the Central Government. Jinnah realised that, in the 
state of war, the Congress ministries in the Provinces, would not last 
long. Therefore, he adopted the polic' O-F appeasement with the Government, 
assuring cooperation of Muslim India the British needed, and,in return, 
hoping British assistance in dissolnf'on of the Congress Ministries in 
the Provinces. Jinnah, thus, aimeo to level grounds for the league's 
culmination to power. 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in his Presidential Address in April, 1936, 
at the Congress Lucknow Session had said: "Every war waged by imperialist 
powers will be an imperialist v/ar whatever the excuses put forward; 
therefore, we must keep out of it". later, the Congress made it clear that 
"India cannot fiaht for freedom unless she herself is free". The AICC 
Session at Tripuri in March, 1939, seeing the dark clouds of v/ar rising 
in the West and exploitation of Indian resources, had vehemently opposed 
the British foreign policies "culminating in the Munich Pact, the Anglo-
Italian Agreement and the recognition of rebel Spain" and "constantly" 
helping the Fascist Powers "in the destruction of democratic countries". 
Strongly opposing the ''Imperialism anri Fascism alike", the Congress urned 
28. I.A, Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, 1940-1947 (Delhi 
Daya Publishing House, 1985), p. 20. 
29. R.C. MajxOTidar, Struggle for Freedom, Vol, XI (Bombay: Bharatiya 
Vidya Bhavan, 1969), p. 624. 
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that the "world peace and progress requiied the ending of both of these". 
On September 5, 1939, Gandhiji expressed his ov/n sympathy with 
England and France and broke dov/n at the veiy possibility of the destruc-
tion of London. He offered \anconditional support to Britain. Jinnah also 
did not lack in palacating the Government. On September 1, 1939, Jinnah 
expressed his sympathy for Poland, Britain and France and declared that 
Great Britain may prosecute the war successfully taking the Muslim India 
into confidence through the Al]-India Muslim League, The League Working 
Committee declared that "real Muslim cooperation and support to Britain 
in this hour of trial could not be secured successfully if H.M.'s 
Government and Kis Excellencv the Viceroy were unable to secure to 
31 
Muslims "justice and fairplay" in the Congress-governed Provinces. 
At the Wardha CWC meeting, v/hich met on September 8-14, 1939, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, on September 8, declared: "We do not approach the 
problem With a view to taking advantaoe of Britain's difficulties ... I 
should like India to play her full part and throw all her resources into 
32 
the struggle for a new order". Nehru had, actually, adopted the policy 
of appeasement to Britain in view of the Jinnah's statement of September 7 
Both aimed to win favour of the British Government for perpetuating 
their provincial control. But Subhas Chandra Bose stressed to launch 
freedom struggle at once to make use of the v;eak position of the Allies 
in the War, while the Germans had threatened to bum England. Bose said 
that the Congress "since 1927, repeatedly declared that India should not 
cooperate in"Britain's war, and that the Congress should now put that 
33 policy into practice", as a result the Gandhi Wing gave up the idea of 
cooperation with the British war-aims altogether, as Bose said that if 
the Congress v/ould not agree, the Forward Bloc would do so. However, the 
Congress on September 14, taking a grave view of the Viceroy's steps, 
resolved that "The issue of peace and war must be decided by the Indian 
30. A.K, Azad, India Wins Freedom (Bombav: Longmans, 1959), n, 245. 
31. V.P, Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Delhi: Orient Longmans, 
1957), p, 62, 
32. The Statesman (Bombay), September 10, 1939. See also Sir Reginald 
Coupland, India: A Re-Statement (london: Oxford University Press, 
1945), Vol, II, p. 214. 
33. Subhas Ch-ndra Bose, n. 23, p. 340. See also R.C. Majimdar, n. 29, 
n, 625. 
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people" and they cannot "pennit their resources to be exploited for 
imperialist ends". The Congress also resolved that if the war was "to 
defend the status quo, imperialist possessions, colonies, vested interests 
and privileges, then Indian can have nothing to do with it. If, however, 
the issue is democracy and a world order based on democracy, then India 
is intensely interested in it". The Congress also resolved that if 
Britain v/as fighting "for the maintenance and extension of democracy-/ 
then she must necessarily^ - end imperialism in her ovm possessions and 
establish full democracy in India", The Resolution also demanded right 
to the Indians for framing their'own constitution without any external 
interference, and asked the London Government to declare their war aims 
"in reoard to democrac^^ and imperialism" and how those aims were going 
to apply to India and to be given effect to in the present. 
It may be pointed out that Subhas Chandra Bose vras, perhaps, ponderina 
over the possibility of gaining military and financial assistance from 
the Axis Powers to overthrow the British yoke from India by force. 
Anticipating the very small army in India to be left b^ -^ the British during 
the War, Subhas Bose's proposal seems to be very radical and convincing, 
Ke did not like to beg but to take his right with might. This was the 
very idea that led to the formation of the Azad Hind Army. Had his proposal 
prohibiting the recruitment of Indians to British army was accepted the 
British would have been reduced reallv ineffective and, perhaps, defeat'^d 
and India miqht have become independent much earlier. 
However, the C^'fC resolution of September 14, 1939, v;as endorsed by 
the AICC on October 9, 1939, demanding an Independent country, democracy 
36 
and the principle of "self-determination of dependent peoples". 
On the other hand, the Muslim league '-'as closely watching the reaction 
of the Congress Working Committee at Wardha. They happily noted that the 
Congress had refused to cooperate with the British war-aims in view of 
the past bitter experience at the close of the First World War, when 
Great Britain had assured to grant sel-^-determination to the Indians. The 
Congress did not want to be befooled again. The Muslim League took all 
34. Sir Reginald Coupland, Vol. II, n, 32, p. 215. See also lAR, 1939, 
Vol. II, pp. 226-28. 
35. Ibid. 
36. D.C. Tendulkar, Mahatma, 1938-1940 (New Delhi: Government of India, 
1952), Vol. I, p. 177. 
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these in view and formulated its own resolution demanding such thing 
that may be effectively obtained in its interest and the British may 
also find better to accecie to it. The British Government, realising the 
fact that the Conr^ress would not lend any assistance, felt that if the 
Muslim league, which had the huge Muslim following, v/ould also go against. 
They also viewed v;ith danger the opnosition of various Hindu organiza-
tion to the British war-aims. Therefore, t-he Government took the way 
of appeasement to the Muslim league to satisfy their own objectives. 
The Muslim League, taking advantage of the British appeasement posture, 
parsed a resolution on the s^tuation,created by the war;at the Lahore 
Conference on September 18, 19 39, that "no assurances must be given as 
to the constitutional advance nor any nev/ constitution framed without 
the consent and approval of the league - the onl^ '- organization that can 
• 37 
speak on behalf of Muslim India". R.C. Majumdar writes that the league 
promised support to the British only on tvro conditions: 'First, the 
Muslims must be assured of "justice and fair-play" in the Congress 
provinces. Secondly, the British Government must give an undertaking, 
"that no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for 
India should be made without the consent and approval of the All-India 
Muslim League, nor any constitution be framed and finally adopted by His 
Majesty's Government and the British Parliament without such consent and 
approval".Further the Government was asked "to take into its confidence 
the Muslim League vfhich is the only oraanization that can speak on behalf 
of Muslim India". Notwithstanding the fact that the Viceroy on October 17, 
1939, "accepted, at least implicitly, the League's claim to speak for 
the Muslims of India", tho questions of provincial ministries and the 
demand for Pakistan were not shelved, in view of many grievances of 
Muslims in the Congress ministries. But it is noteworthy that when the 
cvrc invited Jinnah to state the grievances against the Congress ministries, 
40 the latter rebuffed the gesture. 
It was an atmosphere of divergence of opinion on vzar-aims. All the 
parties had their own views, policies and programmes. On September 10,1939, 
37. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 163. 
38. R.C, Majijmdar, n, 29, p, 626. 
39. Sir Reginald Coupland, Vol. II, n. 32, p. 216. 
40. Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovent'- of India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 
1969), p. 432. 
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the Hindu Mahasabha had declared that it was a matter of "convmon concern 
to the British Government as w<=>ll as Indians" to defend the country from 
foreign attack and that in order to have "effective" cooperation of the 
Hindus, the Government should introduce responsible government at the 
centre and revise the Communal Av/ard. "The National Liberal Federation 
and Hindu Mahasabha offered unconditional support to the Government ...". 
However/ other organizations, such as, the Liberation Federation and the 
All-India Christian Conference extended their full support to the British 
v/ar aims unreservedlv. The Indian States were solidly behind the Govern-
ment and Rabindra Nath Taqore also favoured their stand. As the Congress 
was mitigated by the Hindu Mahasabha ^ince the last decades, it may be 
said that the Congress v:as being fed back by the revivalists of Hinduism, 
whose main aim was to cause a setback to the Muslims and the Muslim 
league. They thouaht that if the British perpetuated their dominance in 
Indin, the power would one day be trans''errer! to the Hindus being in 
majority and if they v/ere defeatori an'-'i le-Ft the country, the Hindus v/onld 
be able to capture Delhi by force. Jinnah had also realised this danger 
and that is why he came fon-'ard to help the British war-aims so that the 
British could transfer power sa-f'eguarding the Muslim interests or even 
by vivisecting the country, 
Gandhiji. Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Jinnah met the Viceroy to discuss 
the Government plan to expand the Executive Coxincil. In the discussion, 
the Congress members re-^ used to cooperate till the British "acceoted the 
CWC viewpoint" of Ser^ tember 14, 1939. On the other hand, Jinnah emphasised 
that the British Government and the Congress should recognise the leacfue 
as "the sole representative bod" of the Indian Muslims". Due to severe 
differences amongst the three parties - the Viceroy, the Congress and 
the league, the talk failed and it resulted in the resignation of the 
Congress ministries and Jinnah's observing the "Day of Deliverance". 
Zetland's Desiderata 
Lord Zetland, the Secretan^ O-F State for India, prepared a memorandum 
41. R.C. Majumdar, n. 29, p. 624. 
42 . See for d e t a i l s M.A.H. I spahan i , ' ^ a c t o r s l e a d i n a to the P a r t i t i o n 
o^ B r i t i s h I n d i a ' , in C.H. r h i l i n r , -ind ' " . D . Wainwrinht, The p - i r t J t ion 
of India : P o l i c i e s and P e r s p e c t i v e s , 1935-1947 (London: George Allen 
and Unwin L td . , 197orr~PP. 331-59. 
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It is significant that only tv/o nations (Hindus and Muslims) 
are emphasised in this statement, iqnoring other communities like 
Christians, Sikhs and Parsls. The obvious inference is that the British 
were only keen to proround the vievnoint o-^  the minority which was acting 
as an impediment to tho Connror;'- mnvcmont. 
On February 3, 1940, linlithrow said to Sikandar Hyat Khan that 
the txjsiticn of Muslims, as maintained by Jinnah, was "unhelpful" and 
49 
"static to a dangerous degree". Fazlul Faq, explaining the position 
of Muslims, assured him of his entire lovalty and support to the Govern-
ment saying: "He was a Muslim first, alv/ays and his duty to his community 
vras one which he could not at any staae -Forget", He complained also 
that the case of Muslims was not ful3y and properly considered either 
in India or in England and assured that he would not enlist support 
of the Congress but expressed willingness to join the Congress ministr^^. 
Referrina the Muslim position, he s^id: -
"The Muslims were in the constant difficulty O^ P bein^ on 
the defensive. They could not recommend any recession from 
the present position in regard to constitutional advance 
or publicly reject the principle of Home Rule or Dominion 
Status". 
Linllthgoi«' advised Fazlul Haq and Sikandar Hyat Khan that "so long 
the Muslims adopted a neaative attitude and unconstructive policy, it 
would be very difficult to make it understood in Great Britain, the 
52 United States and even in this country". Therefore, linlithgov; advised 
them to follow a positive attitude preparing a positive scheme or an 
alternative scheme for the benefit of Muslims. Such encouragements 
directly contributed to and resulted into the demand for Pakistan by 
the Muslim League. 
Linlithgow, the Viceroy, had encouraged Jinnah to adopt a positive 
attitude i.e. positive alternative in favour of the Muslims alone,defining 
49. Enclosure 2 to letter dated Januar^/ 30, 1940. Note of a conversation 
between Linlithgov/ and Sikandar Hyat Khan at Delhi on January 25, 
1940; linlithgow Collection, NAT 
50. Uma Kaura, n. 44, p.146. 
51. Note of a conversation between Linlithgow and Sikandar Hyat Khan 
and Fazlul Haq, February 14, 194 0; linlithgow Collection, NAT 
52. Uma Kaura, n. 44, p. 147. 
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future constitution of India, but Jinnah expressed his inability to 
present in detail "the consic?ered opinion of his colleagues and himself 
on this very important subject" and oleaded for some time to frame his 
response. It reveals that though linlithgov; encouraged Jinnah to present 
an alternative scheme to the federal scheme envisaged in the 193 5 Act, 
Jinnah v/as not eager to give details. linlithgow insisted that negative 
policy would do harm to the Muslim League and wrote to Jinnal \h 
"If he and his friends wanted to secure that the Muslim 
case should not go by default in the United Kingdom, it 
was really essential that they should formulate their plan 
in the near future. At the risk of wearying him I was 
bound to repeat what I had o^ten said before that I was 
convinced that it was quite useless to appeal for support 
in Great Britain for a party v/hose policy vrns one of sheer 
negation". 
Jinnah rerlied that he would "make public at any rate the outlines 
of their position in time to enable him to explain the Muslim ponition 
in Great Britain and in India", and found this opportunity at the meeting 
of the Council of Alf-II on February 25, 1940, vrhere he, appeal" nq to 
the Muslims to organise themselves and to convey the message of the 
league to every Muslim, sain: 
"People ask me what is our goal ... The whole question 
is very simple. Great Britain wants to rule India. Mr.Gandhi 
and the Congress want to ru]e India and the MussaDmans. We 
say that vie will not let either the British or Mr. Gandhi 
rule the Musalmans. We vrant to be free". 
The role of the British colonial rulers in prompting the separatist 
stance of the AIM! is quite evident. As for the acquiescence of the 
league leadership, it v/as clearly a situation in which they were in an 
extremely happy position to ask for a free Muslim state with support 
and patronage of colonial power guaranteed without virtually and 
conditions imposed. Thn traqedv, npparentDv of this whole episode, Iriy 
in the inevitable turmoil and violence that both the Muslims and the 
Hindus masses were to undergo in the event of partition. In as much as 
the Muslim leaaue, on the bidding of thn British rulers, readily agreed 
53. Note of an interview between linlithgow and Jinnah, Enclosure 3 
to letter dated February 6, 1940, from Linlithgov; to Zetland, 
Linlithgov; Collection, NAI 
54. Uma Kaura, n. 44, p. 149. 
55. Jamil-ud-Din, n, 27, Vol. I, p. 132. 
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to precipitate this situation, pe>-haps the blame can be laid more at 
their door. But the guilt of the Congress vrhich all the time claimed 
to be the custodian of the interests of the Indian masses including the 
Muslims can nevertheless be mitigated. Their impatience in dealing v;ith 
this manoeuvre was just a negition o^ Gandhian strategy o^ romnassion, 
love and tolerance. On the issuo of the partition both ATJ^ H and INC 
appeared to be operating -^ rom the snme pedestal an^ level o^ response. 
Hence, the disillusionment of Maul ana Azad in his memoirs. 
Conares.-_Ramgarh, Session, 194 0 
In the same week, after the lahore AIML Session, at the Conaress 
Session held at Ramgarh on March 19-20, 1940, Maulana Azad reiterated 
v^- ^ -56 the Concrress viev;:-
"It vas India's historic destiny +-hat many human races 
and cultures and religions should flov to her, finding a 
home in her hospitable soil, and many a caravan should find 
rest here ... One of the last of these caravans, follovnng 
the footsteps of its predecessors, was that of the followers 
of Islam. This came here and settled here -Por good. This led 
to a meetino of the culture-currents of tv.'o different races. 
Like the Ganga and Jumna, they flowed for a vzhile through 
separate courses, but naturo' s immutable lav/ brought them 
together and Joined them in sangam. This fusion was a notable 
event in history ... Eleven hundred years of common histor^/ 
have enriched India with our common achievements. Our 
language, our poetn/, our literature, our culture, our art, 
our dress, our manners and customs, the innumerable happenings 
of our daily life, everythina bears the stamp of our joint 
endeavour. This joint wealth is the heritane o^ our common 
nationality and we do not want to leave it and go back to 
the time v;hen this joint li^e ha^ i not begun ... The cast has 
novr been moulded and destiny has set its seal upon it.Whether 
we like it or not, we have now become an Indian nation,united 
and indivisible. >7o fantasy or artificial scheming to separate 
and divide can break this unity. Ve must accept the logic of 
fact and history and engage ourselves in the fashioning of 
our future destin-"'" , 
It is apparent that Jinnah, as a shre\i;ed politician, aimed to take 
advantage of the growing rift bet^ -'een the Congress and the Government. 
Further, the Day o^ Deliverance had created a nev; gulf betv/een the 
Conaress and the Muslim Leaaue. After the dissolnt-i on of the Congress 
ministries, the league took over the seats and gained power. Jinnah 
strengthened the League's position under the sha'^ ov; of the sloaan, "Islam 
56, The Leader (Allahabad), March 21, 1940. 
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in danger" and realised that settlement between the Congress and the 
league vas impossible and, hence, determined to work for achieving 
Pakistan, a sejsarate homeland for Muslims, v;hich would be -Pree for 
57 their development v/ithout any interference of the Hindus. 
AIMI lahore Session, 1940 
By the end of 1938-39, Syed Abdul Tatif, Khaliquzzaman, Sikandar 
Hvat Khan, Professor Syed Zafru] Hanan, Moh-^ mnia'^  Afzal Husain Qadri 
C Q 
an'^  Sir Abdullah Ilaroon nut forward nropos^ Tls for the reorganization 
o-p the country on the basis of federation, confederation or vivisection, 
v/hich were considered by the Conference of the All-India Muslim League 
held at lahore on March 22-24,1940. Jinnah, propounding the two-nation 
theory and in the typical tradition of a brilliant lawyer arguing his 
point, said:-
"Notwithstanding a thousand years o^ close contact, these 
nationalities are as divergent today as ever, and they 
cannot at any time be expected to transform themselves into 
one nation merely by means o^ subjecting them to a democratic 
constitution and holding them forcibly together by the 
unnatural and artificial methods o"^  British Parliamentary 
statutes". 
On March 23, 1940, Jinnah red out the resolution: 
"... the scheme of Federation embodied in the Government 
of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unv;orkable 
in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether 
vmacceptable to Muslim India. 
"... Muslim India will not he satisfied unless the v/hole 
constitutional plan is reconsidered _de novo and that no 
revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it 
is framed with their approval and consent. 
57. See for details Jinnah's Speech, Appendix IV. 
58. Sandhya Chaudhri, Gandhi and ^the Parti^ tion of India (New Delhi: 
Sterling Publishers Pvt.lfd. ,""1984)", oT S^ l. 
59. ?''',n. Mtra (ed.). The Indian Annual Register (Calcutta: Annual 
Register Office, 1930-194"Trr~1^ 4 0, pp.'308-09. 
60. S.S. Pirzada, Foijndations of Pakistan, Vo] . II, 1924-1947 (Delhi: 
Metropolitan Book Co.Fvt.rtd., I9"8"2rr P. 341. See also Resolutions 
of the All-India TTuslim league -From December", 1938 to J-Iarch, ig^-fO 
(Delhi: (Navrabzada) Liaouat All Khan, M.A. (Oxon) , M.I .A. (U.P.) , 
Earrister-at-Law, Honorary Secretary, All-India Muslim league), 
pp. 47-48. 
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"Resolved that it is the considered view of this session 
of the All-India Muslim league that no constitutional plan 
would be workable in this country or acceptable to the 
Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, 
viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated 
into regions which should be so r-onsti tut-^ d, with such 
territorial readjustments as may be necessar\', tha-^  the 
areas in which the Muslims are nimierically in a majority as 
in the north-v;estem and eastern zones of India should be 
grouped to constitute "Indenendent State" in v^ hich the 
constituent units shal] be autonomous anc" sovereign. 
"That adequate, ef-^ ective and manc?atorY safeguards should 
be snerificallv provided in the constitution -^ or minorities 
in these units and in the regions for the protection of t]ielr 
religious, culture, economic, political, administrative and 
other rights and interests in consultation with them and 
in other parts of India vrhcre the Mussalmans are in a minority 
adequate, effective and mandator\^  safeguards shall be 
specifically provided in the constitution for them and other 
minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, 
economic, political, administrative and other rights and 
interests in consultation with them". 
The Session also authorised the Working Committee of the AIMI 
"to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic 
principles, nroviding for the assumption finally by the respective 
regions of all pov/ers su'^ h as defence, external affairs, communications, 
fi 1 
customs and such other matters as ma^ ' be necessary" . 
To understand the implications of the words used in the resolution 
and to highlight the argijmentative and conflicting stance which the 
whole issue of partition was fact-assuming, it seems worthv/hi3e to quote 
below the questions raised by Gandhiji and replied by Jinnan in 1944:-
-r S.'Noi ' Gandhiji's Questions ; J i n n a h ' s Answers 
mmmmi^'J' •• 'I ' " • • • I I ..... - - - . . ' _ _ _ „ ^ - _ _ _ _ _ ^ 
|%lcLstan is not in the resolu- Yes, the word "Pakistan" is not 
tlon. Does It bear the original mentioned in the resolution, 
meaning - the Punjab, Afghanis- and it does not bear the original 
tan, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchis- meaning. The word has now become 
tan, out of which the name was synonymous with the Lahore 
mnetnonically formed? If not, resolution. 
what is it?' ' '' 
61. L.A', Sherwani, Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, 1940..-1947 (Delhi: 
Daya Publishing House, 1985), p. 21. "' i 
62. Letter from M.K.Gandhi to M.A.Jinnah, September 15, 1944, in Gandhi-
Jinnah Talks (Nev; Delhi: The Hindustan Times, October, 1944) , pp. 12-14 . 
63. Letter from M.A.Jinnah to M.K.Gandhi,September 17,1944, in Gandhi-
Jinnah Talks, Ibid.,pp.16-18: L.A.Sherwani,n.51, pp. 78-79. 
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Is the goal of Pakistan 
pan-Islam? 
VThat is that distinguishes 
an Indian Muslim from every 
other Indian, if not his 
religion? Is he different 
from a Turk or an Arab? 
This point "does not arise, but 
still I reply that the question 
is a mere bogey. 
This point is covered by my answer 
that the Mussalmans of India are 
a nation. As to the last para of 
your query, it is hardly relevant 
to the matter of clarification of 
of the resolution. 
What is the connotation of 
the word "Muslim" in the 
resolution under discussion/ 
Does it mean the Muslims of 
the India of geography or 
of the Pakistan to be? 
Surely you know what the word 
'Muslim' means. 
Is the resolution addressed 
to Muslims by way of educa-
tion, or to the inhabitants 
of the whole of India by way 
of appeal, or to the foreign 
rulers as an ultimatum/ 
This point does not arise by way 
of clarification of the text of 
the Lahore resolution. 
Are the constituents in the 
two zones to constitute 
'independent States', an 
undefined number in each 
zone? 
No. They will form units of 
Pakistan, 
Is the demarcation to take 
place during the pendency 
of the British rule? 
8. If the answer to the last 
question is in the affirmative, 
the proposal must be accepted 
first by Britain and then 
Imposed upon India, not 
evolved from within the free 
will of the people of India'.'.'. 
9. Have you examined the 
position and satisfied 
yourself that these 
'independent State' will be 
materially and otherwise 
benefitted by being split 
up into fragments? 
10, Please satisfy me that these 
independent sovereign States 
will not become a collection 
of poor States, a menace to 
themselves and to the rest 
of India. 
As soon as the basis and the 
principles embodied in the Lahore 
resolution are accepted, the 
question of demarcation will have 
to be taken up immediately. 
In view of ray reply to (7) your 
question (8) has been answered. 
Does not relate to clarification. 
My answer to (9) covers this point. 
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11, Pray show me the facts and Does not arise out of the clarifica-
figures or otherwise how far tion of the resolution. Surely this 
independence and welfare of is not asking for clarification of 
India as a whole can be the resolution. I have in nxomerous 
brought about by the acceptance speeches of mine and the Muslim 
of the resolution? league in its resolutions have 
pointed out that this is the only 
solution of India's problem and 
the road to achieve freedom and 
independence of the people of India, 
12, How are Muslims under the 
Princes to be disposed of 
as a result of this scheme? 
"Muslims under the Princes". 
The Lahore resolution is only 
confined to British India, This 
question does not arise out of the 
clarification of the resolution. 
13, What is your definition of 
'minorities'? 
The definition of 'minorities' 
You yourself have often said 
"minorities" means "accepted 
minorities". 
14, Will you please define the 
"adequate, effective and 
mandatory safeguards" for 
minorities referred to in 
the second part of the 
resolution? 
The adequate, effective and mandatory 
safeguards for minorities referred 
to in the resolution are a matter 
for negotiation and settlement with 
the minorities in the respective 
States, viz, Pakistan and Hindustan. 
15. Do you not see that the 
Lahore resolution contains 
only a bare statement of the 
objective and does not give 
any idea as to the means 
to be adopted for the 
execution of the idea and 
the concrete corrollaries 
thereof? 
It does give basic principles and 
when they are accepted, then the 
details will have to be worked out 
by the contracting parties. 
For instance: 
(a) Are the people in the 
regions falling under the 
plan to have any voice in 
the matter of separation and, 
if so, how is it to be ascertained? 
Does not arise by way of 
clarification, 
(b) What is the provision for 
defence and similar matters 
of common concern contempla-
ted in the Lahore resolution? 
Does not arise by way of 
clarification. 
(c) There are many groups of 
Muslims who have continuously 
expressed dissent from the 
policy of the League. While 
I am prepared to accept the 
The Muslim League is the only 
authoritative and representative 
organization of Muslim India. 
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preponderating influence and 
position of the League and 
have approached you for that 
very reason, is it not our 
joint duty to remove their 
doubts and carry them with 
us by making them feel that 
they and their supporters 
have not been practically 
disfranchised? 
(d) Does this not lead again 
to placing the resolution 
of the League before the 
people of the zones concerned 
as a whole for acceptance? 
Final paragraph 
"As I write this letter and 
imagine the working of the 
resolution in practice, I 
see nothing but ruin for the 
whole of India ...". 
No; see answer (c) 
"... you have already passed your 
judgment when you;say, "As I 
write this letter and imagine 
the working of the resolution in 
practice, I see nothing but ruin 
for the whole of India", 
However, the resolution asserted the demand for Pakistan leaving 
behind and rendering redimdant all problems of separate electorates, 
composite cabinets, reservation of posts etc, 
M.A. Jinnah's Two-Nation Theory 
Jinnah, in his presidential speech, analysing the Hindu-Muslim 
differences, said that it was "not of an intercommunal character, but 
manifestly of an international one" and he suggested, "it must be treated 
as such". He anticipated that, in the presence of Hindu-Muslim differences, 
"any constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will 
prove destructive". Therefore, deciding that the differences cannot be 
settled, he conclusively said that "If the British Government are really 
in earnest and sincere to secure peace and happiness of the people of 
this sub-continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major 
nations separate homelands by dividing India into 'autonomous national 
64 
states', These words reveal the spirit that Jinnah sincerely longed for 
Pakistan not for enemity between Hindus and the Muslims, but dejectedly 
64. Summary of Speech made by M.A, Jinnah as reproduced in All-India 
Muslim League, Lahore Session, March, 1940, 'Presidential Address 
by M.A, Jinnah', in (Nawabzada) Liac[uat All Khan, n. 60, pp.21-25. 
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since the Hindu-Muslim differences could not be settled. One might add 
that on this point of inevitability of partition the League and the 
Congress viewpoints appeared to converge. Jinnah also expressed himself 
on the advantages of vivisection. He sala: 
"On the other hand, the rivalry and the natural desire 
and efforts on the part of one to dominate the social order 
and establish political supremacy over the other in the 
government of the country will disappear. It will lead more 
towards natural goodwill by international pacts between 
them, and they can live in complete harmony with their 
neighbours. This will lead further to a friendly settlement 
all the more easily with regard to minorities by reciprocal 
arranganents and adjustments between Muslim India and Hindu 
India, which will far more adequately and effectively 
safeguard the rights and interests of Muslims and various 
other minorities". 
Jinnah, in view of the prejudicial statements and reactions of 
Hindus, asserted that "our Hindu friends fail to xanderstand the real 
66 
nature of Islam and Hinduism". He justified that as the Hindus have 
"different and distinct social orders ... it is a dream that the Hindus 
67 
and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality". He said that "this 
misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and 
is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction 
68 if we fail to revise our notions intimi". Still Jinnah wanted to settle 
the Hindu-Muslim problems by revising notions against each other. He 
had in mind the Hindu-Muslim relations during the past when they lived 
like brethren. Justifying his view of two-nation theory, which protracted 
the demand for a separate Muslim homeland, he gave a long statementx-
"The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious 
philosophies, social customs, literature. They neither inter-
marry, nor interdine together and indeed they belong to two 
different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting 
ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are 
different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans 
derive their inspiration from different sources of history. 
They have different epics, their heroes are different, and 
different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the 
65. L.A. Sherwani, n, 61, p, 24. 
66. Ibid. 
67. Ibid. 
68. ibia-; ^ . 
69. Ibid. 
Ill 
other and, likewise their victories and defeats overlap. 
To yoke together two such nations under a single state, 
one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, 
must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of 
any fabric that may be so built up for the government of 
such a state". 
Supporting his idea of India's division, Jinnah recalls the 
examples of Balkan Peninsula which "comprises as many as 7 or 8 sovereign 
states. Likewise, the Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the 
Iberian Peninsula", He observed that the then state of India was 
"artificial" and was "maintained by the British bayonet". He expressed 
his fears that "the termination of the British regime ... will be the 
herald of the entire break up with a worse disaster than has ever taken 
place during the last one thousand years under the Muslims", Assessing 
the constitutional development in view of the Hindu-Muslim differences, 
he saia:-
"Muslira India cannot accept any constitution which must 
necessarily result in a Hindu majority government. Hindus 
and Muslims brought together under a democratic system 
forced upon the minorities can only mean Hindu Raj• He have 
had ample experience of the working of the provincial 
constitution during the last two and a half years and any 
repetition of such a government must lead to civil war and 
raising private armies as recommended by Mr, Gandhi ,to 
Hindus of Sukkur when he said that they must defend themselves 
violently or non-violently, blow for blow, and if they could 
not, they must migrate", 
Here Jinnah has advocated the reason of demand for Pakistan based 
on the assumption that there would be Hindu Raj leading to civil war. 
However, Gandhiji's provocation to Hindus for "blow for blow" otherwise 
they should "migrate" had very much encouraged the Hindu Mahasabha, who 
weaved a long net of riots and conspiracies resulting in the assassina-
tion of Gandhiji's himself. 
Jinnah tried to remove the misxmderstanding of the Congress, which 
proclaimed the Muslims in India a minority. Jinnah claimed that "Mussal-
mans are not a minority as it is commonly known and \inderstood ... 
Kussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they 
70. Ibid. 
71. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
72. Ibid., p. 25. 
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must have their homelands, their territory and their state. We wish 
to live ... as a free and independent people ... in consonance with 
73 
our own ideals and according to th^ genius of our people .'..•*. 
k.K, Fazlul Hag on the Lahore Resolution 
The Bengal Pr^nier, Moulvi Fazlul Haq, while moving the resolution, 
said that the "idea of federation must not only be postponed/ but 
abandoned". He emphasised that "Muslims of India would not consent to 
any scheme which was framed without their approval. To them only that 
constitution would be acceptable as was framed from the Muslim point 
74 
of view", otherwise it would be unworkable. He hoped that the framers 
of the future constitution would consider also the Muslim feelings. He ^ 
said that they "constituted 80 millions scattered all over India" and 
"were in a weak position numerically in almost every province of India". 
He characterised Azad's presidential address as "Tin-lslamic". The Maulana 
had said that "Muslims should not feel nervous: 80 millions was not a 
small number and they need not be afraid", 
Choudhry Khaliquzzaman on the Lahore Resolution 
The MIA and leader of the Opposition Party in the U,P,Legislative 
Assembly, Ch, Khaliquzzaman, laid responsibility of the disastrous 
proposal: firstly, on the Government, "who in order to exploit the Indians 
declared that India was one nation and started the majority and minority 
question"; secondly, on the Congress, which gave a realisation to the 
Muslims that "their existence was in danger and, if they wanted to maintain 
their identity, they must struggle for it",-and, thirdly, on those Muslims, 
"who tried to split the ranks of the Muslims by setting up rival organiza-
tions or joining the Congress or other non-Muslim political parties". 
Criticising Azad's advice that Muslims should not demand separation since 
they were strong enough to defend themselves, Khaliquzzaman said: "if 
73, Summary of Speech made by A.K. Fazul Hag, as reproduced in All-India 
Muslim League, Lahore Session, 1940, 'Presidential Address by 
M.A, Jinnah', (Nawabzada) Liaquat Ali Khan, n, 60, pp. 30-32, Also 
see S,S,Pirzada, n.60, pp. 337-38, See also Radical Humanist 
(Calcutta-12: 15, Bankim Chatterjee Road), p, 196. The Journal later 
shifted to New Delhi in March, 1940, 
]J4. anmmarv of Speech made by A.K.Fazlul Hao. Ibid, 
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the issue between the Hindus and Muslims was to be decided by means 
of the sword, the Muslims had no fear. They did not need 9 crores to 
settle it. As it was, the issue depended on votes". Assuring the Muslims 
in minority provinces, he clarified that, "Muslims in the minority 
provinces should not be afraid as to what would happen to them after 
the partition of India into "Hindu India" and "Muslim India". The same 
thing would happen to them as to the minorities in the Punjab and Benga 
K.K, Aziz on the Lahore Resolution 
I^", 
Searching the cause for the demand of Pakistan, K.K. Aziz said 
that it was"a proof of the desperate" apprehension with which Muslims 
regarded the prospect of Hindu domination" . He opined that "Had the 
Congress formed coalitions in the provinces the already existing fissi-
parous tendencies might have been prevented from spreading". "All the 
assximptions, he further said, "on which the Muslim acceptance of the 
1935 constitution had been based were destroyed by the working of 
provincial autonomy in the Hindu provinces. The Hindu demand for a 
constituent assembly to draw up a constitution for all India proved the 
last straw". Analysing the cause of differences he said, "If the Hindus 
wanted a strong centre and were not prepared to compromise on it, the 
Muslims did not want a centre at all. If the Hindus believed in the rule 
of the majority, the Muslims denied that they were a minority".Assuring 
the Muslims left in India after the alleged partition, he stated that 
"Pakistan would not only safeguard the Muslims left behind in India 
(on the principle of 'mutual retaliation*) but also give self-respect 
78 to those who lived within the boundaries of Pakistan". 
Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan on the Lahore Resolution 
Explaining the Lahore resolution on March 11, 1941, Sir Sikandar 
Hayat Khan said: ",.. When that resolution was passed it was termed the 
Lahore resolution; the word Pakistan was not used at the League meeting 
and this term was not applied to the League resolution by anybody until 
77, Summary of Speech made by gb;Khali^zz&mg{p,as reproduced in All-India 
Muslim League, Lahore Session, 1940, 'Presidential Address by 
M.A, Jinnah*, (Nawabzada) Liaquat Ali Khan, n, 60, pp. 32-34, See 
also N.N, Mitra, The Indian Annual Register,1940,Vol.I, p. 313. 
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the Hindii press had a brain-wave and dubbed It Pakistan. They have 
sown the wind and must now reap the whirlwind". Admitting the authorship 
of the proposal, he said that the resolution which he drafted was 
radically amended by the Working Committee eliminating the part which 
related to the "Centre and co-ordination of the activities of the various 
units ... It must be taken as the official resolution of the Muslim 
League which was ratified by the Muslim League ...". He expressed his 
conviction that "the future destiny of India lies in accepting a position 
of freedom within the British Commonwealth". Proposing the solution of 
the constitutional problem, he reiterated:-
"Under my scheme every iinit will enjoy complete autonomy in 
its internal affairs. It is forttanate that the population of 
India is so distributed in the various units that in four out 
of the eleven British Indian provinces Muslims are in the 
majority, though in two of these they have just a bare majority-
while in the remaining seven provinces Hindus are in the 
majority ... it provides the fullest opport\mity and scope to 
the two major communities, within their respective territorial 
spheres to exercise and enjoy the rights of a majority, subject, 
of course, to the rights and privileges of the minorities. If 
we accept this principle, which to ray mind is a rational 
principle, then all those difficulties which are of our own 
making, and which obstruct our constitutional progress, will 
disappear as if by a magic wand". 
81 Considering the Muslim acceptance of the proposal, he says:-
"At the same time they are willing to concedie - and they 
cannot reasonably deny to the Hindus what they claim for them-
selves as a just right - the same rights and privileges to the 
Hindus in the provinces in which they happen to be the majority 
community ... Since the Hindus will benefit from this proposal 
in seven out of eleven provinces, why should they grudge the 
same facilities and privileges to the Muslims in the four 
Muslim majority provinces?" 
He also thought of the fear that "if the provinces are not free 
and autonomous, there will always be a danger of undue and unwarranted 
interference from the Centre which will be dominated by the Hindus, He 
further anticipated that a "Central Government with a Hindu majority 
would use its authority and influence to strengthen the position of Hindu 
79. From Speech in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, Punjab Legislative 
Debates, Vol. XVI (Lahore: Superintendent, Government Printing 
Press, 1942), pp. 350-56. 
80. Ibid. 
81. Ibid. 
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provinces in the political, economic| sociao. and cultural fields at 
the expense of the Muslim majority provinces on the one hand, while on 
the other they would try to \indermine the authority and position of the 
latter by unnecessary interference and unjust restrictions and obstruc-
/• 82 
tions". However, as its solution. Sir Sikandar recommended as follows:-
"I say, give complete autonomy and freedom to the units 
and let them be demarcated into regions or zones on a 
territorial basis. Representatives of the units within each 
zone should represent their respective units as also the 
region at the Centre. The Centre constituted will not be 
a domineering hostile Centre looking for opportunities to 
interfere with the work of provincial Governments, but a 
sympathetic agency enjoying the confidence and support of 
the provinces - ". 
Sir Hassan Suhrawardy on the Lahore Resolution 
In his opinion, "Mr, Jinnah envisages the course followed in the 
evolution of the Union of the Commonwealth of Australia and that of the 
Dominion of Canada, The Muslim States will first function as separate 
and independent units in the British Commonwealth of Nations, and, if 
and when foxind feasible, confederate as equal partners by mutual consent 
with other parts of India and with other Dominions", Discussing the 
nature of Pakistan to be a symbol of certain facts and progress, he says 
that "It is by no means an aggressive movement against any community or 
political partv. If anything, it is a protective and defensive movement; 
its root causes lie in the social injustice and selfish exclusiveness 
83 
of that great evil, the caste system of the Hindus", 
Suhrawardy highlighted the position of Punjab also. Counting the 
total Sikh population in India as 5,7 millions and that of the Muslims 
94-1/4 millions; and the total Sikh population in Punjab as 03-3/4 
millions and Muslim 16-1/4 millions out of total population of 28-1/2 
millions, he observed that "most of the Sikhs of the Punjab live in the 
area south-east of a line following the Sutlej River up to Ferozpore, and 
from there the railway line passing by Amritsar and Gurdaspur to the 
82. Ibid. 
83, From Lecture on "The Indian Crisis: Muslim Viewpoints", given at 
a joint meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society and the East 
India Association on 4 November, 194 2, Journal of the Royal Central 
Asian Society (London), January, 1943, pp. 61-63. 
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River Ravi". He further indicates that "there has been antagonism 
between the Muslims and the Sikhs" and, therefore, "if after careful 
consideration the Sikh community are not satisfied that, with the consti-
tution of the North-West Dominion under the Pakistan scheme, their 
present influential position in the Punjab and in the whole of India will 
be much improved, they could form an enclave to include the majority of 
the Sikh population, and by treaty rights safeguard the interests of the 
84 
minority living outside the enclave". 
The opinions of eminent Muslims in different states may be instanced 
also. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan said that during his association with the 
Congress he experienced that the Congress was not anxious for freedom 
but wanted to suppress the minorities, and that the Congress had achieved 
its strength with the help of the Muslim League (during association of 
Gandhiji with the Ali Brothers and Maulana Abdul Bari in the Khilafat 
movement). Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, Leader of the Opposition in the Frontier 
Assembly, thanked the Muslims living in minority provinces for their 
support to the League, which meant freedom for six crores of Muslims. 
Sir Abdullah Haroon, M.L.A., Central Province, said that "if the Hindus 
did not treat the Muslims fairly, the latter would treat the Hindus in 
85 
the same way as Hitler treated the Sudetans". Abdul Hamid Khan, a Muslim 
Leader of Madras, said that two and a half years Congress rule had been 
instrumental for awakening the Muslims and consolidating the League, 
Mohammed Alam, who was an eminent leader of the Congress in Punjab and 
an admirer of Gandhiji, "blamed the Congress and said that it simply aimed 
at establishing Hindu Raj within British India". 
Nationalist Muslims on the Lahore Resolution 
The nationalist Muslims criticised the League's demand for a 
separate homeland. Begum Abdul Aziz, President, Nationalist Muslim Women's 
Association, characterized the scheme as mischievous, impracticable and 
87 
against the Islamic principles, Azad Muslim Conference, which comprised 
various nationalist groups, such as, "Jamiat-ul-Ulema, All-India Organisa-
tion of Muslim Divines and Scholars, MaJlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, the Independent 
84. (Nawabzada) Liaquat Ali Khan, n. 60, p. 30. 
85. Sandhya Chaudhri, n. 58, p. 54. 
86. N.N. Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, 1940, Vol.1, p, 314, 
87. The Tribxme (Lahore), March 29, 1940. 
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Party of Bihar, the KrishaTc Praja Party of Bengal, the All-India Morain 
Conference, the Anj\jman-e-Watan of Baluchistan and the Central Standing 
Committee of All-India Shia Conference condemned the partition plan" 
and did not recognize the claim of the League to be the only representa-
tive of all Muslims in India. 
Khan Bahadur Allah Bux, the Sind Premier, said: 
" A majority of the Ninety million Indian Muslims who were 
descendents of the earlier inhabitants of India were in no 
sense other than sons of the soil. He characterised the 
Pakistan scheme as harmful and fantastic and ... that it 
sought to create another Palestine under British mandate". 
He exhorted the Muslims to "live like brothers in a joint family". 
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad desctibeid the p>artition scheme as "meaningless 
g_ 
and absurd". Maulvi Abdul Mai id, presiding over the U.P, Azad Muslim 
Political Conference, on July 28, 1940, repudiating the Pakistan demand 
said: "No power on earth can deprive the Muslims of their religion,culture 
and other rights if they themselves are determined to stand on their 
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own legs". Sir Habibur Rahman, President, All-Bengal Krishak Praja Party, 
remarked: "If Pakistan means Muslim Raj, I will have nothing to do with 
it". He further said: "... the Muslim majority provinces of India namely 
the Punjab, the Frontier, Sind and Bengal etc., had now openly turned 
dovm the Pakistan scheme of Jinnah" and "the proposal was not only absurd, 
chimerical and visionary but also would remain for ever a castle in the 
air ... The Indians, both Hindus and Muslims, live in a common Motherland, 
use the offshoots of a common language and literature, and are proud of 
the noble heritage of a common Hindu and Muslim culture, developed through 
centuries of residence in a common land. There is no one among Hindus 
and Muslims who will be prepared to sacrifice all this in order to accept 
what is demanded by MrUinnah". Khan Abdul Qaiyum declared that "the 
Frontier Province will resist the partition of India with its blooS". 
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Sir Ghulam Hussaln Hldayatullah rejected the idea of Pakistan outrighr. 
M.K, Gandhi on the Lahore Resolution 
Gandhijl disclosed his mind In Harljan on April 6, 1940:-
"I know no non-violent method of compelling the obedience 
of eight crores of Muslims to the will of the rest of India, 
however powerful a majority the rest may represent. The 
Muslims must have the same right of self-determination that 
the rest of India has. We are at present a joint family. Any 
member may claim a division". 
Rejecting the two nations' theorv of Jlnnah, Gandhljl wrote in the 
97 
same issue of Harljan;-
"The 'two nations* theory' is an untruth. The vast majority 
of Muslims of India are converts to Islam or are the descendants 
of converts. They did not become a separate nation, as soon 
as they became converts, A Bengali Muslim speaks the same 
tongue that a Bengali Hindu does, eats the same food and has 
the same amusements, as his Hindu neighbour. They dress alike. 
I have often found it difficult to distinguish by outward sign, 
between a Bengali Hindu and a Bengali Muslim, The "same phenomenon 
is observable more or less in the south among the jxaor who 
constitute the masses of India ...". 
In reply to a statement of Nawabzada Llaquat All Khan, Gandhljl 
wrote on April 13, 19l0:-
"As a man of non-violence, I cannot forcibly resist the proposed 
partition, if the Muslims of India really insist upon it. But I 
never can be a willing party to the vivisection. I would employ 
every nonviolent means to prevent it. For it means the undoing 
of centuries of work done by numberless Hindus and Muslims to 
live together as one nation. Partition means a patent untruth". 
Gandhljl was against the two-nation theory. He wrote:-
95. The Hindu (Madras), April 17, 1940. 
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Mahatma : Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (New Delhi: Government 
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"My whole soul rebels against the idea that Hlndxiism and 
Islam represent two antagonistic cultures and doctrines. 
To assent to such a doctrine is for me denial of God, For 
I believe with my whole soul that the God of the Koran is 
also the God of the Gita, and that we are all, no matter 
by what name designated, children of the same God, I must 
rebel against the idea that millions of Indians who were 
Hindus the other day changed their nationality on adopting 
Islam as their religion. 
"But that is my belief, I fcannot trust it down the throats 
of the Muslims who think that they are a different nation, 
I refuse, however, to believe that the eight crores of 
Muslims will say that they have nothing in common with their 
Hindu and other brethren. Their mind can only be known by 
a referendum made to them duly on that clear issue. The 
contemplated constituent assembly can easily decide the 
question. Naturally on an issue as this, there can be no 
arbitration. It is purely a matter of self-determination. 
I know of no other conclusive method of ascertaining the 
mind of the eight crores of Muslims", 
Gandftiji, who was deeply pained and purturbed at these proposals, 
100 
wrote in the HariTan:-
"I cannot think in terms of narrow Hinduism or narrow Islam. 
I am wholly uninterested in a patchwork solution, India is 
a big country, a big nation composed of different cultures, 
which are tending to blend with one another, each complementing 
the rest, I must wait for the completion of the process, I 
roust wait. It may not be in my day, I should love to die in 
the faith that it must come in the fullness of time ,,,Pakistan 
cannot be worse than the foreign domination, I have lived 
under the latter, though not willingly. If God so desires it, 
I may have to become a helpless witness to the vmdoing of my 
dream. But I do not believe that the Muslims want to dismember 
India, 
"The partition proposal has altered the face of the Hindu-
Muslim problem, I have called it an untruth. There can be 
no compromise with it. At the same time I have said that, if 
the eight crores of Muslims desire it, no power on earth can 
prevent it, notwithstanding opposition, violent or non-violent. 
It cannot come by honourable compromise". 
101 Gandhiji further wrote:-
"... if the Congress loses hope and faith and comes to the 
conclusion that it must surrender its original position for 
the purpose of getting a common measure of agreement, it will 
cease to be the power it is. Today/ it is the sheet-anchor 
of India's hope and faith. It will be well for it, if it refused 
to move away from its moorings, whether it is in a minority 
or a majority". 
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Jawaharla]^ Nehru on the Lahore Resolution 
Jawaharlal Nehru, at a speech in Allahabad/ categorically reject-
ing the Lahore proposals, saS Mh-
"We will have nothing to do with this mad scheme. This 
whole problem has taken a nev? complesion and there is 
no question of settlement or negotiations". 
However/he felt relief especially at the thought that the League 
had come out with clear terms and open decision. Therefore, Jawaharlal 
103 
Nehru, instead of expressing grief, was happy to say:-
"... he was pleased, not because he liked it - on the contrary 
he considered it to be the most insane suggestion - but because 
it very much simplified the problem, they were now able to 
get rid of the demands about proportionate representation in 
legislatxires, services, cabinets, etc,,.. (He) asserted that 
if people wanted such things, as suggested by the Muslim League 
at Lahore, then one thing was clear, they and people like him 
could not live together in India. He would be prepared to face 
all consequences of it but he would not be prepared to live 
with such people". 
At other occasion Nehru said:-
"Many knots of the Hindu-Muslim problem had been merged into 
one knot, which could not be unravelled by ordinary methods, 
but would need an operation ... he would say one thing very 
frankly that he had begun to consider them (Muslim Leaguers) 
and people like himself/ as separate nations". 
Jawaharlal Nehru, expressing his least anxiety wrote ©f the resolu-
tion as "Jinnah's fantastic proposals" reading it as a cat's paw of 
105 
British imperial duplicity. 
Dr. Rajendra Prasad on the Lahore Resolution 
Admitting that the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the Jamiat-ul-Mominin, the 
Ahrars, the Nationalist Muslim organizations, the All-India Shia Conference 
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and others "expressed their opposition to separation". Dr. Rajendra 
Prasad made it clear that "the Hindus and the Sikhs have declared their 
unequivocal determination to resist partition. This is bound to become 
more pronounced and more bitter with the persistence with which the 
proposal for division is pressed. It is difficult to forecast what shape 
this conflict may take in the future". He was sure that the "Distrust 
which is the basis of the proposal is bound to grow and any hope that 
after separation things will settle down and the independent states will 
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soon become friendly will have been built on sand". Explaining the 
position of minorities, he said:-
"For the minorities it will veritably be a case of jumping 
from the frying pan into the fire. The non-Muslim minorities 
will have the situation forced upon them, if the proposal 
succeeds. But the Muslim minority will have chosen it, worked 
for it and extorted it from the non-Muslims and could not 
blame any one else for it". 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on the Lahore Resolution 
He asserted that an integral India will never be an organic whole. 
"India may in name be continued to be known as one country but in reality 
it will be two separate countries - Pakistan and Hindustan - joined 
109 
together by a forced and artificial union". Assessing the impact of the 
Jinnah's two-nation theory, he saia:-
"The two-nation theory will not leave room even for the 
growth of that sentimental desire for unity. The spread 
of that virus of dualism in the body politic must some 
day create a mentality which is sure to call for a life 
and death struggle for the dissolution of this forced union". 
He anticipated that if India will not be divided, the continued 
"union will go on sapping her vitality, loosening its cohesion, weakening 
its hold on the love and faith of her people and preventing the use, if 
not retarding the growth, of its moral and material resources. India will 
106. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, India Divided (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1946), 
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be an anaemic and sickly state, ineffective, a living corpse, dead though 
not buried". He opined that "if this forced union continues there will 
be no political advance for India unless it is accompanied by Communal 
Settlement". He said also that in case of a federation, there will be 
a need of a third party to appeal to in cases of dispute with sufficient 
armed forces to see that the settlement is not broRen. The prestige of 
this assessment is amazing. Ambedkar appeared to be the only statesman 
who could assess the future course and incidentally the future logic of 
Indian leadership which led to emergence of a mental preparedness for 
partition, 
Chimanlal H. Setalvad on the Pakistan Demand 
Setalvad in plain words held the Congress responsible for the demand 
112 
of Pakistan by the Muslim League, He says: 
"The real parentage of the Pakistan movement can be traced 
to the Congress who by the wrong way in which they handled 
the commtinal question and by their behaviour when they were 
in power, created the great distrust in the minds of the 
Muslim community which has driven them to advocate Pakistan, 
In the loeginning. Congress leaders said that there was no 
communal problem in India and if there was, it could be settled 
after India got Independence, forgetting that for the very 
purpose of getting Independence, communal xanity was essential. 
There is the tragic perversity which the Congress displayed 
when they assumed office under the Act of 1935, When the 
Congress won at the elections in Bombay, they pretended, when 
forming the ministry, to provide for minority representation. 
For that purpose, they made a Muslim member of the Assembly 
sign the Congress pledge on one day and made hira minister the 
next day. This was indeed a travesty of Muslim representation 
when that Muslim minister had not the confidence of the 22 
Muslim League members of the Bombay Legislative Assembly, They 
dealt unjustly with the Muslim commtmity and made them hostile..." 
M.R. Jayakar on the Lahore Resolution 
Jayakar, speaking at the Tilak Anniversary on August 1, 1940, 
regarding the Lahore Resolution, said:-
"Its technique is very skillful and astute, and is primarily 
intended to create panic amongst the Hindu community in the 
hope that in the panicky condition, the Hindus would surrender 
more and more rights in order to avoid the advent of Pakistan". 
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On another occasion, in a public meeting, Jayalcar siSt^The remedy 
for India was not vivisection, but was greater fraternisation and mutual 
londerstanding", 
However, the Congress leaders decided to secure political freedom 
of India as early as possible preserving the political unity of as large 
a part of the country as possible and their cherished ideals and left 
the Muslim League for giving up or pursuing its demand of a separate 
homeland• 
The SiXhs on the Lahore Resolution 
Sardar Ujjal Singh, Parliamentary Secretary to Government of Pvmjab, 
said that "Khalsa would resist attempts to divide India" and Master 
Tara Singh, at the UP Sikh Conference held at Luclaiow on April 15, 1940, 
warned, "If the Muslim League wants to establish Pakistan, they will have 
115 to pass through an ocean of Sikh blood". Speaking at Karachi on April 12, 
1941, Master Tara Singh sai lil: 
"I do not share the view of those who say that Pakistan 
is impracticable. We are opposed to Pakistan because its 
very conception is based on extreme communal considerations, 
because its aim is not the protection of Muslims but their 
domination over the minorities, because it is conceived in 
the interest of one community and not in the interest of the 
minorities, because it creates ever-fighting divisions of 
the country. The Pakistan scheme aims at Muslim domination 
in certain parts of the country. This mentality of domination 
is so bad that its result can only be chaos and anarchy. If 
we think we, Hindus and Muslims, cannot unite on any basis 
whatsoever, let us then frankly say that we are unfit for 
swaraj and agree to foreign rule". 
The bivil and Military Gazette 
An article (the author has not given the name) embodies the following 
interesting lines:-
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"The proposal of vivisection of the country can offer no 
solution of the commijnal problem, for minorities ancl majorities 
are bound to remain in Palcistan scheme, lanless it is followed 
by an exchange of populations. In that case every community 
should have its sovereign State. Taken to its logical conclusion/ 
the Pakistan idea will lead to the establishment of hxondreds 
of small warring states, which will become an easy prey to 
an ambitious foreign invader. History will then repeat itself. 
Muslims should therefore think seriously about the danger of 
the scheme which they seem to have evolved in a fit of anger 
or desperation", 
British Attitude to the Demand for Pakistan 
A few Britons believed that India could be governed as one and 
indivisible by their brown successors. "To many Britons in India, who 
found the Congress either incomprehensible or irritating, the demand for 
Pakistan appeared to be a condign punishment to the Congress for its 
impudence in asking the British to quit India. They regarded the partition 
of India as inevitable and not entirely ijnwelcome", 
Jim Masselos, a scholar of Indian nationalism, observed that "the 
Muslim League Resolution was not widely accepted seriously even by Muslim 
119 intellectuals and leaders, much less by middle class and masses", Hugh 
Tinker says: "Some British officials welcomed this (Pakistan) plan as 
means of checkmating Congress demand ye-. 
J.p. Griffiths on the Pakistan Scheme 
Echoing the work of the British officials for building a united 
India, Griffiths says that "The demand for Pakistan is largely akin to 
that cr\' of "Islam in danger" which has never yet failed to rouse the 
MosJ.era to action". He argued that "For many Moslems today the demand for 
Pakistan is connected with one of their deepest emotion's; it has become 
a cry from the heart, which will not be gainsaid". Supporting this idea, 
he quotes Gvry Hint: "Among Moslem youth - at least among the urban classes • 
there is developing one of those romantic, turbulent movements which have 
been among the great driving forces of human history". He concludes that 
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the demand for Pakistan "is a movement which may well destroy Irreparably 
the British conception of a xmited India". 
L.S. Amery on Indian Unity and Division 
Amery sees that there was a fxindamental geographical, racial and 
political xinity, which made them a nation to defend their country from 
time to time in her history. I wished at that time that "if some sort 
of Indian tinity had not existed it would have to be invented" .Expressing 
his apprehension, he says: "If India were brolcen up and reverted to 
chaos tomorrow, Indians would have to set about trying to invent for 
her at any rate some minimxjm unity against the dangers from outside". 
Lord Linlithgow on Peace and Welfare 
The Viceroy on August 8, 1940, made it public that the Government 
"could not contonplate the transfer of their present responsibilities 
for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose 
authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's 
national lire". Speaking on December 17, 1942, the Viceroy,emphasising 
the importance of geographical unity of India, said: "I would judge it 
to be as important as it ever was in the past, nay more important, that 
we should seek to conserve that unity in so far as it may be built up 
consistently with full justice for the rights and the legitimate claims 
of the minorities, whether those minorities be great or sma! Mi". 
Lord Wavell on Indian Unity 
Lord Wavell in an address in Calcutta on February 17, 1944, gave 
instances of England and Ireland, Canada, Britain, France, Italy,Germany, 
Switzerland and the Soviet Union, having federal agreements, which 
operate satisfactorily. He infers that "two commxinities and even two 
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nations can make arrangements to live together in spite of differing 
125 
cultures or religions", 
Sir Reginald Coupland on Centre and Provinces 
Coupland finds the Centre's composition more difficult. He 
observed: 
"The Moslems, it seems certain, would prefer no Centre, 
whatever the material results might be, to one which 
constitutes in any shape or degree a Hindu Raj". 
Referring to the statement of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, he said! 
"The moslems claim to be a separate nation, and, as such, 
entitled, if asked to share in an all-India Centre, to fifty-
percent of all its organs, legislative, executive and 
judicial. If, however, the shape of the constitution is such 
as to reassure them that there would be no room for the 
domination of one community by another, they might be willing 
to abate, to some extent, their claim to a fifty per cent 
share", 
Press Reports on Lahore Resolution 
Commenting on the Lahore Resolution, the Statesman w 
"Partition, we have to recognize, is becoming a live issue. 
If India receives Dominion Status partition seems the 
inevitable result in view of the attitude which the Muslim 
community appears disposed to adopt. If that really represents 
their position neither the Congress nor the Hindu Mahasabha 
would be able to hold them. There would probably be fighting, 
but in any case there would be partition. The situation would 
be further complicated by other facts. The Congress resolution 
repudiates association with Great Britain and aims at severing 
economic links, and the most vocal section of the Congress, 
the Leftists, demand a new economic orientation and affilia-
tion with Soviet economy, while the Rightists are in economics 
purely reactionary and talk of reversion to the spinning 
wheel, and village economy to replace national industry. The 
Muslims on the other hand propose that their independent 
Northern and Eastern federation shall be permanently allied 
with Great Britain and free from fads either about the spinning 
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wheel or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Actually 
at the baclc of their minds is probably the intention 
of making an easy meal of the other half of India* while 
it is busy with the cjuarrel between the spinners and the 
Marxists, and establishing an Islamic empire to be a 
glory of the modem world". 
The Manchester Guardian wrote; "Mr, Jinnah has re-established the 
region of chaos in India", Amrita Bazar Patrlka considered the Lahore 
Resolution an 'absurd scheme'. Advance observea: 
"The child, Mr. Jinnah has begotten, is already dead, 
still he hugs it if only he can thereby spite the Congress 
by proclaiming to the world the disunity between the 
Hindus and the Muslims in India". 
Rozana Hind commented that "Mr, Jinnah is an enemy of Indian 
freedom". The Nagpur Times wrote: "The two-nation theory advanced by 
Jinnah was the crown and culmination of the communalistic attitude so 
elaborately built up by the one time ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity". 
The Leader commented: "Mr, Jinnah' s remedy is v;orse than the disease 
134 
and that it will tend to create Sudetenland all over the country". 
Bharat observed: "There is bulk of conflict but no effort for tjnity, 
there are instructions to how slavery may be perpetuated but there is 
no hint as to how freedom may be achieved". 
The Intelligence Rf^ ports from Bombay informed the Government that 
Jinnah*s Presidential Address at Lahore Session was severely criticised 
1.36 by all except three pro-League Muslim papers. His scheme was characterised 
as "... impracticable and disastrous to the people of India including 
the Muslims themselves since it strike at the very root of national unity 
of Inila". 
129. The Manchester Guardian (Manchester), April 12, 1940, 
130 Sandhya Chaudhri, n, 58, p, 57. 
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137. Home Poll, 18.3.1940, Fortnightly Reports for Second Half of 
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Needless to empha:i se that Jinnah was honoured and greeted with 
the slogan of 'Qaid-e-Azam Zindabad' and a song: "Millat ka Pasban hai 
Muhammad All Jinah" (Jinnah is the protector of national unity) was sung 
in his presence, which reveals that in spite of the large scale criticism, 
he had considerable nijmber of followers. 
Despite massive pervasive press comments, Jinnah persisted in his 
demand for Pakistan, because he was backed by Muirhead, the Under-
Secretary of State, and Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, 
who said to Khaliquzzaman abd Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, in March, 1939, that 
"the British would ultimately concede partition". Further, Jinnah had 
taken the Viceroy into his confidence, who "informed him that he could 
not possibly agree to the demands of Mr. Gandhi". The motive behind the 
proposal for creation of Pakistan seems to lay in Jinnah's anxiety for 
attaining a title of the Father of Pakistan like Mahatma Gandhi as the 
Father of the Nation in India. The proverb comes true that "Two beggers 
can sleep under one rug, but two kings cannot live in one country"(Saadi 
Sheerazi). Jinnah thought that he could not live in supremacy vis-a-vis 
Gandhiji in a united India; therefore, he propounded Pakistan for the 
Muslim majority provinces, while the Muslims in other parts of India 
preferred to live in India and opposed the Lahore resolution. The same 
proverb comes true in case of Nehru. While Gandhiji felt grief and tried 
his best to have settlement with Jinnah, Nehru felt a sense of relief in 
the demand for Pakistan, which he appeared to accept, in an ambiguous 
expression. The demand was Jinnah's last straw and if they wanted settle-
ment, there was a very easy scheme i.e. reservation of seats in the Centre 
and the States according to population much like the Lucknow Pact, which 
was'almost agreed upon by all the parties. But, later, the Nehru Constitu-
tion created antagonism, which could not be settled under the pressure 
of the Hindu Mahasabha and,subsequently, the 1935 Act was implemented, 
which was followed by the Lahore Resolution envisaging a separate Muslim 
homeland. They knew that "it would not bring peace but sword. The Muslims 
in India would raise the cry for oppression at the hands of the Hindus 
and the Hindus in Pakistan would raise a similar cry, and there would be 
retaliatory wars. Instead of peace and harmony there would be aggression 
138. C, Khaliquzzaman, Pathwav to Pakistan (London: Orient Longmans, 
1961), p. 211, 
139, Ibid,, po 234. 
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of one state against the other and the sub-continent would for ever 
remain exposed to third-party intervention. The creation of Pakistan 
would be detrimental even to the best interests of the Muslims, for it 
would permanently divL de and weaken tM m'. 
Gandhiji's stateanents impressed a great majority of people - the 
Hindu and Muslim masses alike as they were wedded to democracy and 
non-violence. The Pakistan idea was favoured by ten per cent of Muslim 
population comprising only the landed groups and the Ashrafs, who, as 
we have seen earlier, were the important elements in the Muslim League 
and were opposed by the third element, the Momins etc. As the first and 
the second elements were less numerous, Jinnah was not very confident 
to secure a decisive verdict in favour of Pakistan, but hoped that the 
two elements, being in power, would dominate over the third element, 
which was in majority^ by using their personal influence. But the Viceroy's 
and Araery's statements of August, 1940, tilted the opinion of most of 
the Muslims in favou'r of the demand, 
141 
The Viceroy said: 
"It goes without saying that they (His Majesty's Government 
could not contemplate the transfer of their present 
responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any 
system of government whose authority is directly denied by 
large and powerful elements in the Indian national life 
nor could be a party to the coercion of such elements into 
submission to such a government". 
142 
Amery, encouraging the Pakistan proposal, sa id: 
"The•foremost among these elements stands the great Muslim 
community, ninety mil l ion strong and cons t i tu t ing a majority 
both in north-western and nor th-eas tern India , but scat tered 
as a minority over the whole sub-continent. In re l ig ious 
and socia l outlook, in h i s t o r i c t r a d i t i o n and cu l tu re , the 
difference between them and t h e i r Hin^u fellow countrymen 
goes as deep, i f not deeper than any s imi lar difference 
in Europe". 
The Br i t i sh policy was to encourage the Muslim League so as to 
ex t rac t he lp in t h e i r war e f fo r t s . With t h i s view, Linlithgow wrote to 
14' Zetlanc Hh 
140. C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright, n. 4 2, pp. 208-09. 
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"My first reaction is, I confess/ that silly as the Muslim 
scheme for partition is, it would be a pity to throw too 
much cold water on it at the moment, though clearly, one 
cannot accept it or associate ourselves with it". 
He reaffirmed it more elaborately in a subsequent telegram to 
Zetlanc Hi:-
"It remains as important as ever that the fullest weight 
should be given to the Muslim position when their assistance 
and support is so essential to us both from the military 
point of view (as they provided at the moment 60 per cent 
of the army) and because of possible reaction in other 
Muslim coxintries", 
The Viceroy, Linlithgow, however, felt that the scheme was more a 
145 bargaining counter. He wrote to Zetland; 
"Jinnah has put forward the scheme in order to show that 
the Muslims have a constructive scheme of their own; to 
offset the extreme Congress claims to independence and the 
contention that the Congress is the mouthpiece of India; 
and that a constituent assembly on the basis of adult 
suffrage is the only machinery for deciding future progress". 
The Secretary of State, Zetland, considered the scheme practically 
void. He mentioned it in a telegram to the Viceroy:-
"I wonder whether Jinnah has ever contemplated that the 
resources of their North-West unit would find the revenue 
for any army that could hold the frontier against Afghanistan, 
let alone Russia, and how does he contemplate North-West 
India and Bengal working together. Pakistan would mean the 
beginning of endless civil war in India", 
' At the CWC meeting in April, 1942, C. Rajagopalachari openly accepted 
the demand for Pakistan of the Muslim League, but as no other member 
supported him, he resigned and propagated the acceptance of Pakistan, which 
strengthened the claim of the League, and, in due course, the country 
was partitioned. 
144. Telegram No. 930-S, from Viceroy to Secretary of State, June 10,1940, 
p. 156,NAI. Also see Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, 
June 30, 1940, p. 192, NAI. 
145. Telegram No. 517-S, from Viceroy to Secretary of State, April 6,1940, 
p. 85, NAI 
146. Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, December 13, 1940, 
Microfilm No. 7, p. 245, NAI 
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The Madras annual session of the Muslim League was held in April, 
1941, The League amended its constitution and adopted the Lahore 
resolution with slight amendments as one of the aims and objectives 
147 
of the All-India Muslim League and in the year to come, Pakistan became 
the goal of the Muslim League, 
CONCLUSION 
The Congress aimed to retain unity of India, but the Muslim League, 
being encouraged by the British policy of 'Divide et Impera* began to 
think over the idea of partition of the country, Iqbal's idea of a Muslim 
homeland within India and Rahmat Ali's idea of a separate homeland 
strengthened the belief of the Muslim League in this regard. They opposed 
the Federal Sch^ne envisaged in the 1935 Act, which could provide a 
strong hold of the Congress at the Centre. The Muslim League proposed 
three or four federations of states, but the Congress opposed. The 1935 
Act was based on the principle of parliamentary democracy, but the 
Congress after winning the 1937 elections did not agree to form coalition 
ministries in the provinces and at the Centre. As a result of this the 
communal problem became more intense and Jinnah declared the observance 
of the 'Day of Deliverance', wh^ Lch caused the Congress ministries to 
resign. All these events helped the growth and spread of the idea of 
Pakistan and the Muslim League began to seriously think for the demand 
of a separate homeland, for Muslims. Since the Muslim and non-Muslim 
organizations stood poles apart and failed to settle their differences, 
Jinnah, to break this permanent impasse, as he considered, resolved at 
the Lahore Session, 1940, for partition of India. The nationalist Muslims 
opposed the resolution, while the Muslim League massively propagated 
the demand. The British officials focussed upon the dangers and the bad 
consequences of the partition. The foreign and Indian papers opposed the 
idea of partition, but the Muslim League conscious of the prospects of 
its being conceded ultimately not only by the British but by the Congress 
leadership also - Gandhiji's personal objections notwithstanding - struck 
to its demand. However, Jinnah, despite condemnations, remained determined 
for the creation of Pakistan. He made the dream a reality. 
147, Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan : The Formative Phase (Karachi; 
Pakistan Publishing House, 1960), p, 124. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE WAR AND THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN 
(1937-1942) 
Since the onset of the Second World War on September 3/ 1939, the 
Congress grew more persistent in the pursuit of its aim of India's 
independence. On the other hand, the Muslim League became more keen for 
its recognition as the representative body of Muslims and acceptance of 
Muslims as a separate nation as also a separate State in the north-western 
and eastern zones of India, The league was to render all possible help 
in the prosecution of the war, if the Government assured to accept these 
demands. The British Government realized that whereas the Congress demand 
had the immediate consequence of departure of the British from India the 
League's demand not only had no effect on the then policies of the British 
Government but also contained a potential prospect of blunting the very 
edge of the national movement. By then, the Muslim League had opened its 
branches throughout the country. The British Government preferred to 
exploit the Muslim League to fulfil its urgent need i,e, mobilisation of 
all possible resources of India for winning the war,- Furthermore, the 
Congress had earlier declared non-cooperation with the British aims while 
the Muslim League had created no difficulties in the British war efforts 
even though the Government had not accepted the League's demand,Moreover, 
the Muslims in ratio to their population, made a very great contribution 
to the army in all parts of India, The Muslim League propagated to 
cooperate with the British to win their cherished goal of a separate 
Muslim homeland. 
On February 3, 194 0, Llnli tliqow sn]'1 to Slkandar Hyat Khan that 
the position of Muslims, as maintained by Jinnah, was "unhelpful" and 
"static" to a"dangerous degree". Linlithgow assured his help and Jinnah 
assured to strengthen the position of the Muslim League by preparing an 
alternate scheme to the 1935 Act, with manifest programmes in the Interest 
of the Muslims, Further, Zetland, on December 13, 1940, had also expressed 
doubts as to how Jinnah would be able to find adequacte resources in the 
NWFP and he had anticipated the beginning of an endless civil war in India. 
Jinnah was seized of all these aspects of the problems of the proposed 
area of Pakistan, which was quite backward economically. He had also to 
convince all sects of Muslims in India of the genuineness of the Pakistan 
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demand, forenlisting their support. It goes to the credit of Jinnah*s 
capability and farsightedness that he fought successfully on all these 
fronts/ and completed the 'Five Year Plan' for the revival, reorganisation 
and revitalization of the Muslim League in 1941 successfully. 
To revitalise the League's machinery through the length and breadth 
of India, he organised Provincial Committees and divided each province 
into divisions. Big cities were divided into wards. Branches in the Wards 
were called Primary Muslim Leagues. Membership of not more than one Primary 
Muslim League was allowed to individuals. Representatives of Primary 
League formed the District Muslim League, The District League elected 
members to form the Provincial Muslim League, Jinnah was doing all these 
things with the specific encouragement of the British Government. 
The growing strength of the Muslim League membership may be assessed 
from the following table:-
Place Year Primary League Nxoniber of Membership 
Madras 1938 
1940 
1941 
183 
330 
302 
43,920 
88,833 
1,12,978 
C.P. 1938 
1943 
23,000 
33,541 
U.P, 1939 8,000 - 10,000 (in each d i s t r i c t ) 
Be/igal 1944 5,50,000 
Sind May 13,1944 3,30,000 
(25% of t h e a d u l t male Muslim 
popula t ion) 
Congress Disengagement wi th the B r i t i s h 
On October 17, 1937, Lord Linl i thgow, a f t e r i n t e r v i e w i n g about f i f t y 
I n d i a n s , i n c l u d i n g Gandh i j i , Nehru and J i nnah , had i s s u e d a s ta tement 
1, Z.H, Z a i d i , 'Aspec ts of the Development of Muslim League P o l i c y , 1 9 3 7 - 4 7 ' , 
in C.H, P h i l i p s and M.D, Walnwright, The P a r t i t i o n of India> P o l i c i e s 
and P e r s p e c t i v e s , 1935-1947 (London: George Allen and Unwln Lt377T575), 
p , 268, 
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reiterating that Dominion Status was the goal of the British policy 
and that the 1935 Act would be open to modification giving full weight 
to the opinions of minorities. He also proposed, "the establishment of 
a consultative group, representative of all major political parties in 
British India and of the Indian Princes, over which the Governor-General 
2 
would himself preside". The Congress, condemning the proclamation, had 
later adopted the policy of non-cooperation at Ramgarh, 
The Congress did not change its policy towards the British during 
the period from 1937 to 1938, As a result when the War broke out, Nehru 
hurried back to India from his tour in China and, considering the conflict 
between democracy and freedom on the one hand, and fascism and democracy 
on the other, declared: "our sympathies must inevitably be on the side 
of the democracy ... I should like India to play her full part and throw 
3 
all her resources into the struggle for a new order". The CWC emergency 
session met at Wardha on September 8-14, 1939, and offered its coopera-
tion in the struggle against fascism, but emphasised that it was to be 
"a cooperation between equals by mutual consent for a cause which both 
considered to be worthy", which Nehru said was the only honourable course 
to adopt. 
On September 11, 19 39, Gandhij i exp la ined t h a t " h i s sympathy w i th 
England and France were reasoned" . The CWC, by i t s s t a t ement of September 
14, 1939, "demanded from t h e B r i t i s h as a cond i t ion fo r I n d i a ' s p a r t i c i -
pa t ion in t h e war the d e c l a r a t i o n of war aims fo r t h e l iqx i ida t ion of 
Imper ia l ism" and ques t ioned " the Anglo-French d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t the war 
7 
was be ing c a r r i e d in the cause of democracy and freedom". The war aims, 
a s Nehru expected, were l i b e r a t i o n of c o u n t r i e s , ex tens ion of democracy 
Q 
and freedom and ending of r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 
2. S i r Reginald Coupland, Report on t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Problem in I n d i a 
(Madras: Oxford u n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1944), P a r t l i s Ind ian P o l i t i c s , 
1936-1942, p . 217. 
3 . V.P, Menon, The Trans fe r of Power In Ind ia (Delhi : Or i en t Longmans, 
1957), p , 60 . 
4 . B.R. Nanda, 'Nehru, t h e Indian Na t iona l Congress and t h e P a r t i t i o n 
of I n d i a , 1935-47 ' , in C .H.Phi l ips and M.D.Wainwright ,n . l , p . 164. ' 
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Foreign Pol icy(Al lahabad:Chai tanya Pub l i sh ing House ,1967) ,p .20 , 
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In mid-November of 1939, the CWC Interpre ted the Br i t i sh a t t i t u d e 
"as a des i re to maintain Imper ia l i s t domination of India in a l l i ance 
9 
with the reactionary elements in the country" and declared tha t "in no 
event can the Congress accept the respons ib i l i ty of government, even 
in the t r a n s i t i o n a l period, without real power being given to popular 
representatives '*, The Congress emphasised tha t the Consti tuent Assembly 
was "the only democratic method of determining the cons t i tu t ion of a 
free country". However, the Congress hoped for an honourable sett lement" 
and adopted the policy of non-violent and peaceful se t t lement . 
Further, the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow had rea l ized tha t he had 
committed a mistake by declaring the war on behalf of the Indians without 
consulting the Indian p o l i t i c a l leaders . To make up for t h i s omission, 
he invi ted the Indian leaders for consul tat ion, but he was dejected when 
the Congress declared tha t "af ter the war Br i t i sh would concede Indians 
' t h e r ight of self-determination by framing t h e i r own cons t i tu t ion through 
a Constituent Assembly". In fact, he did not l i ke to i n v i t e any p o l i t i c a l 
party to pa r t i c ipa t e effect ively in the cent ra l government as i t was 
never the Br i t i sh policy " to expedite in India cons t i tu t iona l changes 
I 
for their own sake or gratuitously to hurry the handing over of controls 
to Indian hands". 
To understand the future political development and situation, it 
seems necessary to survey the swaying waves of thought in the country 
during the first half of November, 1939. In Bengal, it was conceived that 
there would be some proposal acceptable to the Congress, the Muslims and 
the Viceroy to settle the communal problem. The Congress thought that 
its position would "be betrayed by acceding to Mr. Jinnah's demand" and 
the League feared that "Mr. Jinnah might not prove firm enough".However, 
9. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Bombay: Asia Publishing 
House, 1969), p. 4T5T 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid. 
12. B.R. Nanda, n. 4, p. 164. 
13. Lord Linlithgow to Lord Zetland, December 28, 1939; see also Second 
Marquess of Zetland, "Essayez", The Memoirs of Lawrence, Second 
Marcpjess of Zetland (Londonx John Murray, 1956), p. 577; see also 
B.R. Nanda, n, 4, p. 164. 
14. Confidential Reports relating to the First Half of November, 1939, 
NAI (Pol.), p. 21. 
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the Congress and Hindu papers continued to "denounce Mr. Jinnah for 
h is intransigence" and for h i s "constantly expanding l i s t of demands" 
talking the l i ne , as usual , tha t "the problem of minor i t ies was en t i r e ly 
f i c t i t i o u s , tha t democratic pr inc ip les could not be followed except by 
leaving such minori t ies as actual ly might ex i s t to make t h e i r own terms 
with the majority, and tha t Mr. Jinnah and h is Muslim League had no 
r ight to claim tha t they represented unanimous Muslim opinion in view 
of the subs tan t ia l number of Muslims who repudiated him". The Hindusthan 
Standard, without ignoring the Hindu-Muslim differences, wrote tha t 
"concrete i ssues must be faced on both sides in a s p i r i t of give and 
taie". 
In Punjab, i t was blamed on a l l s ides tha t the Congress was put t ing 
"the clock back many years" and tha t i t was unable "to carry a l l Hindu 
opinion in the Pvmjab with i t in i t s recent decis ions" , Pratap observed 
tha t the Br i t i sh aim was to show tha t the Hindus and the Muslims q u a r r e l l -
ing with each other was obstruct ing p o l i t i c a l advance and charged tha t 
the Congress by opening parleys with the League has reduced i t s posi t ion 
to the level of Hindu Sabha and surrendered to communalist Muslims, In 
the Hindu, Bhai Parmanand wrote t ha t Gandhij i ' s theory about the Hindu-
Muslim uni ty , f i r s t , was ' en t i r e ly wrong' , and, secondly, .1 , the founda-
19 t ion of Swaraj, was misleading to the country. In another issue of the 
Hindu, he recal led Gandhij i ' s statement tha t "the Congress did not 
represent the Hindus" and argued tha t i t was, therefore , "impossible for 
Congress, being a non-Hindu body, to negot ia te and reach a set t lement 
with the Muslim League", He held "the Congress leaders more responsible 
than the Br i t i sh Government for br inging up the communal question", Ihsan, 
c r i t i c i s i n g the Congress a t t i t u d e , cal led the Congress uncareful of the 
country 's futxire, and declared tha t "the Muslims would now offer t h e i r 
sac r i f i ces and would defend India by the power of t h e i r ann". The Inqi lab 
argued tha t "Congress was not prepared for a compromise and tha t i t was 
obscuring the real issue by i t s absurd and aimless ob jec t ions . I t stood 
by the const i tuent assembly scheme by which i t hoped to get a l l the 
15. Ibid, 
16. Ibid, 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid., p. 34. 
19. Ibid. 
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minorities unconditionally tinder its control". Secret organizations 
were in preparation for a possible civil disobedience movement. The 
newspapers were publishing exciting reports to highlight the spirit and 
enthusiasm of the people and were committed to printing objectionable 
articles. 
The Congress ministries resigned on November 3, 1939. The Search-
light reported that the appointment of two Advisers establishing a 
bureaucratic government did not follow any violent change in the Govern-
ment policy, Dr, Rajendra Prasad, following Mahatma Gandhi, declared 
that "the country is not ready for civil disobedience, that Congressmen 
must always be thoroughly non-violent and that the immediate aim of 
every Congressman should be the achievement of communal unity". The 
Left Wing of the Congress, the Forward Bloc, the Congress Socialists and 
Kisan Sabha and Communists, being too weak to start a movement or unable 
to be combined, forced the hands of the Congress Right Wing. At Hathwa 
(Saran), the League declared that "Muslims had no quarrel with the Hindus" 
The Hindu Sabha, observing Hindu Nation Day (October 27, 1939) declared 
"India for the Hindus". 
In Orissa, a section of Congressmen, who did not appreciate 
Gandhiji's policy of ' \inconditional support in the WarJ criticised him 
openly. In Cuttack, the League was "looked upon with suspicion by the 
educated Muhammadans who avoided meetings of Maulvi Yakub All Qurashi, 
whose criticisms of some local Muhammadans, had given rise to a defama-
tion case. 
In Assam, the Congress Ministry tendered its resignation on 
22 November 15, 1939, The newspapers criticised the "capitalistic elements". 
The Times of Assam observed: "It is no use denying the difficulties of 
this outstanding communal problem and democracy cannot foster in the 
Indian soil unless our communal problems are solved in the light of our 
national self-consciousness. Democracy without this consciousness will 
20. Jhanq Sial (Jhang), Khal-sa (GUJ ranwala), Film Magazine (Lahore), 
Jarida Al-Islah (Lahore), Pratap (Lahore), Ihsan (Lahore), Mi lap 
(Lahore), Paler Khalsa (Gurmukhi Weekly - Lahore), Shardhanand 
(Urdu Weekly - Rawalpindi). 
21. Report on the Political Events in Bihar during the First Half of 
November, 1939 (Patna: the 18th November, 1939),NAI, p, 42, 
22. Saptake (Silchar), Assam Herald, Assam Tribune and Times of Assam. 
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surely turn out to be e i t h e r despotism of the majority or tyranny of 
the minori ty". 
In the NWFP, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan toured Peshawar and Mardan 
d i s t r i c t s a l leg ing tha t " i f Great Br i ta in were rea l ly out to f ight the 
freedom of small nat ions , she would have done so in the cases of Abyssina, 
Czechoslovakia and so on" and charged tha t "Muslim League leaders have, 
indeed, done more than good to t h e i r cause by the in to lerance shown in 
t h e i r speeches in the Assembly", Under the Indian Press Emergency Act, 
1931, Rilchtini~Khudai~Khidmatgar was warned for i t s c r i t i c i s i n g B r i t a i n ' s 
war aims. The Forward Block press mater ia l was refused publ icat ion since 
i t appealed to the public to refuse to e n l i s t in the B r i t i s h army. 
In Sind, the Congress c i r c l e s looked upon the Working Committee's 
ins t ruc t ions to the Minis t r ies to resign as a f i t t i n g measure for counter-
act ing the policy of the Br i t i sh . Ant i -min i s te r ia l and communal speeches 
continued. One speaker remarked tha t "India , from Kashmir to Cape Comorin, 
belonged to the Hindus, and tha t the Muslims, who came l a t e r as guests 
of the Hindus, had no r igh t to have any say in matters af fec t ing tha 
25 
p o l i t i c a l destiny of Ind ia" . The Beawar Municipal Elect ions campaign 
was s t a r t e d . The Hindu coal i t ion (consis t ing of members of the Mahasabhists 
and the Arya Samaj and cer ta in other Hindus attached to no-party but 
having non-Congress sympathy) opposed the Congress because, they believed, 
the Congress had fai led to protec t Hindu r i g h t s . The posi t ion of the 
Congress w^s qioite precar ious . The Congress was "opposed by Muslims as 
being anti-Muslim and by the ardent Hindus as not being suf f ic ien t ly 
pro-Hindu", The attempt to reconcile conf l ic t ing communal aims was, 
thus, in effect , r esu l t ing in to the a l iena t ion of members from both wings. 
During the second half of November, 1939, in Madras, as a r e s u l t 
of Government prosecutions, there was a marked decrease in the number of 
anti-war speeches, but recruitment did not suffer not iceably as a r e s u l t 
23, Report on the P o l i t i c a l Events in Assam during the F i r s t Half of 
November, 1939, NAI, p , 61 . 
24. Report on the P o l i t i c a l Events in NWFP during the F i r s t Half of 
November, 1939, NAI, p . 63, 
25. Fortnightly Report for the F i r s t Half of November, 1939 (Sind), 
NAI, p . 67. 
26, Fortnightly Report for Ajmer-Merwara for the F i r s t Half of 
November, 1939, NAI, p , 77, 
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of critical speeches. Many speakers were warned. Objectionable pamphlets 
were distributed and slogans written on walls. Sir Currimbhoy Ibrahim, 
a member of the WCML, visited Madras and Malabar and exhorted Muslims 
to join the Muslim League. In Cuddapah^ the enthusiasm was so intense. 
The Pesh Imam of a Mosque was "deposted by his congregation for having 
27 insulted Mr. Jinnah in a sermon". The Muslim League on November 25, 
in Banganapalle State resolved "appealing to the Government not to 
abolish the State but to replace the present Nawab, if found xmfit, by 
y". On November 30, 1939, Rajagopalachari 
addressing a crowded meeting in Bombay City, urged that "foreign control 
29 
could not be eliminated unless India were imited in a common programme" 
with the Muslims, The Hindu Mahasabha, on November 19, at Bombay,resolved 
that "dominion status could only be regarded as the first step and not 
the final goal, the latter being complete political independence", and 
asserted that "the Congress did not represent the Hindus and that any 
settlement made by it with the British Government in consultation with 
30 
the Muslim League would not be binding on the Mahasabha", 
In Bengal, Subhas Bose was the most vocal politician. He ridiculed 
the Congress policy and Gandhiji's insistence for communal unitv to 
improve the communal situation. Referring to the Allahabad resolution 
of the AICC, he said, it amovmted to "licking the feet that kick" and 
31 
intended to "hoodwink and bluff" the countrv into inaction. Bose's 
Forward Bloc insisted that the time was ripe for taking "definite and 
active steps". Criticising Gandhiji, he questioned whether "his leader-
32 
ship will not result in a diminution of Congress prestige". M.N.Roy and 
Dr. Moonje also criticised the Congress policies, Moonje, on behalf of 
the Hindu Mahasabha said the Congress "repudiation of the federal scheme 
and the resignation of Congress ministries were blunders which have 
betrayed Hindu interests", Moonje observed that the commxanal problem 
27, Fortnightly Report for the Second Half of November, 1939, Madras, 
D.O.P. 4-22 (December 2, 1939), NAI, p, 81. 
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30, Ibid., p. 91, 
31, Report on the Political Situation for the Second Half of November, 
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was somewhat improved when an excellent impression was created by 
Jinnah* s broadcast on the conclusion of the Ramazan fast, who "made 
an eloquent plea'*for toleration and a "cultural synthesis". In respect 
of Hindus, he said that "the Congress is not a suitable representative 
of their communal interests and a growing demand that the Hindu Maha-
sabha must be a party to any communal settlement particularly as regards 
Bengal". Communal tension increased in Malda on the question of "music 
before mosques" and "a Muhammadan taking part in the Kali Puja procession 
36 ~ ' 
and behaving roughly" in Burdwan. The Congress blamed Britain for the 
emergence of the problem which was said to be "due to deliberate 
37 
encouragement of commxmal feeling among the Moslems". The Hindusthan 
Standard declared that the Congress "failed to recognise the consistent 
38 
demand for the development of a Moslem culture". Commenting on the 
congress, the Hindu Mahasabha was reported to have said that "in any 
settlement of commxmal difference this body should be treated on the 
same terms as the Moslem League", The Amrita Bazar Patrika declared 
that "The British Government have no legal or moral justification for 
treating the League differently from the Hindu Mahasabha", 
In' Punjab, people were tmusually quiet, but peace was occasionally 
disturbed by party meetings. At Lahore, Sardul Singh Kavisher, the 
leader of the Forward Bloc in the Punjab, in an intemperate speech openly 
"preached revolt from the restraint imposed by Mr, Gandhi and declared 
that it was impossible for the country to obtain freedom otherwise than 
40 by resolt to force" . The Manzilgah affair in Sindh had embittered 
communal relations in Punjab. I 
In Bihar, the communal tension had such an impact that even a 
trivial incident led to a riot. The Darbhanga Muslim League Annual session, 
under the presidentship of Nawabzada Liaquat All Khan, M.L.A.(Delhi), 
from November 24-26, 1939, was attended by 15 to 20 thousand Muslims 
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including Fazlul Haq, the Prime Minister of Bengal, Aziz of Patna, 
Maulvi Abdul Hamid of Budaun and Maulvi Barhanul Hague of Central 
Provinces. The Conference described the "oppression of the Congress 
41 
r4inistr ies and the need for unity among Muslims", Their resolut ion 
condemned the system of j o i n t e l e c t o r a t e s . At another meeting of the 
League, i t was expressed that "Swaraj in India in the present circums-
tances could mean nothing but Hindu Raj", At Gaya, the League supported 
the Br i t i sh Government provided i t safeguarded the r i gh t s and p r iv i l eges 
of the Muslims. On the occasion of the Id prayers, in Monghyr, the 
followers of Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the League held t h e i r prayers separately 
as they had difference of opinion on the e lec tora l system. Dr. Moonje 
v i s i t ed Darbhanga and declared tha t "the Br i t i sh were the friends of 
the Muslims as the l a t t e r had promised support in the w3r". Moonje 
advocated the Hindus "to uni te , obtain mi l i ta ry t r a in ing as volunteers 
and t ry for Swaraj without caring for the support of the Muslims". 
Shareef, an in f luen t i a l member of the League a t Patna, wrote to Search-
l igh t tha t the "Bri t ish master i s i n f i n i t e l y b e t t e r than the Congress 
or Hindu master and, therefore , there could be no lanity between Hindus 45 and Muslims". 
In the Central Provinces and Berar, D.K, Mehta, Manganlal Bagdi 
and Dandekar addressed meetings. The organisers of the Pratap Vyayamshala, 
Wardha, decided to start a Congress Sena Dal, on the lines of the 
Rashtriya Swayam SewaX Sangh (R6SS). R.P, Paranjpe of Poona said that 
the Congress had committed a blunder in refusing to cooperate with the 
British Government. At Nagpur, the Hindu Mahasabha in a meeting,chaired 
by Moonje and attended by Bhai Parmanand of Punjab, the Congress was 
criticised for its conciliatory attitude towards the Muslims. Bhai 
Parmanand said: "The more the Congress wooes the Muslims, the greater 
46 did their demands become". 
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In Assam, Srijut Kuladhar Chaliha, M.L.A. (Central) remarked on 
"non-violence as to insinuate the efficacy of violence". The Muslim 
League was also active in organising the students of the Assam Valley. 
In the NWFP, Congress meetings were held but with small audience. 
There were a few anti-recruiting posters in Hazara District, but without 
any effect on the people. In Orissa, the Congress held a very large 
number of meetings and laid great stress "on achieving unity between 
Hindus and Muhammadans" and the Congress workers were asked "to give 
48 this their first consideration". 
In Sind, at the Second Sahiti Congress Conference held at Deparja, 
Nawabshah District, Khan Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai of Baluchistan 
appealed to the people to join the Congress. Prof. Ghanshuam J.Shivdasani 
remarked that "England's statement that she was fighting Germany for 
the freedom of small nations was false, as she was really fighting to 
preserve her Imperialism which was threatened by the growing power of 
Germany, Moulvi Mahomed Sidik at the Karachi Congress Committee meeting 
said that the Viceroy considered the Indians were "a herd of goats which 
49 
could be dragged into war as in 1914". Hafiz Nasir Ahmad Atta Mahomed 
at the same meeting said that "Mr. Jinnah was mistaken if he thought 
that every Muslim would support him in prolonging the British domination 
of India and he assured the Congress that the Muslims were as anxious 
to attain freedom as any other community". He asserted that the various 
communities in India would come to an immediate settlement if the British 
left them alone to settle their own affairs. 
The most tragic event was the Manzilgah riots during the second 
fortnight of November, 1939, The Hindus alleged that the Muslim shrine 
of Zind Fir (a small island in the" Indus between Old Sukkur and Rohri) 
was in reality a Hindu shrine and was taken forcible possession of by 
Muslims many years ago. Communal agitation led to the decision of the 
Rohri Panchayat to boycott of Muslim meat shops and to open Jhatka shops. 
On the call of the Restoration Committee, thousands of Muslims gathered 
47, Fortnightly Report for Assam for the Second Half of November, 
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to resist the police on November 15, When negotiations failed, the 
Government ordered eviction of the shrine's vicinity from the Satyagrahis 
by a police lathi charge and use of tear gas^ while the Hindu Sabha 
volunteers were strutting about the streets in khaki uniforms, joined 
by the police "who seemed to be getting out of control owing to communal 
feeling in their ranSs". On November 22, the Working Committee of the 
Baluchistan Muslim League at Quetta sympathising with the Muslims 
alleged to have been attacked by the Hindus and urged the Government at 
Svikkur to restore the Sukkur Manzilgah to the Muslims and severely punish 
those responsible for the riots. 
Another serious incident in Sind was the forcible eviction of a 
small Makrani colony unauthorisedly occupying a plot of land near the 
railway station at Hyderabad, The leaflet issued by a Moulvl and other 
leaders of Hyderabad Makrani Jamiat proclaimed that the police pulled 
down the Makrani dwellings and an alleged mosque and appealed to the 
Muslim police to rise equal to the occasion, as did the Hindus not long 
ago when faced with the demolition in Karachi of the Hanuman Temple, 
The Hindu-Muslim tension had become very grave in this period. The 
Arya Samajist said that "every Arya Samajist should get a lathi and a 
knife for self-defence". At meetings of Arya Samaj, the audience were 
exhorted to enlist in the Hindu Volunteer Corps. One Kundomal of Hyderabad 
distributed short iron dandas amongst the local Hindus and offered 
another fifty to the Hyderabad Arya Samaj , Arya Vir Dal, on the line of 
Khaksar, was organised, who praded with lathis in xiniforms for the 
protection of Hindus, Amil Sheva Dal and Yogi Physical Culture resolved 
that Hindus should arm themselves with defensive weapons, .The Hindus 
refused to purchase newspapers from Muslim vendors, A Moulvi at an idgah 
meeting in Dadu District advised Muslims not to purchase sweetmeats from 
Hindu halwais as they were made in an impure way. It was alleged that the 
Hindus of Hyderabad distributed "four thousand lathis, hundreds of spears 
and had stored acid, on account of which the authorities were warned that 
the Muslims could not be held responsible for any breach of the peace", 
Syed Ahmed of Karachi said that Khaksars were to be organised in order to 
re-establish Muslim rule in India lost since the time of Shah Jehan and 
Aurangzeb, 
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On November 16, Hyat accused the Sind Ministry of "dancing at the 
beck and call of Hindus, who in order to eliminate Muslims were endeavour-
ing to usurp Muslim rights to so great an extent that they were now 
53 
interfering in the religious affairs of the Muslims", The Qurbani 
(November 16)aILeged that the Sind Muslims were making daily attacks 
against the life, honour and property of Hindus. The Dawat-e-Islam(Sukkur) 
was equally violent in its attacks on Hindus. The Islah (November 20) 
condemned Hindu propaganda against Muslims and opined that a Civil War 
would result if such propaganda continued. The K\miar (November 21)alleged 
that Muslim police at Sukkur failed to prevent Muslim rioters from 
attacking Hindus and burning Hindu houses and even helped Muslims to do 
so, Al-Wahid, Qurbani, Dharamvir, Dawat-e-Islam, Slndhi and Sind Zamindar 
were warned not to pviblish any article on Manzilgah for one month, 
Zamindar, Ahsan and Shahbaz (Punjab newspapers) held the Sind Government 
responsible for the Si:kkur riots. A poster in Karachi refers "to the 
heartless and oppressive manner in which innocent and oppressed Muslims 
of Sukkur have been ruined and compares the conditions at Sukkur to those 
54 
obtaining in the days of Hilakookhan and Changezkhan", 
On January 7, 1940, Jinnah r e i t e r a t ed League's demand for recognition 
as the sole , authent ic and representat ive organization of Muslims in India . 
Nehru s ta ted tha t the Congress did not recognize the League as sole 
representat ive of Muslims. On January 10, 1940, Nehru a t Ghaziabad 
declared t h a t "there could be no question of sett lement with government 
or of return of Congress min is t r ies to office u n t i l question of I n d i a ' s 55 freedom f ina l ly s e t t l e d " . Linlithgow, in view of the Congress-League 
conf l ic t , thought tha t t h e i r differences "would strengthen B r i t a i n ' s hold 
on :^ndia for many yea r s " . Having careful ly considered negotiated with 
numerous p a r t i e s and Individuals , he favoured maintenance of "the politica]> 
57 
status quo". Nehru, i n t e rp re t ing t h i s Viceroy's pol icy, wrote to Gandhiji: 
"The same old game i s played again, the background i s the same, the 
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various epithets are the same and the actors are the same and the 
C O 
results must be the same". Notwithstanding the fact that the Congress 
and the Government were drifting apart, but there was still a possibility 
of modus Vivendi between them, Nehru came to taiow that Jinnah "was in 
a cooperative mood and invited "Jinnah to join the Congress in protesting 
against India being plxmged into the war, without her consentV hence, by 
appealing to Jinnah's patriotism, he wrote: "Our dignity and self-respect 
as Indians has been insultia". Jinnah seemed cordial, but he did not 
comit himself and continued the conversations. 
Muslim League Appeasement of the British 
The Muslim League,"neither accepted nor rejected the Viceroy's 
statement, but asked for further discussion and clarification". The 
League commended the assurance of giving weight to the interests of the 
minorities and condemned the amendment of the Federal part of the Act 
and, on the whole, demanded that the whole constitutional problem should 
be considered afresh. 
After the Congress Ministries had resigned in October, 1939, the 
Governors in the Non-Muslim majority states and the Muslim League in the 
Muslim majority provinces had taken over the provincial administration, 
the Viceroy began "to lean more on the support of the Muslim League" 
and "with the Congress in wilderness and Jinnah's hands considerably 
strengthened, waverers among the Muslims began trickling into the League'.' 
For all practical purposes Jinnah was given a veto on further constitu-
tional progress and an"adriot politician that he was, he made the very 
most of the situation". It was then generally held that the question of 
minorities was given more importance than it deserved in the light of 
Zetland's speech declaring the Congress demand for self-determination 
to be unacceptable, 
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On November 5, 1939, Jinnah addressed the Viceroy/ asking for 
64 
assurance on the following four points:-
"(1) that as soon as circumstances permitted, or immediately after 
the war, the entire problem of India's future constitution 
(apart from the Government of India Act, 1935) would be 
examined and reconsidered die novo; 
(2) that no declaration would, either in principle or otherwise, 
be made or any constitution be enacted by His Majesty's 
Government or Parliament without the approval and consent of 
the two major communities of India; 
(3) that His Majesty's Government would try to meet all reasonable 
national demands of the Arabs in Palestine; and 
(4) that Indian troops would not be used outside India against any 
Muslim power or country". 
Up to that moment, the League had not created any difficulty nor 
had embarrassed the British in their war prosecution but the provinces, 
where the League had a dominant voice, "had been left free to cooperate 
with the British Government pending their consideration with regard to 
the assurances they had asked for an in particular that the British 
Government should make no declaration regarding the future constitutional 
problems of India and the vital issues that were raised in that connection 
without their approval and consent", 
Jinnah's Five Points 
The Congress on September 15, 1939, had resolved that the issue 
of war and peace was to be decided by the Indians, and the British Govern-
ment in view of the growing discontent and increasing gravity of the 
sitxxation, had declared that the Viceroy's Executive Council would be 
expanded to include in it the representatives of major political parties. 
The Congress was against the formation of the coalition ministries as an 
interim settlement during the War. Meanwhile, in November, 1939, the 
Muslim League put forth five points before the Congress for an interim 
settlement:-
"(1) Establishment of coalition ministries in the provinces; 
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(2) Congress acceptance of the formula that no legislative measure 
affecting Muslims would be passed by a Provincial Lower House 
of two-thirds, if the Muslim representatives in that House were 
opposed to it; 
(3) An undertaking from the Congress not to fly their flag on 
public institutions; 
(4) An understanding as regards the singing of Bande Matram; 
(5) Congress undertaking to cease its hostile campaign against the 
Muslim League", 
The above proposals did not bring any fruitful results and the 
gulf between the Congress and the League rather widened, 
Jinnah, after the resignation of the Congress ministire felt 
"relief at the termination of the majority tyranny which was so ruthlessly 
exercised in the course of the last 27 months'*. Jinnah observed the 
•Day of Deliverance' on December 22, 1939, and released the following 
statement, which was "vitriolic attack on the Congress Party":-
"That the Congress Ministry both in the discharge of their 
duties of the administration and in the Legislature have 
done their best to flout the Muslim opinion, to destroy 
Muslim culture, and have interfered with their religious 
and social life, and trampled upon their economic and political 
rights; that in matter of differences and disputes the 
Congress Ministry invariably have sided with, supported 
and advanced the cause of the Hindus in total disregard and 
to the prejudice of the Muslim interest". 
-Expressing strong resentment, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Jinnah, in 
December, 1939;-
"It thus seems that politically we have no common ground 
and that our objectives are different. That in itself makes 
discussion difficult and fruitless". 
Obviously, these communications marked the turning point of Jinnah's 
policy with his assertion that the British Government should revise the 
whole problem of -India's future constitution de novo, as, according to 
him, "no new constitutional scheme for India could be evolved,and implemen-
ted without the consent and approval of the Indian Muslim League".By the 
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end of 1939, the Hindu-Muslim unity had almost completely evaporated 
in the air. Nehru had put his heart on the constituent assembly elected 
on the basis of adult franchise, and Jinnah's proposal for constituent 
assembly was Utopian. 
Indifference of the Viceroy 
The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, was, on the one hand, taking a 
sympathetic view of the activities and demands of the Muslim League, 
and, on the other, wais becoming increasingly antagonistic towards the 
Congress for its resolution of conditional accord with regard to the 
War Aims, He became so resolute .In his policy against the Congress 
that proposals of some well-wishers to bridge the gulf between the 
Congress and the Government were turned down by the Viceroy. For instance, 
G.D, Birla "laid stress on the fact that it was of vital importance to 
72 
make some move, but the Viceroy was not disposed to take any action". 
The problem of constitutional development in India became a 
sxabject of discussion in England. Sir Stafford Cripps, in December, 1939, 
on his way to China, stayed for a few days in India and stated to the 
press that "some kind of Constituent Assembly (not necessarily quite 
in the form advocated by the Congress) should be set up after the w 
Cripps endorsed the conception of the British people that "when the 
next move was to be made India's constitution should, to the largest 
possible extent, be framed by Indians in India". 
Viceroy* s Offer 
In January, 1940, the Viceroy in Bombay ^offered ''India "dominion 
status" of the "Statute of Westminster variety" at the end of the war, 
in which Gandhiji saw "germs of an honourable settlement", but when the 
two met in February in Delhi and the Viceroy told Gandhlji "to examine 
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the entire field of constitutional progress in consultation with the 
representatives of all parties and interests in India", the Congress was 
again disillusioned, Tje British view was to enact the 1935 Act for: 
"(a) an immediate expansion of the executive council; and after the war 
(b) the revival of the federal scheme to expedite the achievement of 
77 dominion status". 
On Febniary 3-6, 1940, the League Working Committee met in New 
Delhi, and Jinnah proclaimed that Western democracy was unsuited for 
India. To break the deadlock, Fazlul Haq, on February 4, suggested that 
a coalition government should be set up in provinces for the duration 
of war. The Viceroy, on February 5, met Gandhiji and pleaded to break 
political deadlock. The Viceroy also met Jinnah on February 6, Lord 
Zetland appealed on February 11, to the Congress leaders to "escape 
78 from the tyranny of phrases". 
Pakistan Resolution 
However, in the course of political unsettlement, chaos and distur-
bances in the country, the Lahore resolution was adopted on March 23,1940, 
which "India's newspaper headlines next day pronounced" as 'Pakistan 
Resolution' and "so it remained". Jinnah replied hard opposition almost 
from all parties and Non-League Muslim organizations, but Jinnah, a bom 
orator, distorted and silenced the drxjms being beaten against him. 
Consequently, a large number of Muslims, mostly aristocrates and high 
bom, who sided with Jinnah on communal grounds, joined the League and 
along with them the Muslims of other sects also followed Jinnah's plank 
of 'Islam in Danger' or a 'Muslim Pak Homeland'. Jinnah had, by then, 
created a large number of his followers throughout India and had stood 
fast to his position and ambition for the creation of Pakistan, To vitalise 
this goal, he observed 'Pakistan Day' on April 19,1940, and thousands of 
League meetings were held in the country. 
76. Ibid. 
77. Ibid. 
78. Maurice and Taya Zinkin, 'Impressions, 1938-47', in C.H. Philips 
and M.D. Wainwright, n.l, p, 562. 
79. Stanley Woloert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984), p. 185. 
150 
SDcander Hyat' s Opposition 
Sir Sikander Hyat Khan found the concept of partition of India 
"insupportable till the bitter end, for it was at once a repudiation 
of his Unionist Party's basic platform of Hindu-Muslim-Sikh coexistence, 
and his potential to win personal leadership over the League". He 
became aware of the fact that "his days of aspiring to supreme leader-
ship of the Muslims of India was numbered". News of Sikander's rivalry 
at the League's Subject Committee on March 23, 1940, flashed out and 
an angry crowd of young Muslims shouted "Sikander Murdabad" (Death to 
Sikander), but when Jinnah came out of the pandal, they shouted "Quaid-
8 2 ' 
i-Azam Zindabad" (Long L i f e t o Q u a i d - i - A z a m ) . 
Scheme Based on A n g l o - E g y p t i a n Agreement (19 22) 
The Hindu (Madras) i n e a r l y March, 1940, px ib l i shed a scheme b r o a d l y 
b a s e d on t h e A n g l o - E g y p t i a n Agreement o f 1922, which s o u g h t t h a t I n d i a 
would be f r e e t o d r a f t h e r own c o n s t i t u t i o n a t t h e end o f t h e war w i t h 
c o m p l e t e f reedom s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n d i t i o n : 
" ( 1 ) t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n t o be a c c e p t a b l e t o the Muslims and o t h e r 
m i n o r i t i e s ; 
(2) a p r i o r a g r e e m e n t be tween t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f B r i t a i n and I n d i a 
' i n a s p i r i t of f r i e n d l y accommodat ion ' - a p h r a s e u s e d i n t h e 
A n g l o - E g y p t i a n ag reemen t - on (a) d e f e n c e , (b) B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , 
and (c) t h e I n d i a n s t a t e s . " 
Such a d e c l a r a t i o n c o u l d be c o u p l e d w i t h an o f f e r from t h e V i c e r o y 
a c c e p t i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of a p r o v i s i o n a l n a t i o n a l government a t t h e c e n t r e , 
t h e d e t a i l s of which cou ld be worked o u t by a c o n f e r e n c e of t h e p r e m i e r s 
o f t h e e l e v e n p r o v i n c e s " , G a n d h i j i a c c e p t e d t h i s f o r m u l a , b u t r e s p o n s e 
from t h e B r i t i s h s i d e was n e g a t i v e . 
Congres s S e s s i o n , Ramqarh 
The C o n g r e s s a t t h e Ramgarh s e s s i o n h e l d on March 1 9 - 2 0 , 1940, 
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presided over by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, reiterating its demand for 
"complete independence" formally resolved: "nothing short of Complete 
Independence can be accepted by the people of India" and that no 
permanent solution was possible "except through a Constituent Assembly". 
This session reiterated the demands of September 14, 1939, for the 
85 declaration of British war aims, ifowevcr, the session felt that Civil 
Disobedience was "the only course left" (emphasis added). The session 
did not take any extreme action when England vas involved in a life-and-
death struggle v;ith the Germans, as Gandhiji, on April 6, 1940, wrote: 
87 
"We do not seek our independai ce out of Britain's ruin". Nehiru on 
May 20, 1940, stated: "Launching a Civil Disobedience campaign at a time 
when Britain is engaged in a life-and-death strugale would be an act 
88 
derogatory to India's honour". He later observed: "Congress which had 
been on the verge of civil disobedience could not think in terms of any 
89 
such movement while the very existence of free Eng^land hung in balance". 
When the Congress was engaged in deciding about launching a Civil 
Disobedience Movement, the Muslim leaders belonqinq to different non-
Lea<^e parties were thinking over the possibility of creation of Pakistan 
due to constitutional deadlock between the Congress and the League. They 
wanted true settlement betv/een the two major parties. To evolve a common 
solution, they held meetings and conferences, such as the Azad Muslim 
Conference of April, 1940, 
The White Paper 
In view of the divergent claims of the Congress, the League, the 
Depressed Classes and the Princes, and particularly abrupt ending of 
conversation of Gandhiji with the Viceroy, on February 5', 1940, Linlithgow 
preferred to adopt a policy of "wait and see". On April 10, the Government 
84. V.P, Menon, n. 3, p. 79, See also R.J, Moore, 'British Policy and 
the Indian Problem, 1936-40', in C.H, Philips and M,D, Wainwright, 
n. 1, p. 93, 
85. Deva Narayan Malik, n, 6, p, 19. 
86. JawaharDal Nehru, n, 9, p,442. See also A.K, Azad, India Wins Freedom 
(Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1959), p. 32. 
87. Harijan (Ahmedabad), June 1, 1940, Vol. VIII, p. 148. 
88. Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian Struggle, 1920-1942 (Bombay: Asi=^ n 
Publications, 1964), p. 344. 
89. Jawaharlal Nehru, n, 9, p, 435. 
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published the White Paper on "India and the War", which described all 
the events of the period and concluded that "in view of the impasse, 
the Government had no option but to seek the approval of Parliament 
for the continuance of the Section 93 proclamations in the seven provinces',' 
which was approved by the Parliament on April 18, 1940. Lord Zetland, 
the Secretary of State, spoke in the House of Lords:-
"But that does not mean that the future constitution 
of India is to be a constitution dictated by the Government 
and Parliament of this country against the wishes of the 
Indian people. The undertaking given by His Majesty's 
Government to examine the constitutional field in consulta-
tion with representatives of all parties and Interests in 
India connotes not dictation but negotiation. Admittedly 
a substantial measure of agreement amongst the communities 
in India is essential if the vision of a united India which 
has inspired the labours of so many Indians and Englishmen 
is to become a reality, for I cannot believe that any 
Government or Parliament in this country would attempt to 
impose by force upon, for example 80 million Moslem subjects 
of l-Iis Majesty in India a form of constitution under which 
they would not live peacefully and contentedly". 
The Viceroy underlining the above portion of speech sent it to 
Jinnah on April 19, 1940, assuring that "no declaration would be made 
and that no constitution would be enforced by His Majesty's Government, 
or enacted by Parliament without the approval and consent of the 
Musalmans of India", which completed the deadlock of constitutional 
development, 
All-India Azad Muslim Conference 
More than one hundred Muslim leaders, belonging to "different 
92 
non-League p a r t i e s " , seriously f e l t the sever i ty of the League's demand 
for Pakistan in view of the Congress refusal to make any concessions 
to the League, They condemned the Pakistan Resolution and rea l i sed tha t 
"the demand of Pakistan amounted to c lear repudiation of the idea of 
93 
the moint political life of the Hindus and Muslims". They anticipated 
90.V.P. Menon, n, 3, p, 85, 
91,Ibid, Setland reaffirmed his conviction that "political unity of 
India was unattainable without a communal settlement". Times(London), 
April 19, 1940, 
92,Subhas Chandra Bose, n, 88, p. 344, 
93.Times of India (New Delhi), March 27, 1940, ID.8. 
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tha t establishment of such a s t a t e v;ithout the supnort of the common 
people was impossible. Further, they foresaw tha t t he i r p o l i t i c a l 
influence would be l o s t and t h e i r loyalty would be divided between two 
s t a t e s . Therefore, they supported the Congress demand for a const i tuent 
assembly and earnes t ly wanted to search out a formula to re ta in the 
Motherland uni ted . Representatives of "various Muslim n a t i o n a l i s t groups 
94 l ike the Ahrars, Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the Shia Po l ic ia l Conference" held 
a four-day conference in Delhi on April 27, 1940/ under the presidency 
of the Sind Premier, Allah Baksh Somru. The Conference, s ty led as the 
All-India Azad Muslim Conference, accepted Maulana Hafizur Rehman's 
resolut ion, which demandec •1: 
"(1) immediate convening of a Constituent Assembly elected on the 
basis of adult franchise; and 
(2) exclusive right for the elected Muslim members of the proposed 
constituent Assembly to lay down the safeguards for the protec-
tion of rights and interests of the community". 
At the same conference, Asaf All presented another resolution, 
according to which 27 member board vras to be constituted to consider 
such issues as follows: 
"(i) protection of Muslim culture, personal law, and religious rights; 
(ii) political rights of the Muslims and their protection; 
(Hi) non-unitary, federal constitution in which the federal government 
should have only limited powers; 
(iv) safeguards for the economic, social and cultural rights of the M 
Muslims; and 
(v) the Muslim share in the public services". 
The conference condemned the partition of India demanded by the 
Muslim League and did not agree to Jinnah's claim that the League was the 
only representative body of the Muslims. They called upon the "Muslims 
to fight shoulder to shoulder with their other countrymen for the attain-
97 
ment of complete independence". The conference, however, could not make 
94. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p. 83. 
95. Dr. J.J. Pal, Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan (Delhi: Sidhuram 
Publications, 1983), p. 87. 
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any impression on the general Muslim masses. 
On May 14, the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, lord Zetland, 
98 
wrote: 
"I attach no particular importance to the Delhi Conference 
of the Muslims which took place a few days ago. It has 
been well organised and the British press machine has 
written it up admirably ... We both are, of course, aware 
that there is a not unimportant Muslim element outside the 
Muslim League ... Indeed, I am sure that Jinnah remains 
the man to deal with on the Muslim side". 
Disregarding the 100 representatives, the Viceroy wrote to the 
Secretary of State that "Jinnah is our man and we accept him as a 
representative of all Muslims" and that "the Khaksars have formally 
renewed their offer to me of 50,000 men to help in the war", but since 
Jinnah accepted "no responsibility for Khaksars of their activities", 
the Viceroy did not consider it advisable "to enter into any correspon-
99 dence with them or their leaders". Further, the British made it clear 
"to every Indian Muslim that except Jinnah and the Muslim League, they 
were not ready to accept any other party". Thus, the Muslims were 
obliged to join the Muslim League. It is questionable when the British 
favoured Jinnah so much, why they did not accept Jinnah's Fourteen 
Points. 
Congress Rejection of Tv;o-Nation Theory 
The Lahore Resolution of March, 1940, and J innah ' s e lucidat ion of 
Two-Nation theory, perturbed the Congress. The Congress refused to 
accept the theory of Jinnah, who continued to I n s i s t t ha t the Congress 
should f i r s t accede to the league demand for Pakistan, T i l l t h i s time, 
Jinnah was not sure of ge t t ing a decisive verdic t in favour of Pakistan, 
due to opposition of the n a t i o n a l i s t Muslims, who "were denounced and 
condemned on absurd grounds in the most intemperate language". They were 
rebuked by the Leaguers for "accepting money as a pr ice for t h e i r 
98. Wall Khan, Facts are Facts : The Untold Story of I n d i a ' s Par t i t ion 
(New Delhi: Vlkas Publishing House Pvt .Ltd . , 1987), pp. 30-31. 
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patriotism". Hence, the partition cannot be regarded as a result of 
intrigue of selfish leaders. If considered in the light of personal 
emotions, it is said that "Jinnah's consummate political skill lay in 
the manner in which he harnessed these forces under his personal direction 
for the achievement of personal glory and the establishment of the 
political identity for the community". 
However, following the Ramgarh policy, Nehru remarked: "He would 
be prepared to face all consequences of it but he would not be prepared 
to live with such people". "Many knots of the Hindu-Muslim problem", 
Nehru said, "had been merged into one knot, which could not be unravelled 
by ordinary methods, but would need an operation ... he would say one 
thing very frankly that he had begun to consider them (Muslim Leaguers) 
and people like himself, as separate nations". 
Gandhiji, in one of the series of articles in Harijan, wrote on 
May 4, 1940: "The British can retain their hold on India only by a policy 
of 'divide and rule'". He opined that "a true solution will come with 
the end of the (British) rule" and if the demand of Pakistan is a desirable 
goal, "why should it be prevented?". 
On May 6, 1940, Nehru at Poona said that neither the Hindu Mahasabha 
nor the Muslim League had positive programme and "characterized the 
Pakistan scheme as foolish and said that it "would not last 24 hours".The 
Congress was, however, appalled that the "cry of Pakistan swept the Muslims 
109 
off their feet". The extent of the delusion of Muslims that "Pakistan was 
good for them'' was a most astonishing phenomenon. 
102. Hoder Ali Dairkee, The Times of India, January 2, 1946, p. 4. 
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Change In British Government 
Meanwhile, on May 10, 1940, Winston Churchill replaced Neville 
Chaniberlain as Prime Minister and on May 19, 1940, L.S. Amery took over 
from Lord Zetland as Secretary of State for India. Lord Linlithgow, -
however, remained the Viceroy of India, Amery,on May 23, 1940, in the 
House of Commons, declared that "attainment by India of full and equal 
partnership in Commonwealth was goal of British policy", 
ML Conference, Hubli 
Jinnah, at the Bombay Presidency Provincial Muslim League Conference, 
held at Hubli on May 26, 1940, saj \U: 
"I am asked, wi l l the Br i t i sh agree to the basic and 
f\indamental pr inc ip les of the Lahore Resolution, namely, 
to create independent Muslim s ta tes in North-Westem and 
Eastern Zones of India? Whether they agree or whether they 
do not , we shal l f ight for i t to the l a s t d i t ch , I know 
tha t the Br i t i sh p o l i t i c i a n s , press and public are stilH 
holding on to the conception of uni ty and one India ; but 
I am convinced tha t i t i s a self-deception and complete 
ignorance of r e a l i t y . At the same time I am confident tha t 
we have successfully dispel led the fa lse propaganda and 
removed the delusion under which the Br i t i sh public are 
suffering, they with t h e i r sense of sagacity, wi l l not 
f a i l to meet us" , 
Jinnah remarked tha t he was astonished tha t men l ike Gandhi talked 
in such a manner that ref lected t he i r wilDingness to p a r t i t i o n . Jinnah 
113 had never used the word ' v iv i sec t ion ' in the Lahore Resolution, but 
Gandhi in reply to his statement of Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Gandhiji 
and Rajagopalachari talked about the pa r t i t i on as "cut t ing the baby 
114 in to two halves" . Jinnah, in the l i gh t of these statements, foresaw the 
division and pa r t i t i on of India , and did not doubt tha t " in near futute 
Muslim India and Hindu India would ex i s t on the physical map of India" . 
Jinnah sa r ca s t i ca l l y said tha t he could not understand the reason why 
"there was so much hue and cry against the Lahore Resolution", Jinnah 
111. C.H. Ph i l ips and M.D. Wainwright, n, 1. (Chronology, 1935-47), 
p . 563. 
112. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, n. 65, Vol. I , pp. 162-63, 
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added that India was composed of nationalities and. not only castes and 
that he "did not see in India any Central National Government whose 
authority was being smashed". 
By mid-June, 1940, there was a radical change in the attitude of 
Gandhiji, On Jxine 15, 1940, he wroi 117 ) te: 
"The Muslim League i s frankly communal and wants to divide 
India in to tvro par ts . . . Thus for the present purpose there 
are only two pa r t i e s - the Conqress and those who side with 
the Congress, and the p a r t i e s who do not . Betv/een the tvro 
there i s no meeting ground v7ithout the one or the other 
surrendering i t s purpose". 
This was Gandhij i 's f i r s t such a harsh statement which aroused 
suspicions in the League's c i r c l e tha t the Congress Raj was rea l ly a 
danger to the future of Muslims as a d i s t i n c t social identi ty.Consequently, 
Sikander Hyat Khan, leader of the Moderate Section, l o s t h is a l l cards 
when the League's Subject Committee on June 15 and 16, 1940, endorsed 
J innah ' s policy and authorised him to proceed with his negot ia t ions with 
the Viceroy and resolved: 
"No other member of the Committee should negot ia te with 
Congress leaders without Mr, J innah ' s permission. Nor should 
Moslems serve on War Committee pending further i n s t ruc t ions 
from Mr, Jinnah", 
Thus, the challenge of Gandhiji and J innah ' s response there to 
ensured that "the two nation theory was to be fully applied in terms of 
cons t i tu t iona l arithmetJ 
119 
:f c". 
CWC Meeting, Wardha, 1940 
The Committee resolved tha t "the na t ional s truggle for I n d i a ' s 
independence must continue on i t s non-violent course; the war committees 
sponsored by Government should not be supported, and no Congressmen should 
contribute to the war fvmds or e n l i s t in c i v i l guards under o f f i c i a l 
control" . 
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After Germany occupied France, it began air raids on Great Britain 
on June 18, 1940. Premier Winston Churchill in the House of Commons said: 
"The battle of France is over; the batt]e of Britain is about to begin". 
The Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy appealed to the Indians 
"to realize the gravity of the military situation of the war and extend 
all possible cooperation and support". 
By the end of June, 1940, Germany attacked massively and it was 
apprehended that Britain would also shortly follow suit. In view of the 
international situation, the Congress decided to extend conditional 
support to the Government in the war efforts, Gandhiji opposed India's 
122 
participation in the war. To him the issue was one of pacifism, and not 
of India's freedom, while the Congress President Maulana Azad, like many 
others, declared that "the Indian National Congress was not a Pacifist 
123 
organization but one for achieving India's freedom". Gandhiji was opposed 
also on the question of Council entry as against the wishes of Gandhiji 
the CWC advised the Congressmen to accept the Ministry on certain 
conditions. 
The Viceroy interviewed Jinnah on June 27, 1940, Jinnah expressed 
his readiness to cooperate with the Government on the basis of the offer 
of November, 1939, to expand the Executive Council and he hoped that the 
Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes would also agree to 
do so. Jinnah insisted that whatever constitution is declared by His 
Majesty's Government, it should not preclude "a fair and unprejudiced 
124 
hearing of the Muslim League proposal for the creation of two Indias". 
The Viceroy interviewed Gandhiji two days after he had interviewed 
Jinnah on June 27, and explained the possible declaration "purporting 
to give India a status similar to that of the self-governing dominions 
within one year after the termination of the war ... subject to an agreed 
understanding with regard to British commercial interests, defence, 
external affairs, the rights of minorities and treaty obligations to the 
125 princes", to which Gandhiji opposed because he believed that the 
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'exploratory processes' were to "regard rather than to advance the 
progress" of constitutional development, during the war. 
The Viceroy also discussed with Savarkar, President of the Hindu 
Mahasabha, and with the Jam Saheb of Mawanaqar, Chancellor of the Chamber 
of Princes, 
On July 1, 194 0, Jinn ah v;rote to the Viceroy demanding: 
" (i) the British government should not make any statement which 
would, in any way, antagonise the lahore resolution about the 
partition of India; 
(ii) the government should not frame and adopt any "interim or 
final constitution without the previous approval of the Muslim 
League"; 
(iil) the Muslims must be given equal partnership with the non-Muslims 
at the centre and in the provinces so that they might be able 
to secure "equal shares in the authority and control" of the 
Central and provincial governments; 
(iv) if the Executive Council was to be expanded, the number of 
Muslim members must be equal to that of the Hindus, and if the 
, Congress did not join,the Muslims must have a majority share; 
(v) the Muslims should have the majority of the non-official advisers 
in the provinces ruled by the governors; and 
(vi) sufficient representation should be given to the Indian princes 
in the proposed war advisory committee, and regarding represen-
tation from British India, representation of Muslim India must 
be equal to that of the Hindus if the Congress came in,otherwise 
they should have the majority". 
Linlithgow, in reply to above, v/rote to Jinnah on July 6, 1940, that 
"any Coimcil so expanded would co-operate as a whole and as a single 
Government of India", which would not strike a balance between interests 
or preserve the proportions between the important parties. However, he 
assured to keep in mind to secure adequate representation for Muslim 
interests in the event of any expansion. 
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On 'the one hand, the CWC a t Delhi on J u l y 1, 1940, p ressed the 
B r i t i s h t o d e c l a r e complete independence and, a t t h e f i r s t s t e p , t o 
c r e a t e a p r o v i s i o n a l n a t i o n a l government r e s p o n s i b l e t o C e n t r a l Leg i s -
l a t i v e Assembly. On the o t h e r s i d e , J innah opposed i t i n s t r o n g e s t 
p o s s i b l e terms and charged t h a t the demand for a s o - c a l l e d n a t i o n a l 
government meant a Congress Raj and i f t he demand was conceded " i t would 
mean a Hindu-majori ty government - a permanent Hindu ma jo r i t y govemment-
i30 „ ^ - . ^ ms". However, the 
Government did not accept the Conoress demand and took i t as a " p r i c e " 
131 
demanded by t h e Congress for extending he lp t o the B r i t i s h in the war. 
Lord Linl i thgow, cons ide r ing t h e Congress he lp no more i n d i s p e n s a b l e , 
turned h i s favour tovjards J innah , who had expressed d e s i r e t o coopera te 
132 
with the Government in the War e f f o r t s . The AICC met in Poona on J u l y 27, 
1940, and r a t i f i e d the CWC Delhi r e s o l u t i o n of J u l y 7 , 
The August D e c l a r a t i o n , 1940 
On t h e b a s i s of i n t e r v i e w s wi th the p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s , t h e Sec re t a ry 
of S t a t e d e c l a r e d the aims and i n t e n s i o n s of His Majes ty ' s Government^ 
t o break the p o l i t i c a l deadlock. The Viceroy, Lord Linl in thgow, i s sued 
a s ta tement on " Ind ia and the War" on August 8, 1940, t h a t "Dominion 
S t a t u s was t h e i r o b j e c t i v e for Ind ia" and i n s t e a d of c o n s t i t u t i n g a 
n a t i o n a l Government, provided for the "expansion of t h e Governor-Genera l ' s 
Council t o i nc lude a c e r t a i n number of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of p o l i t i c a l 
133 p a r t i e s " , s e t t i n g up a C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee and a War Advisory Counc i l . 
The Dec la ra t ion appeased the MusDim League ensur ing t h a t the B r i t i s h 
Government would no t c^gree t o "any system of Government whose a u t h o r i t y 
i s d i r e c t l y denied by l a r g e and powerful e lements in I n d i a ' s n a t i o n a l 
l i f e , nor could be a p a r t y t o the coercion of such elements i n t o submission 
134 
t o such a government". Obviously, i t meant t h a t no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l scheme 
was accep tab le t o the Government un le s s and u n t i l t he same was agreed t o 
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by the Muslim League, Thus, the Government had perfected its plan of 
a knock-out blow at the Congress declaring its "determination to crush 
135 that organization (Congress) as a whole" due to its antipathy to the 
Khadi-clad, vegetarian, jail-going Congressmen who were the avowed 
13$ 
enemies of the British raj". 
The Viceroy made it clear that (1) "full weight should be given 
to the views of the minorities" and (2) a representative body of principal 
elements of India's national life, after the conclusion of the war,would 
137 be set up "to devise the framework of the new constitution". Meanwhile, 
the Viceroy said that the Indians should reach a friendly agreement, 
"firstly, on the form which the post-war representative body should take, 
and the methods by which it should arrive at its conclusions, and secondly, 
upon the principles and outlines of the constitution itself". The Viceroy 
hoped that the Declaration would pave the way towards the attainment by 
India of that "free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth 
which remains the proclaimed and accepted goal of the Imperial Crown and 
13^ 
of the Br i t i sh Parliament 
1^?". 
In fact, on the very day the Declaration was made, Jinnah had 
signed a "secret letter to the governors informing them of th*^  plans", 
which reveals that the Government had planned "for a knock-out blow at 
the Congress, a declared determination to crush that organization as a 
whole". Some British officials "welcomed this (Pakistan) plan as a means 
of checkmating Congress demands". The British Government hoped that 
Jinnah's partition proposal would not be accepted by other parties and, 
thus, a political deadlock will continue indefinitely and will perpetuate 
the British rule in India, 
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Jinnah met the Viceroy on August 11 and 13, 1940/ and asked for 
certain clarifications, but he di^ ^ not commit himself, Gandhiji wrote 
. 143 to the Viceroy: 
"I have very carefully read your pronouncement and slept 
over it. It has made rae sad. Its implications frighten me. 
I cannot help feeling that a profound mistake has been 
made", 
On August 13, 194 2, Savarkar sent a letter to the Viceroy stating 
that "the expansion of the Executive Council was looked upon by the 
144 
Hindu Mahasabha as a step in the right direction". With regard to 
Dominion Status, he was satisfied, but with regard to the minorities 
"he thought it a pity that the Government should deliberately have chosen 
terms too strong, too vague and too alarming to the Piindus, Any attempt 
to cut at the root of the indivisibility of India as a political unit, 
'could not fail to evoke an undying opposition from Hindudonj as a who 
The Sikhs, the Scheduled Castes and other organizations expressed their 
146 / 
readiness to accept the August offer. 
The Secretary of State, Amery, also encouraged the Pakistan 
proposal in a speech in the House of Commons on April 14, 
"... the foremost among these elements stands the great 
Muslim Community, 90 million strong and constituting a 
majority both in northwestern and northeastern India, 
but scattered as a minority over the whole subcontinent. 
In religious and social outlook, in historic tradition 
and culture; the difference between them and their Hindu 
fellow countrymen goes as deep, if not deeper, than any 
similar differences in Europe", 
The two statements of August 8 and 14, were drafted very cleverly. 
On the one hand, they agreed to the demand for the 'partition' and the 
'two-nation theory', and, on the other, they admiring the cultural unity 
143, V.P. Menon, n, 3, p. 94, See also M.K. Gandhi, Col3ected Works 
of Mahatma Gandhi (New Delhi: Government of India Publications 
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of India emohasized the Britishers' contribution to India's political 
and administrative unity, which they hoped would be preserved with the 
help of the British, 
Jinnah interpreted the Declaration as an acceptance of the'Demand 
for Pakistan'. The Congress leaders also foresaw the partition of India 
in the light of the Declaration. 
The Congress Working Committee recorded: 
"The rejection of the Congress proposals is a proof of the^ 
British Government's determination to continue to hold India 
by the sword ..." 
Maulana Azad, the Congress President, concluded: 
"Now that British has rejected all the offers made by the 
Congress, we have only one thing left to do and that is to 
non-cooperate in every way with the war effort". 
On August 14, 1940, Linlithgow, m a letter to Jinnah, confirmed 
that, before issuing his statement, he had promised the League leader 
to safeguard the Muslim position and, in return, Jinnah had assured 
League's cooperation at the Centre. The Viceroy asked Jinnah to give a 
panel of four names of Muslims so as to select two for the expanded Council, 
which was likely to be in the neighbourhood of eleven; and a panel of 
names to select five Muslims for the War Advisory Council, whose represen-
tativeswere to be around tvienty. 
The League Working Committee expressed in a resolution on September 2, 
1940, that the Viceroy's offer was unsatisfactory and requested him to 
151 
reconsider the matter. However, the League was satisfied that the offer 
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had conceded to the Pakistan resolution. The Hindu Mahasabha adopted 
a conciliatory attitude and T.B. Sapru, representing the Liberation 
Federation, said that the Declaration opened "a new vista" and urged 
its acceptance. Sir Sikandar of the Punjab Unionist Party, considered 
it "a substantial concession to Indian opinion" and suggested that the 
Congress and the League should "concentrate their attention on points 
153 
of substance", but to the Congress, the Declaration was nothing but 
^disappointing. Therefore, the Conoress President, Maulana Azad, refused 
an invitation from the Viceroy to discuss the matter with him, without 
, 154 
consulting the CWC members. 
^ day after the AICC met in Bombay on September IS, 1940. 
Rajagopalachari advocated a "sporting offer". Emphasising an agreement 
with the Muslim League, it said: "If His Majesty's Government agree to 
a provisional national government being formed at once, I will undertake 
to persuade my colleagues to agree to the Muslim league being invited 
to nominate the Prime Minister and to let him form a government as he 
15S 
would consider best". 
The League Working Committee in New Delhi on September 28, 1940, 
demanded 5 seats in the War Council and 3 seats in the proposed expansion 
of Governor-General's Executive Council, while the Hindu Mahasabha 
Working Committee meeting in Bombay in the third week of September, 
announced acceptance of the offer "on honourable terms of equity and 
justice" and demanded 6 seats in the Executive Council and 15 seats in 
the War Council. However, the Hindu Mahasabha did not agree to the 
partition of India. 
Civil Disobedience Movement 
Disappointed by the Viceroy's statement, the Congress, on September 
15, 1940, withdrev/ the offer of cooperation it had made on July 27, and 
Gandhiji decided to launch a resistance to the British war efforts and 
announced his plan for "direct action". Consequently, individual 
152. D.C. Gupta, n. 121, p. 198. 
153. Ibid. 
154. A.K. Azad, n, 86, p. 36. 
15'=-. V.P, Menon, n. 3, p. 95. 
156. Ibid., p. 100. 
165 
Satyagraha was started on November 1, 1940, In view of the Tripartite 
Agreement (between Germany, Italy and Japan)/ the Government, to control 
the situation, let loose repressive measures. On October 30, 1940, 
Nehru was arrested and in November all the Congress Ministers in eight 
provinces/ who took part in the Movement, were put behind the bars. 
Maulana Azad, who had not yet offered individual Satyagraha, was 
arrested on January 3, 1941, and by March 3, as many as 4,749 Congressmen 
were arrested and 2,09,663 were fined. The Muslim League, on February 23, 
1941, characterized the Congress move as an attempt to bring pressure 
157 
on the British Government to concede its demand and warned the Viceroy 
that if he conceded to the Congress demands, the League would resist 
158 
with all their power. During 1941, the Movement lost itis sting as it 
failed to produce any significant favourable results. An Intelligence 
Report says: "In some areas it was limping along, in others, it was 
159 
moribund and still in others, it seemed to be dead". In the meanwhile, 
the position of the Allies became very critical and the War seemed to 
be ^oing the Nazis and the Fascists way. In the East, there was every 
likelihood of Japanese attack on India, which could uproot the British 
from Indian soil. Therefore, the CWC met at Bardoli on December 30, 1941, 
and suspended the Movement advising the Congressmen to stick to their 
posts and to organise the country for an effective defence, 
Jinnah, encouraged by Amery's and Linlithgow's statements and 
the arrest of the Congress leaders during the Civil Disobedience Movement, 
found a favourable climate to push the idea of Pakistan deep into the 
Muslim minds. He indefatigably kept pleading hig demand for Pakistan. 
In a speech delivered in Delhi in November, 1940, he saj m. 
"The whole effort of the Congress seems to me to be like 
that of a bat which has entered a room and flies roiind 
and round knocking against the walDs but will not, cannot, 
see that the door is wide open. That is what the policy 
of the Congress is like. It is, therefore, not possible 
for us to vlev; this movement with equanimity. We must view 
it with serious anxiety. I say to Musalmans, please don't 
get mixed up or involved in this terrible situations, for 
which the Congress alone is responsible. But if we find at 
any time that our interests are at stake we cannot remain 
as onlookers and spectators but we shall play our part and 
intervene, if necessary. Let that be understood" (Emphasis added) 
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The above statement, on the one hand, expresses the fears of 
Jinnah towards the Congress/ vjhich he declared at the Muslim Students' 
Conference held at New Delhi in November, 1940, to be a PtLndu body 
and its objective was to establish a Hindu Raj dominating over the 
Muslims and all the other minorities. He, in support of this statement, 
referred to the declarations of Dr. Moonje and Savarkar, that Muslims 
were like Jews in Germany and should be treated as such. The Jews were 
being brutally killed at a very large scale by the Germans during the 
then continuing Second World War. These declarations of the Hindu 
leaders, he thought v;ill encourage the Hindus to massively massacre the 
Muslims, which apprehension became true during the riots in those days. 
Jinnah concluded that the Congress proclamation of 'nationalism' was a 
veil over the 'perverted nationalism' of the Congress, v/hich actually 
meant the domination and destruction of Muslims, politicalDy, economically, 
educationally, culturally, and in all ways. In view of the Congress 
attitude, he sm^lled these dangers and became sure that the Congress 
would never embrace the Muslims and, hence, he found refuge in the 
establishment of a separate Muslim homeland, that is, Pakistan, Jinnah's 
fears are pronounced in his speech delivered in the Legislative Assembly 
on November 19, 1940, when he addressed the British Govemmeni 161 it: 
"I want your help. I am in danger and so are you. We will 
not apportion the degree of danger between us both. We both 
are in danger. 1 am willing to throw into the pool all the 
resources that I can, and I say, 'I am ready, let us both 
sink or swim'. All right so far, but what about ray having a 
voice in the use of the assets that I being into this pool, 
leave alone the share in th° victory.' Am I not to have some 
share, some voice, some day as to how it is going to be used, 
and how the joint venture is to be run". 
Based on his fears, Jinnah became more and more determined to found 
Pakistan. In his birthday message on December 24, 1940, demanding 
Pakinstan, he said:-
"We have now to prove to the world that we are fit to 
govern and achieve our goal as laid down by the Lahore 
Resolution of the Muslim League, popularly known as Pakistan, 
our organisation, which is undoubtedly,the only authoritative 
and representative body of the Muslims of India, has given 
us a flag, a platform, a programme, and a cherished goal, which 
we are determiner) to fight for and, if necessary, to die for. 
But we have yet to do many before we can achieve our political 
emancipation", 
161. Ibid., p. 185. 
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Jinnah's demand for PaW-Stan became a subject of debate at all 
levels. The newspapers and national intelligentsia engaged in thinking 
about the pros and cons of Pakistan. However/ the most important and 
thought-provoking document, which appeared on the issue of Pakistan in 
those days, was, at the end of 1940, Dr. Ambedkar's Thoughts on Pakistan, 
which putforth the following arguments relating to the creation of 
Pakistan: 
(1) The Hindu-Muslim relations v^ ere too slender to bridge the gulf 
of treating each a separate community, as the Hindus cherished 
the memory of the warriors who had fought the Muslim invaders, 
whom the Muslim consider as heroes of Islam. 
(ii) The Muslims claim themselves a nation instead of a community 
and they were not agreeable to accept the position of the 
French-Canadian people in Canada, 
(iii) Due to Congress refusal to accept the Muslim League as a sole 
representative of the Muslims, the gulf between the Congress 
and the League had widened. 
(iv) The Congress did not agree to share power v/ith the effective 
representative of the minorities and, thus, excluded the Muslims 
from political power, 
(v) The League's charges and grievances were exaggerated, but these 
were manufactured to gain power. 
(vi) The Congress argument regarding xinity of, India was wrong because 
India's unity was broken several times during the past eight 
centuries. The separation of Burma from India was not protested 
against. 
(vii) The Army was predominantly Muslims recruited from the Hindu-
majority provinces and it was doubtful how they ^ '^ould react in 
case of invasion from Afghanistan. Thus, the Congress faced 
the choice : "to have a safe army or a safe border", "To oppose 
Pakistan on this ground was to buy a sure weapon of their own 
destruction, A safe army was better than a safe border", 
(viii)The creation of Pakistan would not solve the commxjnal problem, 
(ix) The league claim over the whole of Punjab and Bengal was totally 
unjustified and it was necessary to re-draw their boundaries. 
(x) Political unity without social unity would prove precarious. If 
India got independence v/ithout partition, India would have a 
continuous struggle between the Congress and the League. It 
inferred that partition was better than xmity. 
(xi) The efforts of the All India Azad Muslim Conference held in April, 
1940, to formulate a charter of Muslim demand, as an alternative 
to Pakistan, had failed to submit any report. 
163, Dr, J.J, Pal, n. 95, pp. 93-94, 
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On January 2, 1941/ in reply to the question asked by Professor 
RadhaTcumud Mukeriee of the Lucknow University, as to what would be 
164 
the future constitution of India, Jinnah explained: 
"So lonq as the central Government was imitary it would 
be impossible to talk in terms of autonomy of lonits. The 
rruestion is not merely cultural but of political, economic 
and sociPl problems which can only be solved according to 
our genittS • in our homelands, orovided that they are 
independent states and in no way under the control of any 
centre for all India. Safeguards, constitutional or otherwise, 
will be of no use. So long as there is communal Hindu 
majority at the centre, safeguards will remain on paper. 
Therefore, I think of nothing better or more suitable 
having regard to the condition and realities than separation 
of Muslims in my proposed homelands". 
Prof, Mukerjee asked Jinnah v/hether Pakistan joined with some 
foreign power would not be a danger to India, Removing the misapprehen-
165 
sion, Jinnah replied: 
"The Muslims in such separate homelands in the first 
instance would be very foolish indeed to invite some other 
Muslim Power to rule over their homelands, government of 
which would be in their ovm hands. It is quite clear that 
tendency now is more towards territorial sovereignty as 
history and development of Muslim sovereign powers in the 
East and the Far East have recently shown. Therefore, on 
the contrary, I am sure that Hindu India will find Muslim 
India not only a friendly neighbour but will defend India 
against foreign invasion and in that case, so to say, 
Monroe Doctrine will come into action in the interests of 
both Hindu India and Muslim India. And in that sense I 
want to say that North-Westem Muslim independent states 
should be co\anted as India's outposts on the Frontier". 
Jinnah toured India for levelling the ground for creation of 
Pakistan reiterating everywhere the demand for Pakistan. On January 3, 
194 0, in an address to the Muslim Progress Society and the Muslim Youth 
Majlis, Jinnah said: 
"Muslims were not out for dominating the whole of India 
and they had no desires and designs to rule over the Hindus. 
Vihat the Muslim League wanted was the Muslims should have 
opportunity to have their own governments to grow freely 
and develop their own culture in the two zones which they 
considered as their homelands". 
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In plain words, Jinnab wanted the League domination in the east 
and west and the Congress over other parts of India, both developing 
their governments according to their own genius. Jinnah went ahead 
beyond acceptance without thinking it impossible to say at the annual 
meeting of the Muslim Educational Service League at Bombay on January 10, 
1941, that all parties concerned should accept the scheme of Pakistan 
lfi7 
so as "to settle the Hindus and the Muslims in their respective nations", 
which in\D Ived the suggestion for large-scale exchange and migration 
of population. 
In February, 1941, Jinnah called upon the Muslims to observe 
March 23, 1941, as the 'Pakistan Day' and appealed to the Government, 
the Princes and the Hindus to accept the Pakistan scheme, on the plea 
that Pakistan had been existing for centuries and would exist till 
eternity. Jinnah, speaking at the meeting to observe the first Pakistan 
Day, emphasised to say that the Congress-League differences had entered 
such an orbit where Hindu-Muslim joint rule was quite impossible. This 
emphasis obviously.rejected the possibility of a Congress-League coali-
tion ministry in the centre. The thought echoing in Jinnah's mind burst 
out when he spoke addressing the first Conference of the Kanpur Muslim 
Students' Federation on March 30, 
"... the last 30 years efforts had been made to bring about 
communal unity, but no settlement could be arrived at due 
to the fact that the basis with which the Hindus and their 
leaders started for the purpose of negotiations were totally 
different. The Hindus began with the truth that the Muslims 
were a minority and as such they might be given necessary 
safeguards, but the Muslims started on the basis that they 
were a separate entity, and as such they could come to no 
settlement. The Congress made this point clear when it came 
into power in seven provinces by treating the Muslims as a 
minority. The Muslim League had, therefore, to formulate its 
goal which was done on 23 March 1940 at Lahore by passing 
a resolution about Pakistan". 
Jinnah also asserted that the Congress had been deceiving the 
Muslims by proclaiming that it was "fighting for the freedom of the 
country and that it was a national organisation". 
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Anti-Communal Conferences 
While these developments regarding partition were taking place, 
the newspapers gave coloured versions of the developments for catering 
to the thrill and scandal seeking instincts of their readers which 
fueled communal hostilities and communal riots broke out more frequently 
throughout the whole sxibcontinent; the most severe ones occurred in 
Ahmedabad, Bombay, Bihar Sharif and Dacca. There was a great need to 
stop the great loss of life and property and it was only possible 
t^ 'rough launching campaign of Hindu-Muslim cooperation and friendship. 
Neither all the Muslims were the leaguers nor all the Hindus were 
enemies of the Muslims, There was only an orthodox commxonal group vrhich 
fomented the riots to achieve their own ends out of the blood and ashes 
of their own brethren. The innately traditional people were easy victims 
to the viles of commxonal leaders and as such they were exploited by 
those who took interest in playing with fire and tears. An eainiest 
effort to check the situation came in the shape of an Anti-Communal 
Conference called in March, 1941, at Lahore, ixnder the Presidentship 
of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The Conference denounced "the Pakistan scheme 
(as) extremely unpatriotic, anti-national and absolutely injurious to 
171 the interests of the country". Three months later, an Anti-Separation 
Conference at Kumbhakonam, under the Presidentship of Muhammed Yusuf 
Shareef and attended largely by the South Indian Muslims, totally 
opposed the "two-nation theory" and challenged the League's claim to 
3-72 
represent the Muslim community, 
Muslim League Session, 1941 
The session held at Madras started on April 12, 1941. It is 
significant in the history of partition of India because it was attended 
by very eminent leaders like E.V. Pamaswami Naicker, the leader of the 
Justice Party; R.K.Shammukham Chetty, Dewan of Cochin; K.V. Reddy, 
A.P, Patro, Kumararajah, M.A, Muttiah Chettiar; C.R, Srinivasan, the 
editor of the Swadesi Mitran; and M.C. Rajah, besides N. Sivaraj and 
other non-Brahmin leaders and that it demanded another sovereign state 
171. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, p. 100. 
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Aligarh Muslim University, December, 1941. H£.- ridiculed the 
notion that Hindu and Muslim cultures are entirely different. 
171 
in the South (Hyderabad). In his Presidential speech/ Jinnah forcefully 
173 
saio: 
"In this subcontinent you have two different societies, 
the Muslim society and the Hindu society and particularly 
in this land, there is another nation, that is the Dravidian. 
This land is really Dravidd stan, and imaqine its three per 
cent of electioneering, three per cent of them should 
secure a majority. Is this democracy or is this a farce? 
Therefore, I have the fullest sympathy and give my fullest 
supoort to the non-Brahmins, and I say to them:"The only 
way for you to come into your own is to live your own life, 
according to your culture, according to your language, 
etc, etc.". 
Defending the demand for Pakistan, Jinnah argued 
"... the democracy for representative government was suitable 
only for a nation, harmonious and homogenous. But could 
not work in a country like India where there were more than 
two nations". 
Jinnah, most bitterly, criticised the Congress position as 
175 
absolutely communal, by saying that: 
"the Hindu Mahasabha, the All India Hindu League, and the 
Liberal Federation were minor offshoots of the Congress 
' which meant nothing else than the solid body of the Hindus. 
If Hindu India was represented by anything, it v;as by the 
Congress". 
The most important feature of this session was that the League 
included the Lahore Resolution in its constitution. Moving this amendment 
for inclusion, liaquat All Khan stated: 
"Pakistan had become their article of faith and the amendment 
now before the House will be an effective reply to those 
who have alleged that it is merely a counter for bargaining". 
The amendment also implied that "every Muslim who is to join the 
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league from now onwards will have to taken an oath of allegiance to 
177 
Paki Stan". 
Referring to the Gandhiji's Civil Disobedience Movement, the 
session characterised it a pressure tactic on the Government to accede 
to the Congress demand. The participants asserted that the Congress 
aimed at nothing but to achieve sovereign power for the Hindus and to 
relegate the 100 million Muslims and other minorities to mere subjects 
of Hindu Raj. The League warned the Government that "any constitutional 
change, either interim or final, made without the approval of the 
League, would mean violation of the solemn pledges ot August, 1940",and 
also threatened that "if any attempt was made to depart, in any way, 
from the declarations of August, 1940, the Muslims would feel constrained 
to resort to any measure and method to resist it with all the powers 
179 they possessed . 
Inclusion of the protagonists of the demand of a 'Dravidistan' 
and the zealous support extended to them by Jinnah is clearly indicative 
of the liasion that existed between the Muslim League and the British 
and underlines the role of the League leaders as willing instruments 
of the policies of Imperial rulers. 
On April 17, 1941, referring to the statement of Dr. Rajendra 
Prasad that he accepted the principles of partition, Jinnah sa; m, 
"Will it not be more logical course that the Congress 
should first make up their mind and accept the basic 
principles laid dovm in the Lahore Resolution of the 
All India Muslim League popularly known as Pakistan/ 
Babu Rajendra Prasad with his judicial mind ouaht to 
know that first, the principle of partitioning India 
must be agreed upon then alone comes the question of what 
ways and means should be adopted to give effect to that 
decision. The question of details will arise then and 
with goodwill, understanding and statesmanship, we shall, 
let us hope, settle them among ourselves". 
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On April 18, 1941/ the Foreign Committee of the All India Muslim 
League published the details of the scheme for India's partition, which 
envisaged the formation of three sovereign Muslim states; one in the 
northwest extending up to~Delhi; the second comprising Bengal and Assam; 
181 
and the third in the south comprising Hyderabad and Berar. Favouring 
this demand, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung of Hyderabad, President of the All 
India States Muslim League, in a speech at Bangalore in April, supporting 
the demand for Pakistan, said that "India had never been a nation nor 
182 
could she never be a single political unit". This followed the formation 
of the Majlis Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen in Hyderabad State. At its foundation 
conference, it was declared that "the Muslims incarnated the sovereignty 
of Hyderabad State, and that the Nizam was the true representative of the 
183 ms". The involvement of Hyderabad and Berar in the Pakistan scheme 
disturbed the Congressmen and they began to think seriously of a solution 
by way of a Congress-league settlement, but they fovind no way except to 
come to terms of the League by acceding the demand for Pakistan. 
Amery's Statement 
The authorities in England also had adopted a more reactionary 
attitude towards the Conoress demand. On April 22, 1941, the Secretary 
of State for India, Leopold S, Amery, in a speech in the House of Commons, 
184 
said: 
"Anxious as we are to see the responsibility of Indian 
Government resting on Indian shoulders we can only transfer 
it to an authority that can assume it without immediately 
breaking down or breaking up. At this crisis of the war 
the basis of administrative and legislative power could not 
be changed, or the direction of India' s war efforts given 
to an entirely new Executive ... Indian statesmen must first 
find the indispensable measure of agreement, freely reached, 
before Britain could contribute further towards her own 
task of joining with them in crowning peace and unity with 
freedom ,..". 
The phrase "indispensable measure of agreement" was highly objec-
tionable to the Congress. Gandhiji called it "Amery's "callousness" and 
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"contemptuous disregard of the situation in India" and charged that 
"The Secretary of State had insulted Indian intelligence by reiterating 
ad nauseam that Indian political parties have but to agree among them-
selves and Britain vrill register the will of united Inifl". Gandhiji 
also admitted that "the gap between the Congress and the Muslim League 
seemed unbridgeable, but if the British statesmen withdrew* recognizing 
that this vas only a domestic quarrel. Congress, the League and all 
other parties would come together out of self-interest and devise a 
homemade scheme for the Government of India". T.B. Sapru described 
Amery's statement "indiscreet and unfortunate" and V.N. Savarkar,President 
of the National Liberal Federation, observed that the speech had caused 
"depression and hopelessness among all who had worked for a better 
understanding between Britain and India". 
The Atlantic Charter 
In December, 1940, the German attacks seemed to destroy England 
for ever. Prime Minister Winston Churchill v;rote several letters to the 
U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt arguing that if the United States 
would not defend the United Kingdom, the U.S. own security would also 
be jeopardised, as a result Roosevelt, on January 6, 1941, enunciated 
the doctrine of "Four Freedoms" - freedom of speech and expression every-
where in the world, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom 
188 from fear". On August 14, 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill met "somewhere 
at sea" and issued a joint declaration, known as the Atlantic Charter, 
stating that: "after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they 
hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the 
means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will 
afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their 
189 lives in freedom from fear and want". The Charter also embodied that: 
Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential 
to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to 
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preserve hxjman rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other 
lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage 
and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world^*. 
Gandhiji urged that the Atlantic Charter should be applied to 
India also. On September 9, 1941, Churchill replied that "those principles 
referred only to European countries and not to the evolution of self-
191 government within the Empire", which disappointed the Indians, who 
observed that the British Government was not willing to concede Congress 
demands for complete independence of India. 
While Great Britain was involved in the War, the Congress was 
carrying on the Civil Disobedience Movement, the League's demand for 
Pakistan was gaining more and more strength, and the leaders had lost 
all interest in the war efforts. In view of the gravity of the war 
situation, the British, to gain their war ends, released many of the 
Congress leaders, including Azad and Nehru, on December 4, 1941. On 
January 16, 1942, the CWC passed a resolution offering cooperation in 
the war effort once again subject to the government changing its attitude, 
but the British made no immediate response. 
Towards the end of February, 1942, Roosevelt emphasised "on the 
possibility of a settlement between the British Government and the 
193 
Indian political leaders". Roosevelt after consulting Churchill,declared 
that the Atlantic Charter was applicable to the whole world. Similarly, 
Evatt, the Foreign Secretary of Australia, declared In the Australian 
Parliament that self-government should be conceded to India to enable 
her to participate in the War efforts effectively. On March 10, 194 2, 
two days after the fall of Rangoon, Roosevelt sent a long cable to 
Churchill stating: "It is merely a thought of mine to suggest the setting 
up of a temporary government in India, headed by a small representative 
group - this group to be recognized as a temporary Dominion Government 
... This representative group would be charged with the duty of considering 
190. Ibid., p. 6. 
191. D.C. Gupta, n. 121, p. 202. 
192. A.K. Azad, n. 86, p. 39. 
193. Winston S, Churchill, The Second World War : The Hinge of Fate 
(London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1951), p. 185. 
176 
the structure of the permanent government in India, Perhaps some such 
method might cause the people of India to forget past hard feelings 
and to become more loyal to the British Empire ..." 
In view of the Congress attitude for cooperation, Roosevelt's 
suggestion and grave danger to India's defence, the War Cabinet-
Churchill and his colleagues - felt it necessary to break the Dolitical 
deadlock in India "in the most impressive manner" and decided to send 
Sir Stafford Cripps to India "to conduct direct discussion on the spot 
1 95 
with the leaders of all Indian parties and communities". Consequently, 
Churchill, on March 11, announced the Cripps Mission to impress that 
the Americans and the British attach great importance to the solution 
of India's problem, but, in fact, he wanted to gain time for the problem 
to be calmly solved. 
Cripps Mission, ,1942 
Sir Stafford Cripps was in close touch with Nehru and the Congress 
and had supported India's independence demand during his visit to India 
in 1939. Cripps arrived on March 23, 1942, and "dispelled somewhat 
the gloom that enveloped the Congress circles and roused great expecta-
196 
tion". Cripps, aiming to win confidence of the Indian leaders, stated 
197 
to the press: 
"I have come here because T am, as always have been, a 
great friend and admirer of India, and because I want to 
play my part as a member of War Cabinet in arriving at 
a final settlement of the political difficulties which 
have long vexed our relationships". 
On March 24 and 25, Cripps met with the Viceroy, members of the 
Executive Council and other official advisers. On March 25, Cripps and 
194. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt Q^ t^  Hopkins : An Intimate History 
(New York: Harper and Brothers,*'"l94sTT pp. 511-12; see also 
Churchill, Ibid., p. 189. 
195. vrinston S. Churchill, Ibid., p. 190. 
196. AICC File No, 55/1940, Proceedings of the AICC, NMMl,, 
197. Nicholas Mansergh (Editor-in-Chief) and 2.W.R. Lymby (eds.). 
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of Power (11 Vols.), Vol. I: Cripps Mission, January-April,194 2 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970); Rep. (Delhi: 
Vikas Pioblications, 1970), Vol. I, pp. 462-63. 
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Jinnah met. Cripps explained that "in case a majority of less than 
60 per cent of members of Provincial Assembly voted in favour of 
accession or non-accession, the minority legislators would have the 
right to demand a plebiscite of the adult population on the accession 
198 issue". Initially/ Jinnah/ agreeing with this plebiscite formula/ 
responded to the proposal favourably though he was dox:tbtful "whether 
4 0 per cent was the right figure to apply to minority for deciding the 
199 
guestion of accession". However, Jinnah wished for setting up a second 
dominion and said to place the proposal before the League Working 
Committee and to Inform him of the outcome accordingly", 
Jinnah and Cripps again met on March 28, 1942, to seek certain 
clarifications and Cripps assessed that the proposals were already 
accepted by the Muslim League in prin Later/ Sikandar Hyat Khan/ 
the Punjab Premier/ confirmed in a meeting that the League had accepted 
the scheme as a whole. Cripps met Nehru and other Congress leaders/ 
whose refusal to accept the proposals qave an impression to him that it 
was due to the influence of GandhiJi, v;hose "policy was one of 'total 
pacifism'/ and who described"the declaration as a 'post-dated cheque' 
203 
and decided to take no part in the discussion". On the same day, on the 
question of control of defence, Rajagopalachari requested Cripps to 
redraft the last paragraph of the proposals making a provision for the 
appointment of an Indian Defence Minister before presenting the scheme 
to the CWC for approval. Cripps did not agree to appoint an Indian called 
Defence Minister. He, however, agreed to create a Ministry of Defence 
Coordination under charge of the Commander-in-Chief as a member of the 
204 Government of India and enumerated a list of transferred subjects. The 
The Congress rejected the proposal as the transferred subjects were 
iinimportant and made the position of the Indian Defence Member ridiculous, 
Cripps, between March 26 and 28, conferred with leaders of all 
198. Sandhya Chaudhri, n, 132, p. 74. 
199. Nicholas Mansergh, Vol, I, n. 197^ pp. 480-81. 
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parties and representatives of communities, and on March 29, 
addressing a gathering issued the 'Draft Declaration' (published on 
March 30, 1942) and said: "The Constituent Assembly can start with 
a declaration of Independence" and "It was comDletely free to decide 
0( 
whether the new Union of India should remain within the Empire or no 
He explained that the new Indian Union shall "constitute a Dominion 
associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common 
allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect in no way 
207 
subordinate in any respect of its domestic and external affairs". Thus, 
the Declaration had conceded the basic demand of the Congress recognising 
India's right to frame a constitution through a constituent assembly 
after the War. The Other clause l.-5id down that "any province or provinces 
which did not acquiesce in the new constitution would be entitled to 
frame a constitution of their own giving them 'the same full status as 
208 
the Indian Union' , The non-acceding pre 
209 
union with 'complete self-government', 
rovinces could then form their own 
On March 29, 1942, Cripps gave impression to Maulana Azad, the 
Congress President, that he agreed to consider the Executive Covmcil 
as a National Government functioning like a Cabinet and the Viceroy to 
be a constitutional head, v;hich he said might be done with the help of 
210 
a convention. But at the viceroy's instance, Cripps changed his version 
and his interpretations became vague and ambiguous. He said to Azad 
that the legal position would remain unchanged and to this effect the 
211 
Viceroy could be discussed. 
Cripps in a broadcast on March 30, 194 2, appealed to the Indian 
people to accept these proposals, and said: "Let the dead past bury 
its dead, and let us march together side by side through the night of 
205. See for full text Appendix V. 
206. V.P. Menon, n. 3, p, 123. 
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high endeavour and courage to the already waking down of a new world 
212 
of liberty for all the peoples". 
213 
Cripps declared: 
"(a) immediately upon cessation of hostilities, steps shall be 
taken to set up in India ... an electecTbody charged with the 
task of framing a new Constitution for India. 
(b) provision shall be made for participation of Indian States in 
the constitution-making body, 
(c) His Majesty's Govemmen-t- undertake to accept and implement 
forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to (i) the 
right of any province of British India^ that is not prepared 
to accept the new constitution, to retain its present constitu-
tional position, provision being made for its subsequent 
accession if it so decides". 
This transfer of power to the Indians v/as siibject to the fxirther 
reservation that Defence was to continue under the British control. 
On the question of effectiveness of the proposal, Sardar Vallabhbhai 
, ^ 21| Patel observed: 
"No more mischievous scheme had been conceived up-to-date. 
It v;as designed to keep the British authority firmly in India 
after the war. That scheme was, in fact, resnonsible for the 
decision of the Congress to ask the British to quit India ... 
If India was to effectively resist external aggression, her 
people should have the fullest freedom and in3ependence. The 
British were not fighting for the protection of India but for 
maintaining their own authority permanently. If they had been 
fighting for Indian defence, they would have had no hesitation 
in accepting the Congress demands". 
When asked to "Give India a National Government now and don't worry 
215 
about post-war arrangements", Cripps renlled that Amery had a hand m 
shaping them with the consent of Churchill. 
212. V.P. Menon, n, 3, p, 125. 
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Azad and Nehru while conversing with Cripps demanded that there 
should be immediately a National Government without waiting tor a 
constitutional change and that the new government should function as 
a free government whose members would act as members of a Cabinet in 
a constitutional government. Sapru and Jayakar in their Memorandum of 
April 5, 1942, transmitted by lord Linlithgow to Amery in London, 
pointed out that "Indian opinion attaches the greatest importance to 
the transfer of real pov/er in the Central Government at the present 
moment and it is for this reason that we emphasize the necessity of the 
complete non-officialization of Government without the reservation ot 
216 
any portfolio during the interim period". 
On this issue, the Muslim League adopted a conciliatry attitude 
but with firm and bold steps, Jinnah, at 'Pakistan Day' public meeting 
in Delhi, on March 23, 194 2, saj \lh 
"It is true that Cripr-s is friend of Congress but we should 
not be afraid on that score ... If vre have adopted attitude 
of non-embarrassment tov/ards British Government, we know 
that if British Government are broken we are also in danger... 
\-Je are prepared to face al] consequences if any scheme 
detrimental to interests of Muslims is forced upon us. We 
shall resist it to utmost; if we have to die. in attempt we 
shall die fighting. We have two opponents - Hindu leadership 
and British leadership. It is futile to attempt to create 
differences and disruption among Muslims and Muslim League 
is only authoritative organisation of Mus]ims. We cannot 
tolerate Muslims in camp of enemy. Non-League Muslims are 
traitors in enemy camp", 
Jinnah's statement shows that he thought the continuance of 
British Raj in India as a safeguard to the rights of the Muslims. 
Constitutional Settlement 
218 
Cripps on April 30, 194 2, in his first broadcast said in New Delhi; 
"I want to play my part as a member of the V7ar Cabinet in 
reaching a final settlement of the political difficulties 
which have long vexed our relationships. Once these questions 
216. Telegram 214-S.C, of 18 April, Mss EUR.F, 125/22; in Nicholas 
Mansergh, Vol. I/The Cripps Mission, January-April, 1942),p, 644, 
217. Telegi-am,MSS, EUR.F, 125/29; in Ibid., pp, 467-68. 
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are resolved, and I hope they may be quickly and satisfactorily 
resolved, the Indian peoples wi]l be enabled to associate 
themselves fully and freely not only x-zith Great Britain 
and other Dominions but with our great Allies, Russia, 
China and the United States of America so that together we 
can assert our determination to preserve the liberty of the 
peoples of the v7orld". 
Maulana Azad, on behalf of the Congress, observed: 
"We did not ask for any legal changes, but we did ask for 
definite assurances and conventions which would indicate 
that the new Government would function as a free government, 
the members of which act as members of a Cabinet in a 
constitutional government". 
In regard to the constituent assembly, Cripps' mind had also been 
working on the lines that the executive council could be converted 
into a cabinet enlarging the powers and even the size of the legislature 
220 
and the Viceroy be made a normal constitutional head of the government. 
Azad and Nehru emphasised that there should be definite assurance 
indicating that the new government would function as a free government 
whose members would act as members of a Cabinet in a constitutional 
government, Jinnah on March 25, 1942, had said, talking with Cripps that 
he would like to "treat the Executive as a Cabinet rather than as the 
221 
Executive according to the constitution". 
With regard to the new constitution, Cripps, on March 25, 1942, 
explained to Jinnah that "all Provinces should formally accede to the 
New Constitution by vote of their Legislative Assemblies but that in 
cases where there v;as less than a three-fifths majority in favour of 
accession, the two-fifths minority should have the right to demand a 
plebiscite of the total adult male population of the province and that 
the plebiscite taken should then determine the question of accession 
?22 
or non-accession". Jinnah said that "the only question was as to whether 
4 0% was the right figure to apply to the minority". Jinnah saw that 
224 Cripps proposal went to meet the Pakistan case, but side by side it 
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offered the provision of the establishment of two or more independent 
unions in India, 
Nonaccession Clause 
The non-accession clause reflected the mischievous spirit of the 
Cripps Declaration. The CWC on April 2, 1942, rejected it and recorded 
that the Congress can not compel "the people of any territorial xmit 
to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established 
wl!!". which encouraged the Muslim League and gave boost to the Pakistan 
movement. Acceptance of this principle inevitably involved guarantee 
of territorial unit having "fullest possible autonomy within the Union, 
but all this should exist in consonance with a strong national state". 
Gandhiji, who met Cripps on his insistence, realised the danger of 
turning India into pieces and advised Cripps on April 4, to take the 
227 first plane home, 
Nehru and Azad approached Cripps and proposed in lien of €he non-
accession clause inclusion of a clause to give the right of secession 
after five or ten years of constitution-making, but Cripps, to their 
dejection, replied that the clause about non-accession was provided in 
the scheme to accommodate the demand of the Muslim league for Pakistan. 
They obviously foresaw the British vindictive motive of converting India 
into a political chequerboard, Jav/aharlal Nehru expressed his fear of 
'balkanization' of India in a telegram to Krishna Menon in England 
criticising "the whole conception (of) leading (to) break up (of) India 
with British forces guarding States interfering (with) freedom (of the) 
union, encouraging disruptive tendencies"{emphasis added), Cripps 
defending the 'non-accession' of provinces in a broadcast said: "The 
door must be left open. If you want to persuade a number of people who 
are inclined to be antaaonistic to enter the same room, it is xanwise 
229 
to tell them that once they go in, there is no way out". Maulana Azad 
remarked that "the main purpose of the Cripps mission should be the 
225. Dr. J.J. Pal, n. 95, p. 102. 
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settlement of political issues like the communal question, and the 
auestion of the states should not be relevant at that stage, for such 
230 
matters should be settled by Indians themselves**. 
Jinnah v/e] corned the non-accession clause. It was a "veiled 
231 
recognition"of Pakistan and not in unequivocal terms. He demanded amend-
ment to ensure the secession of the provinces he claimed for Pakistan. 
Cripps favoured the sentiments of partition because he belif^ved that 
the British Government would readily concede to it. The Hindu Mahasabha 
on April 3, rejected the long-term plan on the ground that "the option 
given to provinces to stay out of the Union v;ould destroy the unity of 
?32 ry". The Sikhs, on March 31, protested that they shall "resist 
by all possible means separation of the Punjab from the All-India Un 
The Depressed classes, on April 1, denounced them because they believed 
that the proposals were "calculated to do the greatest harm to the 
Depressed Classes" and v/ere "sure to place them under an unmitigated 
system of Hindu ru! 
234,, 
lie" , 
Defence Formula 
Cripps in his proposals had also said that during the War period, 
the British Government would inevitably retain the control and direction 
of the Defence of India as a part of their world war efforts and would 
also organise to the full the military, moral and material resources of 
India with the co-operation of the people of India. 
In early April, 194 2, Philips, Sapru, Rajagopalachari, Menon and 
B.N, Rau evolved a formula overnight and finalised it in the early hours 
236 
of the morning as follows:-
" (a) India shall in every possible respect be treated as a free 
member of the Commonwealth, 
230 . The S t a t e s m a n ( C s l c u t t a ) , A p r i l 30, 1942. 
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His Majesty's Government therefore invite the leaders of 
the principal sections of the Indian people to undertake 
the gove3mance of their country and to participate in the 
counsels of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations in 
the world war effort, 
(b) The members of the Executive Council of the Governor-General 
will function on the principles of joint responsibility 
in the manner of a Council of Ministers, 
(c) The policies and measures of the Government of India in 
respect to the prosecution of the war will be subject to 
the decisions of the British War Cabinet, There will be 
the closest association and co-operation between the Defence 
Member and the Commanddr-in-Chief; but this will not affect 
the authority or responsibility of each in his own sphere". 
Meanv^hile, Colonel louis Johnson, President Roosevelt's Personal 
Envoy, arrived in Delhi, on April 3, 1942, as the head of the American 
Technical Mission, He, after consulting v;ith Cripps and Nehru, found 
237 the matter more complicated. Cripps presented the following new formula, 
on behalf of the British War Cabinet: 
"(a) The Commander-in-Chief should retain a seat in the Viceroy's 
Executive Council as 'War Member' and should retain his full 
control over all the war activities of the armed forces in 
India, subject to the control of His Majesty's Government and 
the War Cabinet, upon which a representative Indian should 
sit with equal powers in all matters relating to the defence 
of India. Membership of the Pacific Council would likewise 
be offered to a representative of India, 
(b) An Indian representative member would be added to the Viceroy's 
Executive, who would take over those sections of the Department 
of Defence which can organizationally be separated immediately 
from the Commander-in-Chief s War Department and which are 
specified under head (i) of the annexure. In addition, this 
member would take over the Defence Co-ordination Department 
which is at present directly ijnder the Viceroy, and certain 
other important functions of the Government of Indie v;hich 
do not fall under any of the other existing departments and 
v/hich are specified under the head (ii) of the annexure". 
Cripps assured that if the above formula would be accepted, the 
British Government would take up the task of forming the nev; National 
Government "in consultation with the leaders of Indian opini6n".However, 
the matte^- of defence became most important, which created a deadlock 
in the negotiations. 
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239 
l a : Johnson p roduced t h e f o l l o w i n g formu 
" I n amiDl i f l ec t ion of c l a u s e (e"i of the d r a f t D e c l a r a t i o n His 
M a j e s t y ' s Government make t h e f o l l o w i n g c r o p o s i t i o n ui^on t h e 
sub j ec t -ma t t ' = ' r of t h e De-^cnee of I n d i a : 
(a) The Defence Depar tmen t s h a l l be p l a c e d i n t h e c h a r g e 
of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e I n d i a n member w i t h the exceDt ior i 
of f u n c t i o n s t o be e x e r c i s e d by t h e Commander - in-Chief 
a s War Member of t h e E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l . 
(b) A War Depar tment w i l l be c o n s t i t u t e d which w i l l t a k e 
o v e r such f u n c t i o n s of t h e Defence Depar tment a s a r e 
n o t r e t a i n e d by t h e Defence Member". 
A p p a r e n t l y , t h i s formula i s a c l a s s i c example of t h e o l d wine 
i n a new b o t t l e . 
J a w a h a r l a l Nehru w r o t e t o Johnson on A p r i l 8, 194 2, t h a t C r i p p s 
24( 
new formula "were e n t i r e l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y " . He observec Q 
"Both the approach and the allocation of subjects were, in 
our opinion, wrong, and there was no real transfer of 
responsibility for Defence to representative Indians in 
the National Government. Such transfer is essential for the 
successful defence of the country, for on it depends the 
full mobilisation of the war potential of the country". 
Nehru, in the same letter, foimd the Johnson formula somewhat 
"more healthy", on which further discussions could be made. Hov/ever, 
he emphasised that "a very great deal depends on the allocation of 
subjects between the Defence Committee and the Vfar Department, and until 
241 
this is done, it is not possible to give a final opinion". With this 
in mind, he suggested the follov/ing formula to form the basis of 
242 
discussion: 
"(a) The Defence Department shall be placed in the charge of a 
representative Indian member, but certain fionctions relating 
to the conduct of the war will be exercised for the duration 
of the vrar by the Commander-in-Chief, who will be in control 
of the war activities of the armed forces in India and v/ho 
will be an extraordinary member of the National Cabinet for 
that purpose. 
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(b) A War Department will be constituted under the Commander-
in-Chief. This Department will take over such fimctions 
as are exercised by the C-in-C. A list of such functions 
has been prepared and is attached. 
(c) The Defence Member shall be in charge of all other matters 
relating to Defence, including those now dealt with by 
the Defence Coordination Committee", 
The Congress Working Committee amended the formula very much 
and proposed to consider the national Government responsible for the 
whole of administration, includina defence, which v/as conceded by the 
Viceroy, Cripps and Johnson. However, Sir Stafford Cripps finalised 
the draft on April 8, 194 2. By that time, there had emerged quite a 
few differences between Johnson and the Congress leadership, on the one 
hand, and between Cripps and the Viceroy, on the other. Cripps sent 
home his formula recommending its acceptance, but the Viceroy also sent 
his disapproval of it, 
Cripps, on the question of Azad and Nehru as to what would be 
the position of the Governor-General in the Drooosed scheme, had renlied, 
without consulting Viceroy linlitHaow and "presumably with the assistance 
24 3 
of Louis Johnson" that the Governor-General will "function as constitu-
tional head like the King in the United Kingdom" and that "power would 
244 
rest with the Council as it rests v;ith the British Cabinet", This made 
the Viceroy feel offended and disregarded. The Viceroy wrote to Churchill 
that he and Cripps "could have got Nehru's agreement to the original 
245 
proposa l , had no t Cripps and Johnson worked out t h i s new arrangement" . 
Church i l l read t h e communication to John Hopkins and George C.Marshall 
and expressed grave concern t h a t Ind ia demanded se l f -government " a t a 
time when the Japanese v/ere dangerously c lose t o her bo rde r s and 
247 d e s t r o y i n a shipping in the Indian Ocean a t an alarmii^g r a t e " , The same 
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dav, Churchill wrote to Cripps that he would be repudiated if he 
ar". When Azad met again with Cripps he did not say catego-
rically that the Executive Council would have "full and unfettered 
freedom of decision". He said to Azad that "the position now enjoyed 
249 
by the Viceroy could not be changed v/ithout a change in the law" . 
Cripps realised his inability to proceed further and the talks closed 
do^ '^n. Consequently, no favourable amendments could be made in the 
proposals and all the parties rejected the Cripps proposal for one 
reason or the other. 
The Congress, on April 10, 1942, rejected the proposal on the 
ground that the British Cabinet and the Viceroy were not agreeable to 
250 
transfer the portfolio of Defence to Indian hands; it was dissatisfied 
with the provision of non-accession and position of the Executive 
Council; the claims of princely States were disregarded and the proposal; 
could lead to the formation of Pakistan, The C^JC reaffirmed these 
decisions on April 11, 194 2. Maulana Azad remarked that "the main 
purpose of the Cripps mission should be the settlement of political 
issues like the communal question, and the question of the States should 
not be relevant^at that stage, for such matters should be settled by 
253 
Indians themselves". 
The Muslim League rejected thp plan on April 11, 1942, because 
Pakistan was not conceded equivocally and the right of Muslims' self-
determination was denied, and there was no clear indication of two 
constituent assemblies - one for the Muslim majority provinces and the 
other for Hindu majority provinces. In fact, the proposals attempted 
to please every section of India but ended in pleasing none. As a result, 
Cripps flew back to England on April 12, 194 2, leaving the impression 
248. Robert E. Shenvood, n. 194, p. 52. 
249. Ibid, 
250. V.P, Menon, n. 3, pp. 130 and 136. 
251. Home Poll., File No. 49/8/1943, containing the book by 
C, Rajagopalachari, The Way Out, NAI, 
252. I.A. Sherwani, n. 127, pp, 60-62. 
253. The Statesman (Calcutta), April 30, 1942, 
254. See Appendix VTI : Resolution of the Muslim League Working Committee 
on the Draft Declaration, April 11, 194 2. 
255. D,C, Gupta, n, 121, p. 212; See also B. Shiva Rao, n, 215, p. 435. 
"On April 12, 1942',' Cripps wired Churchill "There is no hope of 
agreement and I shall start home on Sundav",Stanley Wolpert,n,79, 
p. 202, 
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that the Government actually did not want to extend any power to the 
Indians but meant only to pacify the international critics of British 
policy in India. 
After the departure of the Cripps ^4ission, the political deadlock 
continued on commimal oroblems and the Conqress and the Leaque came 
out blaming each other for the failure of the Cripps Mission. It v;as 
understood that Gandhiii had telephoned from Sevagram to the Congress 
256 leaders at Delhi to reject the proposals. Maulana Azad, in a press 
statement, on April 11, 1942, said: 
"It would be entirely untrue to suggest that the Working 
Committee's decision has in any way been influenced by 
Gandhi's views as he (Gandhi) made it clear to the Working 
Committee members that they were perfectly free to come 
to their OVTI decisions on the merits of the proposals". 
258 
Rajagopalachari said: 
"I can say authoritatively that Mahatmaji, v;ho was absent 
from Delhi during the later stages was not responsible for 
anything that took place". 
On June 16, 1942, Cripps in a press interviev; said: 
"The assurance that the Congress V?orking Committee had 
accepted the proposals came through the press and other 
sources. Then further consultations took place in which, 
I understand, Mr. Gandhi was consulted and after some 
further delay, the Congress turned down the proposals". 
Gandhiji, replying to Cripps's statement on June 28, 1942, said 
to the representative of the United Press of London: 
"The delebrations, therefore, of the Working Committee at 
New Delhi, were carried on without any interference or 
gxiidance on my part. Therefore, the negotiations had nothing 
to do at any stage with the question of non-violence". 
256. Louis Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1957), p, 388; see also Alexander Horace, India Since Cripps 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1944), p. 20. 
257. M. Sx±)rahmanyam, Why Cripps Failed.- (New Delhi: The Hindustan 
Times Press, 1943', p. 41; 'see also AICC File No, 55/1940, 
pp. 30-40, NMML, 
258. M. Subrahmanyam, Ibid., pp. 41-4 2. 
259. Home Poll. File No, 49/8/1943, n. 247, p, 9. 
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189 
Nehru sa id: "No cruestion of violence or non-violence arose in 
261., 
our t a lks . . . We rejected the proposals purely on p o l i t i c a l grouros". 
In October, 194 2, Cripps chanqed his view and sa ia ; 
"I do not believe tha t Gandhi who was not present v^ hen the 
decision was taken v/as personal ly responsible for the 
reject ion of the Government's proposal". 
Opinion About the Mission 
Gandhiji wrote tha t the negot ia t ions fa i led due to differences 
with Cripps as to what powers the Br i t i sh Government wanted to par t 
26 3 
vrith during the war. Nehru said that on the question of transfer of 
power the British Government was "determined to hold on to what it had. 
Behind them stood the imposing figure of Mr. Winston Churchill*. 
Dr. Rajendra Prasad commented that the tongue was that of Cripps, the 
language was that of Amery and no group in India v;as prepared to accept 
265 
the Proposals in April, 1942, dressed in a different way". Moonje said 
that the Proposals encouraged Jinnah to stick to a position that 
rapprochement was impossible without accentance of Pakistan. Mudaliar 
said that the purpose of the Mission was to convince the Labour Govem-
267 
ment that a constitutional settlement was impossible by the Indians. 
Majumdar stated that Churchill stopped the negotiations between Cripps 
268 
and the Congress. Louis Fischer, the American journalist, wrote that 
Cripps was not allowed to make good his assurance about the National 
269 
Government. Harold Laski ascribed that some of the Cripps' colleagues 
261. S. Gcipal (ed.). Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (New Delhi: 
Orient Longmans, 1976), Vol.12, p^ 243. 
262. Home Poll., File No. 49/8/1943, containing clipping of Manchester 
Guardian, dated October 24, 1942, NAI. 
26 3. Harijan (Ahmedabad), May 24, 194 2, Vo]. IX, p. 161. 
264. Jawaharlal Nehru, n. 9, p. 464. 
265. The Tribune (Lahore), April 19, 1942. 
266. AICC File No. 65/1942, Press Statement, February 2, 1943, Moon 1e 
Papers, NMf!L. 
267. Home Poll. File No. 727, Sr. No. 16, Jayakar Papers, NAI. 
268. S.K. Majumdar, Jinnah and Gandhi (Calcutta: V,l. Mukhopadhaya, 
1966), pp. 186-87. 
269. Home Poll., File Vo, 37/16/1942, NAI. See also Ram Manohar Lohia, 
Mystery of Sir Stafford Cripps (Bombay: Padma Publications, 1942), 
p. 9. 
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were jealous and afrai-i of his success. The nationalist press opined 
that Cripps Mission was an unsuccessful drama to befool the ''/orld. 
The Statesman wrote that Cripps was not strong enough to do his drafting 
27 2 
and he succumbed to the influence of Nev; Delhi. However, the Mission 
recognised India's right of self-determination and independence, a 
Dominion Status and framing ot tVieir own constitution. It gave chape 
to the fancy of Pakistan and a new enthusiasm to the Muslim League to 
achieve their goal. Hodson rightlv obsen/es: "This was a hole in the 
' 2 7 3 
dyke which Mr, J inn ah was determined to vriden" . 
Rajaji's Acceptance of Pakistan 
After the departure of the Cripps Mission^ Gandhiji became, in 
the summer of 1942, a great advocate of mass action to drive the British 
out of the Indian subcontinent, while the danger of Japanese attack on 
Calcutta was increasing as on April 6, Cocanada and Vizagapatam were 
already bombed by the Japanese and their warships were cruising in the 
Bay of Bengal, In view of all the disarray of political parties and '.'ar 
likely to be fought between Great Britain and Japan, Fiaj agopalachari 
(better known Rajaji) thought that the root of all these catastrophe 
and disaster was the Congress-league differences on the question of 
demand for Pakistan by the League. This issue had also created great 
disturbance and distrust among the Muslims and' Hindus and riots were 
occurring. Rajaji thought that if the League demand was accepted, the 
Congress-League conflict would end and pave the way for establishment 
of a unity and a solid front against the British, He believed that 
Congress-league combined strength alone would make the covintry independent 
from foreign yoke, whether Great Britain or the Japs, As Nehru stated, 
274 
India was in a "helpless and inert, bitter and sullen" condition, the 
Madras Congress Legislature Party met on April 23, 1942, and recommended 
to the All-India Congress to "aclcnowledae the Muslim league's claim 
270. Dawn (Delhi), September 24, 1944. 
271. Home Poll., 18/5/1942, Fortnightly Report of the First Half 
of May, 1942, 
272. The Tribune (Lahore), April 13, 1942 (The Editorial commented on 
the news item which appeared in the Statesman). 
273. H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1969), 
p.105. 
274. See for full details The Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 
April 25, 1942; see also I.A. Sherv^ ani, n. 127, p. 65. 
191 
for separation". Rajaji moved the resolution at the AICC met at 
Allahabad, on May 1, 1942, but it was rejected - 15 members voting for, 
and 120 members against it. Pandit Jagat Narayan's resolution, disagree-
. 2 7 7 
ing Rajaji's proposal, v/as adopted (92 members voting and 17 against it). 
Gandhiji's view was that the "question of majority and minority is a 
creation of the British Government and would disappear on their v/ithdrawal" 
Rajaji, disappointed at having lost his Pakistan resolution at 
Allahabad, campaigned in favour of the demand for Pakistan by the League 
and, in June, met several times with Jinnah to obtain a measure of 
congress-League unity, but failed, and Jinnah, on June 22, 194 2, said 
that Pakistan demand was "immutable" and warned again that if the Govern-
ment surrendered to the Conaress in any matter detrimental to Muslim 
279 
interests serious consequences would follow. 
Quit India Movement 
Gandhiji and Nehru had divergent views on the question of launching 
a direct resistance against the Government. Gandhiji suggested non-violent 
non-cooperation against the Japanese if they controlled India and demand 
of British withdrawal from India.Nehru and Azad were not convinced as 
to how Gandhiji would be able to drive Japanese. Gandhi-Nehru differences 
developed to the extent that Gandhiji asked Nehru and Azad "to resign 
from the Congress Working Committee if they were too sure of the efficacy 
28n 
of their stand", but Patel intervened and the crisis was averted, T . 
The Wardha CT?C held on July 14, 1942, adopted that the Congress proposal 
\'ia.s "not only in the interest of India but also that of Britain and of 
281 
the cause of freedom to which the United Nations proclaim their adherence". 
The Wardha resolution also stated that if the Government did not heed 
to the Congress proposal, Gandhiji would be authorised to laimch a 
275. The Indian Annual Register, January-June, 1942, pp. 294-95; see 
I.A. Sherwani, n, 127, p, 66. 
276. Ibid. 
277. The Civil and Military Gazette,(Lahore),May 3, 1942. 
278. S.C. Hose, The Indian Struggle, 1920-1942 (Works of Subhas Chandra 
Hose; compiled by the Netaji Research Bureau, Calcutta); (New York: 
Asia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 443-44, 
279. D.C. Gupta, n. 121, p. 221, 
280. A.K. Azad, n, 86, p, 76. 
281. D.C. Gupta, n. 121, p. 223. 
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non-violent and wide-spread s t rugnle . The resolution vras to be r a t i f i ed 
by the AICC on August 1, 194 2, at Bombay. Soon, the Viceroy/ Lord 
Linlithgov;, in New Delhi, ordered a r r e s t of Gandhiji, Nehru and pr incipal 
members of the CWC. Hov/ever, the au thor i t i e s in London and Washington 
anxiously beocin to v;ait the conclus:ons of the orc on August 7 . The 
CVJC at Bombay on August 8, 1942, endorsed the 14th July r'='Solution 
and resolved "in the event of continued Br i t i sh reca lc i t r ance , to s t a r t 
"a mass struggle on non-violent l ines" under the leadership of Gandhiji, 
i f the Br i t i sh and the United Nations fai.led to respond to the ca l l of 
reason and j u s t i c e for an honourable set t lement, and tha t "only af te r 
a l l attemrits to bring about an agreement x^ rere f rus t ra ted by the Br i t i sh 
284 
and Gandhiji gave the sanction". 
Churchill and Linlithaow hac' already planned to crush the "mass 
s trugnle", b e t t e r knovm as "Quit India Movement". In the morning Gandhiji, 
Nehru, Azad, Pate l , Rajendra Prasad, Kripalani, Asaf Ali, Mr?. Sarojini 
Naidu and about 148 Congress leaders v/ere a r res ted and t h i s was follov^ed 
v/ith the im.prisonment of thr- ran'k and f i l e of Congressmen a l l over the 
country. Nehru observed: "For the f i r s t time since the great revol t of 
1857, vast numbers of people rose to challenge by force (but a force 
without armsl) the fabric of Br i t i sh rule in India" . The Provincial 
Governments were given c?iscretionary powers for proscribing the movement. 
By the end of 194 2, police and army resorted to f i r ing 538 times, as a 
resu l t 40 persons were "killed, 1,630 injured, 26,000 convicted ^nd 18,000 
28fi detained under the DIR. The Government col lected Rs.25,000,000 as f ines . 
Reactions to the Movement 
There were a number of p a r t i e s , organizations and eminent persons, 
who opposed the Quit India Movement, most probably due to i t s timing 
when the Br i t i sh Government was l ike ly to f a l l . T.B, Sapru, the Liberal 
282. Ib id . 
283. AICC, Indian National Congress, March, 1940 - September, 1946 
(Allahabad: 1947), op. 120-24; also see E. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, 
n. 129, Vol, II, pp. 340-4?. 
284. See for details AICC Resolution of August 8, 1942; also see Coril 
Henry Philips (ed.). The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858 to 
1947 : Selected Documents (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 
p. 342. 
285. D.C. Gupta, n. 121, o. 229. 
286. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, n. 129, Vol. II, pp. 374-78. 
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learners called the Wardha resolution "ill-considered" and "il]-opportune" 
and urged a concerted effort for sete]ement of internal conflict. 
Ambedkar, th^ leader o-^  the Depres-pd Classes, described the Civil 
288 
Disobedience Movement as "irresponsible and insane" and wished that 
Gandhiji and Jinnah should' both better quit politics, Savarkar^ the 
spokesman of the Hindu Mahasabha, appealed to all Hindus not to lend 
289 
any support "to the Congress move", ""he Sikhs, loyal to the Government, 
remained aloof from the Movement and decried The British labour 
Party leader, Clement Attlee, then Deouty Prime Minister, issued a 
statem.ent on August 12, making "an earnest appeal to the Indian people" 
that the Movement would endanger "not merely Indian freedom but the 
freedom of the v/hole '-.'orld", whereas the United States expressed belief 
that "the establishment of a free India in the post-War world is secure 
and is not endangered by any possibility of evasion or procrastination 
292 
by the British Government". In the United States, eminent authors ]ike 
Pearl Buck and Lin Yu Tang, and publicmen like V^edell WilRii and Henry 
294 295 
A. Wallace "espoused the cause of dependent Inaia". The newspapers 
like The Nev.' York Herald, Tribune, WashJ ncton Post, Washington Star, 
Washington Time Herald, Baltimore Sun, Christian Science Monitor held 
the Congress Party responsible for the "ugly situation", "violent 
296 
activities" and "lav;lessness" in India, in strong terms. 
The Muslim League Working Committee on August 20, 1942, "deplored 
the decision arrived at by the All-India Congress Committee on August 8, 
1942, to launch an 'open rebellion' by resorting to mass civil disobe-
dience movement in pursuance of their objective of establishing Congress-
Hindu domination in India, v.'hich has resulted in lawlessness and 
287. D.C. Gupta, n. 121, p. 230. 
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considerable destruction of life and nroperty". The League charged 
tbat the Congress had launched the movement to force the Government 
to hand over oower to a Hindu oliqarc^ -'y and to "force the Mussalmans 
298 
to submit and surrender to the Conaress terms and dictation".Therefore, 
the League called upon the Muslims "to abstain from any participation 
in the movement initiated by the Congr'^ss and continue to pursue their 
299 
normal peaceful life". Jinnah "appealed to the Hindu public to "stop 
this internecine civil war before it v^ as too late". Jinnah declared m-e Qui  I dia Movement  "r ckles?: and th ughtl ss act" an  an attempt 
302 
to dominate the Congress over the Muslim League, 
Only Chiang Kai-shek sent a "columinous" protest against arrest 
of the Congress lea'-Iers to Roosevelt, who sent it to Churchill. The 
British Premier resented the "intervention" of the Chinese Premier and 
303 
advised him to "mind his o\'m. business". By the end of 1942, the Movement 
came to an end, 
COrCLUSICN 
The Muslim and Non-Musi ITI organizations stood poles apart and 
failed to settle their differences. Jinnah at the lahore Session, 1940, 
resolved for partition of India. The nationalist Muslims oprosed the 
resolution, while the Muslim League massively propagated the demand. 
The British of'^ 'icials focussed ui:;on the dangers and the consequences 
of the partition. Differences betv/een Gandhiji and Jinnah became quite 
unreconciliable. The former offered assistance in the War aims subject 
to immediate transfer of power to the Congress,while the latter offered 
assistance unconditionally and demanded transfer of power to Hindu 
India and Muslim India. Cripps Mission failed as it satisfied neither 
to the Congress nor to the M^uslim League. Quit India Movement failed 
297. For details see Appendix VIII; P "solut i on _o-^  _th'^_ _A1J_-India _Musllm 
league from April, ,1942^  "L9._^ /^_^ l^ '^ 'l^ S (publ fshed by ^Nawabzada) 
Liaquac Ali Khan CDelM r'Aff-Indfa'MUS] im league), pp. 9-15. 
298. Ibid. 
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303. D.C. Gupta, n.l2l, '^.231. 
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due to opposite or Tiainly of the Muslim League. The foreign and 
Indian statesmen and papers opposed the idea o^ partition, but tho 
'^ M5jli'^  I oaaur, '^onsrious of the orc)sof-^ cl.s of iL.i being conceded 
ultimately not only by the British but by the Congress leadership 
also - Gandhiji's personal objections notwithstanding - stuck to 
its demand of homeland for Muslims. 
CHAPTER V 
pErtAND FOR CREATION CF _PAKIST^I 
(1942-1944) 
Dur ing t h e c o u r s e of Qui t I n d i a movement/ J i n n a h p r o c l a i m e d a 
nev; s l o g a n f o r t h e Muslim League , " D i v i d e and Q u i t " . V i c e r o y Lord 
L i n l i t h g o w , v/ho was once on f r i e n d l y t e r m s w i t h t h e Congressmen, t u r n e d 
more c o o p e r a t i v e t o w a r d s t h e Muslim l e a a u e , v/hich h e l p e d J i n n a h i n 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e l e a g u e ' s p o s i t i o n . The V i c e r o y a d v i s e d S i k a n d a r Hyat 
Khan and F a z l - u l - H a q g o t t o •undermine J i n n a h ' s p o s i t i o n a s t h e l e a d e r 
of t h e Muslim League and made him a " C r e s c e n t Card t o n e u t r a l i s e t h e 
Congre s s c h a l l e n g e " . L i n l i t h g o w w r o t e t o Amery on O c t o b e r 12 , 1942: 
" I t was p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t n o t t o a n t a g o n i s e M r . J i n n a h 
a t a t i m e v/hen Muslim League v/ere i n f a c t x m o f f i c i a l l y 
c o o p e r a t i n g i n t h e war e f f o r t . . . Any r e c o n s t r u c t i o n would 
t e n d t o b r i n g Congres s i n t o po^.'er". 
Encouraged by t h e Government , J i n n a h r e v i t a l i z e d t h e Muslim League 
and c l a i m e d : 
"The Muslim I n d i a was n e v e r so w e l l o r g a n i s e d , n o r so 
a l i v e and p o l i t i c a l l y c o n s c i o u s as t o d a y . The League h a s 
e s t a b l i s h e d a f l a g and a p l a t f o r m d i s p l a y i n g and d e m o n s t r a -
t i n g t h e comple t e u n i t y of t h e e n t i r e body of t h e Muslims 
and has d e f i n e d i t s g o a l " . 
By 1941 , t h e t o t a l number of L e a a u e ' s membership r o s e i n Madras 
t o 1 , 1 2 , 9 7 8 , i n C e n t r a l P r o v i n c e s , t o 3 3 , 5 4 1 (1943)7 i n Benga l 5 , 5 0 , 0 0 0 
(1944) and i n S l n d 3 , 3 0 , 0 0 0 ( 1 9 4 4 ) . The League w i t h i t s d i v i s i o n s , 
s u b - d i v i s i o n s , c i t y b r a n c h e s and w a r d s , became a ' r e v o l u t i o n airy' and 
'mass movement ' , w i t h a v a s t a l l e g i a n c e of t h e Mus l ims . To e d u c a t e 
1 . M.V. P y l e e , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Deyelopment i n Ind ia . (New D e l h i : As ia 
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P o l i c i e s and P e r s p e c t i v e s , 1935-1947 (London: George A l l e n and 
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Muslim opinion in favour of the League, District and Provincial 
Conferences widely publicised its aims through newspapers and leaflets 
and the League leaders extensively toured the country. A separate 
department of information, publicity and propaganda was created to 
collect information about the existing newspapers in various languaaf^ s. 
Nev7S agencies v;ere classified as 'Sympathetic'/ 'Neutral' and ' Onnosi-
tion'. A number of propagandists, preachers and speakers were trained 
and audience were classified as 'educated', 'literate', 'urban', 'rural', 
'industrial', 'trade' and 'tribal* groups. The publicizers were grouped 
as 'organizers', 'workers', 'followers', 'inactive sympathizers', 
'neutrals', 'inactive oppositionists' and 'hostiles'. Paid propagandists 
were appointed and whole time v/orkers lived at party houses. A Committee 
of Writers produced Pakistan literature Series and Home Study Series, 
besides suitable literature on social, political, educational and other 
matters. Tracts and brochures were issued by the Central Office, reading 
rooms and libraries were set up and services of professional musicians 
were acquired for reciting the songs. The propaganda machinery was 
backed by the official press. The Muslims produced a few Urdu papers 
and Morning News and Star of India in English, from Calcutta. With the 
help of Isphani, a business magnate, Jinnah turned the Dawn Weekly(Delhi) 
into a daily to support the League's cause, 
Jinnah organized Muslim National Guards and provided them with 
iiniforms. The League's Secretary explained: "The uniform was intended 
to give them a xmiformity of dress and only the preliminaries of the 
military formation parade were sought to be taught to facilitate the 
regulation of their movements". The purpose of the Guards was "to create 
in 'them a soirit of service and sacrifice and to shape them into a 
disciplined body of enthusiastic selfless workers for the social,economic 
o 
and p o l i t i c a l u p l i f t of t h e masses . The D i s t r i c t Leagues had t o r e c r u i t 
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the Un ive r s i t y L ib ra ry , Hamdard L ibra ry , t h e Freedom Movement Archives, 
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young men and "to teach them a code of morals, to engage them in 
beneficial activities like the spread of literacy and keep them attached 
to the League by providing for them healthy sports and games ,.. The 
national guards on different occasions performed 'excellent services'...". 
After 1941, Jinnah started his 'Second Five Year Plan', which 
laid increased emphasis on the educational, social and economic uplift 
of the Muslims. The object of the Second Plan though covered 'Muslim 
India' in the British India, but actually all the efforts and resources 
vrere directed towards the proposed area of Pakistan/ which was mainly 
agricultural but industrially backward and wherein the Muslims lagged 
behind their sister community. Jinnah encouraged Muslim businessmen to 
establish heavy industries, v^ hich would open new vistas for workers and 
labourers-and new prospects of employment to educated youth. On July 4, 
1943/ Jinnah/ addressing the Baluchistan Muslim League Conference, said: 
"So long as a nation is weak economically/ it cannot hope to win the 
battle of lire". At the ML Karachi Session in December/ 1943, Jinnah 
appointed a Planning Committee consisting of technicians, economists, 
men of commerce and practical businessmen "to examine the condition of 
India, particularly of the 'Pakistan area', with a view to preparing the 
Muslim 'to participatfe in the national developments in the directions of 
commercial and agricultural expansion/ and industrialization, and be 
ready for a gigantic and co-ordinated drive in the field of economic 
• 13 
reconstruction, and in the post-war reconstruction". 
In 1943, Jinnah decided to establish a Federation of Muslim Chambers 
of Commerce, and Nurur Rehman, the Secretary of the Calcutta Muslim 
Chamber of Commerce/ was appointed its Organising Secretary, The Federa-
tion was established in 1944. The Federation held its first meeting on 
April 24/ 1945. Jinnah wrote to Isphani on May 6/ 1945: 
"I hope that you people realize the urgency and the importance 
of Muslim India making every effort to make up the leeway. '.'That 
vje want is selfless workers and deeds and not mere v/ords and 
thoughts and speeches". 
9. Ibid. 
10 . J a m i l - u d - D i n Ahmad ( e d . ) , n . 4 , V o l , 1/ p p . 2 4 9 - 5 3 . 
1 1 . I b i d . / V o l , 1 1 / p p , 7/ 17/ 2 8 - 2 9 . 
12 . I b i d . / V o l . 1/ p . 522 . 
1 3 . Z.H. Z a i d i / n . 4 , p . 270 . 
1 4 . I b i d . , D. 2 7 1 . 
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Jinnah encouraged the creation of the Muslim Commercial Bank, 
which was incorporated in Calcutta in July, 1947, with an authorized 
capital of three crores of rupees, and launched the Miihammadi Steamship 
Company with the help of the Habibs. In 1946, Jinnah, backing a project 
of Orient Ainvays owned and operated by Muslims, purchased shares for 
Rs. 25,000, while fixing the value of the share as low as Rs.5/- for 
15 
the poor Muslims. 
In 1944/ an Education Committee was appointed for the preservation, 
fostering and promotion of Islamic traditions, culture and ideals and 
general well-being of the Muslims. The Committee appointed various other 
sub-committees, the primary and secondary education committee, the 
Women's Education Committee, the Teachers' Training Committee, the 
higher education committee, and the science education committee. 
Jinnah took up the task of revitalisation and popularisation of 
the Muslim League after the 19 37 elections, with full determination to 
establish a Muslim Homeland. If Calcutta v;as a business centre in the 
east, Karachi was also a well-developed town in the west. Jinnah had in 
his mind that Pakistan would cover Bengal and Assam in the east and 
Baluchistan, Sind, NWFP and Punjab in the west. It is not understood as 
to why Jinnah emphasised establishment of industries in the West rather 
than in the East while the number of League members were also more in 
the East. If the western region was barren without any distinct commercial 
development, the neighbouring areas of Calcutta were yet in a very 
miserable condition and the economic condition of the Muslims v;as poorer 
than that of the Muslims in the west. The measures like Planning Committee 
Steamship Company and Airways benefitted the West utmost. Jinnah viewed 
the V7est as a very strategic region being nearer to the Muslim countries 
of Iran and Arabs. He had gone with his plan of Pakistan to such an 
extent that he did not agree to any proposal for achieving independence 
without partition of India. He wanted his own rule with his own history. 
Congress Policy Towards the League 
The League's constant demand for creation of Pakistan and growing 
gulf between the Congress and the league forced Gandhiji to change his 
15. Ibid. 
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policy towards the League. On June 15, 1940, he wrote; "There are only 
tv;o parties - the Conaress and those who side with the Congress, and 
1 6 
the parties who do not", to vrhich Jinnah had replied that the Muslim 
League was the third party. Gandhiji also wrote on the same date: "It 
is an illusion created by ourselves that we must come to an agreement 
17 
with all parties before v;e can make any progress". Soon after the 
departure of Cripps in April, 1942, Gandhiji realized that "attainment 
of independence is an impossibility till we have solved the Communal 
tangle" and concluded that the communal problem would not be solved 
lonless and until the British leave India, Therefore, he began to demand 
independence and transfer of power to the Congress, being a majority 
party, and afterwards the Congress would solve the communal problem, to 
which the League expressed its strong opposition - and this stalemate 
continued uiitil 1947. Gandhiji, however, laid down his policy on the 
19 
Indian \jnity without brooking over the idea of partitioning. He wrote: 
"If the vast majority of Muslims regard themselves as a 
separate nation having nothing in coijmion with the Hindus 
or others, no power on earth can compel them to think otherv^ ise. 
And if they want to partition India on that basis, they must 
have the partition, ijnless Hindus want to fight against 
such a division. So far as I can see, such a preparation is 
silently going on, on behalf of both parties. That way lies 
suicide", 
To maintain the Indian unity, A.K. Azad stated on August 2, 1942, 
that "he had no objection to British handing over power to the Muslim 
20 
League or any other party" as, he believed, no single party could function 
without the cooperation of other parties. He had not supported the 
League's demand in 1937. Gandhiji clarified it in his letter written 
21 to a Muslim businessman in Bombay a fev; hours before his arrest: 
16, Sir Reginald Coupland, Report on the Constitutional Problem in 
India (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1944), Indian Pontic's, 
Part II, 1936-1942, p, 242. 
17, Ibid. 
18, Harijan (Ahmedabad), April 18, 1942; see also Sir Reginald Coupland, 
n, 16, p. 298. 
!?• Harijan, Ibid. 
20. R.C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movem_ent _in India, Vol. I 
(Calcutta: Firma K.I, Mukhopadhyay, 1917), p,*695. 
21. Sir Reginald Coupland, n. 16, p, 299. 
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"Provided the Muslim League co-operated fully with the 
Congress demand for immeciiate indepen'^ ence without the 
slightest reservation/ subject of course to the proviso 
that independent India v;ill permit the operations of the 
Allied armies in orc^ er to check Axis aggression and thus 
help both China and Russia, the Congress will have no 
objection to the British Government transferring all the 
power it to-day exercises to he Muslim League on behalf of 
the whole of India. And the Congress will not only not 
obstruct any government that the Muslim League may form 
on behalf of the people, but will even join the Government 
in running the machinery of the Free State". 
A British politician has also quoted Mahatma Gandhi as telling 
him that if Britain did not wish to hand over India to the Congress it 
22 
could "hand it over to (Mohammed Ali) Jinnah and the Muslim League". 
But if the Government had really agreed and Gandhiji persuaded the 
Congressmen to serve xinder Jinnah/ it would have created a great mess. 
There was also the likelihood that Jinnah could form the Government on 
principles purely in the interest of the Muslims, then there would have 
been riots and Jinnah would have been forced to mend his ways. Neverthe-
less, there is no doubt that Gandhiji "wanted India to remain intact". 
Gandhiji is reported to have said: 
"We must quit India forthwith and not bother about what 
happened afterwards. If we did not want to give charge to 
the Congress, we must hand it over to Jinnah and the Muslim 
League. On no account was"" Britain to divide India, It must 
be handed over intact. If Britain had no thoughts of self-
interest, she should gain from India's freedom. Her trade 
with India would increase because there was so much goodwill 
towards her". 
Rajagopalachari, in the absence of the Congress leaders in jail, 
renewed his plea for acceptance of Pakistan but neither the press nor 
Jinnah nor Ambedkar supported him. The Hindu Mahasabha disapproved the 
idea of Rajagopalachari, Azad and Gandhiji, and opposed the scheme of 
Pakistan as strongly as possible. Savarkar, in the annual meeting of the 
Hindu Mahasabha held in December, 194 2, at Kannur, spoke in bitter and 
and provocative language: "The Moslems' duty was allegiance to the nation 
22. B.K. Tiv/ari (from London), 'Let Jinnah Govern an Undivided India', 
Indian Express (Nev/ Delhi), June li, 1985. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid. 
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Their rights and responsibilities were the same as those of other 
minorities/ and they would be similarly represented on a democratic 
basis at the Centre, But the 'outrageous and treacherous' demand for 
Pakistan would not be tolerated". The outburst of Hindu Mahasabha gave 
a clarion call to the Muslim League and they became more conscious of 
their position and demanded more strongly the creation of Pakistan. 
Civil Disobedience Movement 
Gandhiji believed in the peaceful demonstration through non-violent 
means and an harmless instrioment for pressurising the. British to come 
to terms, Woodrow Wyatt met Gandhiji and the members of the parliamentary 
delegation. He observed that Gandhiji vras not as rigid about non-violence 
as v/as conceived. Gandhiji once said to him that if it were god's will 
that there be a civil war, there would be one. -^^ att asked that if 
there will be a civil war, would he tel3 the Congress to adopt non-violence 
when the Muslims won't and, thus, "they will sweep through India with 
27 28 
fire and sword". Gandhiji said slov;Iy: 
"Yes, I would certainly tell the Congress to adopt non-violence. 
But I wouldn't ejcpect them to. VJhat I would expect them to do 
is to take one eye for one eye and one tooth for one tooth. Not 
like the British who take one hundred eyes for one eye and one 
hundred teeth for one tooth". 
In Bombay on August 8, 194 2, as the AICC, demanding immediate end 
of British rule, resolved to sanction "a mass struggle on nonviolent 
29 
lines on the widest possible scale' under Gandhiji's leadership and the 
Congress President proposed to address appeals to President Roosevelt, 
Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and Maisky, Russian Ambassador in Britain, the 
Government, in the morning of 9th of August, arrested Gandhiji and the 
members of the CWC and, gradually, all the important leaders in the country, 
The League utilising this vacuum, demanded in a resolution at Bombay on 
August 20, condemning the Congress Civil Disobedience movement, that the 
Government should immediately guarantee "to the Muslims the right of 
25. Sir Reginald Coupland, n. 16, p. 304. 
26. B.K, Tiwari, n. 22, 
27. Indian Express (New Delhi), June 11, 1985. 
28. Ibid. 
29. M.A.H. Ispahani, 'Factors leading to the Partition of British India', 
in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainv^right, n. 4, p. 342. 
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self-determination" and a pledge that"they will abide by the verdict 
of a plebiscite of Musalmans and give ef-Pect to the Pakistan scheme" . 
The Hindu Mahasabha also "formulated demands v;hich did not differ 
markedlv from those of the Conaress, excent that they were more militant 
31 
in tone and more openly antagoniatic to the Muslim League", The Hindu 
Mahasabha, however, set up a committee under Shyama Prasad Mookerjee 
"to make a final effort for an Indo-Brltish settlement on honourable 
32 
terms", but all talks between Mookerjee and Jinnah failed. Besides the 
Hindu Mahasabha, the Muslim leaders on the Congress side and some amongst 
the Muslim League also realised the necessity of an honourable settlement 
at any cost. They seriously began to'think that the dream of Pakistan 
would take shape causing perpetual drift and differences between the 
Congress and the League, the Hindustan and Pakistan, and the Hindus and 
the Muslims. One such leader anxious to bridge the gulf between the 
33 
two parties, was Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, v/ho had formulated a scheme to 
solve the communal problem. 
Distrust of Jinnah for Hindus 
Jinnah visited Kashmir in 1935 and exhorted the Muslim majority -
to carry the minorities along v/ith them, while Sheikh Abdullah, sided 
with the Congress and said good-by to communal oolitics. Ghulam Abbas, 
joined by Mirv.'aiz Yusuf Shah, revived the Muslim Conference and invited 
the well known Ittahad-ul-Mussalmeen leader of Hyderabad Bahadur Yar Jung 
to a session of the Conference in Srinagar, but when he was about to 
address, the session, he v;as asked to leave Srinagar within 24 hours. 
Sheikh Abdullah's statements against the leaguer created a wedge of 
misunderstanding betv.-een the National Conference and the League. Sheikh 
Abdullah along with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad met Jinnah in Delhi at his 
Aurangzeb Road residence, and said, that Jammu and Kashmir v/as a "Muslim 
majority area and our view could only be that of a majority. On the 
contrary, Mr. Jinnah was the leader of a minority in the country which 
had to seek some protection and guarantees ... I told Jinnah that he had 
30. V.P, Menon, The Transfer of Pov/er in India (Delhi: Orient Longmans, 
1957), p. 143. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid. 
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every riqht to plead on behalf of- the Muslims and to ask for safeguards". 
Sheikh Abdullah said that there vjore other factors like geographical 
contiguity, lerguage, culture etc. neccnsary for a separate State and 
"if religion v;ere the only factor for nationhood, India could then be 
35 
divided ^nd sub-r^ivided into several entities". Jinnah replied: 
"I am like your father and have grown old in politics. It 
is my experience that Flindus can not be relied upon. They 
can never be your -I^ riends. I^ or years I have tried to ov/n 
them but have not succeeded. A time v;il] come v/hen you will 
repent and appreciate my viewpoint". 
Jinnah also said: 
"Kow can you trust a people v.'ho refuse to take v7ater from 
your hand. There is no place for you in their society". 
Congress Politics to Throw the Ieaoue 
A.fter the arrest of Candhiji and other Congress leaders, there 
va? a great hue anr^ cry in the country that the Conoress "meant to be 
•Po.i r and honest ''^ 'th the Muslims" and wanted "to give them the type of 
independence they were seeking" and, therefore, it was the resnonsibi]ity 
of the Muslim league "to join hands vdth the Conaress to gain indenendence 
for the peoples of the sub-continenr". T^ he Muslim league at the Bombav, 
Auaust, 1942 session considered the serious situation. Ispahani and 
other League learners w r e convinced that the league "should not let slip 
the OTM-^ ort^ Jm" ty to achieve freedom from the British for both Hindus and 
38 
Muslims", T.'hich could be plainly considered also to be in the interest 
of the Lea^up. But they failed to anticipate the aftermath, '^-hen the 
Congress leaders would come out from jail and strugole for power and 
dominate being an majority. It ''^as Jinnah only who anticipated the 
Con.-ress designs and called the Muslims to avoid both the Congress and 
39 
British traps. The cause for Jinnah's view vrere the two articles - one 
^^ 'ritten by Gandhiji in the Harijan and the other a statement bv Nehru 
34. The Hindustan ^Times, Sunday Magazine (Ue^ ; Del'-d) , i'.ay 25, 1985, p.4 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
37. M.A.'^ -'. Ispahani, n. 29, p. 346. 
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which appeared in the Bombay Chronicle of August 23, 1942, which proved 
that "all the inspired talk which had filled the air with the blessings 
of the Congress leaders outside prison and influential big Hindu business-
men had no meaning and was a clever trao to throw the Muslim League 
off balance and to involve it in trouble similar to that of Congress, 
a ship that had lost its rudder and was cauqht in a storm in mid-ocean". 
The Congress, later, tried to entrap the League vath the formula of 
second-line leader, Rajaji, 
Sir Sikander Hyat* s Formula 
"His scheme provided that, in the absence of a 75 per cent majority 
of members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly in favour of either 
accession or non-access-on to the Indian Federation, the Muslim community 
should be given an opportunity of deciding on non-accession by means of 
a referendum; if they so deciried, the non-Muslim portions of the Punjab 
should, by a similar referendum, be accorded the right to cut themselves 
adrift from the province. If it actually came to the point where non-
Muslims decided to break adrift, it would mean (assuming the \jinit 
concerned to be a district) that the Ambala division and a large part of 
the Jullundur division, and also the Amritsar district, would cease to 
belong to the PunjaB". Thus, in either rase dismemberment of the Punjab 
was indispensable. The Viceroy, however, dissuaded Sikaner Hyat Khan 
43 
"from publishing or proceeding with his scheme". 
Sir Sikander had resigned from the Muslim League soon after the 
league conference on May 29, 194 2, and in spite of persuation and request 
made by Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman on behalf of Jinnah did not vrithdraw his 
resignation. Sir Sikander did not ]ike the idea of partition of Punjab 
but he was confident that the way the league was going on it would 
become inevitable. Khaliquzzaman and other members of the league v^ ere 
reluctant at the Lahore Resolution and wanted to get rid of it by 
accepting the Cripps proposal, but due to Jinnah's opposition to this 
approach, the Cripps proposal could not be accepted by the league, vhile 
the Congress had totally rejected it. 
40 . I b i d . , p . 347. 
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On the one hand. Jinn ah had chalked out a v;ell planned scheme 
for creation of Pakistan, and, on the other, he sought every opportunity 
to capture seats in Provincial Lea1sla+-ive Assemblies to make the 
Congress as much ineffective as possible and to mobilise the British 
favour towards the League's demand. In Assam, Sir Mohammad Saadullah 
had reconstituted a League Ministry suoported by the European members 
in December, 1941. In Bengal, Sir John Herbert, the Governor, caused 
44 the downfall of Fazl-ul-Kag's ministry and Nazim-ud-din, supported by 
the European members, formed the League ministry on April 24, 1943, In 
Sind, Sir Hugh Dow, Governor, forced Premier Umar Allah Baksh, v/ho was 
later murdered in May, 1943, to resign, and Sir Ghulam Hidayatullah formed 
the League ministry. In N^^P, Aurangzeb Khan, with the tacit approval 
of the Governor, Sir George Cunningham, formed the League ministry after 
May, 1943. In Punjab, there was the Government of the Unionist Party 
composed of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs \jnder the leadership of Sir Sikander 
Hyat Khan, v7ho oressed Jinn ah "to abandon the provocative catchword of 
46 Pakistan". After the death of Sir Sikandar in late December, 1942, Jinnah 
dominated the Pionjab politics because Sikander's successor, IChizar Hyat 
Khan could not check the increasing support of the Muslim members of 
the Indian Civil Service to the Muslim League. Thus, the death of Slkaner 
Hyat Khan and Umar Allah Baksh in quick succession left the field open 
for Jinnah in west'India. In the east, Fazl-ul-Haq, who was "fickle and 
changed sides easily", and fought against the growing intransigence of 
the Muslim intelligentsia, lost popularity and his support declined as 
a result the Governor removed him from office, after which his weakness 
became public and he could not come back to the political stage. The 
British suDoorted Jinnah and his prestige rapidly increased. The outright 
rejection of the August Offer and the Cripps proposal by the Congress 
were taken seriously by the Government but the league's rejection was 
44, Fazl-ul-Haq had broken away from the Muslim League and formed an 
alliance with the Krishak Praja Party (a section of the Congress) 
and the Hindu Mahasabha. 
45. Unionist Party v;as established by Sir Mian "^ azl-i-Husaln and 
Chaudhuru Chhotu Ram as a joint front against the Congress. 
46. Linlithgow Papers, Microfilm No. 128, No. 15, Extract from Quarterly 
Report (February 1, 1941 to April 30, 1941), prepared by the Office 
of Secretary to Governor-General, NAI. See also Bhim Sen Sachar, 
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47, Humayvm Kabir, Muslim Politics, 194 2-7', in C.H. Philips and 
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treated formal rather than substantial. The British authorities decided 
to curb the power and influence of the Congress at any cost and to 
encourage the League with a view to makinq it a rival of the Congress 
48 
on the all-India scene. Though the British authorities made no secret 
of their pro-League tendency, they could not help the league to substan-
tially improve its position due to political resurgence in the country. 
Firstly, the Congress leaders were in jail and, Jinnah, whose policy was 
mainly against the Congress, was fighting in the air and, thus, the 
League was loosing its impact. Secondly, with the passage of time, the 
Muslims, who once criticised the Congress policies, began to come into 
fold of the Congress remembering the progressive measures they had taken. 
Thirdly, life became more difficult than earlier due to imemployment 
and supply of goods from India to v/arring Allies; and fourthly, October 
cyclone and floods destroyed stocks on a large srale v/hich resulted in 
1943-44 famine claiming the lives of about two million people. All this 
happened during the course of the League's ministry. Obviously, the 
people hoped that it was the Government's responsibility to save the 
masses from such calamities, Jinnah's exhortations that it was owing to 
the Hindu machination did not carry much conviction as a result the 
League ministry in Bengal was thrown out in spite of having the Governor's 
support 
*:l. 
The question of division of Punjab had become a very burning 
question during the second half of 1942. Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth, 
Secretary, ,Hindu Mahasabha, met Khaliquzzaman in the early October,1942, 
and proposed to form a coalition when the Congress leaders were behind 
the bars, provided that Muslim League could agree on the partition of 
Punjab. The Raja said that he had met with Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan 
and he was agreed to leave the Ambala Division and if he (Khaliquzzaman) 
could agree to leave the Jullundur Division, there would be no problem 
to divide the country into India and Pakistan according to the Lahore 
Resolution. Khaliquzzaman replied that the Raja wanted to dismember the 
country. Khaliquzzaman wrote to Jinnah that the population of the Muslims 
in Pxmjab and Bengal v;as much more than the Hindus and there t-'as no fear 
from the general elections as the Muslims had very much emancipated 
during the last five years (1937-194 2). Khaliquzzaman pointed out that 
48, Ibid. 
49. Ibid./ p. 393. 
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in case of rormation of a Muslim ministry in Bengal, the League would 
have the benefit of having Calcutta and the coal and iron mines from 
Calcutta to Bihar, but in case of partition, at the most the Sylhet 
Division would be obtained, but Calcutta and the mines would go off 
their hands. And if Punjab would be divided, India would get a way to 
Kashmir. Thus, the bovindry, which was to be marked along the River Yamxma 
would shrink up to that of Lahore, Further, the Muslims and other 
minorities in U,P,, Bihar, C,P., Bombay and Madras, v/ould be like a bird 
in the net, which would be very disastrous for the Muslims of U,P, and 
Bihar, Therefore, Khaliquzzaman appealed to Jinnah not to accept a small 
Pakistan, which though he might get easily, but would sacrifice the life 
of crores of Muslims in India, 
At the League Working Committee in November 8, 1942, in Delhi, 
Khaliquzzaman voiced his views against the partition of Punjab. Meanwhile, 
Husain Imam spoke that if the Ambala Division would be separated from 
the proposed boundary of Pakistan, there v/ould be no harm. Khaliquzzaman* 
who had to accept the partition of Punjab and Bengal with a heavy heart, 
replied that on certain principles of partition, the Julliinder Division 
will also have to be separated there being non-Muslim majority. Jinnah 
said that he had "no idea of giving up of our claim" for the division 
Pxinjab. The Congress v/as declared unlawful and the Hindu Mahasabha was 
the only party with which the League could negotiate for any settlement. 
In December, 194 2, the Muslim League resolved that Muslims were 
entitled to homelands in North-West and North-East of India where they 
v/ere in majority, 
Gandhljl'a Fast 
The Government accused the Congressmen for being mad after power 
and held them responsible for violence and bloodshed as the Bombay AICC 
session had expressed doubt that Jinnah might form the Nationa,l Government, 
and that had much agitated the Hindus and the riots broke out,- Gandhijl, 
on September 23, 1942, wrote to the Viceroy refuting the charges. The 
Viceroy suppressed the letter and violence and agitation continued. 
Gandhiji resented and wanted to be alilov.'ed to clear his position or to 
be tried in a court of law, but the Government wanted to release Gandhiji 
50. Ch, Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore: Longmans Green & Co., 
Ltd,, 1961), p, 288. 
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only after he had withdrawn the Quit India Movement, Gandhiji replied: 
"My answer is that the Government goaded the people to 
the point of madness. They started leonine violence ,.. 
on a scale so gigantic that it displaces the Mosaic law 
of tooth for tooth by that of ten thousand for one ,.. 
If then I cannot get soothing balm for my pain, I must 
resort to the law prescribed for Satyagrahis, namely, a 
fast according to capacity". 
In jail Gandhiji had realised that the Civil Disobedience Movement 
was laxinched when time v;as not yet ripe and people were not properly 
trained, Gandhiji, in protest against the conduct of the Viceroy and 
also for self-purification sent notice to the Viceroy that he would 
begin his fast on February 9, continuing for 21 days, which actually 
started on February 10, 1943. The Government in New Delhi and London 
took it as a threat and pressure and an act to embarrass them in case 
of his death. Therefore, instead of persuading Gandhiji, the Government 
52 prepared for his cremation. After 9-10 days, his condition very much 
deteriorated. On February 19, a conference of about 150 leaders of all 
parties (except Congress and Muslim League) was held in Delhi. The 
conference urged the Viceroy to release Gandhiji immediately, but Churchill 
and Linlithgow remained unmoved, Rajagopalachari and others saw him in 
jail and succeeded in getting the fast ended on March 3, 1943. Gandhiji's 
21 day fast impressed the people about his "extraordinary strength and 
53 
supernatural powers". Hov/ever, Gandhiji still remained in jail and 
attitude of Gandhiji and the Government remained unchanged. The Congress 
leaders urged the Government to release Gandhiji and expressed hope that 
he would do his best to solve the "internal deadlock". The Viceroy 
pointed out that "the essential preliminary to such a government was 
that measu re of agreement between parties, communities and interests 
which he had been so anxious to foster, but to which the excessive 
claims and the totalitarian ambitions of the Congress and its leaders 
had been so consistent an obstacle". The Muslim League applauded the 
51. Correspondence with Mr. Gandhi, August, 1942 - April, 1944 (New 
Delhi: Government of India, 1944), pp. 7-9, 
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(Bombay; Orient Longmans, 1959), p, 91, 
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56 decision of the Viceroy. Rajagopalacbari remarked that the Viceroy's 
reply was "revealing the Versailles spirit wishing to humiliate the 
57 Congress and others and was influenced by passion and prejudice". 
During the period of war, the breach between the Congress and the 
Government was skillfully exploited by the shrewd politician, Jinnah, 
58 for "consolidation of the Muslim leage in the Muslim majority provinces", 
59 
which he practised since the very outbreak of the War. This assumption 
finds ground as Jinnah, in February, 1940, had asked Linlithgow for 
err) 
the Governor's support to teach "a salutary lesson to the Congress" by 
forming a League ministry in the NWFP, When the Congress ministry had 
resigned a few months earlier. 
The Muslim League at its annual session held in Delhi on April 24, 
1943/ claimed that all the Muslim majority provinces (Assam, Sind,Bengal 
and NWFP and Pvinjab), which the League claimed for Pakistan, were then 
under the control of the League ministries due to fal] of the Congress 
ministries and resignations tendered by three TDrominent Congressmen. 
Jinnah presented the demand for Pakistan in a forceful manner and in 
appreciable words, Pe reiterated his earlier contention that the Conaress 
had not changed its policy and its suggestions for settlement contained 
the same ideas with change of words v;hich meant to establish Congress 
rule, that is, Hindu Raj, which the League could never accept. He said 
that he would be happy if Gandhiji vould like settlement on the basis of 
creation of Pakistan, for which he v;as ready. He complained that Gandhi ji 
was writing letters to Lord V?avell but not to him directly, for which 
nobody was creating hindrence to him. Jinnah also said that there was 
no use of going to the Viceroy or sending deputation to him or writing 
to him. Jinnah saw no difference between political mentality of Gandhiji 
fi 1 fi 2 
and the Congress and t h e Hindu l e a d e r s h i p , J i nnah procla i raea: 
56 . I b i d . 
57 . I b i d . 
5 8 . Hugh Tinker , Experiment with Freedom: I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , 1947 
(London: Oxford Un ive r s i t y P re s s , 196777 p , 30, 
59 . B.R, Nanda, 'Nehru, the Indian Nat iona l Congress and t h e P a r t i t i o n 
of I n d i a , 1935-47 ' , in C.K. P h i l i p s and M.D. Wainx/right, n . 4 , p . l 7 3 . 
6 0 . V .P , Menon, n . 30, p . 7 8 . 
61. Ch, Khaliq-uz-Zaman, n, 50, p, 310. 
6 2, Matlubul Hasan, Saiyid, Mo^ a^mma^ ^ Ali Jinnah: A Political Study 
(Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1953, 1st edn./ 1945), p, 790. 
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"I say to the Hindus - and the Britishers "know it better 
than anybody else - that the quickest way for the freedom 
of the peoples/ both Hindus and Muslims, is Pakistan. It 
may come in my life-time or not, you vrill remember these 
words of mine. I say this v;ith no ill-wil] or offence. 
Some nations have killed millions of each. That is not 
permanent. An enemy of today is a friend of tomorrow. 
That is life. That is history". 
Jinnah further examined the various suggestions put forward by 
various organizations and Individuals, analysed their various imp] •'ca-
tions and concluded how tv^ ey failed to meet the Muslim demand.Referring 
to the Fhoenix-like rise and regeneration of Muslim India from the 
very ashes of its ruination after the destruction during the 18th and 
the 19th centuries, Jinnah said tha^ the rise of the Muslim League 
and demand for Pakistan amounted to a 'miracle'. 
The session regrette-^ the Government' s -Failure to guarantee 
Muslims' self-determination, vramed the Government that the imposition 
of any kind of federal constitution would be forcibly resisted, and 
exhorted Muslims"to face the effort and sacrifice required to reach the 
63 
cherished goal of Pakistan". On May 22, Sanru and a few Idberal leariers 
urgp-d the Viceroy to annoint an impartial tribunal to investigate into 
the charges levelled aqainst the Congress, but their appeal was rejected, 
On July 24, a non-Party conference appealed both to the government and 
Gandhiji to close the "present dismal chapter of strife and il]-feeling 
64„ in the country". 
In February and April, 1943, tTilliam Philips, Roosevelt's Personal 
Representative, v;as not allowed to see Gandhiji and the CWC members in 
j^il to break the impasse between the Congress and the qovemment. He 
v.'rote to Roosevelt that it might "affect our con-nict of the war in 
this part of the world, and our future relations with the coloured 
65 
races". In early May, Philips met Churchill in V7ashinqton; the lati-er, 
on the question of constitutional devejooment in India, became hot and 
blue and warned it "was only Britain's "biisiness" and no American 
"interference" would be tolerated". 
63. V.P. Menon, n. 30, p. 148. 
64. D.C. Gupta, n. 53, p. 235. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid. 
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War Situation , 
London was fully absomed in the Second VJorlci IJar. In late January, 
the Allies entered into "Tripoli (libya) . In May, the Axis Powers were 
driven out from Africa, On S^^ptember 3, Italy surrendered and Mussolini 
was dismissed from Premiership. In Russia, German troops were pushed 
back 400 miles v/estward from Stalingrad. In the Far East, by November, 
Nevj Guinea and Gilbert Islands were got vacated by the Japanese. There 
was no sian of end of the war. Rome anr" France vrere still under occupa-
tion of Germans and Hitler v;as still balking of world conquest, Japan 
still occunied a vast emrsire in Asia and the Pacific. 
Congress August, 1943 Proposal 
The political deadlock continued and Rajaji, to resolve it, 
,. -^--r - - .- - - - -_. - o opines 
68 
that Rajagopalachari's sugaestlon was worthy of consideration. The 
resolution passed in Bombay on August 8, 1943, as well as corresnondence 
between Azad, Nehru and Abdul Latif, shows thab the Congress and the 
AICC, whatever might be their attitude in the past, agreed to make the 
69 following concessions to the league: 
"(a) For the interim period, provided bhe British agree to the 
formation of a real National Government, the task for forming 
such a Government may be entrusted to Mr. Jinnah; 
(b) In regard to the permanent constitution, the Congress is prepared 
to accept the largest measure of autonomy being conceded to the 
federating units and residuary pov/ers vested in them. If,however, 
a territorial unit is not satisfied with the basic structure of 
the new constitution, and desires .secession, the federation 
v/ill not resort to coercion". 
The proposal did not satisfy the League. On February 10, 1944, 
70 71 
Philios v.'rote to Presi-ient Roosevelt in WasV>inaton: 
67. Correspondent in Delhi from 1935 of The Hindu and The Manchester 
Guardian. Brother of the late Sir Senegal Rau had close contacts 
with Indian nationalist leaders. 
68. B. Shiva Rao, 'India, 1935-47', in C.H. Philips and M.D.Wainwright, 
n. 4, p. 456. 
69. Ibid., p. 458. 
70. Vfilliam Philips \'as Roosevelb's Special envoy in succession to 
Johnson. 
71. E. Shiva Rao, n. 68, p. 458: 
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"The impression is widespread among Indians that the 
British Government is determined to preserve the status 
quo in spite of the promises given with regard to post-vrar 
indenendence and general assurances contained in the 
Atlantic Charter". 
Arrival of Field-Marshal Visco-mt _Sir Archibald ^^avell 
travel] ' s selerf'^n for the Vicerolity of India came as a surprise 
to Lord Linlithgow. Amery, in the House of Commons, annotmced that his 
appointment "does not imply any change in the settled policy to v^ hich 
his Majesty's Government v;ere pledged v/ith regard to the development 
of Indian self-govemmeni". On October 20, 1943, Lord Wavell took over 
charge of the Viceroyship of India from Lord linlithgow. Ifavell vas 
the C-in-C of India before his aooointment as Viceroy and had taken a 
orominent part in the negotiations between different parties and the 
Government during the Cripps I'lission in India. 
On August 2, 1943, linlithgow har' said that the Indian political 
parties v/ere responsible for the constitutional deadlock and advised: 
"If there is to be any progress, Indian publicmen should, without delay, 
start to get together and to clear the v/ay for it". He did not refer to 
Jinnah's allegation made four months earlier that the British "were not 
\irilling to part with pov/er" and Azad's statement that "the National 
Government be placed in the hands of the Muslim League, and the ConaresG 
v/ould extend full cooperation to such a govem-nent". lord Wavell was 
mindful that just after the Nar, the Indian people would demand transfer 
of power. This period was economically very disastrous and politically 
difficult. Before assuming charge. Lord V.'avell' s speeches revealed that 
he tjas keenly interested to resolve the Indian deadlock. 
Amerv's Policy Towards India 
Amery, the Secretary of State for India, ansv;ering to a question 
by Sorenson, a labour Member, on the floor of the House of Commons on 
October 28, 1943, said that the Connress had "orr^ barked upon a policy of 
72. V.P. Menon, n. 30, p. 153, 
73. D.C. Gupta, n. 53, n. 238. 
74. Ibid. 
75. Ibid. 
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irrpsnonsible sabotaqe of the vrar effort" and, hence, no negotiations 
76 
coiild be undertaken with the Congress leaders. Arnery also warned Wavell 
to be sufficiently careful in dealing v.'ith the Congress for constitu-
tional advancement and that he should not "go beyond the Cripps proposals 
77 during the war". With such instructions from home, Wavell was quite 
unable to rectify, as he stated, "mistakes" and "blunders" committed in 
the past. Therefore, he declared that Cripr^s offer still remained open, 
which neither satisfied the Congress, nor the League nor any non-party 
member and, consequently, the Dolitical deadlock continued to find roots 
in the commvmal differences. By that time, the League leaders had 
realized that they had committed a mistake by rejecting the Cripps 
proposal, but it is astonishing that Jinnah rejected the same proposal 
vrhen reiterated by Lord Wavell. Had the CripT>s proposal been accepted 
and the league agreeing to the Congres? August, 1943 resolution, had 
cooperated Xsath the Congress, it vas quite possible that the history of 
India might be different. But, during the year 1943, Jinnah's position 
had become very much consolidated and he was quite sure of getting a 
Muslim homeland under his ovm leadership. He sav; in the horizon the star 
of his fate making him the Father of the Nation of Pakistan, 
Reaction to Amerv's Policy 
lord Wavell anticipated that after the Allies victory in sight it 
would be difficult to deny or delay the transfer of power. Therefore, he 
hastened to prepare conditions for i t , but communal settlement between 
the Congress and the league seemed im-oos.sible. The AII^ Karachi session 
held on December 24-26, 1943, established an "Action Committee" and 
"Parliamentary Board". The Committee and the Board were to supervise the 
working of the League in the State Assemblies and "to organise the Muslims 
all over India to resist the imnosition of a unitary constitution and 
79 to prepare for the coming struggle for the achievement of Pakistan". On 
76, B, Pattabhi Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress 
(Delhi: S. rhand and Company, 196^), Vo''. II, n, 558. 
77, D.C. Gupta, n. 53, o. 239. 
78. See Ch. Khaliq-uz-Zaman, n, 50, p, 311. K>^cliq-u2-2aman had proposed 
for the formation of a 'Supervision Committee', but on the advice 
of Jinnah, the Cor^mittee o^ Acf'on and the Parliamentary Board were 
established. 
79. V,P. Menon, n. 30, p. 153. 
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the other hand, the Hindu Mahasabha in a meeting in Amritsar demanded 
"the preservation of the integrity of India, the introduction of 
federation with a strong Centre, and the refusal to any province, 
community, or section, of the right to secec'e". 
Vfavell's Declaration of United India 
On February 13, 1944, lord V7avell delivered his first important 
speech addressing the joint session of the Central Legislature. The 
important point in the speech was the emphasis on "united country enjoyinc 
complete and unqualified self-government as a willing partner of the 
British Commonwealth". Ke laid the responsibility of delaying the transfer 
of pover on the Indians for not agreeing as to "how the tv/o great 
communities and certain other im'Dort9nt minorities, as v^ ell as the Indi-in 
States, should live within that unit <3nd make the best use of its v/ealth 
8 2 
and oppor tun i t ies" . 
Jinnah c r i t i c i s i n g V?avell's emphasis on 'United India ' accused 
p T 
him of "fishing in Congress v;aters". Further, the Congress and the 
Liberals also condemned Wavell's refusal to release the Congress leaders. 
However, Sir TeJ Bahadur Sapru agreed that formation of a national 
government at the Centre v;ould need a v^ hole-hearted support of the 
84 political parties, which v/as not forthcoming. 
Release of Gandhiji 
Shortly before the death of Kasturba Gandhi on February 22, 1944, 
Gandhiji had written a letter to Lord Wavell refuting the charges against 
him. He wrote: 
"Promises for the future are valueless in the fact of the 
world struggle in which the fortune of all nations and 
therefore of the whole of humanity is involved. Present 
performance is the peremptory need of the moment if the 
war is to end in world peace ... Therefore a real war 
effort must mean satisfaction of India's r^ emand. "Quit India" 
only gives vidid expression to that demand, and has not 
the sinister and poisonous meaning attributed to it without 
warrant by the Government of India". 
80. 
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Lord Wavell replied expressing sympathy with Gandhiji and also 
enclosed a copy of his statement mar^ e in the central legislature, V^ avell 
complained that the Congress policy was "to hindering and not forv;arding 
India's progress to self-government and development" and hoped the 
Congress to abandon the policy of non-cooperation and join v;ith the 
other political parties and the British for economic and political 
progress of India "not by any dramatic or spectacular stroke, but by 
hard steady work towards the goal ahead" . Meanwhile, the Congress' and 
the League, being dissatisfied by the Viceroy's address, made a common 
cause in the Central Legislative Assembly and the Government was defeated 
•in a series of important divisions, in particular, the Finance Bill was 
thrown out. Further, the Liberal leaders continued their efforts to 
resolve the impasse. A Non-Party Conference held at Lucknow recognised 
the frustration caused by the "immobility of the Government" and authorise< 
Sapru to prepare a memorandum for submission to the Viceroy, The memoran-
dum pointed out that out of 18 advisers, only three were Indians and the 
Governors were acting in their discretion, and demanded the coalition 
ministries or ministries representing all the important elements in the 
legislature should be established in those provinces where Governor's 
autocratic rule is manifest. The Viceroy was of the view that though the 
British Government wanted India to i-^ rogress towards self-government, but 
he did not know as to hovr His Majesty's Government or the Governor-
General could help to produce a 'national cfovemment'. In his view, 
drastic constitutional change was impossible during v;artime and that a 
body should be formed to suggest a scheme for political settlement and 
the means of a changeover after the-v.'ar, to which Sapru agreed but said 
that such a body formed by the government v;ithout support or backing of 
political parties will have no effect on the people* s mind, Wavell agreed 
to Sapru's views but did not agree to setting up provincial executive 
councils with hostile legislatures. While these negotiations were afoot, 
the Congress was demanding in resolutions for the release of Gandhiji 
to help in arriving at a permanent settlement betv/een the Congress and 
the League. In the middle of April, 1944, Gandhiji suffered an attack 
of malaria and there v;ere apprehensions of his dudden collapse,Therefore, 
the Government found it a favourable time to release. Gandhiji for two 
88 purposes; firstly, to help in constitutional settlement, and secondly, 
86. Ibid. 
87. Ibid., p, 156. 
88. Ibid., p. 159. 
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for his recovery. Gandhiji, along v/ith a few CWC members, was released 
89 
on May 6, 1944, "solely on medical groxmas", and 'Quit India Movement' 
came to an end. 
Gandhiji's release had no effect on the war situation, because 
the German divisions were destroyed in the Ukraine (USSR) in the spring 
of 1944, and German resistance was cracking in Crimea. In the Indian 
Ocean, the Allies forces were advancing to reconquer Burma and the 
Japanese were starving in Assam. On the other fronts in Africa, the 
German forces were being defeateri. In this circumstance, when the British 
were foreseeing their victory, there '-'as no need of having any help 
through releasing Gandhiji, Hov^ever, it may be said that Great Britain 
released Gandhiji for maintaining internal peace in India and, if required, 
to have a favourable condition for recruiting more sepoys from India. 
The Congress and the Hindu Press had r^ a^lised that the Nazi and Fascist 
forces in the West and Japanese in the East woiild soon come to terms 
and were afraid of severe act "'on against them by the British as they 
had not cooperated with them in their war aims. Therefore, to minimize 
the severity of the impact of the Quit India Movement, which had caused 
riots and destruction they had begum to call it as a mere civil disobe-
dience movement. Such statements were given by many a prominent 
Congressmen, 
The release of Gandhiji cannot be looked at as a British plan 
to get assistance for winning the vrar. ITad it been so the British 
Government would have released all the Congress leaders from jail ensuring 
their favour for this aim. The Government did not release the Congress 
leaders and even did not allow Gandhiji to inteirview them in order to 
discuss a fresh approach. 
Gelder's Interview of Gandhiji 
90 A British journalist, Stewart Gelder, interviewed Gandhiji on 
July 9, and it was published without Gandhiji's permission. In the 
interview, Gandhiji had said that he had no intention to hinder the Allied 
war efforts and offer civil disobedience. He wanted "a national Government 
89, D.C. Gupta, n. 53, p. 242. 
90, Correspondent of the News Chronicle (London). 
91, The Times of India (New Delhi), July 11, 1944. 
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in full control of civil ar^ministration"/Viceroy and C-in-C to have 
complete control of military operations)^ and to "advise the Congress 
to participate in such a government if formed". He wished it to be 
composed of persons chosen by the elected members of the Cf^ntrnl Assembly, 
The ordinance rule would give place to normal administration in the 
presence of the Viceroy, who vrould be like the King of England, guided 
by responsible ministers, and popular government to be restored in all 
the provinces. He suggested that the Viceroy and the C-in-C would have 
complete control over the military operations, subject to advice and 
criticism from the national Government. Gandhiii aimed that the port-
folio of defence should remain jn the hand of the Indians, and had no 
objection to the Allied forces carrying on their operations on Indian 
soil, however, the expenses of the operations would be borne by Great 
Britain and not by India. The interview could serve one of the two 
purposes of Gandhiji, that is, either the Viceroy had to allow Gandhiji 
to see the Congress leaders in jail or he '"as to be granted interview 
'•'ith the Viceroy. 
The Viceroy replied that he would be glad to consider Gandhiji's 
93 
any constructive sugoestion. On July 27, 1944, Gandhiji wrote to Wavell: 
"I am prepared to advise the Working Committee to declare 
that ... mass civil disobedience envisaged by the resolu-
tion of August, 1942, cannot be offered and that full 
co-operation in war efforts should be given by the Congress 
if a declaration of immediate Indian independence is made 
and a national government responsible to the Central Assembly 
be formed s\abject to the proviso that during the pendency 
of the war, the military operations should continue as at 
present, but v/ithout involving any financial burden on India", 
On July 28, the House of Commons noticed that Gandhiji's demand 
for immediate independence did not ensure the safeguarding of the 
constitutional oosition for minority elements and that this demand was 
not different from those putforth two years ago by the Conqress President 
to Cripps in Anril, 1942, uDon which the negotiations betv/een the 
Congress and the Government had ceased. The Viceroy also made it clear 
that the "British of-^ er to_ India of unqualified freedom after the war 
92. V.P, Menon, n. 30, p, 160. 
93. D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma, Vol. Six (Delhi: The Publication Division, 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 
June, 1962), D, 263. See also V.P, Menon, n.30, pn. 166-67. 
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"had been made conditional upon the framing of a constitution agreed 
04 
to by the main elements of India's national life" and the "object of 
these conditions was to ensure the fulfilment of their duty to safe-
guard the interests of the racial and religious minorities and of the 
95 Depressed Classes, and their treaty obligations to the Indian States". 
He also said that the constitution could not be altered durina the 
period of the v;ar an<^ if the "leaders of the Hindus, the Muslims, and 
the important minorities were willing to co-operate in a transitional 
government established and v/orking within the present constitution, I 
96 believe good progress might be made". The Viceroy opined this although 
he knew that it was not possible. He laid do\'m the following measures 
97 
for transfer of power: 
"For such a transitional aovemment to succeed, there 
must, before it is formed, be agreement in principle 
between Hindus and Muslims and all imnortant elements 
as to the method by which the new constitution should 
be framed. This agreement is a matter for Indians them-
selves. Until Indian leaders have come closer together 
than they are now, I doubt if myself can do anything 
to help. Let me remind you too that +-he minority problems 
are not easy. They are real and can be solved only by 
mutual compromise and toleran'^e", 
V7avell announcement, undoubtedly, was a clear plan for prolonging 
the British rule in India or, at least, until the war ^^ a^s over, as the 
communal tangle was not likely to be solved in near future. Gandhiji 
characterised the Viceroy as a conjurer and concluded:' "It is as clear 
as crustal that the British Government do not propose to give up the 
power they possess over the 400 millions, unless the latter-"develop 
strenath enough to wrest it for them, I shall never lose hope that India 
98 
will do so by purely moral means". Thus, the negotiations between 
GandMji and Wavell closed and tho former, after rebuff from the Govern-
ment, helplessly turned towards Jinnah ^or a comrrunal settlement and 
the latter av/aited the outcome of their talks. 
94. V,P, Menon, n, 30, p, 161. 
95. Sir Francis Low (ed.). The Indian Year-Book, 1947 (Bombay: Bennett, 
Coleman ^ Co. Ltd.\ ryp, 879-80. 
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98. D.G. Tendulkar, n. 93, p, 265. 
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Rajagopalachari's Formula 
Rajaji/ who openly proc]aimed for acrentance of Pakistan,believed 
that only through Congress-league unity, in^O'-endence could be achieved 
and peace could be maintained in future. Vith this view, Rajaji put 
forv/ard a set of proposals, which he had discussed with Gandhiji in 
t9 100 
3, and even before in jail in February, and the latter had 
expressed his full approval of tnem.. In vie^' of Government' s refusal to 
relax any restrictions or to discuss or negotiate terms of any settlement 
with the Congress, Rajaji wrote to Jinnah on April 8, 1944, enclosing 
the draft formula on behalf of Gandhiji hoping that it would bring about 
a final settlement of the impasse. The nrooosals were publicised on 
July 10, 1944, Gandhiji on September 24, 1944, stated: "When he presented 
the formula^at the Aga Khan Palace, I rid not take even five minutes 
102 
and said 'Yes' because I see in it concrete shape". 
The formula embodied the follov/ing six clauses, which formed the 
basis for terms of settlement betv/een the Indian National Congress and 
the All-India Muslim League, to which Gandhiji agreed and M.A, Jinnah 
was requested to agree: 
"(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution 
for free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand 
for independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the 
formation of a provisional interim Government for the transitional 
period. 
(2) After the termination of the v.'ar, a commission shall be appointed 
for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east 
of India, v/herein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. 
In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants, 
held on the basis of adult franchise or other practicable franchise, 
shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan, 
If the majority decides in favour of the formation of a sovereign 
SState separate from Hindustan, such decisions shall be given 
effect to, without prejudice to the right O-F the districts on the 
border to choose to ioin either State. 
99. AICC File 6/1947, NMML. See also I.A. Sher'/'/ani, Pakistan Resolution 
to Pakistan,1940-1947(Delhi! Daya Publishing House, 1985), p. 44. 
100. Bombay Chronicle (Bombay),October 31, 1942, Home Poll. File No.3/21/42, 
containing clipping of the paper, MAi, 
101. B.N, Pandey, The Indian M-'-tional Movement, 1885-1947: Select Documents 
(Delhi etc.: Macml11 an, 1979), p. 144. 
102. Sandhya Chaudhri, Gandhi and the Partition of India (New Delbij 
Sterling Publishers Pvt.Ltd., 1984), p. 51. 
103. Gandhi-Jinnah Talks (New Delhi:The Hindustan Times, 1944), p. 36; 
see also N.N. Mitra (ed.). The Indian Annual Register (Calcutta: 
Annual Register Office,1930~1947),1944,Vol.II,np. 129-30; see also 
Sir Francis Low (ed.), n. 95, np. 871-72. 
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(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of 
viev before the plebiscite is helc!. 
(4) In the event of separation, a mutual aqreement shall be 
entered into -Por safequardina de-^ence, commerce and communica-
tions and other essential nuToses. 
(5) Any trans-Fer of population shall only be an absolutely voluntary 
basis. 
(6) These terms shal] be binding only in case of transfer by Britain 
of full power and responsibility for the governance of India". 
As the proposal contained recognition of principles of partition 
of the country and, indirectly, creation of Pakistan, Jinnah took 
interest and observed that Gandhiji at last accepted the principle of 
Pakistan and only how and when this should be carried out remained to 
104 be settled. He said also that the words "endorses the Indian demand 
for independence" (clause 1) implied that the Muslim league was ao.= inst 
independence and in this sense was a causo of insinuation to the Muslim 
lO*^  
league. Further, it gave the Congress a suoerior position and made the 
league a subordinate body. He raised the r^ uest-'on as to •"ho would appoint 
the commission (clause 2) , what \\fould be its personnel and pov/er and 
v.'ho would enforce its findings.-' !'e rJdi.culed the "contiguous districts" 
while the Lahore session had recommended "aeoqraphical contiguous units" 
where the Muslims v/ere in majority. Jinnah also questioned as to who 
would safeguard the defence, rommerce -{nd communication In case of 
seoaration as there was no indication of the form, character and personnel 
107 
of the provisional Government. The most objectionable v/as clause 6,which, 
according to Jinnah, meant that all steps for partition would remain on 
paper pending transfer of pov/er to the Congress by the British Government. 
Further, independence to British India v;as also objected to by him and 
many League leaders as they held that independence for them meant libera-
tion not only from foreign voice but also from Hindu Raj. Therefore, 
Jinnah rejected the Rajagopalachari's -Pormula saying "it offered a 
shadov; and a husk, a maimed, mutilated an^ moth eaten Pakistan that 
toroedoed the Muslim leaque Resolxation of 1940". 
104. Ba\-m (Delhi), July 31, 1944. 
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Rajaji, being pertumed having no response from Jinnah, wrote 
a letter follov/ed by a telegram on June 30, 1944, asking whether the 
proposal had been accepted or rejr>c'-ed by the leaaue. Jinnah did not 
consider Rajaji as a resnonsible renresentrtive canable o-F carrying out 
its acceptance by the Congress. Hence, ear]1er he did not renly and 
icmored it, but on receipt o^ ^ the telegram, he replied on July 2, 1944, 
expressing surprise as to why Rajaji had presumed that the proposal had 
been rejected and that ^e v/ould '-•lace the formula before the leaau'^, if 
it vas offered by Gandhiji. Rajaji had earlier written and wrote again 
that it was conceded by Gandhiji and if he (Jinnah) could not approve 
of it/ there was no sense in placing it before the league Working Committee, 
As Jinnah did not reply to it, Rajaji telegraphed him that the negotia-
tions should be treated as closed end that he would release the correspon-
dence. The release O'P the correspondence exchanged between Rajaji and 
Jinnah, though caused a great sensation and evoked very strona reaction 
from the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs, and the Liberals, including 
V.S, Srinivasa Sastri, but it could not affect Jinnah's mind. 
The MI Working Committee met at Iahore on July 29, 1944, to consider 
the offer of Rajaji-Gandhi formula. On July 30, Jinnah delivered a long 
historic speech at the meetina of the League Council. He discussed the 
formula clause by clause. His main observption was that neither Gandhiji 
nor Rajaji was authorised by the Congress to rommence the negotiations 
on the formula with him. He said that the lehore Resolution did not 
mention plebiscite of any type an^ ,^ hence, declared the idea of a district-
wise plebiscite as simply absurd. He s^ iid that the formula "was not 
conceived to lead to fruitful results, or a solution or settlement of the 
problem pertaining to the destiny of a nation of 100 millions of Muslims 
110 
and their posterity". Evidently, Jinnah did not conceive Pakistan only 
in the east and the ^est for the Muslims there, but he talked about the 
problems of the Muslims living throuahout the length and breadth of Indi^. 
Jinnah maintained this contention until partition and left the Muslims 
of other parts of India to -Fiqht for their riqht and sa-^ ety themselves 
after the creation of Pakistan. 
Jinnah criticised the hasty release of the proposals, vrhich, in 
his opinion, was deliberately done to out him down in the eyes of the 
110. Dr. J.J. Pal, Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan (Delhi: Sidhuram 
Publications, 1983), p.' 87. 
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public in India and abroad. He did not find any harm if Gandhiji had 
communicated the proposals to him so that he could have placed the 
same before the ML Working Committee. As Gandhiji and Rajagopalachari 
had not consulted Jinnah regarding the proposals, he "interpreted them 
as pure and simple dictation without a .sincere desire to negoti 
He asked whether Gandhiji was associating with the Droposals as a 
dictator of the Concress or in his pergonal capacity. The whole argument 
of Jinnah was in the finest tradition of a brilliant lawyer who was 
the least concerned about the secular concept of an Indian nation and 
was keen to use it to further the basic goal of achieving Pakistan as 
a pre-condition of Indian independence. 
If we take a close viev/ on the proposal, we find: firstly, that 
the plebiscite was to be held after the power was transferred to the 
Congress majority government in the Centre and the leaaue being in 
minority would have been powerless. Therefore, in the elections or 
referendum there v/as every likelihood that the Congress might use undue 
influence and power as had been experienced during the Congress ministries 
earlier. Secondly, we find that League' s r^ osition vras becoming weak due 
to internal differences with Fazlul Haq and Khizar Hyat Khan, as a 
result of which Jinnah's prestige was suffering a set-back and the 
league v/as loosing ground. But when Rajagopalachari sent the proposal, 
Jinnah, a clever lawyer, found therein a way to rise on the political 
horizon as the sole and single guiding torch of the Muslim League. 
Representing himself as the only bene-^ act-or of the Muslims, raised many 
questions to publicise his popularity and the important role of the 
League being played for the cause of the Muslims. The League made it a 
point for rejoicing throughout the country that the Congress Patriarch 
after all inclined to concede its demand. Thirdly, the League began to 
warn the Muslims that they should strengthen their unity as the Congress 
was layino trap after trap for them. Such type of proclamations made the 
position of Jinnah very strong. 
Critical Analysis 
Abdul Halim Ghaznavi, MIA (Central) and President, National 
Mohammadan Association, said that the proposals were the shrewdest stroke 
ill,. Dawn (Delhi), July 31, 1944. 
112. Ibid. 
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of policy/ differed from the League's demand and aimed to destroy the 
113 League's scheme. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad opined that the motive of the 
formula was to put Jinnah and the Mussalmans of India in the wrong and 
114 bypass the League's demand for Pakistan. Roshan Jaman Khan, President, 
District Muslim League, Gonda, said that the formula meant enslavement 
115 
of Muslims through their cooperation with the Congress. The Dawn charac-
terized the formula a "Booby trap" to force the League to accept what 
the Congress offered after the British had been eliminated from the 
scene. The paper observed that like the Cripps' proposals, the formula 
a]so did not accept the principle of self-determination demanded by 
the Muslim League, Cripps "proposed ^ plebiscite province to province" 
and the formula suggested "plebiscite district by district". 
The Spectator commented that Jinnah "did not find it attractive 
as the whole formula "rests on the air as it talks of indeoendence during 
117 
war which will not be granted by the British". Moonje, Jayakar and 
George S, Arundala opposed the formula as it surrendered to the League's 
claim of vivisection of India. Sir Chiman Lai Stalved, N,N, Sarkar, 
Sir P,S, Sivaswami, Sastry, Sir Homi Mehta and Sir Sultan Chenoy proclaimed 
that the division of India into two sovereign states without a Central 
control of subjects of vital issues and having separate armed forces 
was "fraught with dire consequences for the future and will imperil the 
very independence of the country ... Such partition will, instead of 
solving the problem of minorities, accentuate it and will not be in the 
118 interest of Muslims themselves. The Sikhs, on August 20, 1944, opposed 
the formula because the Sikhs were to be divided into two sections to 
be held in perpetual bondage, and as Master Tara Singh said the divisions 
v/ould put 17 districts in Pakistan and 12 districts in Hindustan. The 
Tribune wrote that Jinnah had been treading the path leading "not to 
the heaven of peace and orosperity but to the jungles of civil strife 
120 
and rancour". Lord Wavell onined that the "Formula is a try out" and 
113. Dawn (Delhi), August 1, 1944; also see of July 12 and 13, 1944. 
114. Ibid., July 13, 1944. 
115. Ibid., July 23, 1944. 
116. Ibid., July 12 and 30, 1944. 
117. Spectator (london), July 13, 1944. 
118. Virendra, Pakistan : A Myth or a Reality (Lahore: Minerva Book Shop, 
1946), pp. 109-10. 
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Gandhiji aimed to "assess the strenath of the Hindu feelings against 
121 
Pakistan". Anery viex^ ;ed the formula conditional to transfer of power 
by the British and partial because it '^ id not include the whole of 
122 
Punjab, Bengal and Assam, and believed that Gandhiii meant humiliation 
of Jlnnah and his removal from all-India politics. However, the formula 
formed the basis for Gandhi-Jinnah talks. 
Gandhi-Jlnnah Talks 
Gandhiji saw in the League's demand for Pakistan increasing pace 
of communal strife and, hence, desired on May 4, 1943, to have a face-
to face talk with Jinnan. He imm^ d^iately blessed the Rajagopalachari's 
formula with an aim to take the v;ind out of the League* s sails as he 
believed that Jinnah's demand for sGr>aratlon ^'QS merely a slogan. But 
he was disappointed by Jinnah's two-nation theory. Gandhijl did not 
agree to the creation of a Central Government, but he desired a Board 
of Representatives of both the States to solve the matters of common 
concern. According to Pyarelal this was not only to form part of the 
federal constitution but was to be brought into being by a treaty between 
the two states. 
The ideological background and distrust between Gandhiji and Jinnah 
stood in the way of commencement of their talks. Unfortunately, the 
Congress and the League could not create a congenial atmosphere and 
sincere desire for 'give and take'. According to the Congress viewpoint, 
Rajaji's formula t>'as to be implemented after transfer of power while the 
League wanted the settleirent under the aegis of the British so that the 
Muslims might not be left at the mercy of the Hindus, v7ho could forget 
all' the commitments and agreements. This was the main difference which 
remained and Gandhi-Jinnah talks could not solve this issue. 
121. Nicholas Mansergh (Editor-in-Chief) and E.V7.R. Lumby (ed.). 
Constitutional Relations Between Britain anc^  India : The Transfer 
of Power (11 Vols.), Vol. IV; The Bengal Famine and the" New 
Viceroyalty, 15 June - 31 August, 1944 Tlondon: Her Majesty's 
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As Gandhiji failed to reconcile with the Viceroy, he had written 
from Panchgani to Jinnah at Srinagar on July U, 1944, expressing desire 
to meet him for talks on the question of Pakistan. He wrote: "Do not 
regard me as an enemy of Islam or of Indian Muslims. I have always been 
a servant and friend to you and to mankind. Do not disappoint me". Jinnah 
replied that he would be glad to receive him at his house in Bombay. 
The MI Working Committee met in Lahore on July 30, and fully authorised 
Jinnah to negotiate with Gandhiji. Jinnah having the pleasure of Gandhiji' 
acceptance of the principle of partition, dismissed Rajagopalachari's 
formula, as offering "a shadov; and a husk, a maimed, mutilated and moth-
eaten Pakistan". 
125 
Gandhiji and Jinnah met almost daily from September 9 to 27, 1944, 
and had 14 sittings and initiated their talks on the basis of Rajagopala-
chari' s formula. On September 10, Jinnah wrote that he was doubtful aboi t 
the representative character of Gandhiji, which was very shocking to 
the Congressmen as such objection was not raised even by the British 
Government, and v/hich conduct was contrary to the content of the telegram 
to Rajaji, in which Jinnah had said that if Gandhiji would send his 
126 proposal directly to him, he would place it before the ML Working Commit te$ 
Gandhiji assured that he would be able to get his agreement with him, 
if any, ratified by the AICC. Gandhiji laid down on September 11, the 
127 
following conditions, to which the League was required to agree before 
taking up the question of Pakistan: 
"(1) The immediate grant of independence to India as one single unit; 
(2) The immediate formation of a provisional interim government 
responsible to the existing central assembly or a newly elected 
one (naturally with a'75 per cent Hindu majority); 
(3) The provisional government to frame the constitution of India or 
to set up an authority to frame the constitution after withdrawal 
of British power; 
124. V.P. Menon, n. 30, p. 16 3. 
125. Jinnah wrote that August 19 would be a suitable date for their 
meeting, but he fell ill. The matter was promptly conveyed to 
Sevagram and later September 9, v/as fixed for the first meeting. 
The matter of discussion v^ as brought in writing for clarification 
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(4) This government to draft the treaty and agreements as regards 
administration of matters of common concern such as foreign 
affairs, defence, communications, customs, commerce and the 
like which would be matters for efficient and satisfactory 
administration under a central authority; 
(5) the provisional government to set up a commission to demarcate 
continuous districts having an absolute Muslim majority.After 
all these conditions had been complied with, the demarcated 
areas would be permitted to decide through a plebiscite of 
all their inhabitants whether they wished to form a separate 
state. But in any case all matters of vital importance were 
to be administered by a central authority vrith a Hindu majority. 
Gandhiji called this scheme a partition or division between 
brothers, but Jinnah, who demanded sovereign Pakistan, declared; "This 
is not independence. It is a form of provincial autonomy subject always 
in the most vital matters to an overwhe]mingly Hindu federal authority". 
Rajaji's formula also came \ander discussion. Clause 6 was not 
acceptable to Jinnah, as according to it the power was to be transferred 
to a Hindu Raj and the coming into existence of Pakistan had to depend 
on the mercy of Hindustan, Jinnah said that Rajaji had presented the 
Lahore resolution in the formula in a distorted way. Gandhiji said that 
he had given it a shape and life. The discussion continued up to 
September IS. Later, Gandhiji raised the question of Jinnah's two-nation 
theory and said that there was no indication of it in the Lahore resolu-
tion. Therefore, Gandhiji abandon the Rajaji formula and to find a 
solution in the light of the Lahore Resolution put forvrard his own 
formula. 
Gandhiji's Proposals 
On September 24, 1944, Gandhi ji v/rote to Jinna' ^2^:-
"Differing from you on the general basis, I can yet recommend to 
the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation 
contained in the Muslim League Resolution of Lahore, 1940, on my basis 
and on the following terms:-
128. Jinnah-Gandhi Talks (Central Offic=> of the All-India Mus] im 
league, 1944)', D, 76. 
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"(a) The areas should be demarcated by a commission approved 
by the Congress and the League. The v'ishes of the inhabitants 
of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the 
votes of the adult population of the areas or through some 
eouivalent method, 
(b) If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed 
that these areas shall form a separate State as soon as 
possible after India is free from foreign domination and can, 
therefore, be constituted into tvro sovereign independent' States, 
(c) There shall be a Treaty of Separation which should also provide 
for the efficient and satisfactory administration of Foreign 
Affairs, Defence, Internal Communications, Customs, Commerce 
and the like, which must necessarily continue to be matters 
of common interest between the contracting parties, 
(d) The Treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights 
of minorities in the two States". 
Jinnah rejected Gandhiji's proposal on September 25, as being 
'fundamentally opposed to the Lahore Resolution'. Jinnah said: 
"It is impossible to maintain that either of them satisfies 
any of the essentials embodied in the Lahore Resolution ... 
These terms are. a veritable trap and a slough of death", 
Gandhiji requested Jinnah to refer the matter to the League's 
Council instead of rejecting it at his own and to allow him to address 
the League's Co'ancil, but Jinnah did not agree as some prominent leaders 
were opposed to the move of Pakistan and wanted a settlement with the 
Congress, Jinnah insisted for acceptance by the Congress of the following 
principles: 
(1) The Muslims should be recognised as a nation with an inherent 
right of self-determination; 
(2) Pakistan should comprise six provinces,that is, Sindh, Baluchistan, 
the NWFP, Punjab, Bengal and Assam, subject only to minor 
territorial adjustments; 
(3) Important matters like foreign affairs, defence, internal 
communications, customs and commerce should not be delegated 
to the Central Government. 
Jinnah's first demand could not be conceded by the Congress /because 
it ran counter to its creed, could give Pakistan a right to interfere 
130. Dawn (Delhi), October 5, 1944. 
131, M. Gwyer and A, Appadorai, n, 128, Vol, II, pp. 550-51. 
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in the a f fa i r s of India, could londennine the basis of I n d i a ' s existence 
and could encourage the other groups and communities to emulate the 
Muslim League. 
The second demand v;as unjust if ied and the Congress was determined 
tha t i f Jinnah wi l l have Pakistan i t should not include those d i s t r i c t s 
of Assam and Bengal and of Punjab which were predominantly non-Muslim. 
Jinnah*s demand for inclusion of Punjab, Bengal and Assam in the 
boundaries of Pakistan v^ as quite unjus t i f ied , because the Muslim majority 
in Pxinjab and Bengal was marginal and in Assam' i t was non-exis tent . 
"Jinnah did not see why non-Muslim populations in these provinces should 
have a voice in determining the i r own fate? i f there was t o be a 
132 
plebiscite or referendirn/ it vras to be confined to Muslims". 
As the Lahore Resolution o^ the Muslim League had admitted the 
necessity of "territorial readjustments" and the non-Muslim majority 
districts of Assam, Bengal and Punjab had strong feeling against their 
inclusion within Pakistan, the Congress was in a bargaining position 
vis-a-vis the Muslim League, After the breakdown of the talks with Jinnah, 
whom Gandhiji had started addressing as 'Qaid-e-Azam' (the great leader), 
Ganahlji procIaiii« 133 id: 
"Where there is an obvious Muslim majority they should 
have the fullest right to constitute themselves into a 
separate state. But if it means utterly independent 
sovereignty, so that there is nothing common between the 
two, I hold it to be an impossible proposition. Then it 
means a fight to the knife". 
Gandhiji's threat to use knife against the Muslims had a very 
dangerous repercussion on the Hindu masses and they rose against the 
Muslims and riots broke out while the country was already in flame. On 
the other hand, the British Government only enjoyed the scene and were 
delighted in seeing the two major communities destroying each other 
and blaming the other for the killing. 
With regard to the third demand o^ Jinnah - the total separation 
of Pakistan from the rest of India and the elimination of a common centre 
in any form, the Congress had gone a long way in opposing it. As Jinnah 
132. B.R. Nanda, n, 59, p, 174. 
133, Jinnah-Gandhi Talks, n. 128, p. 61, 
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pressed the Congress to first accept complete partition and then to make 
agreements on Foreign Affairs etc., the Congress leaders felt no need 
to malce further material concession in order to meet Jinnah' s third 
demand. The Congress cherished the dream of a united India since its 
very existence, and its acceptance of the partition was the destruction 
of its dreams and the failure of its struggle. However/ there was a 
134 
imiversal desire outside the league circle for the unity of Inaia. Thus, 
if the partition of India was repugnant to the Hindus as they worshipped 
the map of India, it was also repugnant to those Muslims who did not 
like the vivisection of their community. Further, the League' s demand 
for Pakistan had encouraged the forces of communal, cultural, linguistic 
and political separatism for there was also demand of separate homeland 
for the Sikhs (Khalistan) and Dravidians (Dravicistan) and creation of 
linguistic provinces, such as, Andhra and Maharashtra, and even the 
Princes were dreaming of independence. The Congress saw that the establish-
ment of Pakistan would cause disintegration of India. 
Further, notwithstanding the Lahore resolution, v/hich envisaged 
tvjo independent sovereign states with no connexion between them, except 
probably by treaty, Jinnah demanded only one Pakistan with two wings and 
he did not agree to the plebiscite and demanded self-determination as a 
nation the league being the only authority representing the Muslims and 
the Muslim nation. Gandhiji's argument that India was a big family and it 
was better if the Hindus and the Muslims of the north-west and the east 
could settle their problem amicably was instantly objected to by Jinnah, 
who replied: 
"It seems to me that you are labouring under some misconcep-
tion of the real meaning of the word, "Self-determination", 
Apart from the inconsistencies and contradictions of the 
various positions that you have adopted in the course of our 
correspondence/ as indicated above, can you not appreciate 
our point of view that we claim the right of self-determina-
tion as a nation and not as a territorial unit, and that we 
are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim 
nation, which is our birth-rightv Whereas you are labouring 
134. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, n, 128, p. 577. 
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under the v\rrong iriea that "Sel"^-determination" means only 
that of "a territorial unit", v^ bich, by the way, is neither 
demarcated nor defined yet, and there is no union or 
federal constitution of India in beinq, functioning as a 
sovereign Central government. Our is a case of division 
and carving out two independent sovereign States by way 
of settlement between tv;o major nations, Hindus and Muslims, 
and not of severance or secession from any existing union, 
which is non est in India, The right of self-determination, 
v^ hich we claim, postulates that we are a nation, and as 
such it would be self-determination of the Muslims, and 
they alone are entitled to exercise that right", 
Gandhiji stated that all the talks and correspondence seemed "to 
run in parallel lines and never touch one another". He said: "The 
136 breakdovm is only so called. It is an adiournmcnt sine dxe". Jinnah said: 
—T" 
"We trust that this is not the final end of our effort 
il". 
Gandhi ji v/rote to Jinnah on September 26, 1944: 
"I cannot accept the Lahore Resolution as you want me to, 
especially when it seeks to introduce in its interpreta-
tion theories and claims which I cannot hope to induce 
India to accept". 
In the meanwhile, Jinnah's attitude hardened because he had received 
message from Feroz Khan Noon that Amery was thinking to grant 4 0 per cent 
representation each to the Hindus and the Muslims and 20 per cent to 
other communities at the Centre. The talk made crystal clear that 
Congress-League cooperation was not possible at all as the Congress, on 
the one hand, did not agree to yield to the League's demand for Pakistan, 
and, the League members, though in minority, were not prepared to live 
as second-class citizens on the mercy of the Hindu Raj and that for 
maintenance of their respect, dignity, rights, religion and culture, they 
were determined to fight to the last breath for creation of Pakistan, 
a Muslim homeland, \mder the leadership of Jinnah, while the very 
eztremism of the Muslim leaaue annoyed and alienated many moderate groups 
139 
and parties and made them closer to the Congress. Despite this, a very 
sizable pooulation of Muslims in India were swept with a revolutionary 
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spirit created by speeches of Jinnah and they were almost mad after 
him. Having such a strona background, Jinnah on October 8, 1944, 
proclaimed: 
"There is only one realistic way of resolving Hindu-Muslim 
differences. This is to divide India in tv.'o sovereign parts, 
Pakistan and Hindustan", 
Jinnah, expres-ing friendly understanding vrith the Congress,told 
a London newspaper correspondent that "Pakistan would resist any 
^ ^' ^ ^ • 141,, 
aggression on India by a foreign Dower". 
Opinions on Gandhi-Jinnah Talks 
Gandhiji's recognition of Jinnah as the only leader of the Muslims 
and his negotiations for settlement only with^'him made the Muslim League 
an important political organization and gave to Jinnah the highest rank 
of Muslim leadership. As a result all those, who were earlier vacilating 
in their loyalty, began to sunoort Jinnah and placed him on a footing 
14? 
of virtual equality with Gandhiji. Maulana Azad, the then Congress 
President, reluctantly commented; "I think Gandhiji's approach to Jinnah 
on this occasion was a great nolitical blunder. It gave new and added 
importance to Jinnah v/hich he later exploited to the full" . Sapru 
supported the stand taken by Gandhiji. B.L. Mitter, Advocate General 
of India, commented: "Jinnah played the part of Hitler and demanded 
acceptance of Lahore Resolution with no interpretation of It". The Hlndu-
Mahasabha criticised Gandhiji's offer to Jinnah as it strengthened 
Jinnah's rosition. The Sikhs considered the Gandhiji's offer as a sword 
145 
of Damocles hanging over their heads. Humayun Kabir looked upon the 
J46 147 
er. Azad said it gave added importance to Jinnah, 
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148 
Yuqantar supported Gandhiji's stand and Amrit Bazar Patrika criticised 
the ever increasing demands of the Muslim League, The Tribune and The 
Times of India commented that both Gandhiji and Jinnah were responsible 
for the failure of the talks. The Bombay Chronicle criticised uncoopera-
149 
tive attitude of Jinnah. However, it orovoked the Hindu and Sikh 
minorities in Punjab and the Hindus in Bengal. The most bitter criticism 
came from the Hindu Mahasabha. Savarkar asserted that "the Indian 
provinces were not the private pr9perties o"^  Gandhiji and Rajaji so 
that they could make a gift of them to anyone they likea". 
Liaqat Ali Khan said that Gandhiji's offer was "a fraud calculated 
151 to thwart and frustrate the Muslim demand of Pakistan". Chaudhri Ghulam 
Abbas charged Gandhiji for his persistance in the spirit of Savarkar. 
As the majority of the Muslim league were in favour of compromise with 
Gandhiji/ Jinnah was afraid of loosing their support/ while the League 
position in Punjab, NWFP and Bengal v/as not sufficiently strong. Jinnah, 
however, rejected the Gandhiji's terms of plebiscite, v/hich ensured 
deprivation to Pakistan of eleven districts in Punjab and twelve district; 
in Bengal including Amritsar and Calcutta. 
Lord Wavell concluded that the talks failed as Gandhiji and Jinnah 
153 differed completely as to the nature and scope of Pakistan. Bertrand 
Glancy, the Governor of Punjab, stated that claim for Pakistan was not 
154 
a viable proposition. Sir H. Twyman, the Governor of U.P. and Berar, 
said that the talks meant to trap Jinnah into an exhibition of unreason-
ableness. Gandhiji and Jinnah were poles apart. However, undoubtedly, 
it proves extraordinary wisdom of Jinnah, v/ho saw in the darkness of 
cloudy political strife a clear light of second silver spoon of poison 
administered by Gahdhiji to kill the League. Jinnah saved the Muslim 
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League first from the acceptance of Rajaji's formula and second time 
from agreeing to Gandhiji's terms. Both the formula and the talT^  meant 
establishment of Congress rule after Independence and then a decision 
about the creation of Pakistan. 
The talks had a great reaction on the public mind and they were 
keenly awaiting the practical outcome. The Congressmen had disapproved 
of Gandhiji's move but very few of them were in a position to criticize 
Gandhiji. On the other side, the Muslim leaguers wore jubilant as they 
had, at last, succeeded in making the Congress accept Jlnnah as an equal 
to Gandhiji, B. Shiva Rao, a correspondent of The Hindu and The Manchester 
Guardian, and brother of Sir Senegal Rau, who had close contacts with 
the Indian nationalist leaders, v/rote to Khurshed Ben, who was functioning 
as one of Gandhiji's Secretaries, on December 31, 1944, that the intended 
forty days fast of Gandhiji would do no good to the country and that he 
should rather apply his mind ^or a constitutional settlement. 
B. Shiva Rao's Prooosal 
• • • I I • r- • • • — • • • • • » • • i a i - - i i » • ^ • • • • • • • i l . i M l l • 
Shiva Rao wrote also to Khurshed Ben in the letter of December 31, 
1944, that Jinnah wants complete separation while Gandhiji was vfilllng 
to give self-determination to Muslim majority areas and this issue should 
be settled at the forthcoming general elections and before the elections 
Gandjijl should set up a small Committee to work out the main princioles 
of Federation Constitution for all India. Giving details of his proDosal, 
157 
Shiva Rao wrote: 
"What I would suggest is that this small drafting committee 
with Sapru as the Chairman should draw up a new list of 
siibjects, a very short federal list, say of six or seven 
sxobjects which must be federal (like Defence, Foreign Affairs, 
Currency, Tariffs etc.) and a concurrent list. There will be 
no Provincial List according to my plan, all imspecified 
subjects being left t^o the Provinces or federating units. 
Provinces and States will all have to federate in regard to 
this short list. In regard to the subjects in the concurrent 
list, it will be open to them to decide if they federate or 
keep the subjects to themselves. The advantage of this will 
be that some provinces where the Muslims are not in a majority 
v:ill want a strong Federal Centre and can federate in regard 
to a large number of subjects. xMuslim provinces can federate 
only in regard to the minimum federal list and thus enjoy the 
largest measure of autonomy. There v/ill be provision in respect 
of the new subjects in course of time". 
156. B. Shiva Rao, n. 68, p. 465. 
157, Ibid,, pp. 465-66. 
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res: He wrote about the Sta 
"So far as the States are concerned, the Drafting Committee 
should- lay dovm certain minimum requirements of adminis-
tration to which they should conform before being eligible 
for admission into the Federation. Gandhi has from time 
to time laid down some of these minimum. The elective 
principle must of course be recognized" 
159 
Regarding the elections, he said: 
"My own suggestion is that, when the Drafting Committee 
has completed its preliminary tasTc, the principles of 
the new Constitution on these lines should be popularized. 
The next general elections for the Provinces and the 
Centre should not be fought by the Congress on party lines. 
The only question should be whether the candidate accepts 
Federation of the type proposed by the Committee (and 
later approved by Gandhi and a few other leaders) or prefers 
Pakistan of Jinnah's conception. Candidates should be set 
up for every constituency including Muslims. The question 
must be ta>ven up v;hether Muslims want Federation of this 
type or Jinnah's Pakistan. All this work needs a nreat 
deal of planning and organization and Gandhi should think 
of those lines and not contemplate a fast". 
Shiva Rao wanted Khurshed Ben to place the proposal before Gandhij i 
for his consideration. 
Sapru's Formula 
In a letter to Sir B.N. Rau, Sapru v;rote about the attitude of 
Gandhiji. Sapru had long interviews with Gandhijl, who showed him his 
letter to the Viceroy and discussed the whole situation at length with 
him. About the establishment of national government, Sapru writes of 
his discussion with Gandhiji as follows: 
"I told him that it was hopeless to establish a national 
government responsible to the Legislature during the war 
and that therefore he might accept my formula of a national 
government consisting of representatives of all parties,who 
would not be liable to be dismissed by the Legislature 
during the interim period but vrould technically be responsible 
to the Crown, which meant that the power of Parliament and 
the Secretary of State would continue during the interim 
period". 
158. Ibid. 
159. Ibid. 
160. Ibid. 
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Gandhiji entertained this proposal at first sight, but in the 
evening he considered it far from meeting his demand. Gandhi ji v/as 
prepared to agree to the principle of self-determination, but he was 
not agreeable to go beyond the Rajaji's formula. Flowever/ Gandhiji was 
in dead earnest to find a solution of the problems. Further, the Muslim 
League also rejected it as they recommended joint electorate but not 
Pakistan. 
Desai-Liaquat Pact 
On the one hand, Gandhiji xvas willina to continue his efforts 
for a peaceful settlement, and, on the other, the vast and varied 
sections of the public, party and non-party leaders. Liberals, Hindu 
Mahasabhites, Depressed Classes and the Non-League Muslim Majlis, 
particularly the newspapers, were urging steps for resolving the deadlock, 
which was not possible without the release of the Congress leaders, 
about whom Amery had declared in early January, 1945, in the House of 
Commons that there was no plan of releasing them. The Government's 
intention was to force the Congress and the Ieaaue to settle their 
differences so that a central government could be established and the 
Japanese could be driven to their lands. Gandhiji was also convinced 
that the British Government would not grant independence to India unless 
and until the Congress and the League had reached some accord as to the 
country's future government and immediate formation of an interim 
National Government. Therefore, Gandhiji advised Sapru and Bhulabhai J. 
Desai, a constitutional lawyers of great eminence, to continue the talks 
for settlement. Desai was the leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party 
in the Central Assembly and also a personal old friend of the Deputy 
Leader of the Muslim league, Nawabzar'a I j aquat Ali Khan, who was also 
the General-Secretary of the League since 1937. Desai and Liaquat Ali 
162 
Khan held a s e r i e s of d i s c u s s i o n s and drew the fol lowing p r i v a t e and 
c o n f i d e n t i a l p roposa l s for coopera t ion between t h e Congress and the 
League so as t o make the tv;o p a r t i e s agree t o foirm a ' c o a l i t i o n government 
a t the c e n t r e : 
161. B. P a t t a b h i Sitaramayya, Vol. I I , n . 76, p . 649. 
162, S i r F ranc i s Low ( e d , ) . The Indian Year-3ook, 1945-46 (Bombay: 
Bennet t , Coleman Sc C o . ) , pp. 876-77, 
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Draft "Desal-Liaquat Pact" 
"The Congress and the league agree that they will join in 
forming an Interim Government in the Centre. The composition of such 
Government will be on the following lines:-
(a) An equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and 
the League in the Central Executive (the persons nominated 
need not be members of the Central Legislature); 
(b) Representatives of minorities (in particular the Scheduled 
Castes and the Sikhs); 
(c) The Commander-in-Chief. 
The Draft further explains; 
"The Government will be formed and function within the 
framework of the existing Government of India Act, It is, 
however, understood that, if the Cabinet cannot get a 
particular measure passed by the Legislative Assembly, they 
will not enforce the same by resort to any of the reserve 
powers of the Governor-General or the Viceroy. This will 
make them sufficiehtly independent of the Governor-General. 
"It is agreed bet>«'een the Congress and the league that, 
if such Interim Government is formed, their first step 
would be to release the Working Committee members of the 
Congress. 
"The steps by which efforts would be made to achieve this 
end are at present indicated to take the following course: 
On the basis of the understanding, some way should be 
found to get the Governor-General to make a proposal or a 
suggestion that he desires an Interim Government to be 
formed in the Centre on the agreement between the Congress 
and the League and when the Governor-General invites 
Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Desai either jointly or separately, the 
above proposals would be made declaring that they are 
prepared to join in forming the Government. 
"The next step would be to get the withdrawal of Section 93 
in the provinces and to form as soon as possible provincial 
Governments on the lines o^ a coalition'.' 
Desai showed this plan to Gandhiji and secured his consent and 
the Viceroy recommended its adoption to the Secretary of State. The Khan, 
the League's General Secretary, remained quiet for a considerable time, 
but when his reply came, it ''-as surprisingly an outright rejection of 
the proposals. The Nawabzada said to Desai that the proposals can be 
made a basis for discussion and \7hatever he told v.'as his "personal opinion" 
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However, the pact furnished a bagis for Wavell's Offer, Later, the Pact 
was repudiated by the Congress leaders a]so as a result, Desai, like 
Rajaji, made an exit from the political stage. 
Liaquat Ali Khan, however, har! placed the proposals before Jinnah, 
who declare? 167 
"We are willing and reatfy to sit do'-nm and come to a settle-
ment with the Hindu Nation on the basis of a division of 
India, Other\^ rise it is not possible to make any progress. 
It is immaterial whether I do to Mr. Gandhi or he comes to 
me". 
On the fifth anniversary of the lahore resolution, Jinnah said: 
"It is not possible to believe that any Musalman, who has 
got the slightest of self-respect and iota of pride left 
in him, can tolerate a Ministry in a Muslim majority 
province, which takes orders from and is subject to the 
control of Mr. Gandhi at Sevagram or the Congress v/ho are 
deadly opponents to all Muslim aspirations and their national 
demands". 
While Desai negotiated with Fav/abzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Sapru 
calJIed a Non-Party Conference in Delhi on November 19, 1944, and appointe 
a Non-Party Conciliation Committee to go through the various problems 
of the partition of India. The Committee recommended a single union of 
The report was closer to the Congress demand but did not find 
171 favourable response from the Muslim League besides the Muslim press 
17 2 
started its scathing criticism. 
The Congress-league conflict af-Fected the league, v/hich began to 
loose grounds in the States. In February, 1945, the league Ministry in 
Slnd, led by Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, was defeated. He formed 
new ministry on March 14, On March 12, League Ministry in NVfFP was defeat? 
167. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed,), n. 4, Vol. II, p, 166, 
168. Ibid. 
169. Constitutional Proposals o"^  Sapru Cor^ n^ ittee (Bombay: Padma 
Publications, 1945) , pp. 2-4. ~" 
170. N.N. Mitra, n. 103, 1945, Vo]. IT, pp. 176-80. 
171. Ibid., 1944, Vol, II, p, 70. 
172. Nicholas Mansergh, Vol. V, n. 165, pp. 824-25; see also Dawn (Delhi), 
April 14, 1945, and December 31, 1945. 
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and Dr. Khan Sahib/ leader of Congress Party, invited to form a new 
government. On March 28, Mazimudriin's ministry in Bengal v^ as defeated 
and the Viceroy took over the ar'ministration vmder Section 93. In Assam 
Sir Mahomed Saadullah formed coalition cabinet with Gopinath Bardolai, 
the Congress leader. 
Meanwhile, the '/Jar in Europe came to an end on May 7, 1945, when 
the Germans laid dov/n arms and the Indian and overseas politics moved 
in a different direction as a result the proposal was left over. Thus, 
an attempt to solve the constitutional deadlock died a premature death. 
It may be pointed out that the Desai-Iiaquat Pact had made it an 
essential objective to get the Congressmen released immediately. The 
iraprisonm.ent of the Congress leaders and the harsh attitude of the 
British government against the'ir release drew the attention of the 
world politicians, thinkers and philosophers, Bertrand Russel, the 
famous philosopher urged Britain to "Quit India" after the end of the 
Japanese war, Bernard Shaw, the noted novelist and writer, considered 
the VE-Day as a mockery of the victory celebration in Europe as millions 
of people were then subjected to tyranny, injustice and exploitation. 
Public opinion in the United States also was demanding that the Indian 
deadlock should be resolved, as the Jepanese vere still holding Singapore 
and Indonesia and Truman's advisers visualised that cooperation of India 
would make significant contribution to Allied operations ageinst Jaoan 
from the Indian soil. There v/as every likelihood of revitalisation of 
Japan and even ninety days after surrender of Germany there was no 
certainty that the Allied forces v?ould crush the Japanese up to their 
land. Thus, the international pressures, persuasions and appeals forced 
Churchill to reconsider his attitude towards India. 
CONCLUSION 
The Congress-League antagonism grew more and more intense. 
G^dhiji did not care if there v;as a civil war. The Hindu-Muslim distrust 
turned into violent riots. The Congress attempted to reconcile with 
the league proposing the interim govemm.ent to be entrusted to Jinnah 
and maximxim powers to the federal provinces, but Jinnah disagreed. On 
the other hand, there was no sion of the end of the War in Europe and 
the British Government ^ras willing for settlement of the communal problems 
for esrsblishing an interim aovernment. Wavell criticising the Quit India 
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Movement emphasised for the xmity of India,JJLnnah criticised the Wavell 
declaration. Gandhi-Jinnah talks involved the Rajagopalachari's formula, 
but no settlement could be reacheci. Eesiries other proposals, Desai-
Liaquat formula also could not bring the f.-^o parties to a point of 
agreement. The Muslim league persisteri for the creation of Pakistan. 
CHAPTER VI 
WAVELI. PLAN AND SIMLA CONFERENCE 
(1945) 
Round about 1944-45/ Jinnah was vigorously supported by the 
intellectuals of the Aligarh Muslim University, who produced considerable 
literature and propaganda material in favour of Pakistan and to make 
the Hindu-dominated India ^^ reak at the centre "suggesting all sorts of 
divisions, cutting the country into various bits and pieces". Secondly, 
the "generality of Muslims began to entertain the comforting feeling 
that the Hindus would now be cut down to size, in no position to lord 
2 
it over them, compelled to share power on a basis of parity". Thirdly, 
the Muslim officials "were secretly sympathizing with the Pakistan 
concept as they saw opportunities for "wider employment in the highest 
3 
offices without having to compete with the Hindus". On the other hand, 
the Congress, which was fighting a war for democracy and self-determina-
tion, was confident that it could rvm the country themselves. On May 6, 
1945, Germany surrendered. By the end of the War, the great majority 
of Indians wanted the British to leave the country. Thus, the league 
demanded for Pakistan and the Congress demand for immediate transfer o^ 
power to it, polarized their politics. The league, which in 1940,regarded 
Pakistan as anything but a pipe-dream, by 194 2-43, was toying with the 
idea, but by 1945, many v/ere in -Favour of it, 
lord Wavell Plan 
Lord Wavell had realized that proper administration would be 
impossible without cooperation of the Indian people. Therefore, he had 
initiated an Indo-British settlement and v/rote to Churchill to enlist 
India as a member of the British Commonwealth. On March 21, 1945, he left 
India and reached England on March 23, along with V.P, Menon and Sir 
Evan Jenkins. On March 26, the Cabinet Committee of India did not approve 
the Wavell's proposal. Churchill favoured "partition (of India) into 
1. C.S, Venkatachar, ' 1937-47 In Retrospect: A Civil Servant's Viev;', 
in C.H. Philips and :^D. Wainwright, The Partition of IndiaiPolicies 
and Perspectives, 1935-1947 (London: George A13en and Unv/fn Ltd., 
"197017 13. 486. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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Pakistan, Hindustan and Princestan" 
The Russian Government pressurised the British Government for 
ending the deadlock and to transfer power into the hands of the Indians. 
Meanwhile, the coalition tfovemment of the United Kingdom/ formed by 
Churchill on May 11, 1940, broke 6o\m and Churchill resigned on May 23, 
1945, and general elections were proclaimed to be held on July 5,1945, 
but he was still the head of the "Caretaker Government", while his 
Conservative Party was loosing its influence and the Labour Party getting 
strengthened. While Churcill was being lauded for his achievement in 
v/inning the War, he vras being severely criticised by the Labour Party 
for his wrong handling of the Indian problem and continuing the imprison-
ment of the CV7C members. Therefore, Churchill changed his attitude 
towards India due to the forthcoming elections in England and, on May 31, 
1945, made a strong appeal to the Cabinet meeting and got approved the 
Wavell's proposal. Wavel] left london on June 6, and reached India on 
June 14, 194 5. On the eve of Wavell's departure, Amery, in the House of 
Commons, announced that the Viceroy had been empowered to make proposals 
on the composition of an interim government in India, which created a 
good deal of expectation as political life in India was at a standstill. 
Lord Wavell broadcast his speech in India on June 14, 1945, and on the 
same day, Amery, in london, also made an announcement in Parliament. They 
declared a new solution to break the political deadlock as authorised 
by His Majesty's Government. 
Wavell's Broadcast 
Wavell on June 14, 1945, in a broadcast from Delhi said "to ease 
the present nolitical situation and to advance India towards her goal 
of full self-government." offered a plan of an interim arrangement, to 
end the communal deadlock, giving right to the Indians for framing their 
ovm constitution, which envisaged: 
4. Penderel Moon (ed,), Wavell - The Viceroy's Journal (london: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), p7 106. 
5. Sir Francis Lov; Ced.), The Indian Year Book, 1947 (Bombay': Bennett, 
Coleman & Co.,Ltd.), p, 882. ~ - - -
6. See for details Penderel Moon (ed.), n. 4, pp. 141-42; see also 
Nicholas Mansergh (Editor-in-Chie-P) and E.W.R. Lxjmby (ed.). Constitu-
tional Relations Betv^een _BrJ teJn and I_ndia : The Transfer of Power 
(11 Vols,), Vol. V: The Simla Conference, Background and Proceedings, 
(Continued) 
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1. Executive Coioncil of the Governor-General consisting of 
equal number of Caste Hindus and the Muslims, 
2. All the members of the Executive Council were Indians except 
the Viceroy (who was a?so the Governor-General) and the 
Commander-in-Chief, who retained the rosr^ onsibility for 
defence of India. 
3. The war portfolio was retained by the Government. 
4. A British High Commissioner was to be appointed to look after 
the Commercial interests on the lines of the Dominions. 
5. The new Executive Council was to work within the framework 
of the 1935 Act, and the Governor-General retained the power 
of veto against a majority decision of the Councillors. 
6. The interference of the Secretary of State '-'as to be decreased 
to the minimum. 
7. The portfolios of External Affairs, Finance and Home Affairs 
were placed in the charae of an Indian Members of Council. 
The Members were to be elected by the Governor-General after 
consultation with political leaders. They had to work under 
the Government of India Act, 1935. 
8. The Interim Government would in no way prejudice the final 
constitutional settlement, and that the proposals intended 
to make a long-term solution easier. 
To achieve the above objectives, he declared to hold a political 
conference at the Viceregal Lodge in Simla on June 25, 1945,and suggested 
7 
to invite the following twenty-one leaders of different shades of opinion, 
except the Hindu Mahasabha: 
1, Premiers of Provincial Governments; or, for Provinces then 
under Section 93 Government. 
2,' Persons who last held the office of Premier in the provinces 
administered by Governors; 
Note 6 continued 
1 September"1944 - 28 July 1945 (london: H T :!3jesty's Stationery 
Office, 1974), pp. 1122-23; also see Sir Francis Low, Ibid., 
pp. 882-84; also see Jaadish Saran Sharma, India's Struggle for 
Freedom : Select Docu-nents and Sources, Vol.1 (Delhi: S. Chand 
Sc Co., 1962), pp. 617-20; also see I.A. Shen^ rani, Pakistan 
Resolution to Pakistan, 1940-1947 (Delhi: Daya Publishing House, 
1985), pp. 85-86 (AppendTxT^ 
7. See for details I ,A. Sherv/ani, Ibid., pp. 86-87; see also V.P.Menon, 
The Transfer of Power in India (Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1957), 
p. 460. 
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3. The leader of the Congress Party and the Domuty Leader of 
the Muslim League in the Central Assembly. 
4. The leaders of the Congress and the league in the Council of 
State. 
5. The leader of the Nationalist Party and the European Group 
in the Central Legislative Assembly. 
6. Gandhiji and Jinnah, as the recognized leaders of the two 
main political parties; and 
7. A representative of the Sikhs; and 
8. A representative of the Scheduled Castes. 
Lord vravell described three main tasks of the nev/ proposed 
Executive Council: "first, to prosecute the war against Japan; secondly, 
to carry on the government of British India (with its manifold tasks of 
post-v;ar development) until a new permanent constitution could be agreed 
upon and come into force; and thirdly, to consider (when the members of 
the Government thought it possible), the means by which such agreement 
could be achieved". The third task v;as most important. Wavell said that 
neither the British Government nor he ^imsplf "had lost sight of the 
need for a long-term solution, and the present Drooosals were intended 
9 
to make such solution easier". 
Amery's Declaration of Wavell plan 
The same plan was broadcast by I .8. Amery, the Secretary o-*^  State 
for India in England, on Jiine 14, 1945. Amery said that the Viceroy had 
been empowered to make proposals on composition of interim government 
in ,India, The main features of Amery's speecn were the following:-
"1. The Executive Council would be reconstituted by the Viceroy, 
the nominated members v;ould be selected from among the leaders 
of Indian political life giving a balanced representation to 
the main communities i.e. the Muslims and the Hindus. 
8. R.c. Majumdar, Struggle for Freedom (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 
1969), p, 717; see also V.P, Menon, n. 7, p. 183, 
9. R.C, Majijmdar, Ibid. 
10, See for details Jagdish Saran Sharma, n. 6, pp, 620-23; see also 
B.r. Pandey, The Indian "-la t ion a list Movement, 1885-1947 : Selected 
Documents (London: Macmillan, r97~9')', TO, 182, 
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2. The Viceroy would call a conference of leading Indian politicians 
to get a list of names from which he would make recommendations 
for appointments/ but he would have unrestricted freedom of 
choice in doing so. 
3. The members: of the Executive Counci] vould he Indians, vith 
the exceotion of the Viceroy and the C-in-C; the latter would 
retain his present position as war I'lnister, which was essential 
so long as the defence of India v/as a British responsibility. 
External affairs would be in the charge of an Indian member. 
4. The relations between the British Crown and the Indian Princes 
would not be affected, and the Viceroy of India would have the 
veto power although he would not use it unsparingly and would 
act on the advice of the Council". •* 
The Secretary of State also stated that the Cripps Offer of 1942 
still stood in its entirety, which contained tv/o main principles;"first, 
that no limit was set to India's freedom to determine her o^iin destiny, 
v/hether within the Commonwealth or outside it, and secondly that this 
destiny could only be achieved by a constitution or constitutions framed 
and agreed to by Indians", He said that so long as there was no Indian 
constitution, the Governor-General's over-riding power over a majority 
decision was necessary to protect the minorities, to safeguard the Indian 
interests and the interests of the Indian States. With regard to the 
appointment of a British High Commissioner, he said that it \<as necessary 
for reasons of practical convenience. He further said that through the 
members of the then Executive Council rendered great service, but they 
could not cooperate for reconstruction; hence, there was no way better 
than their agreement to join the Executive Council. He acknowledged 
Wavell's "deep sympathy with India's aspirations and to his firm belief 
12 
in India's future greatness". 
Referring to the new proposals of Amery and Wavell, the King in a 
speech in the British Parliament on June IS, 1945, expressed hope that 
"the invitation extended to the Indian political leaders would be accepted, 
so that the immediate tasks might be undertaken with the full co-operation 
of all sections of Indian public opinion". 
Release of the Congress leaders 
As the press and the public welcomed the proposals and there was 
11. V.p. Menon, n. 7, p. 184. 
12. Ibid. 
13. TBTd., pp. X84-85. 
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general aclcnowledgment of the Lord' s sincerity and his earnest desire 
to end the political deadloclc, the Viceroy on June 15, x:inconditionally 
relea=5ed all the former Presidents of the Congress including Nehru, 
Fatel and Azad from the jail, except the rf^presentatives of the Hindu 
.Mahasabha/ so that they could consider his proposal and participate in 
the proposed conference to be held at Simla on June 25. 
Reaction of Gandhiji 
The Viceroy, soon after the broadcast (betv/een June 14 and 15) 
issued invitations to all political leaders and carried on corresnondence 
with Gandhiji and Jinnah. Wavell did not invite Azad as he thought that 
Gandhiji v7ould represent the Congress and also as Azad's inclusion could 
offend Jinnah. Gandhiji protested that he would be representing no 
institution and it was only the Congress President (A..I'.. Azad), v/ho could 
represent the Congress. Therefore, Favell issued invitation to Azad also. 
Azad informed the Viceroy that he would place the invitation before the 
Cl-JC on June 21, and would send his reply thereafter, 
Wavell wrote to Gandhiji that he needed his help and hoped that he 
would attend the Conference. VJavell invited Gandhiji for a'preliminary 
talk on Jxxne 24/ and expressed his hope that Gandhiji would participate 
in the proceedings of the Conference. Gandhiji assured that he, in his 
personal capacity/ shall alvrays be at his ser-^ 'ice during and even after 
the Conference. 
In his letter of Jxone 16, 194 5, Gandhiji raised the objection 
relating to "India's aoal of indeTiendence and the question of parity of 
14 
representation betvreen Caste Hindus and Muslims". Regarding the 'goal of 
independence'/ Gandhiji pointed out that the broadcast seemed "rigorously 
15 to exclude the use of the vrord ' indet5endence'" and, therefore, demanded 
revision of the declaration to bring it in line v/ith the Indian aspiration; 
The Viceroy, referring to Amery's statement of Jvine 14, that "there was 
no limit set to India' s freedom to decide her ov/n destiny, whether as a 
free partner in the Commonwealth, or even outside it", replied that any 
change in the terms of the broadcast v/as not practicable. On June 18, 
14. Ibid./ p. 185, 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid., p. 184, 
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Gandhiji, in a press interview on the question of his satisfaction vith 
the clarification offered by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, 
said he did not want to express his opinion^ which might influence the 
opinion of the Congress Working Committee. 
Regarding the 'parity of representation between the Caste Hindus 
and Muslims', Gandhiji wrote to the Viceroy that it was untrue and 
offensive as the Congress represented all the Indians and even the Hindu 
Mahasabha, which was only representative of Hindus, would disclaim 
representing "Caste Hindus". The Viceroy replied that the term 'Caste 
Hindus' was used without any intention of being cause of offence but 
merely to express equality betv/een the Hindus and the Muslims other than 
the members of the Scheduled Castes. The Viceroy also said that the 
exact number of members of the Scher'uled Castes would be decided after 
discussion at the Conference. The Viceroy refuser" to ef-Pect any change 
in the draft of his broadcast to eliminate the term, 'Caste Hindus', as 
requested by Gandhiji in a telegram expressing apprehension that "unless 
a change was made to meet the objection taken on the question of parity 
between Caste Hindus and Muslims, religious division would become 
18 
officially stereotyped on the eve of independence". Gandhiji personally 
refused to subscribe to the explanation of the Viceroy, and stressed 
that by maintaining the parity bet\.'Gcn Caste Hindus and Muslims, the 
19 Viceroy would "surely defeat the purpose of Conference". He threatened 
to advise the Congress members not to participate in the Executive Council 
in case the principle of parity remained the same. The Viceroy expressed 
his inability to change his broadcast and desired not to discuss its 
details before the Conference as before it no party or person was expected 
to,either accept or reject the plan. He only wanted an answer to the 
effect whether his proposal v/as v;orth discTissing at the Conference. 
Gandhiji replied if change in the 'parity clause' was impossible, he v:ould 
advise the Conaress members not to participate in the formation of the 
20 
new Executive Cotincil. He wrote: . 
17. Mahatma Gandhi: Correspondence with the Government, 1944-47 (Ahmedabad; 
Navajivan Publishing House; 1959), Telegram from Viceroy to Gandhi, 
dated Jtme 16, 1945, p, 21. 
18. Ibid. Telegram from Gandhi to Viceroy, dated June 17, 1945, p. 22. 
19. Ibid., o. 22. 
20. V.F. Menon, n. 7, p. 187. 
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"Congress has never identified itself v/ith Caste or non-Caste 
Hindus and never can, even to gain independence, which will 
be one-sided, untrue and suicidal. Congress to justify its 
existence for winnina the independence of India must remain 
for ever free to choose the best men and \%'omen from all classes 
and I hope always will. That it has -For the sake of concilia-
ting the minorities chosen men to represent them, though they 
have been less than best, redounds to its credit, but that can 
never be oleaded to justify or perpetuate distinctions based 
on caste or creed. The Hindu riahasabha is the only body claim-
ing to represent solely Hindu interests". 
Expressing his viev;s on the possibility of a settlement, Gandhiji, 
in a statement on Jxjne 15, approved the Desai-Liaquat Ali Pact, which 
could be useful if set in proper political setting. He said that in rhe 
light of Bhulabhai ^esai-Liaquat Ali pact, he anticipated the forthcoming 
Viceregal Con-Terence to be purposive. 
On the question of omission o^ the Hindu Mahasabha, Gandhiji made 
it clear that if it meant treating the Congress as a sectional or Hindu 
body, the Con^^ress would not take part in the Conference, Gandhiji was 
satisfied if the Viceroy had invited only political parties and avoided 
the parties based on religious distinctions. He assumed that due to this 
reason the Muslim Majlis anri similar bodies were not invited to take part 
in the Simla Conference, 
Reaction of Jinnah 
On June 15, the Dawn, the league's official organ, protested that 
"with regard to the Muslim moiety , the Musalmans will tolerate no 
infiltration of non-League stooges to humour any party". On the same day, 
Jinnah telegraphed the Viceroy that he would like to.seek some clarifica-
tion, so that he could consult the ri Working Committee and decide about 
his participation in the Conference and requested that the Con-Terence 
should be postponed for a fortnicfht for this purpose. The Viceroy advised 
Jinnah to arrange for his Working Committee to meet at Simla. Jinnah 
replied that vdthout complete kno\.'ledge of the Viceroy' s proposals, it 
would not be possible for the Working Committee to decide. The Viceroy 
said that Jinnah could consult his Working Committee when the proposals 
were fully known to hjm at the Conference, The Viceroy also said that 
long adjournment of the Conference voulri be very inconvenient and sugnestod 
21, Ibid., p, 188. 
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that the l^ Working Committee should meet at Simla before the end of 
June. Jinnah replied that he vrould decide after discussing with the 
Viceroy on June 24, 1945. 
Reaction of Hindu Mahasabha 
The members of the Hindu Mahasabha were much aggrieved at their 
not having been called to participate in the Simla Conference, However, 
it vigorously opposed the proposal of parity betvreen the Caste Hindus 
and the Muslins in the Executive Council. To express its resentment, it 
passed a strongly worded resolution, organised demonstrations and 
observed hartal on July 8, 1945. 
CWC Meeting 
Meanwhile, the Congress Working Committee held, its meeting at Bombay 
on June 21 and 22, 1945, to consider the Viceroy's proposal and for 
attending the Simla Conference on June 25, and issued instructions to 
the party participants for their guidance. First, the Viceroy's suggested 
arrangements were to be considered on an interim and temporary basis, 
especially in regard to communal parity, v/hich principle v/as not acceptable 
and applicable in the provinces and the arrangements had to be related 
to the Centre only. Secondly, if the communal parity was agreed urion, it 
should not mean that "all the Muslim members of the National Government 
will be nominated by the Muslim League" and that "names may be proposed 
for Hindus, Muslims, Scheduled Classes, etc., by all groups in the 
Conference and to be adopted by the Conference as a whole". Thirdly, the 
decisions taken were to be confirmed and ratified by the AICC (v;hich was 
not possible as the AICC and other Conaress Committees were still banned). 
Fourthly, they had to keep in mind the larac number of detenus and 
Congress prisoners and they had to plead for their release; and finally, 
they had to seek clarification regarding External Affairs Department; 
financial implications of defence, nationalist character of the Indian 
army; discontinuation of Indian sunport for the imperialist control of 
any of the S.E, A^ian countries deprivinn them o-F their freedom; remova] 
of barriers between the States, peoples, the Princes and members of the 
^Tational Government -Por their amalopmaticn v;ith the Federal India; estab-
lishment of coalition qovernment in the provinces; and nonacreotance of 
foreicm recruitments. 
22. Jaadish Saran Sharma, n. 6, ^. 6 24. 
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Viceroy's Meetings 
The Viceroy, on Jiine 24, separately invited and had interviev;s 
v'ith Azad, Gandhiii and Jinnah, 
Azad/ the Congress President, accompanied by Govind Ballabh Pant, 
former Congress Premier of the United Provinces, met with the Viceroy. 
Complaining about the unDrincipled behaviour of the league, Azad 
asserted that 'they vrere under the impression that they had the support 
of the government and therefore they vrould not accept any reasonable 
23 
terms". The Viceroy assured him that the government would not support 
'24 
the members of the league and that the government would rem.ain neutral. 
He accepted the general principle of the Viceroy's proposals and agreed 
to cooperate with the Viceroy in the prosecution of the war against 
Japan and that the members of the Council should be first-class men 
having confidence of their party and able to take decision independently. 
Azad contended that the Conference was being held at a short notice and 
should be adjourned and all the Congress prisoners should be released. 
The Congress President said that he "was more interested in the end 
than in the means, and wanted to be clear that the proposals were intendec 
to facilitate and not to obstruct a final settlement". On the question 
of the Viceroy's overriding powers, Wavell said that "this was part of 
the chain of responsibility throuah him to the Secretary of State for 
26 India and to Parliament, and tha-^  the power in\ist remain". Pegardmg the 
defence portfolio, Azad said that he had no objection to the C-in-C 
retaining the portfolio, but he v^ ou^ d like that the British army became 
a real national army. He urged that the countries liberated from Japan 
should not be subjugated. Finally, he emphasised that the Congress "would 
not fight on the principle of parity betiv'een Hindus other than Scheduled 
27 Castes and Muslims, but it would fight on the method of selection" and 
the Congress "must have a say in the representation of commtmitles other 
than the Hindu community, and v/ould not agree to Muslim names being put 
2S ' 
fonvard by only one communal organization". 
23. Maulana AJDUI Kalam Azad, India Uins Freedom (Cplcutta: Orient 
Longmans, 1959), D, 106. 
24. Ibid. 
25. V.P, Menon, n. 7, p, 189, 
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Gandhiji also demancled release of all Congress political prisoners. 
He mainly objected to the term 'Caste Hindus' and preferred to call them 
'Non-Scheduled Hindis'. About coalitions in provinces, he said that "the 
-ninorities should be represented in the provinces only by members of 
their body belonging to the Congress", to v/hich the Viceroy replied 
that "the minorities should be reoresented by someone they trusted". On 
the question of the position of the Secretary of State's Services, the 
Viceroy said that "the Indian Civil Sen-'ice could be trusted to carry 
29 
out the instructions of the Executive", and on the method of selecting 
the new Council members, he said that he v/ould ask for panels of names. 
On the parity issue, the Viceroy reiterated its answer given to Azad. 
As ccording to 1935 Act, the smaller minorities had to vote with 
the Hindus, Jinnah said that the Muslims would alxvays be in a- minority 
under the Viceroy's scheme. Therefore, he sugaested "if the majority 
of the Muslims were ooposed to any measure, it should not go by vote" 
to v;hich the Viceroy said that it v/ould be undemocratic, Jinnah urged 
that the Muslim league had the right to nominate the Muslim members and 
expected that they would have a fair share of the key portfolios. He 
was opposed by the Punjab Unionists or Congress Muslims. He, like Azad, 
preferred the possibility of adjournment of the Conference as he had to 
consult his Workina Committee. 
Cn the basis of the discussions, vravell formulated the follo--'inq 
main problems likely to be discussed at the Conferencc:-
1. Congress opposition of parity bet^'een Muslims and Hindus other 
than Scheduled Castes in the new Executive Council. 
2. League's demand for nominating the entire Muslim members of the 
Co'oncil. 
3. Punjab Unionists apprehended that a Congress-Leaaue coalition at 
the centre would lead to nolitical instability in Punjab. 
Simla Conference Proceedings 
31 
The twenty-one invitees assembled in the Viceregal lodge, Simla, 
on June 25, 1945, at 11.00 A..". There were equal number of Hindus and 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
31. See for-details y.p. Menon, n. 7, p. 191, 
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Muslims, besirles European, Scheduled Caste and Sikh renresentatives. The 
Viceroy said that what he proposed vas not a final solution of India's 
constitutional se'ttlement and that they could pave the way for a settle-
ment. He said their wisdom, statesmanship and goodwill was on trial and 
they should rise above the old prejudices and enmities and think for 
the benefit of t?ie four million people of India, 
Lord V7avell said that the participants should believe him as a 
sincere -Friend O^ F India and he v/ould endeavour to guide the discussions 
to the best interest of the country. He announced himself and Sir Evan 
Jenkins as Secrot:irias to the Conference and said that the proceedings 
of the Conference should be kept confidential and a note anproved by the 
Conference vjould be released to the oress. He gave them copies of his 
statement and that made by Amery and placed the follov/ing tv/o points 
for consideration: 
" (A) If '^e CQuld reach acreement on the composition of "the Council, 
were the general principles xonder which it would '-'ork - programme 
outlined in my broadcast, parity o^ Hindus and Muslims, present 
constitution etc. accept'iblov 
(B) if above principles were acceptable, could wo reach an ?>qreoment 
on composition of Council and names to be recommended"^ 
The Conference met on June 26, anr? discussed, point by point, the 
various issues relating to the rronosed 'i;xecutive Council of the Governor, 
The Viceroy explained the term, 'Caste Hindus' meaning Hindus not belong-
ing to the Scheduled Castes, and said the phrase "so far as the interests 
of British India are concerned" meant that "relations with Indian States 
were a matter for the Crovm Representative and that the Govemor-General-
33 in-Council had nothing to do with them". The Viceroy observed that as the 
1935 Act underlined that three members of the Ilxecutive Coimcil must be 
persons who had been in the service of the CrovTi for at least ten years, 
it v;ould not be possible for the nevi members to take office in the new 
Executive Council and, hence, it required amendment, vrhich, due to 
dissolution of Parliament, was not possible be-^ore August, Kher proposal 
for amendment by an Order in Council v/as not accepted by Wavell, Wavell 
said that the ourpose of appointment of a British High Commissioner was 
32, Penderel Moon (ed.), n, 4, op, 146-47. 
33. V.P. !lenon, n, 7, p. 193. 
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"to safeguard the British interests v;hich impinged on Indian problems, 
it could only be done through the Governor-General, which meant a step 
forward on the road to Dominion Status or Independence. With regard to 
external affairs, the Viceroy said that this portfolio wo'ild be under 
charge of an Indian .Member instead of the Governor-General, Regarding 
the overriding power of the Govemor-G-^neral-in-Council, the Viceroy 
said that "this vjas part of the chain of responsibility to Parliament". 
The Viceroy also said that instead of establishment of an interim 
government/ they may consider any long-term solution also. 
Lord Wavell described three main tasks of the new proposed Executive 
Council: first, to prosecute the war aq.':inst Japan; secondly, to consider 
a future constitution of India (when the members of the Executive Covmcil 
after some experience constitute a body to study the various constitutions 
of the v/orld e.g., the USA and Canada) ; and thirdly, though his proposals 
did not affect the Indian States, but in case of a long-term solution, 
the Indian States would be associated in framing a new constitution. The 
Viceroy also explained that in the provinces v/here there were ministries, 
the holding of a -resh election -^'o'lld be at the ^isciTtion of the provin-
cial governments. A-^ter this, the morning session on June 25, closed. 
The evening session started at 2.30 F.ri. vrith discussion on general 
principles. 
Maulana Azad, the Congress President, asserted that the Congress 
would not accept the interim settlement, that prejudice the national 
character of the Conaress reducing it to the level of a communal body. 
He emphasised that the proposals meant attainment of Indenendence for 
India and sought exr^lanation of the following points: 
(1) the schope and -^iinctions of the proposed External Affairs 
Department; 
(2) the giving of a national character to the Indian Army an^ the 
removing of barriers isolatino it from the national Government 
and the people; 
(3) the policy with regard to the liberated coiintries in South-East 
Asia after the war; and 
(4) the relations betv;een the national Government and the Indian 
States and States' people". 
34. Ibid., p. 194. 
35. Ibid., p. 195. 
255 
Jinnah said that he could not un-^ erstand Azad' s viev; and desired 
:he Viceroy to elucidate these points. The Viceroy said that the External 
Affairs Department comprised relations with foreign countries, the 
tribes on the north-west and on the north-east of India, the administra-
tion of British Baluchistan, and the affairs of certain frontier States, 
which would be transferred to the new Indian Member. He opposed that 
the Indian Army should be brought into politics, but agreed that it shoulc' 
be "a truly national'army, ef-^ icient and contented". He expressed his 
inability to com'nit with regards to the future of the occupied territories 
in South-East Asia, in which several countries were interested. He said 
that the Indian States were not under jurisdiction of the Governor-General 
in Coxancil and only a federal constitution, embracing both British-Indian 
crovinces and States could enable the central government to exercise 
37 
control over the States. Regarding the Congress goal of independence, 
the Viceroy referred to Amery's statement of June 14, and assured that 
"there v/as nothing in the proposals to brand the Congress as a communal 
bo3y". 
Cn the question of representation, Jinnah said that the Congress 
represented only Hindus. Dr. IChan Sahib, the Premier of the m-TFP, objected 
to it. The Viceroy observed that the Congress represented its members, 
to which Jinnah agreed. The members of the Congress included both Hindus 
and Muslims and Jinnah could not deny it. P.N. Banerjee (Nationalist 
leader in the Central Assembly) deplored t)ie absence of the Hindu Mahasabha, 
the Krishak Proja Party, Momins etc. and Madan Mohan Malaviya. He condemned 
the parity betv;een Hindus, other than the Scheduled Castes and Muslims 
and urged immediate release of nolitical prisoners. Sir Henry Richardson 
supported the proposals. Khizar Hyat Khan said that the short-term plan 
would affect the future. The Maharaja of Parlakimedi said that "the 
interests of person who had supported the vjar effort should not be 
39 
neglected". Master Tara Singh approved the proposals but did not identify 
the Sikhs v/ith the Congress though they were in sympathy with it. Sivaraj 
asked for safeguard and protection of his community i.e. Scheduled Castes. 
36. Ibid., p. 196. 
37. Ibid. 
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Sir Mahommed Saadullah opposed the inclusion of Hindu Mahasabha. The 
Viceroy said that he had made the. Conference as representative as he 
could and sincerely wished to cooperate. 
Jinnah said that the proposals envisaged a stop-gap arrangement 
and did not affect the Congress demand for independence here and now 
and the league's demand for Pakistan not immediately. He said the League 
would not agree to any constitution on any basis other than that of 
Pakistan/ and recalled Government's proclamation that future constitution 
would be framed by agreement and would not be imposed on the country. 
Opposing the Congress demand for a common central Govemm.ent/ Jinnah 
read the resolution of ML Working Committee of August 20, 1942. He 
conceded that the Comress represented 90 per cent of the Hindus and 
not many J^ i^slims, Sikhs and Scheduled Castes, while the Muslim league 
represented 90 per cent o^^ the Muslims'; hence, it can not be concluded 
that the Congress repre'sented all the communities. He, therefore, 
supported the proposals subject to decision taken on the basis of communal 
parity. The Viceroy split up the proposals for discussion under two 
heads: 
"(a) those primarily for agreement between the parties and the 
Viceroy; and 
(b) those primarily for settlement between the parties themselves". 
On June 26, the Viceroy oave the participants a copy of statement/ 
42 
which stated as follows: 
"(A) Stibject to agreement under B, is the Conference prepared to 
agree to an Executive Council: 
(i) publicly committed to the thre^ tasks set out in the 
Viceroy's broadcast; 
40, The resolution declared that "the Muslim league has been, and is, 
ready and willing to consider any proposals and negotiate with 
any party on a footing of equality for the setting up of a 
provisional Government of India in order to mobilize the resources 
of the country for the purpose of the defence of India and the 
successful prosecution of the war" provided that the demand for 
Pakistan was conceded unequivocally. 
41, V.P. Menon/ n. 1, p. 198, 
42, Ibid, 
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(ii) consisting of men of influence and ability recommended 
by the Conference, and prepared to take decisions and 
the responsibility -^ or them; 
(iii) with all portfolios (including external affairs) held 
by Indian Members, except the war portfolio which would 
be held by the Commander-in-Chief; 
(iv) having within it an equal number of Muslims and Hindus 
other than Scheduled Castes; and 
(v) working in all respects under the present constitution, 
including the constitutional provisions for control by 
the Secretary of State and the Governor-General. 
(B) Subject to agreement \inder A, is further agreement possible on: 
(i) the strength and composition of the Executive Coimcil by 
parties and communities; and 
(ii) the method by v/hich panels of names v;i]3 be submitted 
to the Viceroy to enable him to make his recommendations 
for appointment to the nev; Executive Council", 
The Conference considering the items under group A, agreed to the 
clauses (i), (ii) and (iii), but dif-Fered on clause (iv) relating to 
communal parity, P.N. Banerjee opposed parity between Muslims and Caste 
Hindus and division of Hindus betv/een tv/o sections - Caste and non-Caste 
Hindus, which, he said, \/as illogicel, absurd and antiquated. He accepted 
that the Scheduled Castes were not fairly treated and were likely to be 
squeezed out. He declared that the Executive Council "should be selected 
43 
on the basis of ability and capacity" either wholly consisting of Muslims 
or Scheduled Castes, 'if they had confidence of the people*. In other 
words, he meant to say that on this principle in every circumstance the 
Congress being a majority party would dominate the Executive Council 
having widest area of influence. However, the Viceroy justified that 
though communalism was deplorable, but then it was a standing fact and 
there was no escape, 
Sivaraj objected to the nrant of parity to Muslims with Caste Hindus 
neglecting the rights o'F other minrrities an^ i, disagreeing v/ith Banerjee, 
dem.anded that the Scheduled Castes should also be considered separately 
from the main Hindu community as he thouqht that the system of parity in 
the Executive Council might lead to league's claim for parity also in 
43. Ibid., p, 200. 
258 
services and the army and he wanted to share the benefit for his 
commvmity. 
G.B, Pant, opposing the communal parity, said that a "national 
government formed on a communal basis was really a contradiction in 
terms. The Congress did not worry much about the number of places in 
the Council assigned to one community or another, but vras concerned vith 
the parties to which the members belonged". Rajagopalachari treated 
"the Hindus and Mualims as two electoral bodies rather than as tv/o 
45 
communities". Dr. Khan Sahib said that "only a revolution would cure the 
46 
comm.unal problem". The other members, .more or less, agreed to the 
communal parity. 
While discussing on item (v) , Lord Wavell opposed the suggestion 
of Banerjee that from the very outset it should be ensured that the 
Viceroy would not overrule the decision of the Executive Council and 
would not use his veto power. The Viceroy referred to Amer^ *-' s declaration 
of June 14, in this context, which emphasized protection of minorities. 
Sivaraj asked for making a law -f^or protection of the position of the 
Depressed Classes. Pant hoped that the Viceroy would not use his veto 
as in the present Council. Kher did not like to reply on the Viceroy. 
Referring to Part B, the Viceroy laid dovm three possible methods 
for reaching an agreements (1) private discussion and, if necessary, 
discussions between the leaders and himself; (2) appointment of a 
committee by the Conference to suagest an agreement; and (3) adopting 
47 the two methods together. At the suggestion of Rajagopalachari, supported 
by Jinnah and Azad, the Conference xvas adjourned and the next meeting 
held on Jxone 27, 1945, which lasted -Por about an hour, in view of the 
conversations betv/een Pant and Jinnah, which they had begun on June 26. 
He asked the Congress to submit names for selection to the Executive 
Coxjncil and then the Conference adjourned till June 29, 1945. 
On June 27, Jinnah said to the Viceroy that though he did not agree 
to the appointment of the Executive Council of the Muslims not belonging 
44. Ibid., p. 201. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Ibid. 
47. Ibid., D. 202. 
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to the Leaque, but he vould nlace any ,formula, suggested by the Viceroy, 
before the Ml WorT<inq Complttee, Cn the same day, Jinnah told the 
Viceroy to constitute the Council of fourteen members - five I^lndus, 
•^ ivG Muslims, one Sii:h and one Scho ""nled ^asfe and the rest others, and 
insistef^ to retain the riaht of nominating all the Muslim members of 
the Council from amongst thn Muslim Icaouc. Cn the ochor b-nd, the 
Congress claimed to nominate members o" all communities including Muslims. 
If Jinnah's proposal v.'as acrepto"^, even the Congress President, Maulana 
Abul Kalam Azad could not be a member o-^  the Executive Council, and it 
had been the most derogatory/ position of the Congress, to v^ hich the 
Con'^ress never anreed. If, in the liqht of the fact that it v/as not 
necessary that the Congress President would alv;ays be a Muslim, the 
Conaress had agreed to Jinnah's terms, there could have been any possibi-
lity of anreement. Hov;ever, the Viceroy felt that the Conqress-I eanue 
48 
confrontation in the Council 'v/oii]d not help to solve ^iroblemc. 
T'l^e Conference met tor the -Fourth time on June 28, As the Pdnt-
Jinnah discussion pT-o"''uced no aereemenl-, the Viceroy intervener. He 
proposed that all the interests should send him a specified date, lists 
of the persons containing more names than seats in the Coxincil whom they 
t\'ould like to be included in the Executive Council and he v/ould try, by 
adding some more names of his choice, to form a list of members accentcM e 
to all. He desired the oarties to send the lists of persons in the 
fcl]o'"'ing manner: .\2ad (Congress) and Jinnah (leaoue) - betv.'een 8 and 
1? each; Shivaraj (Scheduled f^ asto - 3; Baneriee (i alio^alisi- Party), 
the Maharaja of Parla'-'imedi , I^ hizar ^-y^t ''han and "aster Tara Sinrrh - 3 
49 
each. Azad pressed ^or inclusion of members o-*^  all communi+-ies, parti-
cularly the Scheduled Castes and Christians, in their Congress list, 
although Shivaraj had objected bo the Congress claim "to nominate 
renresentatives o"^  the Scheduled Castes, and insisted that the number o-^  
its members should bear the same ratio to their population as the Muslim 
50 
members bore to theirs". He meant to say that i-^ the Muslims were recog-
nised on the basis of Jinnah's two-nation theory, fhey were also a separat 
element in the national life O-F India. 
48, Fenderel Moon, n. 4, o, 149. 
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Maulana Azad went so far to suggest that the League should accept 
in principle the Congress right to nominate whosoever it liked but 
in practice the Congress would not nominate a Muslim. Jinnah still 
refused to sit with him on the same table to discuss the names unless 
the Congress explicitly declared that it had no right to nominate a 
Muslim. As desired by Khizar Hyat Khan and Maharaja of Parlakimedi, the 
Viceroy assured that the lists would be kept secret. Master Tara Singh 
suggested that if the final agreement could not be arrived, there should 
be general elections, Sivaraj objected to the Congress claim and insisted 
that the Scheduled Castes should have the representation in the Council 
bearing the same ratio as the Muslim members have to their population. 
He did not press for parity. Sivaraj and Jinnah said that they would 
send the list after consulting their Working Committees, The Viceroy 
assured that he would not impose the settlement but he would like to 
prevent the breakdown and adjourned the Conference till July 14, 1945. 
52 
Jinnah on Jxme 30, insisted that behind the disputes about 
representation lay the bigger question of "whether we are to have a 
constitution or constitutions" and that must "be settled first". Jinnah, 
explaining the representation in the Councils, said: "the combination 
consisting of Gandhi and Hindu Congress, who stand for India's Hindus 
national independence as one India" had been reinforced by the exponent 
of geographical unity. Lord Wavell, Jinnah also said that Gandhiji had 
said,in 1940, that "Pakistan cannot be worse than the foreign domination", 
Jinnah replied, "But Hindustan could and would be worse". Therefore, 
Jinnah was prepared "to let independence wait upon division, while the 
51, S.IC, Majumdar, Jinnah and Gandhit Their Role in India's Quest for 
Freedom (Calcutta: Firma K.L. .Mukhopadhyay, 19661*^  pi 213. 
52, See for details of Nicholas Mansergh's view on Jinnah's stand. 
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Congress was not prepared to let independence wait upon \inity", Jinnah, 
57 further, criticising Gandhiji for having withdrawan from the negotiations 
and advising the Congress President, demanded that the Congress should 
give up its national character and function as a communal organisation 
and if Gandhiji accepted the demand of Pakistan in principle, there 
was no need of any Conference and they could hold another conference 
of their own, Jinnah also proclaimed that India's freedom cannot be 
resolved tmtil the Congress agreed to the division of the country first. 
Jinnah vehemently said: "Mr. Gandhi is an enigma ... How can we come to 
a settlement with him", 
The Congress Working Committee met on July 3 and selected a panel 
61 
of the following names and submitted it to the Viceroy: 
"l. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad 
2. Asaf Al i 
3 , Pand i t J awaha r l a l Nehru 
4 . Sa rdar Vallabhbhai P a t e l 
5 . Dr. Rajendra Prasad 
6 . M.A. J i n n a h 
7, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan 
8, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan 
9, Dr. Shyamaprasad Mookerji 
10, Gaganvihari Mehta 
11, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur 
12, Muniswami Pi Hay 
13, Radhanath Das 
14, Sir Ardeshir Dalai 
15, A Sikh member 
Congress Muslim 
Congress Muslim 
Congress Hindu 
Congress Hindu 
Congress Hindu 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Hindu Mahasabha 
Hindu 
Woman, Indian Christian 
Scheduled Class 
Scheduled Class 
Pairsi 
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It may be observed that the most important leaders, like Sivaraj 
(Scheduled Caste) and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya (Hindu Mahasabha) 
were not nominated by the Congress due to their open opposition of some 
of the Congress policies. The other members were old associates of the 
Congress. 
The ML Working Committee met on July 6, and the next day, Jinnah 
made three suggestions to the Viceroy: "first, that the Muslim League 
should not be asked to submit a panel, but that its representatives 
should be chosen on the basis of personal discussion between the Viceroy 
and himself; secondly, that all the Muslim members of the Council should 
be chosen from the League; and,thirdly, that some effective safeguard, 
other than the Viceroy* s veto, should be provided to protect Muslim 
interests from majority decisions of the Council". On July 8, Jinnah 
had a prolonged discussion with the Viceroy and emphasised that "None 
except himself as head of the Muslim League could nominate the Muslims 
on the new Council". On July 9, the Viceroy regretted his inability to 
guarantee to the League that the Muslim members would be selected 
exclusively from the League's list. The Viceroy pleaded for a fair play 
between the parties, not only in the composition but also in the working 
of the Council, Jinnah, on the same day, replied that as the required 
assurances were not forthcoming, he would not sxibmit any list. On the 
other hand, the Viceroy found the Congress list disappointing because 
a great proportion of them were stooges for Congress from the minorities. 
Meanwhile, he received the lists from other delegates and made his 
provisional selection and intended to send it to His Majesty's Government 
for approval, provided it was approved by all the parties. For this 
purpose, the Viceroy met Jinnah on July 11, 1945, Meanwhile The Trihune 
commented: 
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"Ridicule and laughter are provoked everywhere by Jinnah's 
claim that the Muslim League is the sole representative of 
the Muslim community. It has been clearly demonstrated that 
it is false and comic. No political party in the world,however 
brazen faced it may be, can after getting 4 per cent or 6 per 
cent of the votes in a general election assert that it 
constitutes the exclusive mouthpiece of the electorate. But 
the Muslim League has done so". 
Wavell-Jinnah Meeting 
Wavell sent a list of provisional selection for approval to the 
Home Department, but, interestingly enough, the Home Department asked 
him again to persuade Jinnah and show him the list to confirm that it 
did not include the name of any Congress Muslim so that he could put 
forward the Muslims* names for selection. Therefore, Lord Wavell met Jinnah 
on the afternoon of July 11, 1945, and expressed his willingness to 
include in a 14-member Council, four members of the Muslim League and 
one member (Pxinjab Muslim of the Unionist Party) not belonging to the 
League and giving him the four names desired Jinnah's suggestion, which 
he assured, would be based on parity not only between Hindus and Muslims 
but also between the Congress and the league. He said also in secrecy 
that he had not shown the list to the Congress, who might possibly^ raise 
objection to the arrangement. Jinnah, at once, said that it was impossible 
, 70 tmless: 
" (a) all five Muslim members of the Council were taken from the League, 
and 
(b) the Governor-General's power of veto was reinforced by a special 
safeguard for the Muslims within the Council e.g., a provision 
that no decision objected to by the Muslims should be taken 
except by a clear two-third majority, or something of the kind". 
The Viceroy was puzzled for he could not neglect the Punjabi Muslims 
Unionist Party, which was a dominant body in Punjab, and which was broken 
away from the League. Further, the position of the Muslim League was at 
a low ebb in other provinces also. In the NWTP, the Congress xmder Dr.Khan 
68. Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), pp. 244-45. 
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Saheb had taken control. In Bengal, Kazimuddin was defeated in the 
Assembly and the province was being administered by the Governor, Only 
in Sind and Assam, the League ministries were in power. In spite of all 
these deficiencies, the Muslim League claimed that "it was the League 
and the League alone, that represented the Muslims", However, here 
Jinnah committed a mistake. He should have accepted the Wavell proposal 
for inclusion of one member of the Unionist Party. He could bring him 
in his favour in future. The viceroy had included in his list the 
following!-
1. Liaquat Ali Khan - Muslim League 
2. Ch, Khaliqxizzaman - Muslim League 
3. Khwaja Nazimuddin - Muslim League 
4. Essak Sait - Muslim League 
5. Sir Muhammad Nawaz Khan (Landlorei) Unionist Party 
6. Jawaharlal Nehru - Congress (Caste Hindu) 
7. Vallabhbhai Patel - Congress (Caste Hindu) 
8. Dr.RaJendra Prasad - Congress (Caste Hindu) 
9. Dr. M.S, Aney - Congress (Caste Hindu) 
10. Sir B.N, Rau - Congress (Caste Hindu) 
11. Master Tara Singh - Sikh 
12. Dr. Ambedkar - SC Untouchable. 
13. Muniswami Pilai - SC Untouchable. 
14. Dr. John Matthai - Christian 
15. Viceroy 
16. Commander-in-Chief 
However, blatantly obstinate position taken by Jinnah despite 
League's weak electoral position and the support given to him by the 
Home Office and the Viceroy, beyond all limits of reason can be directly 
related to the League's and Jinnah's posture of a dependable friend 
of the British in war as well as in peace. The Viceroy, however,expressed 
his inability to accept either of the two conditions of Jinnah, who, in 
turn, said that "if that were so, the Muslim League could not co-operate". 
Thereupon, the Viceroy reluctantly informed him that in the circumstances 
his efforts were evidently futile and that he would make his statement 
on July 14, accordingly, 
Wavell desired to carry out the interim arrangement including 
members of other Muslim organizations or independent Muslims, in place 
of the Muslim League, and sought Amery's opinion in this respect, but the 
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Secretary of State directed that the proposals should not be proceeded 
with. Wavell informed Sir Francis Mudie (the Home Member), Sir Evans 
Jenkins and Menon, Menon was terribly disappointed as he was pleading 
with the Viceroy that League's claim that it represented all the Muslims 
of India was untenable, that the Unionist Party could not be let down, 
and that no compromise should be made with the league and he should go 
ahead with his plans, so that Jinnah's claim for Pakistan could be 
avoided. But as the decision of the Secretary of State was final, they 
had to act accordingly. On the same day (July 11), Wavell informed 
Gandhiji that due to Jinnah's terms, the Conference has failed.Gandhiji 
was not surprised and said, "as the Congress and the League, Hindus 
and Muslims, were irreconcilable, it would be necessary at some time 
74 for the British to decide between them". On July 12, Wavell explained 
the position to Khizar Hyat Khan, Maulana Azad a]:id Pant, who expressed 
indignation at the League's attitude. 
Maulana Azad made a long statement and said: 
"The Muslim League claimed the right to nominate all Muslim 
members of the Executive Council, This was a position which 
the Congress could not accept. By accepting it, the Congress 
would have reduced itself to a sectarian and Hindu organiza-
tion, and thrown away the work of half a century. This was 
the Congress view and, as a Muslim, he agreed with it whole-
heartedly. As a Muslim he was convinced that the Congress 
must carry the Muslims of India with it ,., The Viceroy was 
right in rejecting Its (League's) claim as he had apparently 
done. There was no doubt where the responsibility lay ,,, 
The communal problem had become so acute that, in the opinion 
of the Congress, it could only be solved by some final and 
just decision". 
There appears to be a lot of wisdom in Rajagopalachari*s analysis 
who said that the failure of the Conference was an understandable policy, 
He doubted the sincerity of the British Government, which proved true 
in future. He thought that the League's demand should not be allowed to 
stand in the way of constitutional development and the Viceroy could 
have declared a short-term solution on a territorial or administrative 
73, Proposal regarding inclusion of one member of the Unionist Party 
(Malik Khizar Hyat Khan) in the group of five members claimed by 
the Muslim League, 
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basis. The League was adamant to apparently untenable demands, the 
inability of the Viceroy in all fairness to agree to them and the 
dictate of the Home Department to close down the talks all appear to 
be inter-related plots of drama produced and directed by the imperial 
masters. In the context of this intrigue sincere efforts and pleadings 
of the Congress were JTJB t irrelevant. For Jinnah the situation was quite 
happy and he exploited it to the fullest benefit. 
As Azad and Rajagopalachari held the League responsible for the 
failure of the Conference, Jinnah stood to remind the Conference that 
the League and the Congress had entirely different angle of vision and 
in the Council every matter was taken up by them according to their own 
policies, which, according to Jinnah could create problems in the working 
of the Council, He made it clear that the League's demand for Pakistan 
and the Congress demand for a united India were quite contradictory 
and "Musalmans of India were determined to have Pakistan", and, thus, 
any conciliation between them was impossible. In the circiimstances, it 
was better that the British Government were to carry on the government, 
Jinnah repeatedly said that the League was determined to have Pakistan 
and could agree to any agreement for an Interim provisional government 
subject to two conditions: "first, a declaration by His Majesty's 
Government giving Muslims the right of self-determination; and,secondly, 
the grant to Muslims of any equality with all other communities in the 
77 interim government". 
Banerjee deplored that the League had obstructed the progress 
and suggested that the Viceroy could go ahead without the League, Khizar 
Hyat Khan claimed one seat for himself on the basis that "there were 
different schools of thought among the Muslims and he did not think any 
party should have a political monopoly". Master Tara Singh considered 
Pakistan a danger to the Sikhs and suggested that "the differences 
between the Congress and the Muslim league should be put to arbitration" 
and agreed to Pakistan "if Jinnah on his part would agree to a separate 
State for the Sikhs". Sivaraj, referring to the number of his Scheduled 
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Caste commxinity as sixty million/ claimed to be treated at par with the 
Muslim League and the Sikhs. 
Wavell, having no way of settlement^ however, declared the failure 
of the Conference in the last sitting of the Conference on July 14, 1945* 
accepting full responsibility of his own. The Conference, thus, came 
to an end. 
Amery wrote to Wavell: 
"So all our plans have for the moment broken down in the 
face of Jinna's intransigence ... that it is the Muslim League 
and not you or I who stand in the way of their aspirations ,,. 
They must now either acquiesce in Pakistan, or realise that 
they have somehow or other to win over Muslim support against 
Jinnah, and that a mere facade of tame Congress Muslims does 
not help them", 
Amery also suggested to hold the elections that winter and argued 
that "It by no means follows that Jinnah will sweep the board in the 
Muslim Provinces ... On the other hand, if he really does, then this claim 
that the Muslim members should all be members of the League could not 
so well be resistec 1i". 
«i= In reply Wavell admitte 
"The immediate cause of the failure of the Conference was 
Jinnah* s intransigence about Muslim representation and 
Muslim safeguards ,,,", 
The leaders gave statements at a press conference on July 14, 1945, 
expressing their viewpoints, 
Jinnah regretted that though the first issue had oblique reference 
in the statements made by Amery and Wavell, but it was not mentioned in 
the proposals. Regarding the second condition, Jinnah said, that the 
proposals reduced the Mudlim League's representation to one-third. He 
feared that the other minorities, which were xjnable to organize their 
own independent States, were helpless to join the Congress in the Council 
keeping it always in majority. He did not believe in the Viceroy's power 
of veto, which depended at his will and the League had no provision to 
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force the Viceroy to take steps against any proceedings against the 
Interest of Muslims. Therefore, he wanted that the League should have 
some form of power to veto the proceedings, Jlnnah also referred that 
as the composition of the Council was based on communal basis, it was 
but natural that the Congress were to act prejudicially. Therefore, the 
League had to secure sufficient safeguard through membership of five 
League members selected by the Muslim League Itself on the basis that 
the League was the only representative of all the Muslims in India, 
Jlnnah calculated that the proposal envisaged representation of five 
Muslims, of them two were Congress Muslims and one from the unionist Party 
of Punjab; thus, the League was left with two members only. Jlnnah also 
objected strongly to the Viceroy's determination to select the Muslim 
members (League or Non-League) himself out of the panel suggested by the 
Muslim League and considered by himself. Rajagopalachari also advised 
the Viceroy that in any interim arrangement the Congress and the League 
would be in conflict due to their different angle of vision and the 
League's fear was undeniable that "the Congress would make use of any 
interim arrangement to consolidate its position and gradually to strangle 
Pakistan". 
Azad blamed both the Muslim and the League for the failure of the 
84 
Conference, Menon writes that "Azad said that the blame for failure 
rested mainly on the Muslim League, but he could not altogether absolve 
the British Govemmenr". He blamed the Viceroy for giving the right of 
veto/rhe Muslim League and having failed to declare the members of the 
Council due to Jlnnah*s opposition to its composition, Aaad meant to say 
that the Muslim League's claim was not proper as the League's position in 
the provinces was miserable and It was running its government in only two 
provinces, Assam and Sind, that too depended upon the Congress support. 
Jlnnah said th^t xmder the Wavell Plan the Pakistan Issue was to 
be shelved indefinitely as the interim government could have lasted for 
an unlimited period with the assistance of the British, which had a strong 
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inclination for a united India, Further, the interim government could 
have been transformed into a permanent \jnitary government securing Hindu 
national independence of India, Jinnah expressed the fear that the other 
minorities ethnically and culturally very close to the Congress had to be 
associated with the Hindu society favouring the Hindu Raj and voting 
against them, Jinnah reiterated that since Wavell's proposal did not 
entitled the League to nominate all the Muslim representatives as its 
chosen spokesman, the League "would have emerged out of this conference 
minus everything and we would have entirely betrayed our people. It would 
have been an abject surrender on our part of all we stand for, and it 
would have been the death-knell of the Muslim League. This was the 
position which faced us and we found that it was impossible for us to 
accept this arrangement", Jinnah later saidt 
"There was the combination consisting of Gandhi and the Hindu 
Congress, who stand for India's Hindu national independence 
as one India, and the latest exponent of geographical unity. 
Lord Wavell, and Glancy-Khizr who are bent upon creating 
disruption among the Muslims in the Punjab, and we were sought 
to be pushed into this arrangement, which, if we had agreed to, 
as proposed by Lord Wavell, we should have signed our death 
warrant", 
Jawaharlal Nehiru said that "Muslim League represented mediaeval 
89 
conceptions and fear complexes", Hossain Imam, who attended the Conference 
in his capacity as leader of the Muslim League Pari:y in the Council, knew 
that Jinnah was being backed by the British for taking a fizm stand. Just 
before the Viceroy declared his flhal decision, Hossain Imam said to 
V,P, Menon that "the Viceroy was not aware that a member of his own 
90 Executive Council was advising Jinnah to stand firm". This view finds 
strength due to attitude of Liaquat Ali Khan. Menon discussed with Llaquat 
All Khan in the evening of July 13, for reaching an agreement. Liaquat Ali 
said that the "crucial issue with the League was the insufficiency of 
the Viceroy* s veto to protect the Muslim interests" and stressed that 
"no decision objected to by the Muslim members should be taken by the 
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Executive Council except by a clear two-third majority". Menon proposed 
to devise a formula acceptable to all parties and Liaquat Ali Khan 
promised to inform him after discussion with Jinnah, but he never retxirne c 
It may be said that Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan considered further 
negotiations out of vein. 
The statement of Menon that Hossain Imara "gave me the impression 
that the members of the Working Committee of the Muslim League were far 
91 
from unanimous in rejecting the Viceroy's offer", on way to Cecil Hotel, 
before the Viceroy communicated his final decision, on July 14, 1945, 
seems quite incorrect. Menon has used the word 'impression' and not a 
word carrying authenticity. If the matter was a fact he could have 
quoted directly. The doubt is confirmed in view of the statement of 
Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, who writes that in the meeting of July 14, of 
the Muslim League at the Cecil Hotel at 6,00 P,M,, the whole correspondenc 
of Jinnah with Wavell was reconsidered and, at last, it was decided 
that (1) the Muslim League would not send list of more than five names 
of Muslims and (2) of the 12 seats in the Executive Council, five should 
be reserved for the Muslim League and there would be no right to any 
Muslim Party to be included in it. On these two demands, there was no 
92 
disagreement between the members of the Muslim League. If no member of 
League had any objection to it, it is difficult to believe that Hossain 
Imam and Liaquat Ali Khan, the most trusted companions of Jinnah, had 
stated in confidence with Menon, as above. It is surprising that R.C, 
Majumdar has also interpreted it in more clear words: "According to 
V,P, Menon, Husain Imam, the leader of the Muslim party in the Council 
of State, and Liaquat Ali Khan did not endorse the views of Jinnan". 
However, the Congress and the League could not agree even though 
the Hindus in India constituted 70 per cent and the Muslims were only 
30 per cent, and the Congress had accepted the equal number of represen-
tatives in the Executive Council only to come to terms with the Muslim 
League so as to win self-government for India at any cost. Their 
differences became severe because Jinnah objected to the Congress proposal 
to nominate one or two Muslims out of its quota of five. However, the 
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Conference revealed that Jinnah would not be satisfied with anything 
less than Pakistan, as he was being encouraged by the British Government 
and his arrogance had reached the sununit vi th the backing of the British 
imperialilm. Durgadas reported that Jinnah was assured by the British 
Government that if he "stepped out of the talks, he would be rewarded 
, . 95., 
with Pakistan", 
Jinnah, like Ch. Khaliquzzaman, had also realized that the national 
government if formed with the ratio of representation of Hindus, Muslims 
and other minorities as 5+5+2, 5+5+3 or 5+5+4, in all cases the League 
had to remain in the Council and had to face all the consequences as 
feared by the Muslim League, With this view, the League should not have 
accepted to participate in the Simla Conference and they should have 
made it clear in the very beginning (1940 Lahore Resolution) that they 
would neither participate in any national government nor allow to form 
any such government and that they would agree only on the division of the 
country establishing Pakistan. If the League had adopted this policy and 
assisted the British war aims openly, they might be considered more 
favourably and had obtained the Pakistan along with Jamuna, 
On the other hand, the Congress was determined to establish a 
unitary government and make the Jinnah's plan for Pakistan unsuccessful 
without giving any safe comer to the Muslim League, To settle the 
differences, the Viceroy, as directed by the Home Department, decided to 
call a conference of all parties while they were well aware of the funda-
mental differences between the Congress and the league viewpoints. The 
decision reveals the intention of the British Government to prolong the 
British rule in India and to make final decision later in the face of 
the war in the Far-East, The conference served this purpose well.Secondly, 
the Churchill government had viewed the Muslim League as a proper instru-
ment for utilising it in the interest of the British Govemmait and, hence, 
did not like the formation of the Executive Council which did not include 
the representatives of the Muslim League sufficiently. Wavell knew this 
British policy before summoning the conference. But when he was trying 
and was on the verge of reaching an agreement while talking with Jinnah 
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on July 11, making him agree to five seats for Muslims including one 
for Khizar Hyat Khan, the Secretary of State directed him not to go 
much ahead. Thirdly, there was black sheep in Wavell's existing Cabinet, 
97 
who excited Jinnah not to accept the proposal. However, Wavell failed 
to adopt a firm attitude and allowed the AIML veto to prevail. 
Choudhry Khaliquzzaman sarcastically says that the Congress 
several times opposed the inclusion of Hindus (Non-Congress) chosen by 
the British Government, because the Congress could not depend on them. 
Similarly, the League could not depend on the Non-League Muslims, But 
when the Maulana was proud of supposed seven Muslim members in the 
Council, had he not in his mind that he would leave the Congress and 
join the Muslim League and, thus, he was inflicted with communal 
mentality. 
In the light of these facts, it may be admitted that the Simla 
99 
Conference "was a fraud upon the public as well as upon its members". 
Its impact was also not good. It gave strength to the demand of creation 
of Pakistan and confirmed a power of veto on Jinnah in deciding any 
future constitutional development in India, Jinnah fully exploited this 
situation created by Wavell and it was apprehended that the League's 
claim that it was the sole representative of Muslims of India would be 
conceded in fact or in theory in the near future. Therefore, the "wavering 
and middle-of-the-road Muslim politicians tended to gravitate to the 
Muslim League". Jinnah welcomed this development. 
Later ,Maulana Azad, maintaining that the Conference was a turning 
point in the history of national movement, wrol 101 )te: 
"The Simla conference marks a breakwater in Indian political 
history. This was the first time that negotiations failed, 
not on the basic political issue between India and Britain, 
but on the communal issue dividing different Indian groups", 
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Political Change In England 
After the Simla Conference, two important events took place. 
First, the general elections in England, which results caroe out on 
July 20, 1945/ returned the Labour Party to power securing a clear 
majority in the House of Commons and Churchill's 'Caretaker Government' 
was replaced by the Labour Government, with Element R, Attlee as Prime 
Minister and as Amery, the Secretary of State for India under the 
Conservative Government, lost the election, Penthick Lawrence became 
the Secretary of State for India. Secondly, as Japan was not surrender-
ing unconditionally, atom bomb was dropped by the United States on 
August 6, 1945, on Hiroshima and the other on August 9, on Nagasaki, as 
a result the Japanese unconditionally surrendered. The Congress President 
cabled to Attlee: 
"Hearty congratulations to the people of Great Britain on 
the results of the election which demonstrates their 
abandonment of the old ideas and acceptance of new world". 
King's Declarations 
The Congress expressed jubiliation as Churchill had given veto 
power to the Muslim League while the ML members feared that Attlee would 
not accept the deirtand of Pakistan. Sir Stafford Cripps, who had opined 
after the failure of the Simla Conference for granting free self-
government to India, emphasised to expedite permanent settlement giving 
place to the question of Pakistan as a major issue. He also urged to 
hold new elections and to form a constituent assembly with the represen-
tatives so elected "to work out a new free self-goveining constitution 
for British India, or such part of it as was ready to consent to such 
103 
a constitution". The last elections to the Central Assembly were held 
in 1934 and to the Provincial Legislatures in 1936. The elections were 
postponed due to war and there seemed no justification for putting off 
the elections any longer. The Congress, the Muslim League and all the 
parties favoured the general elections. The Viceroy was also in favour 
of it. In the first week of August, 1945, he held a meeting of the 
Provincial Governors, who also agreed for holding the elections as early 
as possible, 
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In the opening session of the Parliament, the King decla 
"In accordance with the promises already made to my Indian 
peoples, my Government will do their utmost to promote in 
conjtmction with leaders of Indian opinion early realization 
of full self-government in India". 
The Government invited Wavell to London in order to consult with 
him the whole situation. Wavell, on August 21, announced that the 
elections would be held in the cold weather. Wavell left India for London 
on August 24, accompanied by Sir Evan Jenkins and Menon, and reached 
there on August 25, 1945. 
Azad* s Proposal f6r Communal Settlement 
While Wavell was in England and a number of Congressmen were in 
jails and all hopes of communal settlement between the Congress and the 
League had failed, Abul Kalam Azad produced his own plan before Gandhiji 
for settlement. Menon writes about Azac W. 
"It was useless to enter into the causes of the commxinal 
problem or to apportion blame for it, Muslim fears could 
only be removed by devising a scheme under which they would 
feel secure. Any attempt to form a unitary government at 
the Centre would fall. Partition was against the interests 
of the Muslims themselves. As an Indian Muslim, he regarded 
partition as a defeatist policy and could not accept it. He 
suggested to the Congress that the future constitution of 
India must be federal with fully autonomous units; that the 
central siijjects must only be of an all-India nature and 
agreed upon by the constituent units, and that the units 
must be given the right of secession. There must be joint 
electorates both at the Centre and in the provinces, with 
reservation of seats and such differential franchise as might 
be needed to make electorates reflect the strength of popula-
tion of the communities. There must be parity of Hindus and 
Muslims in the central legislature and the central executive 
till such time as communal suspicion disappeated and parties 
were formed on economic and political lines. There should 
also be a convention by which the head of the Indian federation 
would, in the initial period, be Hindu and Muslim by turn, 
Hindu friends were exhorted to leave entirely to the Muslims 
the questions of their status in the future constitution of 
India, If Muslims were satisfied that the decision was not being 
imposed on them by a non-Muslim agency, they would drop the 
idea of partition and realize that their Interests would be 
best served by a federated and united India", 
104. D.C, Gupta, Indian National Movement (Delhi: Vikas, 1970), p. 251. 
105. V.P, Menon, n, 7, p. 221. 
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Wylle's Proposals 
Sir Francis Wylie^ the Governor of the United Provinces (1945-47), 
who was against the partition of the country, proposed the following 
solution to break the constitutional deadlock. He writes: 
"I circulated a paper arguing that means simply must be 
found to avoid the carving up of the country. A complete 
rearrangement of the map of India was necessary I wrote to 
create federal units based on linguistic, cultural and 
religious affinities. The federal concept was still capable 
of all sort of extensions. Why should not the Muslim units, 
once their limits had been established, be allowed to 
maintain their separate armed forces, fly the flag of the 
union with some added emblem that would satisfy their 
susceptibilities etc., etc. Always provided that the federal 
government had effective control at least of defence, foreign 
affairs and, if possible, communications. The Indian states 
should, I suggested, be left alone for the time being, but 
should be told straight away that their future lay with the 
Indian union and that, when this was establi^ed, their special 
relationship with the British Crown would be terminated. The 
rearrangement of provincial boundaries should, I wrote, be 
entrusted to a Royal Commission consisting exclusively of 
Indian members. It will not be forgotten that the creation 
of linguistic provinces was an old demand of the Indian 
National Congress", 
Though the intention of Francis Wylie was fair enough, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, with whom Wylie discussed the idea of a Royal Commission, was very 
cold about it because he thought it to be a means for delaying the transfer 
of power and "he boggled particularly at the notion of a separate flag 
for a federal unit", Wylie met with many prominent Muslims, who were not 
so many in the twilight of the raj, and expressed his opposition to the 
partition of the country, "^ hey all agreed, but it did not mean that "they 
enjoyed the prospect of living under a perpetual Hindu majority but that, 
if Jinnah had his way# their community, in what was left of the country, 
would be so weakened that in the end it might be completely submerged". 
Declarations of Wavell and Attlee 
In England, the Labour Party leader and Prime Minister Clement Attlee 
106, Sir Francis Wylie, 'Federal Negotiations in India, 1935-39' and 
After', in C,H, Philips and M,D. Wainwright, The Partition of India: 
Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947 (London: George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., 1970), pp. 525-26, 
107, Ibid, 
108, Ibid. 
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carried out far-reaching reforms and took revolutionary decisions in 
respect of overseas British territories. He had often declared that 
he would work for the liberation of India and when Wavell was called by 
him to England it was expected that some useful solution would come out. 
During the long discussions with the Secretary of State and the India 
Committee of the Cabinet/which included Clement R. Attlee, the Prime 
Minister, and Sir Stafford Cripps, then President of the Board of Trade 
also, and which was chaired by Attlee), Wavell explained that "Jinnah 
spoke for 99 per cent of the Muslim population of ^ndia in their appre-
hension of Hindu domination .,, The real strength of Mr, Jinnah's 
position was the widespread and genviine fear among Indian Muslims of 
Hindu domination and Hindu raj". He was inclined favourably towards the 
Muslim League, which, he anticipated, "might prove to be his only allies 
in the coming struggle for power". It was decided that the Cripps 
proposals for 'provincial option' should be retained and the question 
of framing the future constitution of India would best be left to be 
taken up after consulting the Indian leaders returned at the conclusion 
of the elections. Lord Wavell returned to India on September 16, and 
made an annoxmcement on 19th on behalf of His Majesty's Government: 
"As stated in the gracious speech from the Throne at the 
opening of Parliament, His Majesty's Government are determined 
to do their utmost to promote in conjunction with the leaders 
of Indian opinion the early realisation of full self-government 
in India, During my visit to London they have discussed with 
me the steps to be taken, 
"An announcement has already been made that elections to 
the central and provincial legislatures, so long postponed 
owing to the war, are to be held during the coming cold vreather^  
Thereafter His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that 
ministerial responsibility will be accepted by political 
leaders in all provinces, 
"It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to convene 
as soon as possible a constitution-making body, and as a 
preliminary step they have authorised me to undertake,immediately 
after the elections, discussions with the representatives of 
109, Humayun Kabir, 'Muslim Politics, 1942-7', in C.H. Philips and 
M,D, Wainwright, Ibid,, p. 396. 
110, Stanley Wolpert, n. 76, p, 250, 
111, Ibid. 
112, V,P, Menon, n. 7, pp. 218-19, 
277 
the Legislative Assemblies in the provinces, to ascertain 
whether the proposals contained in the 1942 declaration are 
acceptable or whether some alternative or modified scheme is 
preferable. Discussions will also be undertaken with the 
representatives of the Indian States with a view to ascertaining 
in what way they can best take their part in the constitution-
making body, 
"His Majesty's Government are proceeding to the consideration 
of the content of the treaty which will require to be concluded 
between Great Britain and India, 
"During these preparatory stages, the Government of India 
must be carried on, and urgent economic and social problems 
m\ast be dealt with. Furthermore, India has to play her full 
part in working out the new World Order, His Majesty's 
Government have therefore further authorised me, as soon as 
the results of the provincial elections are published, to take 
steps to bring into being an Executive Council which will have 
the support of the main Indian parties". 
Lord Wavell, in a personal message, emphasised the importance of 
the annoimcement, which conveyed the Goveimment' s decision to go ahead, 
and that the new Government in Britain took up the issue of India at its 
first opportunity. He said that after the elections the Indian leaders 
and the representatives of the States would be consulted to determine 
the form of constitution and for this purpose a constitution-making body 
would be set up. 
On the same day (September 19), Attlee, in his broadcast reiterated 
the Wavell declaration adding that the 194 2 Declaration (Cripps Proposals) 
still "stands in all its fullness and purpose" and that the Declaration 
"envisaged the negotiation of a treaty between the British Government and 
the constitution-making body". The British Government was considering 
the contents of such a treaty, and in that treaty nothing would be provided 
which would be "incompatible with the interests of India". He appealed 
to all the Indians to make a united effort to help evolve a constitution 
which would be accepted by all parties and interests in India. 
Reaction of the Congress 
The statements of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State were not 
favourably received by the main Indian parties. The AlCCymeeting in Bombay 
113, For text of Attlee's statement see B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, History 
of the Indian National Congress (Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 196977 
Vol. II, pp. 669-70, 
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on September 21, characterised Wavell's proposals as "vague and 
114 inadequate and vmsatisfactory" and pointed out that there was no reference 
of immediate change at the Centre or independence, and that the Declara-
tions only spoke of "alterations" and "modifications" in the Cripps 
scheme and did not clarify whether those "representatives of the Indian 
States" would represent the princes or they would be the spokesmen of 
the people. They demanded release of political prisoners but decided 
to contest the elections to demonstrate the will of the people on the 
issue of immediate transfer of power. The AICC passed a resolution 
reiterating the Congress policy of independence and unity in the following 
^ 115 terms: 
"Nevertheless, the Committee declares also that it cannot 
think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial 
\jnit to remain in an Indian Union aaainst their declared 
and established will. While recognising this principle, 
every effort should be made to create conditions which 
would help the different units in developing a common and 
co-operative national life. Acceptance of the principle 
inevitably involves that no changes should be made which 
result in fresh problems being created and compulsion being 
exercised on other substantial groups within that area. 
Each territorial unit should have the fullest possible 
autonomy within the union, consistently with a strong 
National State", 
Though this resolution was put aside, but on the right of secession, 
very strong speeches were made and it was declared that the Congress 
would not make more approaches to the League but "would contact the 
Muslim masses direct and would try to reassure them by appropriate means 
116 
through the election manifesto. 
Reaction of the Muslim League and Nationalist Muslims 
Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan reiterated their earlier statements 
that no solution would be acceptable to the Muslim League except on the 
basis of Pakistan and acceptance of the Muslim Leaaue as the sole 
representative of all the Muslims in India, The Muslim League, which had 
by then created a strong press and had become a people's party, claiming 
the loyalty of almost every Muslim, demanded that the provinces of the 
114. V.P, Menon, n, 7, p, 220. 
115. Ibid., p. 222. 
116. Ibid. 
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Punjab, Sind, the NWFP, Baluchistan, Bengal and Assam In their entirety 
should be formed into a separate sovereign State of Pakistan. The Muslims 
had realised that their interests lie only with Jinnah and the League 
as a result many Muslims, who were earlier in the Congress, joined the 
117 
League and Jinnah "welcomed them like lost sheep", ?or instance, Abdul 
Qaiyura Khan of NWFP, the Deputy Leader of the Congress Party in the 
Central Assembly, changed his allegiance to the Muslim League. However, 
the nationalist Muslims found themselves in a difficult position because 
they knew that the Muslims would not vote for them xantil and unless t^ey 
were assured of some protection from the Congress, 
I.N.A. Trials 
The Indian military personnel, who, while warring on the British 
side, were captured by the Japanese, were turned into the Indian National 
Army founded by Subhas Chandra Bose, At the conclusion of the war, over 
20,000 of them were rounded up, repatriated to India and charged for 
waging war against the King and inducing the fellow prisoners to join 
them. The first batch of three accused officers included a Hindu, a Muslim 
and a Sikh to be tried by a Military Tribunal in the Red Fort, Delhi. 
Desai, Sapru and Nehru set up a panel of defence. The trial evoked a 
strong enthusiasm and when the League joined them, the agitation spread 
throughout the whole India, These trials provided much material for an 
anti-British propaganda, "Wild demonstrations were held over a wide area, 
from Calcutta to Lahore and Bombay, and from Lakhnau to Madura,occasionally 
accompanied by popular violence and firing by the police". The British 
Government realized that if they would attempt to prolong their rule in 
India, the people would be more restive and violent as they had become 
conscious of their country's plight and backwardness due to century-old 
British exploitation of their land and resources. Therefore, the British 
Government, which had become weak, economically and politically after 
the war and was unable to manage its distant territories, thought it 
proper to transfer power to the Indians in a respectable manner at the 
earliest, 
Attlee, on September 23, 1945, made a statement, which clarified 
117, I b i d , , p . 221, 
118. See for day- to-day account , AIR, 1946, P a r t I , pp, 269-84, 
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some ••misxmderstanding" created by V/avell's statement, and assured 
that a constitution-making body would be urgently set up, by which 
the Indians will decide their own future. On November 8, Jinnah said 
that the "Government was groping in the dark" and asserted that the 
constitution-making body should be formed only after the question of 
Pakistan was settled and suggested that* to solve this issue, "there 
should be two separate constitution-making bodies for the two parts 
into which India should be dividSd". 
Meanwhile, a million or more Indian soldiers, recriiited during 
the war, began to return to India with a new political consciousness. 
They had fought for democracy and it was but natural that tbey wished 
to see democracy in India as well. Further, the sepoys had become 
accustomed to somewhat good standard of life and disliked to live in a 
miserable condition in the villaqes, to which they mostly belonged. They 
also resented the discrimination in emoluments, treatment and standard 
of life between themselves and the British soldiers. They had proved 
themselves as good soldiers as the British and had realised that the 
British were not superior to them; hence, they argued that ••there should 
be eouality of treatment among soldiers of the Commonwealth without 
12C 
regard to their country of origin, complexion or creec " > § " . 
The Congress threat for another struggle, the trials of the INA 
soldiers, widespread demonstrations, demand of British Indian soldiers 
returning home and severe strains on British- economy created a very 
dangerous and tense situation compelling the British Government to 
re-state their policy. Consequently, Attlee, on December 4, 1945,declared 
in the House of Commons that a Parliamentary Delegation would shortly 
visit India to meet leading political leaders, to learn their views and 
to convey that "India should speedily attain her full and rightful 
position as an independent partner State in the British Commonwealtri". 
It was the first announcement of the British Government with respect to 
India's independence,which was widely appreciated. 
119, V,P, Menon, n, 7, p, 224. 
120, HxOTayun Kabir, n , 109, pp . 396-97. 
121, See for d e t a i l s N.N. Mitra ( e d . ) . The Indian Annual R e g i s t e r , V o l . 1 1 , 
( C a l c u t t a : Annual R e g i s t e r Off ice ,1930-1947) , p . 150; a l s o see 
S i r Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the 
Indian C o n s t i t u t i o n , 1921-1947, Vol . I I (London: Oxford u n i v e r s i t y 
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The CWC at its Calcutta session held on December 7, 1945,reaffirm-
ing its faith in non-violence, asserted that it does not include "burning 
of public property, cutting of telegraph"wires, derailing trains and 
intimidation". 
j 
Wavell found support and felt relief from the long drawn resolu-
tion of Gandhiji on December 7, and addressing the Associated Chambers 
of Commerce on December 10, 1945, in Calcutta, he assured the Indian 
people of "political freedom and a government or governments, of their 
own choice" and unless some reasonable settlement was reached between 
the Congress, the minorities, "of whom the Muslims are the most nxnnerous 
and most important", and the rulers of Indian States, the British could 
not abandon their responsibility of governing India. He said that India's 
problem was difficult and "would not be solved by repeating a password 
or formula. 'Quit India' would not act as the magic 'sesame' which 
opened Ali Baba's cave. It could not, and would not, be solved by violence, 
Disorder and violence were the very things that might check the peace 
123 124 
of India's progress". Ke further said: 
"We are going through a very difficult and testing time, 
and it will need coolness and wisdom if we are to avoid 
calamity. In so far as I can help by personal contact,I 
am always prepared to do so". 
Wavell announced that the life of the Assembly would expire on 
October 1, 1945, and the new members would take their seats at the budget 
session of 1946. As the electoral rolls were not ready, the life of 
that Chamber was extended up to May 1, 1946, and elections were required 
to be held as early as possible. 
The Punjab Governor, Glancy, on August 1, 1945, had argued: Unless 
the Muslim League could be steered away from the crude version of Pakistan, 
there would be civil war in the Punjab; and immediate Central elections 
might consolidate the Muslim League position". Casey thought that Jinnah 
122. V.P. Menon, n , 7, p . 224. 
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had no real successor and the "Palcistan idea might go to pieces without 
him. 
The Viceroy had announced that the elections to the central legis-
lature would be held first; then would follow the elections to the 
provincial legislatures where ministries were functioning, and the 
legislatures in provinces where ministries were not functioning. However, 
the Congress and the Muslim League announced to contest the elections 
and began preparation for it. The Akali Sikh Congress* the Working 
Committee of the All-India Scheduled Castes, the National Liberation 
Federation, and the Ccxranunist Party of India also annovnced to contest 
the elections, 
Jinnah, to establish the firm position of the League, began to 
oppose Gandhiji strongly. On August 6, in his first pxiblic speech at 
Bombay, Jinnah had restated: "There are only two major parties in this 
country. Invitations issued to Mr. Gandhi and myself were on the basis 
that Mr, Gandhi was the recognised leader of one of the parties and myself 
the leader of the other. The British called them parties, but in fact 
126 
they are two major nations". 
At one occasion, Jinnah argued that 'every vote in favour of the 
Muslim League candidate meant Pakistan, and every vote against the Muslim 
League candidate meant Hindu Raj*. At another meeting, he said: 
"The Hindus and Muslims are different in everything. We 
differ in our religion, our civilization and culture, our 
language, our architecture, music, jurisprudence and law, 
our food, society, dress - in every way we are different. 
We cannot get together only in the ballot box. The Hindus 
want the Itoitary Government because in that case they have 
a perennial majority of three to one and thus they rule 
over the Muslim nation because the Muslims would be in a 
minority always". 
C»i November 1, 1945, Jinnah predicted that the Muslim League would 
• sweep' at the polls and informed a reporter from the Associated Press 
128 an. 
Jinnah charged the nationalist Muslims that they were neither 
126. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, n. 60, Vol. II, p, 387, 
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nationalists nor true Muslims because if they were honest Muslims and 
felt that the League was doing against the interest of Muslims^ they 
would have joined the League and guided it. 
Addressing the ML Conference/ Jinnah, expressing his feeling 
towards the Government and the Congress, said: 
"We have no friends ... Neither the British, nor the Hindus 
are our friends. We are clear in our minds that we have to 
fight against both of them. If both (being Banias) are 
combined against us, we shall not be afraid of them. We shall 
fight their united might and, InshalJah, win in the end". 
When Jinnah asked the crowd, whether they wanted Pakistan or not, 
he was loudly and repeatedly cheered by the slogan, "Allah~o-Akbar"(God 
is Great). He said that to win Pakistan, they had only to "vote for 
the League candidates", Jinnah became defensive, sarcastic and irate 
towards Gandhiji, when he sa3 m-. 
"They (Hindus) ask: 'What are the sacrifices of Mr, Jinnah 
and the Muslim League."' It is true that I have not been to 
jail. Never mind, I am a bad person. But I ask you, 'Who 
made sacrifices in 1920-21."', Mr, Gandhi ascends the gaddi 
(throne) of leadership on our skulls". 
The above statement reveals that Jinnah felt Gandhiji's ascendency 
to the throne of Congress leadership as his step on his 'skull' as the 
former did not tolerate the latter's inclination towards Congress domina-
tion over the Muslims reducing them to the status of an ignorable citizen 
without having any power of 'check' on-the working of the Congress 
government and thus amending the constitution against the interest of 
the Muslims. Thus, Jinnah's uncompromising attitude was a measure of 
safeguard of Muslim interests. 
Jinnah's hectic propaganda, the position accorded by the British 
to the Muslims at Simla and the British acceptance of the League's demand 
for Pakistan made the people realize that the communal voting would clear 
the way for success of the League. 
On December 3, 1945, Casey, the Bengal Governor, told Gandhiji that 
what was "standing in the way of self-government for India" was not the 
129, Ibid,, pp. 438-39, 
130. Ibid. 
284 
British but the Muslim League, which was "suffering from Hinduphobla" 
and urged that the Congress should announce "a sxibstantial list of 
safeguards" for Muslims for inclusion in the new constitution to "blunt 
the edge" of League's fears and suspicions. Gandhiji replied that he 
had "conceded safeguard after safeguard", but Jinnah '•constantly raised 
his price" until he demanded Pakistan. Gandhiji also sai ML 
•*... he believed Jinnah to be a very ambitious man and 
that he had visions of linking up the Moslems of India 
with the Moslems in the Middle East and elsewhere and 
that he did not believe that he could be ridden off his 
dreams". 
The xincanny accuracy of Gandhiji's assessment of the position of 
Jinnah and his party is amazing. 
Attlee's Declaration 
On December 4, 1945, Attlee declared in the House of Commons that 
a Parliamentary Delegation owould shortly visit India to envisage means 
132 for solving communal problem so that independence could be granted. 
Wavell, on December 10, 1945, had made clear that independence would 
be granted only after settlement reached between the Congress and the 
133 Muslim League r that is, the Muslims, However, according to Wavell's 
statement of September 19, 1945, on elections and his plans for summoning 
constitution-making body, elections held in December, 1945, 
Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly 
The elections to the Central Legislative Assembly were held and 
the results were announced on December 31, - Januaty 1, 1946,which 
showed the elected members as follows: 
131. Nicholas Mansergh, n, 125, pp. 590-91, 
132. V.P, Menon, n, 7, p, 226. 
133. D.C, Gupta, n. 104, p. 253. 
134. V.P. Menon, n. 7, p. 226. 
135. R.C, Majumdar, n. 8, p. 724; V.P. Menon, n. 7, p. 226. 
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S.No, Party Elected 
Congress 
Muslim League 
European Group 
Independents 
Akali Sikhs 
(represented for the 
first time) 
56(57) 
30 
8 
5 
2 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Nominated on January 4/ 1946 
1. Official 26 
2. Non-official 14 
Total 40 101(102) 
Previous members of 
dissolved Assembly 
36 
25 
8 
21 
10 (Nationalists) 
100 
The results confirmed that the "Congress won an overwhelming 
success in the General constituencies, the Hindu Mahasabha and other 
opposing candidates preferring in most cases to withdraw rather than 
risk defeat. The Muslim League won every Muslim seat, the Nationalist 
Muslims forfeiting their deposits in many instances. The Congress 
secured 91.3% of the votes cast in non-Muhammadan constituencies and 
the Muslim League 96.6 per cent of the total votes cast in Muhammadan 
constituencies". The results proved that the Congress and the Muslim 
League were the only major parties that counted in the Indian politics. 
The Congress Central Election Board in its bulletin issued on January 6, 
1946, declared that "the Congress stood vindicated; it was the biggest, 
i37 ry", while 
the Muslim League also celebrated its victory on January 11, 1946, and 
Jinnah on that occasion "congratulated the League on winning all the 
Muslim seats in the Central Assembly". 
Elections to the Provincial Legislatures 
Elections to the eleven Provincial Legislatures lasted for three 
and a half months, commencing on January 9, 1946, in Assam and ending in 
various provinces up to the middle of April. The results are given belows 
136. V.P, Menon, n, 7, p. 
137. Ibid. 
138. Ibid. 
226. 
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•Results of Elections of Provincial Legislatures - 1^31 
1 ; 
Provinces Seats won by Congress Seats won by Muslim League 
Assam 
Sindh 
NWFP 
Pimjab 
Bengal 
Bombay 
Madras 
Orissa 
U.p. 
Bihar 
C.P. 
58 out of 108 35 (All Muslim seats) 
21 (joined by 7 others) 27 (joined by 1 independent) 
35* (All Muslim seats) 
30 (plus 19 Nationalist 
Muslims) 
17 out of 38 
51 (joined by 22 Akali 75 (79 out of 86*) 
SlTchs,unionists 20) ^ independents 
87 out of 250 
Absolute majority 
Absolute majority 
Absolute majority 
Absolute majority 
Absolute majority 
Absolute majority 
113 out of 119 
(116 out of 119 Muslim seats*) 
All Muslim seats 
(30 out of 30*) 
All Muslim seats 
(Similar results*) 
All Muslim seats 
54 out of 66. 
34 out of 40 
(43 out of 50«) 
13 out of 14 
(* Ch. Khaliquzzaraan. Pathway to Pakistan (Urdu), pp. 970-72) 
139, R.C, Majximdar, Struggle for Freedom (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya 
Bhavan, 1969), p. 725. 
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The results of the elections showed that in Assam the Congress 
won all the General seats and the League almost all the Muslim seats. 
The Congress formed the ministry. In Sind^ though the Congress coalition 
had the "majority of one over the Muslim League, the leader of the League 
140 
was asked to form a ministry by the Governor", which was severely 
criticised as being xmconstitutional. In the NWFP, the Congress having 
absolute majority formed the ministry. In the Punjab, the Congress, 
forming a coalition with the Akali Sikhs and the Unionists, formed the 
ministry. In Bengal, the Muslim League being in absolute majority formed 
the ministry. In Bombay, Madras, U.P., Bihar, Orissa and C,P., the 
Congress won absolute majority and formed the ministry. The Congress 
offered two seats to the Muslim League in Assam in the ministry, but 
the League rejected the offer because of inclusion of one Nationalist 
Muslim. In Pvirijab, the Congress invited the Muslim League to form ministry, 
but the latter did not agree to the alliance. In Bombay, Madras, U,P,, 
Bihar, Orissa and CP., the Congress invited the League to join the 
Congress ministry, but the negotiations failed. It may be noticed that, 
first, the Congress and the League emerged as the two important parties. 
Secondly, the Muslim League had claimed to form Pakistan including 
Assam, Bengal, Sind, NWFP, Punjab and Baluchistan, but it could come 
into power in only two - Bengal and Sind, where the League formed the 
ministry and, that too, in Sind with the favour of the Governor, Thirdly, 
142 
majority of the Scheduled Castes supported the Congress. In total, the 
Congress won 930 seats with absolute majority in eight provinces emd 
in three provinces the Congress became the second largest party. The 
Congress failure in winning the majority in these provinces was due to 
the League propaganda fomenting religious sentiments and commiinal passions. 
However, the League's capture of 428 seats indicated its increasing 
influence in Indian politics, it also showed an emergence of the Panthic 
Akalis in Punjab, the disappearance of the Hindu Mahasabha and Justice 
Party in Madras and decline of the Iftiionist Party in Pvinjab, which won only 
20 seats. The following figures of the votes cast shows thfct the Congress 
polled 80 per cent of the General votes and the League 74 per cent of 
the Muslim votes cast: 
140. R.C, Majiimdar, Ibid., 
141. V.P, Menon, n, 7, p, 229, 
142. R,C. Majumdar, n. 8, p. 726. 
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14 Final figures of the total votes cas 
1. congress Party _ 11,683,053 
2. Muslim League - 4,530,538 
3. Communists - 653,489 
4. Scheduled Castes Federation - 509,217 
5. Pmjab Unionists - 413,815 
6. Hindu Mahasabha - 285,567 
7. AXali Sikhs (mainly Punjab) - 178,509 
8..Krishak Praja Party (mainly Bengal)- 132,581 
9. Jamiat-ul-Ulema (non-League Muslims)- 132,190 
10. Nationalist Muslims (mainly U.Pi - 125,434 
11. Radical Democratic Party - 118,661 
12. Ahrars - 67,461 
13. Momlns (Bihar) - 29,168 
14. Khaksars - 21,100 
The success of the Muslim League, on the one hand, "loaded the dice 
heavily in favour of Pakistan", while that of the Congress, on the other, 
"held out a fair hope that the Congress would be able to hold together 
the rest of India even after the creation of Pakistan and to thwart the 
Muslim League's design to Include the predominantly non-Muslim areas of 
144 
Assam and Bengal and of the Punjab within Pakistan". 
Parliamentary Delegation 
The Secretary of State, on November 8, 1945, had cabled the Viceroy 
to ask: "But can Jinnah be Induced to accept a modified form of it 
i45 e/". On November 19, 1945, 
Cripps had advised the Cabinet Committee to send a parliamentary delega-
tion to India and to urge the Viceroy to meet Gandhijl, whom he xinderstood 
was "willing to influence Indian opinion towards moderation". Wavell, in 
depression, wired an "immediate, top secret reply: "I do not think it 
147 
advisable that I should invite Gandhi to see me". 
To assess the depth of the Congress-League confrontation on the 
communal problem - constitutional development and independence, the 
143. D.C. Gupta, n, 104, p, 256. 
144. S.R. Mehrotra, 'The Congress and the Partition of India', in 
C.H. Philips and M.D. Walnwrlght, n. 106, p. 217. 
145. Pethlck-Lawrence to Wavell, November 8, 1945, see Nicholas Mansergh 
and E.W.R. Lumby, n. 125, Vol. VI, p. 463. 
146. Cabinet Minutes, November 19, 1945, Ibid.> p. 501. 
147. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, November 23, 1945, Ibid., p. 524. 
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British Government decided to send a parliamentary delegation to India, 
Pethick-Lawrence, on December 21, 1945, wrote to Jinnah and Azad asking 
whether they would like to meet the delegation to "discuss matters with 
him". Having elicited a positive response, the Parliamentary Delegation, 
consisting of ten members - eight from the House of Commons and two 
149 from the House of Lords, headed by Professor Robert Richards, arrived 
in India on January 5, 1946. The Secretary of State wrote to the Congress 
and the League Presidents that the basic purpose of the Delegation was 
"to make personal contacts". 
The political leaders received the Delegation - which toured the 
country for about a month - with cordiality and friendliness. Jinnah, 
on January 10, 1946, reiterated that "he would take no part in an interim 
Government without a prior declaration accepting the principle of 
Pakistan and 'parity' with all other parties" and also insisted "on two 
constitution-making bodies" leaving India and Pakistan to settle their 
boundary through negotiations without envisaging predominantly non-Muslim 
areas, Jinnah made it clear: 
"Any attempt to impose a unified constitution » or to accept 
a majority decision by a single constitution-making body, 
would be resisted, if necessary by force, ... that Pakistan 
would remain within the Empire with a British Governor-General, 
Relations with Hindustan would be purely diplomatic; there 
would be no common currency, transport system, army etc.". 
Jawaharlal Nehru, during talks with the Delegation, conceded that 
the Government "might have to declare for Pakistan, but that there would 
have to be a plebiscite in border districts to confirm it". He thought 
that the results to the Central Assembly were Insufficient to ascertain 
the consensus of the people as the Muslims, according to him, "did not 
151 know what they were voting for". Miss Muriel Nlchol, one of the members 
of the Delegation said: "Without rancour or bitterness, and in a clear 
yet firm way. Pandit Nehru stated the Congress case for India's freedom. 
152 
,., I have really met a great man", Richards, the leader of the Delegation 
148, Pethick-Lawrence to Jinnah, December 21, 1945, Ibid,, pp,672-73. 
. 227, 149, 
150, 
151, 
152, 
V.P, Menon, n. 7, 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 228, 
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at a press conference, stated: 
"There are deep divisions among you, but those divisions 
disappear in the unity with which you, in my opinion, very 
rightly demand a measure of self-government at this time. 
There are several views on that particular question, but 
I do say that we are all conscious of the fact that India 
has at last attained political manhood; and it will be the 
privilege of the Government in England,I hope, to extend 
and further that confidence which India has in herself and 
in her ability to take her place among the free nations of 
the world", 
On January 28, 1946, the Viceroy, addressing the newly elected 
central legislature in a seven-minute speech, said that the British 
Government was determined to establish a new Executive Council and to 
set up a constitution-making body as soon as possible, Patel, welcoming 
the speech, said: "The ship has reached the shore ... The freedom of 
India is near at hand", but Jinnah, opposing the speech, reiterated that 
"the Muslim League was not prepared to consider anything short of 
immediate recognition of the Pakistan demand", 
Parliamentary Delegation Report 
The Parliamentary Delegation returned to 10 Downing Street in the 
middle of February and reported that Pakistan would have to be conceded -
and the sooner the better, Mrs, Muriel Nichol, on February 13, 1946, 
maintained that she found the Punjab 'explosive* as the Muslim population 
there was "all worked up in favour of Pakistan"; hence, Pakistan must 
be conceded. She believed that Jinnah would agree to modify his demand, 
155 if it was acceded "at an early stage". Brigadier Austin Low felt that 
the HMG should not make a declaration in favour of Pakistan as he feared 
that "Pakistan is not a viable proposition". M,P, Reginald Sorensen 
regarded "Pakistan as wholly irrational - he was not sure that Mr.Jinnah 
could be regarded as a rational person - but, in his view, necessary", 
Arthur Bottomley "did not like Pakistan but thought it would be necessary" 
,.. (a) to avoid widespread bloodshed, (b) to preserve our own trade 
interests, for whereas the strong tendency in the Congress majority 
provinces was to boycott trade with the United Kingdom, the Muslims were 
153, Ibid, 
154, Ibid, 
155, Nicholas Mansergh and E,W,R, Lumby, n. 125,Vol. VI, p. 948, 
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156 
eager to do business with us", 
Francis Tumbull, the Private Secretary of Pethick-Lawrence 
stated in his note of February 13, 1946, on the "viability of Pakistan": 
"There is bound to be an economic price to pay for the satisfaction 
of the Moslem demand for political independence" and warned: 
"The division of India will be bom in" bitter antagonism 
and it will certainly be rash to assume that this will 
not be reflected in the efforts necessary to regulate the 
machinery of communications and of economic intercourse 
between the Pakistan States and the rest of India ... It 
is hard to resist the conclusion that taking all these 
CCTisiderations into account the splitting up of India 
will be the reverse of beneficial so far as the livelihood 
of the people is concerned", 
Jinnah reiterated that the League would not be prepared to 
co-operate in any interim arrangements until this principle had been 
accepted beyond all doubts that there would be two constitution-making 
bodies -"one for the Pakistan areas and the other for the rest of In 
In a press interview, Jinnah also said that if the Govemnent would 
call a single constitution-making body, the Muslims would revolt 
throughout India. 
Wavell, sensing a country-wide disturbance, wrote to the Sefcretary 
of State regarding the future programme and commimicated his two important 
observations: "First, that if Jinnah refused to participate in the 
interim Government, the Government should go ahead without him. Secondly, 
though Pakistan had to be conceded, the larqe non-Muslim populations 
(in the East Punjab and West Bengal) could not be forced to remain in 
Pakistan against their Meanwhile, the provincial election campaign 
and the "poisonous propaganda" had caused Hindu-Muslim riots, especially 
in the Punjab, Therefore, Pethick-Lawrence, in consultation with the 
British Cabinet, concluded that it would be useless to leave another 
round of political negotiations to the Viceroy alone, and a Cabinet Mission 
156. Ibid., pp. 949-50. 
157. "Viability of Pakistan",Ibid., pp. 951-55. 
158. Ibid., p. 955. 
159. V.P. Menon, n. 7, p. 228. 
160. R.C. Majumdar, n. 8, p, 726. 
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could only break the Hindu-Muslim "deadlock". Therefore, the Cabinet 
on February 19» 1946, decided to send in March a three-member Mission 
to conduct, in association with the Viceroy, negotiations with the 
161 leaders. The announcement came as follows: 
"In view of the paramount importance, not only to India 
and to the British Commonwealth but to the peace of the 
world, of a successful outcome of discussion with leaders 
of Indian opinion, the British Government have decided 
with the approval of His Majesty the King to send out to 
India a special mission of Cabinet Ministers consisting 
of the Secretary of State for India (Lord Pethick-
Lawrence), the President of the Board of Trade (Sir 
Stafford Cripps) and the First Lord of the Admiralty 
(Mr. A.V, Alexander) to act in association with the Viceroy 
in this matter". 
The Cabinet thought the mission as its "final card in the game 
162 
of British India spinning so swiftly to its tragic finale". The Cabinet 
realised that if the negotiations failed, civil disobedience and 
disobedience of the army would follow. Further, by that time the total 
number of Europeans in all official services was rapidly dwindling as 
they had opted for retirement on their pensions back home and there 
was precious little time left to break the deadlock for transferring 
the power. 
Bombay Sailors' Revolt 
Another significant occurrence which highlighted the compulsive 
situation for the British was the sailors' revolt on Februaiy 18, 1946. 
The sailors in the Royal Indian Navy in Bombay harbour demanded higher 
wages and on February 19, 3000 of them marched around the Bombay calling 
themselves members of the Indian National Navy in emulation of Hose's 
I.N.A. Later, they captured the ship and threatened fire. On the persua-
tion of Vallabhbhai Patel, they surrendered unconditionally, while the 
elections continued. 
Attlee's Declaration 
CSi March 15, 1946, the Prime Minister Attlee, in the House of 
Commons, declared that to solve "the problem of the development of India 
161. N.N. Mitra (ed.). The Indian Annual Register, n. 121, p. 129; 
see also Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, n. 121, p. 571. 
16 2. Stanley Wolpert, n. 68, p. 254. 
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into a completely self-governing nation" has been very difficult and 
"it would be a great mistake to stake out the claims of rival communities" 
In the rather fluid position, he did not like "to tie dovm those who 
are going out too rigidly". He said that the Cabinet Mission was being 
sent to help India to attain her freedom "as speedily and fully as 
possible" and the form of Government had to be decided by the Indians. 
He also said; "India herself must choose what will be her future 
constitution: what will be her position in the world" and hoped that 
Indian people would like to remain within the British Commonwealth. He 
desired an Interim Government to be set up and assured that he "would 
not like to fetter the Viceroy's discretion in any way with regard to 
the allocation of portfolios". He also hoped that "the statesmen of 
British India and of princely India will be liable to work out a solution 
of the problem of bringing together, in one great policy, these desparate 
constituent parts". Referring to the protection of Minorities, he said' 
"we cannot make Indians responsible for governing themselves and, at 
the same time, retain over here responsibility for the treatment of 
Minorities and the power to intervene in their behalf". He was sure 
that "everyone will vi sh them (Cabinet Ministers) Good-Speed". 
The announcement of the Prime Minister made the Indians to believe 
that Independence of India was certain and it would not be delayed after 
making necessary preliminary arrangements. This belief was further 
strengthened in the light of the Prime Minister's statement reading -
"We are mindful of the rights of the minorities and the minorities 
should be able to live free from fear. On the other hand, we cannot allow 
a minority to place their veto on the advance of the majority", which 
"served as 'open sesame' to the closed doors of the solution of Indian 
problem". Had this principle been adopted by Churchill, the problem 
of constitutional deadlock could have been solved long ago, and,perhaps, 
without partition of India, However, this statement did not please Jinnah, 
who demurred to the declaration and reasserted that the Muslims were 
not a 'minority' but a 'nation' and repeated his usual threat that 
163. See for details A.C. Banerjee, n. 84, pp. 104-10. 
164. Ibid., p. 110. 
165. V.P. Menon, n, 7, pp. 234-35. 
166. R.C, Majumdar, n. 8, p. 728. 
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if only a single constitution-making body be set up, the Muslim League 
would not cooperate with it. However, all the other political leaders 
welcomed Attlee's declaration to send the Cabinet Mission, 
CONCLUSION 
Wavell on June 14, 1945/ declared a plan to end commxmal 
deadlock giving right to the Indians tor framing their own constitution. 
Gandhiji objected the parity between the Caste Hindus and the Muslims, 
to which the Hindu Mahasabha supported. The leaders met at Simla 
Conference but they could not reach a settlement. Azad's and Wylie's 
proposals also could not be accepted by the Congress and the league. 
On September 19, 1945, Wavell declared for an early realisation of 
full self-government and to hold elections for the Central and Provincial 
legislatures. The Congress and the League won majority of seats. The 
Parliamentary delegation recommended creation of Pakistan in February, 
1946, while some opposed. In consequence, Attlee declared to send 
Cabinet Mission to institute India's freedom as early as possible. 
He asserted that the minority would not be allowed to veto on the 
advance of the majority. The leaders of all parties, except Jinnah, 
welcomed the declaration. 
CHAPTER VII 
.CABINET MISSION PLAN AND INTERIM GCVEHNMENT 
(1946) 
As declared by Attlee on February 19, 1946, the special mission 
of Cabinet Ministers, including Pathick Lawrence, the Secretary of 
State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, 
and A.V, Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, landed in Karachi on 
March 23, 1945, mainly to explore the following objectives:-
(i) Whether Indians would like to associate with the Commonwealth 
or would be completely independent; and 
(ii) to find out means for the transfer of power to the Indian hands. 
The Cabinet Mission arrived in New Delhi on March 24, 1946, and 
the Secretary of State at a press conference at Delhi on March 25, 
declared: 
"We have now to work out in cooperation the means by which 
Indians can themselves decide the form of their new 
institutions with the minimum of disturbance and the 
maximum of speed". 
To clear the misgivings of the Muslims that the minority can not 
be allowed "to place a veto on the advance of the majority", he observed! 
II 
• • • 
whi le t h e Congress are r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of l a r g e r 
numbers i t would no t be r i g h t t o regard the Muslim League 
as merely a minor i ty p o l i t i c a l p a r t y - they a re in f a c t 
ma jo r i ty r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the g r e a t Muslim community". 
The Sec re t a ry of S t a t e a l s o dec l a red t h a t " the Viceroy, while 
1. N. Mansergh and E.W.R, Lumby ( e d s , ) . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s 
between B r i t a i n and Ind ia : The Trans fe r of Power (11 V o l s . ) , V o l . V I I : 
The Cabinet Mission, 23 March - 29 June , 1946 (London; Her Majes ty ' s 
S t a t i o n e r y Off ice , 1977), p . 1 . 
2. V.P, Menon, The Transfe r of Power in I n d i a (Delhi : Or i en t Longmans, 
1957), p . 236; see a l s o R.C. Majumdar, S t r u g g l e fo r Freedom(Bombay: 
Bhara t iya Vidya Bhavan, 1969), p . 728. 
3 . N. Mansergh, and E.W.R, Lximby ( e d s . ) , Vol .VII , n . 1, p . 3 , 
4 . Kees ing ' s Contemporary Archives , 1946-1948, p . 7786. 
5 . V.P. Menon, n . 2, p . 236. 
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continuing to carry the full load of his normal responsibilities, will 
join with us as our colleague in the discussions with Indian leaders". 
The announcement of the Mission created great hopes for solution 
of the coiranxmal tangle and break of the constitutional deadlock, as a 
result it was welcomed all over the country. The Congress was happy at 
the arrival of Cripps, who, as Wavell said on February 12, 1946, was 
"sold to the Congress point of view" and was not quite "straight" in his 
7 
"methods". The League hoped some favour as Major Woodrow Wyatt, an old 
and close friend of Jinnan, had returned to India as Cripps' assistant. 
He was the first member of the Mission to meet Jinnah on March 27, at 
his home in New Delhi. Wyatt reported to Cripps on March 28: "The Muslim 
League seems to be solidly behind Jinnan", Cripps met Jinnah on March 30, 
and found him "calm and reasonable but completely firm on Pakistan", 
As a result of conversation with Cripps, Jinnah agreed to invite Gandhiji 
and meet him, Jinnah at this stage did not know that Lawrence and Cripps 
had confidential negotiations with Gandhiji, Nehru and Patel through 
Sudhir Ghosh who acted as their emissary not only before but also while 
the Cabinet Mission was in India, 
From April 1 to 17, 1946, the Mission interviewed 742 leaders in 
182 sittings, covering every shade of opinion, mainly that of the Congress 
and the Muslim League, and the negotiations and interviews lasted for 
over seven weeks. 
On April 3, first, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, pleaded the case of 
the Congress "on the basis of independence and on the assumption that 
the future constitution would be determined by a constitution-making body". 
Regarding the composition of the Central Government, "in an interim 
6, Ibid. 
7, Penderel Moon (ed,), Wavell - The Viceroy's Journal (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), p. 211, 
8, Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (New York: Oxford Iftiiversity Press, 
1984), p. 256. 
9, Note by Major Woodrow Wyatt, see N, Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby, n,l. 
Vol. VII, pp. 22-23, 
10. Note by Cripps, Ibid., pp. 59-60, 
11, Azad writes: "that the Centre should have a minimum list of compulsory 
subjects and an additional list of optional ones"; see Maulana A.K. 
Azad, India Wins Freedom (Calcutta: Orient longmans, 1959), p. 141. 
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government, of, say, fifteen members, there might be eleven provincial 
representatives, and four places might go to representatives of the 
minorities". He suggested a new idea of federation to solve the commxinal 
problem: "with a limited number of compulsory federal subjects such as 
defence, communications and foreign affairs, and autonomous provinces 
12 in which would vest the residuary powers". Azad admitted that under 
this proposal, the "Muslims would not get more than two or three seats 
in the Executive Council, but arrangements could be made to give them 
more". The Congress President, Azad, stated that on the completion of 
the work of the constitution-making body, the provinces should have 
three choices: "(1) to stand out of the constitution; (2) to enter the 
constitution by federating for the compulsory subjects only and (3) to 
federate for the compulsory as well as for the optional subjects". 
Regarding the League demand, Azad said that the Congress would never 
agree to the partition of India, He urged that the provincial legislatures 
should be taken as federal colleges to choose the constitution-making 
body and agreed that" it was not possibletocompel the Indian States to 
come, but the proposition could be made attractive to them". 
After Azad, Gandhiji was interviewed. He stated in his personal 
capacity that he never appreciated Jinnah's Pakistan demand. He said 
that Pakistan meant independence of culture and satisfaction of illegi-
timate ambitions and urged that Rajagopalachari's foinnula should be put 
into shape. He reasoned that Pakistan was an 'untruth'. Denouncing 
Jinnah*s two-nation theory as most dangerous, he calculated that all 
the Muslims, except 'a microscopic minority' were converts, the descen-
dants of India-bom people. Therefore, he argued for one-constitution-
making body instead of two as demanded by Jinnah, Gandhiji made, as it 
seems, a very realistic suggestion that for the interim period, "Jinnah 
should be asked to form the first Government with the ministers chosen 
from amongst the elected members of the legislature. If he refused, 
14 the offer should be made to the Congress".Gandhiji added that "The 
Interim Government must be absolutely national'.' Mr, Jinnah could choose 
whom he liked for his Government, They would be subject to the vote 
15 
of the Assembly from which they were drawn". The Secretary of State 
12, V.P. Menon, n. 2, p. 238, 
13. Ibid., p. 239, 
14, R,C, Majxamdar, n, 2, p, 729. 
15. N. Mansergh and E.W.R, Lumby (eds.). Vol. VII, n. 1, pp. 117-18 
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government, of, say, fifteen members, there might be eleven provincial 
representatives, and four places might go to representatives of the 
minorities". He suggested a new idea of federation to solve the commxinal 
problem: "with a limited number of compulsory federal subjects such as 
defence, communications and foreign affairs, and autonomous provinces 
12 in which would vest the residuary powers". Azad admitted that under 
this proposal, the "Muslims would not get more than two or three seats 
in the Executive Cotmcil, but arrangements could be made to give them 
more". The Congress President, Azad, stated that on the completion of 
the work of the constitution-making body, the provinces should have 
three choices: "(l) to stand out of the constitution; (2) to enter the 
constitution by federating for the compulsory subjects only and (3) to 
federate for the compulsory as well as for the optional subjects". 
Regarding the League demand, Azad said that the Congress would never 
agree to the partition of India, He urged that the provincial legislatures 
should be taken as federal colleges to choose the constitution-making 
body and agreed that"it was not possibletocompel the Indian States to 
come, but the proposition could be made attractive to them", 
After Azad, Gandhiji was interviewed. He stated in his personal 
capacity that he never appreciated Jinnah's Pakistan demand. He said 
that Pakistan meant independence of culture and satisfaction of illegi-
timate ambitions and urged that Rajagopalachari's formula should be put 
into shape. He reasoned that Pakistan was an 'vmtruth'. Denouncing 
Jinnah's two-nation theory as most dangerous, he calculated that all 
the Muslims, except 'a microscopic minority' were converts, the descen-
dants of India-bom people. Therefore, he argued for one-cons tit uti on-
making body instead of two as demanded by Jinnah, Gandhiji made, as it 
seems, a very realistic suggestion that for the interim period, "Jinnah 
should be asked to form the first Government with the ministers chosen 
from amongst the elected members of the legislature. If he refused, 
14 the offer should be made to the Congress".Gandhiji added that "The 
Interim Government must be absolutely national" Mr. Jinnah could choose 
whom he liked for his Government. They would be subject to the vote 
15 
of the Assembly from which they were drawn". The Secretary of State 
12. V,P, Menon, n, 2, p. 238. 
13. Ibid., p. 239. 
14. R.C. Majumdar, n. 2, p. 7 29. 
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interrupted and pointed out that as Jinnah* s party would be in minority 
in the assembly, he would be asked to provide over a government, most 
of whose ministers would belong to the Congress majority party in the 
assembly, to which Gandhiji replied that it was "inescapable". Further, 
in that case Jinnah's government would have to be predominantly Hindu. 
The Mission interviewed Jinnah on April 4, 1946. Jinnah narrated 
the history of India from the days of Chandragupta to the British raj 
arguing that "there had never been any Government of India in the sense 
of a single government". The British rule made the country 'partly 
united'. In view of the separate and sovereign Indian States, Jinnah 
said that "India was one, but this was not so, India was really many 
17 
and was held by the British as one". He recalled that Hindu-Muslim 
tension began when the British partitioned Bengal in 1906 to give a small 
amoijnt of power to Muslims in East Bengal the Muslims were granted 
separate electorates. He referred to the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, 
the Communal Award, separation of Sind from Bombay and making the NWFP 
a Governor* s province, which decision were taken by the British to safe-
guard the interest of the Muslim minority in India, Pleading the case 
for demand of Pakistan, he argued in favour of the two-nation theory 
18 
as follows: 
"The differences in India were far greater than those between 
European countries and were of a vital and fxjuidamental character. 
Even Ireland provided no parallel. The Muslims had a different 
conception of life from the Hindus, They admired different 
qualities in their heroes; they had a different culture based 
on Arabic and Persian instead of Sanskrit origins. Their 
social customs were entirely different, Hindu society and 
philosophy were the most exclusive in the world, Muslims 
and Hindus had been living side by side in India for a thousand 
years but if one went into any Indian city; one would see 
separate Hindu and Muslim quarters. It was not possible to 
make a nation unless there were essential uniting factors", 
"How could His Majesty's Government put 100 millions of Muslims 
together with 250 millions whose whole way of life was so 
differentr- No Government could survive vmless there was a 
dominant element which could provide a 'steel frame'". 
16 , V , P , Menon, n , 2, p , 240, 
17 , I b i d , 
18 , I b i d . , p p . 2 4 0 - 4 1 ; s e e a l s o N, Mansergh and E,W,R, Liimby, V o l , V I I , 
n . 1, p p . 1 1 9 - 2 1 , 
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"There were In India two totally different and deeply 
rooted civilizations side by side, and the only solution 
was to have two 'steel frames', one in Hindustan and one 
in Pakistan". 
Jinnah agreed that common railways, customs and so forth would be 
convenient, but questioned which government would control those services. 
He meant to say that the matter could be settled only after "the 
fundamentals of Pakistan were agreed". 
Jawaharlal Nehru was, in those days, on a visit to Malaya. A 
British official reported to the India Office about Nehru on April 4, 
20 
as follows: 
"He was a little scornful of Jinnah and doubted very much 
whether he had either the intention or the power to start 
a revolt in India if he did not secure Pakistan ,,.Jinnah 
rather reminds me of the man who was charged with the 
murder of his mother and father and begged the clemency of 
the Court on the ground that he was an orphan". 
Dr. Ambedkar, the leader of the Scheduled Castes Federation,opposed 
a constituent assembly, which would be dominated by Caste Hindus and 
suggested instead of two ad hoc committes - one for constitutional and 
other for communal questions^ Claiming constitutional guarantee to the 
Scheduled Castes, he urged that in case of joint electorates, his 
community voters and candidates would be ignored being in absolute 
minority. Therefore, he demanded separate electoral college for the 
Scheduled Castes, 
Jagjivan Ram, the leader of the All-India Depressed Classes,League, 
supporting Dr. Ambedkar, demanded that "the Scheduled Caste members of 
the Provincial Legislatures should form an electoral college for selecting 
their representatives in the Central Government", 
The Sikh leader, Giani Kartar Singh, demanded a separate sovereign 
State, KhaliStan, comprising Jullundur and Lahore Divisions, together 
with Hissar, Kamal, Ambala and Simla Districts of the Ambala Division, 
and the Montgomery and Lyallpur Districts,while Baldev Singh pleaded for 
19. V,P, Menon, Ibid,, p. 241. 
20. "Secret" Note by Duckworth, April 4,1946, in N. Mansergh and 
E.W.R, Lumby, n, 1, Vol. VII, p, 136, 
21. R.C, Majumdar, n. 2, p. 731, 
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a xmited India demanding A5% seats to the Muslims and the rest divided 
between the Sikhs and the Hindus, Master Tara Singh and Hemam Singh 
demanded separate State for the Sikhs with the right to federate either 
22 
with the Hindustan or Pakistan. 
Sapru and Jyakar, the Liberal leaders, suggested immediate 
formation of an interim government/ strongly opposed Pakistan, and 
suggested equality of Muslims and caste Hindus in the Central Government, 
The Hindu Mahasabha leaders, Shyamaprasad Mookerjee and I.B, Bhopatkar 
decried the idea of parity between the Hindus and the Muslims in the 
23 Central Government, The State rulers were prepared to join an all-India 
!? federation. 
On April 15, the Communist Party, in a Memorandum to the Cabinet 
25 
Mission, stated: 
"We suggest the setting up of a Boxindary Commission to redraw 
the boundaries ... so that the re-demarcated Provinces become 
as far as possible linguistically and culturally homogeneous 
National tftiits, e,g,, Sind, Pathanland, Baluchistan, Western 
Punjab etc. The people of each such Unit should have the 
unfettered right to self-determination, i.e. the right to 
decide freely whether they join the Indian Union or form a 
separate Sovereign State or another Indian Union"• 
ML Legislators' Convention 
On April 9, when the Mission was carrying on the interviews, Jinnah 
called in Delhi a Convention of over 400 members of the various legislature 
recently elected on the ML ticket. The League leaders solemnly pledged 
"in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful" that for achievement 
of Pakistan they would undergo any danger, trial or sacrifice which may 
be demanded of them, while the Quaid-i-Azam said "while we hope for the 
best, we are prepared for the worst". Bengal's Suhrawardy said that the 
22. I b i d , 
23 . I b i d . , p . 732, 
24. V.P. Menon, n , 2, p . 241 . 
25. I .A.R. , 1946, Vol. I , p . 220. 
26. Syed Shar i fuddin P i rzada ( e d , ) . Foundations of Pak i s t an : A l l - I n d i a 
Muslim League Documents, Vol . I I (Karachi : Na t iona l Pub l i sh ing 
House L t d . , 1969), p . 523 . 
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Muslims of Bengal wanted a land to live in peace, were ready to fight 
and lay down their lives. Khaliquzzaman said: "Muslims will now decide 
their own destiny". The Nawab of Mandot (Punjab) said that "if stalwart 
soldiers of the Punjab could defend Britain against Nazi aggression, 
they can also defend their own hearths and homes". The NWFP Pathan 
leader Khan Abdul Qayyum shouted: "Thank God, we have one flag, one 
leader, one platform and one ideal, Pakistan, to fight for", Sardar 
Shaukat Hayat Khan saids "three-quarter million demobilized soldiers in 
the Punjab are pledged to achieve Pakistan". Sir Firoz Khan Noon said: 
"Neither the Hindus nor the British know yet how far we are prepared to 
go in order to achieve Pakistan. We are on the threshold of a great 
tragedy". 
However, the Convention in a lengthy/resolution stated that the 
Hindu dharma and philosophy had degraded 60 million human beings to the 
position of tintouchables and threatened to reduce Muslims, Christians 
and other minorities to the status of irredeemable helots, socially and 
economically. They were "convinced of the futility and ineffectiveness 
of the so-called safeguards provided in the Constitution and in the 
Instrxanent of Instructions to the Governors and were driven to the 
irresistible conclusion that in a united Indian Federation, if established 
the Muslims, even in majority provinces would meet with no better fate 
and their rights and interests could never be adequately protected 
28 
against the perpetual Hindu majority at the Centre". To save the Muslim 
India from domination of the Hindus, they emphasised the necessity of 
a sovereign Pakistan and declared that they would "never submit to any 
Constitution for a United India and will never participate in any single 
constitution-making machinery set up for the purpose, and that any 
formula devised by the British Government for transferring power from 
the British to the peoples of India, which does not conform to the 
following just and equitable principles calculated to maintain internal 
I 
peace and tranquillity in the country, will not contribute to the 
29 
solution of the Indian problem: 
27. I b i d . , pp . 516-20. 
28. Resolu t ion of the A l l - I n d i a Muslim League from January , 1944 t o 
December, 1946 (publ ished by Llaquat Al l Khan, Honorary Sec re t a ry , 
All I n d i a Muslim League), pp . 45-47, 
29. I b i d . 
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"1. That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-East 
and the Pxmjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan, 
in the North-West of India, namely, Pakistan zones, where the 
Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign 
independent State and that an unequivocal undertaking be given 
to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay; 
2, That two separate constitution-making bodies be set up by (the) 
peoples of Pakistan and Hindustan for the purpose of framing their 
respective constitutions; 
3, That the minorities in Pakistan and Hindustan be provided with 
safeguards on the lines of the All-India Muslim League resolution 
passed on the 23rd March 1940, at Lahore; 
4, That the acceptance of the Muslim League demand of Pakistan and 
its implementation without delay are the sine gua non for the 
Muslim League co-operation and participation in the formation of 
an Interim Government at the Centre". 
The Convention threatened that "any attempt to impose a constitutic 
on a xjnlted India basis or to force any interim arrangement at the Centre 
contrary to the Muslim League demand, will leave the Muslims no altemati 
but to resist such imposition by all possible means for their survival 
and national existence". 
The resolution of the Convention and Jinnah's viewpoint were 
discussed by a large niimber of the Congress and other party leaders, 
while the Cabinet Mission was also devising its own scheme to find out 
a common formula to bring the Congress and the league together. To explo] 
possibilities of compromise, the Mission decided to interview Jinnah and 
Azad again, 
Jinnah's Interview 
Oi April 16, 1946, Jinnah reiterated his demand for Pakistan, but 
the Mission felt it difficult to accept as much of the proposed territo-
ries of Pakistan was inhabited by non-Muslims, The Mission believed 
that progress might be possible in one of two v;ays: (1) acceptance of 
a separate state of Pakistan including Muslim majority districts of 
Bengal, Punjab and Assam, or (2) establishment of Union Centre for 
essential sxibjects - defence, foreign affairs and communications, forming 
a federation including the proposed territories of Pakistan with equal 
Congress and League representation, with provision to secede after 15 yel 
30, Ibid, 
31. V.P. Menon, n, 2, p. 249, 
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The question of federation of the Indian States regarding their joining 
the Centre would be considered later. In both these cases, Pakistan 
was sure to be created. The Secretary of State stated two propositions: 
(1) "a small Pakistan with sovereign rights and a treaty relation, 
and a larger Pakistan which would function together with 
Hindustan on terms of equality within an all-India Union for 
the essential purpose of defence and foreign affairs"; 
(2) "there would be two federations linked by a Union Centre. The 
Indian States would come in either at the Union or at the 
federation level and there would be equal representation of 
Hindustan and Pakistan at the Union level. The communal balance 
would be retained at the Centre by some means even if the 
Indian States came in", 
Cripps explained that there would be no Union Parliament and the 
Union Executive would be formed by the federation choosing the members, 
with the equality of two component parts. Jlnnah replied that "no amount 
of equality provided on paper would work. Equality could not exist 
33 between the majority and a minority within the same governmental system", 
Jlnnah, thus, did not agree to the idea of Indian Union as domination 
of the Muslims by the Hindus could not be prevented under the proposal. 
Further, Jinnah persisted that first the principle of Pakistan should 
be conceded, then he would be prepared to discuss the area to be Included 
in it, but he would not in any event accept the exclusion of Calcutta. 
The Secretary of State pointed out that in case Jlnnah's demand 
for inclusion of six provinces and Calcutta into Pakistan are accepted, 
there will be "a large internal element of Hindu population, as well 
as external opposition from a hostile Hindustan" and that India in betweei 
the two parts of Pakistan will create a very dangerous aid hostile 
position. Jinnah replied that it was an exaggerated statement as "all 
34 the non-Muslims could not be counted as Hindus". The Secretary of State 
said that a settlement without agreement would lead to chaos. Jinnah 
retorted that this argument should be put before the Congress. Jinnah, 
preferring the matter to be considered on the basis of sovereignty and 
a small area, said: 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid., p. 250. 
34. Ibid., p. 251. 
35. Ibid. 
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"If the Congress would say that on that basis they wanted 
certain defined areas taken from Pakistan, he was willing 
to discuss whether what they proposed was reasonable; fair 
and workable. He would try his best to reach agreement with 
the Congress; but if what they proposed struck at the heart 
of Pakistan, or if the principle of Pakistan was not 
accepted, it was no use pursuing the matter". 
Thus, there were three contestants in the field of acquiring power 
from the British, the Congress, the Muslim League and the Indian States, 
Azad, interviewed on April 17, also reiterated that there should 
be two lists of central subjects - Compulsory including foreign affairs 
and defence, and Optional covering the remaining central subjects, under 
36 
the existing constitution. The Secretary of State said, in this case, 
there would be stib-divisions of the Centre into two parts dealing with: 
"(a) the provinces that had opted for the full range of subjects and 
37 (b) the provinces that were federated for the compulsory subjects only", 
which would ultimately "work out in practice as separate centres for 
Pakistan and Hindustan". Azad said that it had to be discussed with the 
CWC. In the meanwhile, Gandhiji and Nehru informed Sir Stafford Cripps 
in Kashmir that "the proposal for an all-India Union on a three-tier 
38 basis would not be acceptable to the Congress", But Azad on April 26, 
agreed to the three-tier proposal, that is, a single federation broken 
up into two parts, Jinnah also reluctantly accepted this proposal, but 
demanded a letter. On April 27, the Secretary of State sent letters to 
Jinnah and Azad with the identical terms asking to send four negotiators 
for discussing the possibility of agreement, and recommended adoption 
of either of the following two resolutions on the fxaidamental constitu-
39 
tional problems: 
Section A 
There should be a loose federation in the form of a "Union of 
All-India" consis t ing of three pr inc ipal p a r t s , the Hindu-majority 
provinces, the Muslim-majority provinces, and the S ta te s , with defence, 
foreign a f fa i r s and communications minimally in the hands of the Union 
Government, but with a wider range of optional powers t h a t might, by 
agreement, e i t h e r be exercised by provinces cooperating as groups, and 
thereby cons t i tu t ing a t h i r d t i e r in the pa t te rn of Government, or be 
t ransferred to the Centre, 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid., p, 252. 
38. TEId., p. 253. 
39. Sandhya Chaudhri, Gandhi and the Partition of India (New Delhi: 
Sterling PiJalishers Pvt.Ltd., 1984), pp. 159-60. 
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Section B 
There should be two Indias, Hindustan and Pakistan. The Pakistan 
element consisting only of the majority Muslim Districts that is 
roughly Baluchistan, Slnd, North-West Frontier Provinces and Western 
Punjab in the North-West and Eastern Bengal without Calcutta but with 
the Sylhet District of Assam in the North-East. The two divided parts 
would have a Treaty of alliance offensive and defensive but nothing 
in the way of an actual executive centre and, therefore, no common 
defence of the sxobcontinent. 
Second Simla Conference 
The Congress, in reply to the Secretary of State* s letter, wrote 
that there was no mention of India's Independence and withdrawal of 
British troops from India, However, to discuss the future of India or 
any interim arrangement, the Congress send Azad, Nehru, Vallabhbhal Pate 
and Abdul Ghaffar Khan, The Muslim League stated that there were several 
Important matters, which required elucidation and clarification, and 
sent Jlnnah^ Mahommed Ismail Khan, Liaquat All Khan and Abdur Rab Nishta 
These representatives met at Simla between May 5 and 12, 1946, 
On May 5, Jinnah refused to shake hands with Azad, The discussion 
was controversial. The Congress wanted the centre to have "powers of 
direct taxation and to be self-supporting, while Jinnah advocated that 
it should be given a lianp sum and should have to go to the groups if it 
40 
wanted more". On the question of central legislature, the Congress 
insisted on having one, while Jinnah opposed it. The basic differences 
were that the League advocated the two-nation theory, while the Congress 
pleaded for a unitary government. On May 6, Jinnah cross swords in 
most deadly duel in Indian history, Nehru said: 
"The Union of India, even if the list of subjects was short, 
roust be strong and organic. Provinces would not be prevented 
from co-operating among themselves over such subjects as 
education and health; but they would not need a Group Executive", 
Jinnah refusing the invitation saia: 
"But if the Congress ... would accept the Groups, the Muslim 
League would accept the Union". 
40, Penderel Moon (ed,). Wave11 - The Viceroy's Journal (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), p, 257, 
41, N, Mansergh and E.W.R, Lumby, n, 1, Vol, VII, p, 437, 
42, Ibid. 
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On May 8^  the Secretary of State sent Jinnah and Azad identical 
copies of nine suggested points of agreement stating "There shall be 
an All-India Union Government and Legislature dealing with Foreign 
Affairs, Defence, Ccmriuni cat ions, fundamental riahts and having the 
necessary powers to obtain for itself the finances it requires for 
these subjects"; secondly, vesting of "All the remaining powers in the 
Provinces" and, thirdly, "Groups of Provinces may be formed and such 
groups may determine the Provincial subjects which they desire to take 
43 
in common". Jinnah replied on the same day that it was a fundamental 
departure from the original formula embodied in his letter of April 27, 
which was already rejected by the Congress, Gandhiji rejected the 
formula because 90 million Muslims would enjoy "parity" with over 200 
million Hindus and, hence, termed it "really worse than Pakistan", 
As the matter could not be settled, Nehru, on May 9, proposed an 
tjmpire to settle their differences. On May 10, Nehru wrote to Jinnah 
that for choice of a sxiitable umpire it would "probably be desirable to 
exclude Englishmen, Hindus, Muslims and Sikna", The Congress drew up 
a considerable list including Americans, On 11th, the Conference learnt 
46 that "Jinnah had refused to accept the decisions of an umpire", as a 
result the Congress and the League were asked to sutroit their statements 
on the points still outstanding^. The League and the Congress submitted 
their memorandum on May 12, which represented their respective stands 
taken earlier. 
As Jinnah agreed to enter into a common Union Centre provided 
the Muslims were granted the right to frame their own group and provincia! 
constitutions for the 'six Muslim provinces' through a separate consti-
tution-making body i,e, the virtual recognition of Pakistan and the 
Conaress did not agree to it, the Secretary of State closed the Conferenc* 
on May 12, and returned to Delhi on May 14, and published his own scheme 
on May 16, 1946. It was unfortunate that though the Cabinet Mission 
4 3 , See Appendix :IX 
4 4 . N, Mansergh and E.W.R, Liimby, n , 1, V o l , V I I , p , 4 6 6 , 
4 5 , I b i d . , p . 5 0 2 , 
4 6 , V , P , Menon, n , 2, p , 2 5 9 . 
47. See Appendix X . 
48. See Appendix XI . 
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exerted their utmost to bring the parties to an agreement and the 
Congress and the League also made considerable concessions, but no final 
agreement could be reached. 
The Cabinet Mission Plan 
The Plan may be divided into three parts:-
(I) examination of the proposals for creation of Pakistan; 
(II) setting-up of an Interim Government (Short-Term Plan); and 
(ill) a long-terra settlement i.e. application of the Mission Plan. 
(1) Creation of Pakistan 
The Muslim League had claimed the formation of Pakistan including 
six provinces (Assam, Bengal, the Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan), 
which was not acceptable to the Mission. An alternate proposal that 
Pakistan should consist of only the Muslim majority areas was not 
acceptable to the Muslim League. Therefore, the Mission rejected the 
claim of Pakistan on the following grounds: 
1. The number of Muslims in British India and Non-Muslims in 
Pakistan will still remain considerable. 
2. The inclusion of districts in Pakistan pre-dominated by Non-Muslims 
was inconsistent. 
3. The partition of the Punjab and Bengal was contrary to the wishes 
and interests of a very large proportion of the inhabitants 
of these provinces. 
4. The division of Pxinjab would necessarily divide the Sikh community, 
which was lanfair. ' 
5. The creation of Pakistan was not feasible considering the 
administrative, economic and military conditions of India. 
6. The defence of the two contemplated sections of Pakistan - East 
and West - would be insufficient. 
7. There would be greater difficulty for the Indian States in 
associating themselves with India and Pakistan, and lastly, 
8. the two halves of Pakistan would be separated by hundreds of miles 
and the communication between them, both in war and peace, would 
be dependent on the goodwill of India. 
49. See Appendix XII. (St-atement of Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy, 
16 May iy46;, v.p. Menon, n. 2, pp. 470-7S. 
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(ii) Short-Term Plan 
The Short-Term Plan envisaged immediate establishment of an 
Interim Government Joined by all the major political parties to carry 
on the administration while the constitution-making was in progress in 
view of the Long-Term Plan, The Interim Government, having fullest 
measure of co-operation of the Government, was to comprise of only 
Indian Ministers. 
(iii) Long-Term Plan 
Sximmarily, the Plan recommended: 
(1) a union of India; 
(2) a central executive and legislature; 
(3) residuary powers vested in the provinces; 
(4) the States retained all subjects and powers other than those 
ceded to the Union; 
(5) Provinces to be free to form groups with executives and legislatures; 
(6) the term of the constitution could be reconsidered after an 
initial period of ten years; 
(7) the constitution-making body to be constituted immediately 
through direct election; 
(8) the representatives would meet in New Delhi as one body to create 
a constitution-making body, 
(9) the Constituent Assembly to have three sections: 
(I) Section A : Madras, Bombay, U,P.,C,P., Bihar and Orissa; 
(II) Section B : Punjab, NWFP and Sindh; and 
(III) Section C J Bengal and Assam; 
(10) each section would decide its provincial constitution; 
(11) the groups would assemble to settle the Union Constitution; and 
(12) the Union Constituent Assembly would negotiate a treaty with the 
United Kingdom for transfer of power. 
The Mission also annoiaiced that an Interim Government would be 
formed at the centre under the British supervision following the elections 
of Union Legislative Assembly and that if any party did not accept the 
Mission Plan of May 16, it would be excluded from the Interim Government. 
As Jlnnah and Llaquat All Khan belonged to provinces which had a majority 
50, Ibid. 
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of non-Muslims, Wavell gave green signal that they could be elected 
from another Provincial Assembly. The Mission proposed that there shall 
be elected by each Provincial Legislative Assembly the following numbers 
of representatives, each part of the Legislative Assembly (General, 
Moslem or Sikh) electing its ovm representatives by the method of 
proportional representation with single transferable vote: 
51 
Table of Representation 
Province 
Madras 
Bombay 
United Provinces 
Bihar 
C e n t r a l P r o v i n c e s 
O r i s s a 
Section 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
General 
45 
19 
47 
31 
16 
9 
Muslim T o t a l 
4 
2 
8 
5 
1 
0 
49 
21 
55 
36 
17 
9 
T o t a l 167 20 187 
Pvmjab 
NVfFP 
S i n d 
B 
B 
B 
8 
0 
1 
16 
3 
3 
Sikhs 
0 
0 
28 
3 
4 
T o t a l 9 22 35 
Bengal 
Assam 
C 
C 
27 
7 
33 
3 
60 
10 
T o t a l 34 36 
Maximxira f o r I n d i a n S t a t e s 
Grand T o t a l 93 + 210 78 + 
70 
385 
The s t a t e s u n d e r Group A were t h e C o n g r e s s d o m i n a t e d p r o v i n c e s . 
In Group B, t h e Congre s s c o u l d form i t s m i n i s t r y u s i n g i n f l u e n c e o v e r 
few Muslim members, a s t h e r e were 12 Non-Muslim and 16 Muslim s e a t s , and 
5 1 . L.A. S h e r w a n i , P a k i s t a n R e s o l u t i o n t o P a k i s t a n , 1940-1947 ( D e l h i : 
Daya P u b l i s h i n g House, 1985) , p . 112 , 
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there was no such principle that they will not defect the party from 
they were elected. In Group C, in Assam the Congress had the dominating 
position, but was grouped with the Muslim majority province of Bengal. 
The Muslim League, however, was in a dangerous position as the non-Muslims 
were to play the game of influencing the Muslim members, which could 
tip the balance. 
The Mission Plan accepted the Congress demand of a Iftiited India, 
while the Muslim League commented that it offered a weak Central Govern-
ment unable to take any decision without the help of the major communities. 
The Plan accepted also the League demand of compulsory grouping of the 
provinces on communal lines, and the Congress demand that India should 
not be partitioned. 
Gandjiji's Statement on the Plan 
On May 17, Gandhiji was the first to release his comments: that, 
"if the statement of the Mission was genuine, as he believed it was, 
it was in discharge of an obligation they had declared the British owed 
to India, namely, to get off India's back. It contained the seed to 
53 
convert this land of sorrow into one without sorrow and suffering". On 
the 18th morning, Pethick-Lawrence and Cripps met with Gandhiji, who 
questioned "whether the procedure laid down for the Constituent Assembly 
was subject to alteration ... whether it was open to Congress represen-
tatives in the Constituent Assembly at the opening meeting to deal with 
procedure to raise the question whether the Assembly should in fact 
divide into the three sections, or whether it should decide the Union's 
constitution first". The Viceroy replied that it had first "to get power 
at the centre in the Interim Government" and then could "at any time 
torpedo the Constitution-making Body by raising some crucial communal 
54 f 
issue". Gandhijl also said that the Plan was not an award and the 
Constituent Body could not be a sovereign body. The Constituent Assembly 
could abolish the distinction of Muslims and non-Muslims and no province 
52. M.L. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on che Indian 
Constitution, 1921-1947 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 
Vol. II, pp. 577-84. 
53. Harilan (Ahmedabad), May 17, 1946. 
54. Record Meeting, May 18, 1946, N. Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby, 
n. 1, Vol. VII, p. 616. 
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could be compelled to belong to a group against its will, Gandhiji, 
however, wrote that his first attempt would be to wreck the Groups of 
Provinces and on May 20, wrote that Interim Government should be formed 
immediately. Lord Alexander was convinced that Gandhiji intended "to 
hximiliate the British Government and to promote a policy of scuttle, and 
secondly, to secure power without a constitution coming into being and 
so to abandon the just claims of the Muslim League", 
Maulana Azad's Contention 
On May 20, Maulana Azad complained to the Secretary of State that 
the grouping had compelled the provinces to sit in a section and the 
dominating province "may even conceivably lay down rules, for elections 
and otherwise, thereby nullifying the provision for a province to opt 
eg 
out Of a group". He said that the constituent assembly would be a 
59 
sovereign body and would be free to vary 'in any way it likes' the 
recommendations and the procedures suggested by the Mission. 
On May 20, the Mission wired to Attlee that the "situation had 
taken a turn for the worse ... Congress proposes to make an attack on 
the grouping proposal and .,, they object to parity in the interim 
Executive, These two points may be crucial in securing Muslim co-operation" 
Jinnah's Statement on the Plan 
On May 22, Jinnah regretted that "the Mission should have negatived 
Muslim demand for the establishment of a complete sovereign state of 
Pakistan" which he held was the "only solution of the constitutional 
problem of India" and charged that the Mission had done so "simply to 
appease and placate the Congress". Commenting on the operative part of 
55. Penderel Moon, n. 40, p, 273. 
56. Gandhi to Pethick-Lawrence, N. Mansergh and E.W.R, Lvunby, n, 1, 
Vol, VII, pp. 636-37. 
57. Ibid., p. 638. 
58. Papers Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India (Delhi: Manager of 
Publications, Publication Division, Government of India,1946),p,33, 
59. A.G, Noorani, 'The Cabinet Mission and Its Aftermath', in C.H,Philips 
and M.D, Wainwri^ht, The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 
1935 - 1947 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd,,1970), p. 107. 
60. N. Mansergh and E,W.R, Lumby, n, 1, p, 644, 
62, Dawn (Delhi), May 23, 1946. 
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the Plan, Jinnah said that they had divided Pakistan into two zones 
under Sections B and C; and instead of two, only one constitution-making 
body was devised. There was no indication as to how the Union will be 
empowered to raise finances required for Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Communications, while the League wanted that the finances should be 
raised only by contributions and not by taxation. The Plan laid down 
that any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature 
should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present 
and voting while the League's view was that (a) there should be no 
Legislature for the Union, (b) there should be parity of representation 
between the Pakistan Group and the Hindustan Group in the Union Executive 
and Legislature and (c) no decision should be taken by the Uhion in 
regard to any matter except by a majority of three-fourths. These three 
terms were omitted from the Plan. The League's proposal that the Pakistan 
Group should have a right to secede from the Union after an initial period 
of ten years was omitted from the Plan. How the representative of 
British Baluchistan was to be elected was not indicated in the Plan. 
Jinnah calculated that in the constitution-making body, there will be 
an overwhelming majority of Hindus. In a House of 292, for British India 
the Muslim strength will be 79, and, if the number allotted to the Indian 
States (93) was taken into account, it was quite obvious that the Muslim 
proportion was further reduced, as the bulk of the States representatives 
would be Hindus. The Plan suggested that opting the Provinces out of 
their Group would be decided under the new Constitution by the new Legis-
lature of the Provinces, while the League had demanded referendum of the 
people. Lastly, there was the door open in the Plan to include more 
subjected vested in the Union Government, which destroyed the basic 
principle that the Union was to be strictly confined to three subjects. 
CWC Resolution on the Plan 
On May 24, 1946, the Congress Working Committee regretted to find 
that the Plan was different from their objectives i.e. "independence for 
India; a strong though limited central authority; full autonomy for the 
provinces; the establishment of a democratic structure in the Centre and 
in the units; the guarantee of the fundamental rights of each individual 
so that he might have full and equal opportunities of growth, and,further, 
that each community should have the opportxmity to live the life of its 
62. Ibid. 
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choice within the larger frameworK". They also found that the provision 
for initial grouping was inconsistent with the freedom promised to the 
provinces in this respect. The Committee interpreted paragraph 15 that 
"the respective provinces will make their choice whether or not to 
belong to the section in which they are placed. Thus, the Constituent 
Assembly must be considered as a sovereign body with final authority 
for the purpose of drawing up a constitution and giving effect to it". 
They also criticised the inclusion of Europeans in the electorate for 
the Constituent Assembly for the group comprising Bengal and Assam in 
spite of their very small numbers and that too one member for one million 
of population. Thus, they enjoyed a weighted representation in the Bengal 
and Assam Assemblies. However, the Congress deferred their decision 6n 
the Mission Plan till the complete picture was available. 
Reaction in Punjab and Bengal 
While the Mission waited for the League's decision, news of 
favourable reaction from Punjab was received and, at the same time, 
widespread commxonal riots kept motmting in Karachi, On May 24, the Bengal 
Governor informed the Mission that both the Bengali Hindus and Muslims 
were much "relieved" as they hoped that their province would not be 
partitioned if the plan were accepted. He warned also that rejection of 
Jinnah's proposal would lead to resignation of the League ministry and 
would also serve as a "signal for a Jehad", as there was "a serious 
situation in Chittaaong started by students protesting against the 
rejection of Pakistan", On May 24, Woodrow Wyatt met Jinnah secretly. 
Wyatt observed that Jinnah wanted to tell the Mission that "the British 
should remain as the binding forces in the Indian Centre for some 15 
years and deal with defence, and foreign affairs of Pakistan and Hindustan 
67 
consulting the prime Ministers of each State", This seems a very 
seisible solution, but, Jinnah did not tell it to Cripps and Lawrence 
as he did not believe in their sincerity and was desperate due to his 
lungs requiring surgical operation* 
63. See The Indian Annual Register,January-Jvme, 1946, pp. 16 2-64, 
64. A.G, Nooranl, n, 59, p. 107. 
6 5 . N. Mansergb and E.VI.R, L\jmby, n , 1, V o l , V I I , p . 6 5 5 . 
66. Record Meeting, I b i d . , pp. 675-78, 
67. I b i d . , pp. 685-86, 
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Wyatt asked whether Jinnah would agree that the League's Working 
68 Committee pass a resolution on the following lines: 
"The British had exceeded their brief in pronouncing on the 
merits of Pakistan. They had no business to turn down what 
millions of people wanted. Their analysis of Pakistan was 
outrageous. But the Muslims had never expected the British 
to give them Pakistan. They had never expected anyone to give 
them Pakistan. They knew that they had to get it by their 
own strong right arm. The scheme outlined in the Cabinet 
Mission's Statement was impracticable and could not work,But 
nevertheless in order to show that they would give it a trial, 
although they knew that the machinery could not fxjnction, 
thfey- would accept the Statement and would not go out of 
their way to sabotage the procedure - but they would accept 
the Statement as the first step on the road to Pakistan". 
Jinnah was delighted at this statement and completely convinced. 
On May 25, the Mission issued a supplementary statement. "Once 
the Constituent Assembly is formed and working on this basis there is 
no intention (of the Government) of interfering with its discretion 
or questioning its decisions" and HMG "will recommend to Parliament such 
action as may be necessary for the secession of sovereignty to the 
Indian people subject to ... adequate provision for the protection of 
the minorities (paragraph 20 of the statement) and willingness to 
conclude a treaty with HMG to cover matters arising out of the transfer 
of power (paragraph 22 of the statement)". The statement went on to 
say that the grouping "is an essential feature of the scheme and can 
only be modified by agreement between the parties". It further said 
that "all portfolios including that of the War Member will be held by 
Indians and that the members will be selected in consultation with the 
Indian i>olitical parties". These changes were a long step towards 
independence. The Statement also said that there was "no intention of 
retaining British troops in India against the wish of an independent 
India under the new Constitution", but it was necessary during the 
interim period for the security of India. 
Sikhs Reaction to the Plan 
Since its publication, there was a wave of dejection, resentment 
68. Note by Woodrow Wyatt, May 25, 1946, N. Mansergh and E.W.R.Lumby, 
n. 1, pp. 686-87; see also Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 
(New York: Oxford university Press, 1984), p, 271. 
69. Papers Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India, n. 58, pp, 24-25, 
315 
and indignation throughout the Sikh community^ because Sikhs were 
entirely thrown on the mercy of the Muslims. Having only four seats in 
Group B, the Sikhs had "genuine and acute anxiety" due to being subjected 
to a perpetual Muslim majority rule. The Sikhs, on May 25, threatened 
to take measures against it. They argued that the Mission recognised 
"the very genuine and acute anxiety of the Muslims lest they should find 
themselves sxibjected to a perpetual Hindu majority rule", and this 
principle should apply to them also. Secondly, the Mission put the non-
Muslim areas of Punjab, Bengal and Assam, where the non-Muslims were in 
overwhelming majority, under the Muslim domination to placate and to 
protect the Muslims from non-Muslims, The Sikhs claimed that they shoild 
also be treated in the same way against Muslim domination. They resented 
that the Sections 15(2) and 19(7) provided that th'e majority of both 
the Hindus and Muslims were necessary for certain purposes, while the 
Sikhs were entirely ignored. They put forward three questionst 
•• (1) What is the significance of recognising the Sikhs as one of 
"the main communities"/ 
(2) Suppose the majority of Section B frames a constitution under 
Section 19(5) but the Sikh members do not agree. Does it mean 
deadlock or does the opposition of the Sikh members mean 
simply dissociation." 
(3) Is there any hope of obtaining for the Sikhs the same right 
as is given to the Muslims and the Hindus under Sections 
15(2) and 19(7)/" 
The Secretary of State, on Jxme 1, 1946, replied that "of the 
various alternatives open to us the best one from the Sikh point of view 
71 
was chosen". He wrote that the Mission would not agree "to issue any 
addition to, or interpretation of, the Statement" and assured that the 
Viceroy would discuss the position of the Sikhs with the leaders of the 
main parties when the Constituent Assembly was formed. 
Viceroy's Assurance to Azad and Jinnah 
On May 25, Azad wrote to the Viceroy suggesting that "in informal 
conversations the Viceroy had stated that it was his intention to 
ftjnction as a constitutional head of the Government and that in practice 
the interim Government would have the same powers as a Dominion cabinet". 
70. Letter from Master Tara Singh to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, May 25,1946, 
Ibid., p, 61, 
71, Lord Pethick-Lawrence to Master Tara Singh, Ibid,, pp, 61-62, 
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The Viceroy replied that he had never stated like this. The Viceroy, 
however, assured that the HMG "will give to the Indian Government the 
greatest possible freedom in the exercise of the day-to-day administra-
72,. 
tion of the country", 
Jinnah returned to New Delhi on June 2, and Wavell met him on 
June 3, Jinnah asked what would happen if the Congress refused to accept 
the Plan, Wavell,on June 4, replied that "we shall go ahead with the 
plan laid down in the statement so far as circximstances permit if either 
73 
party accepts; but we hope that both will accept", 
ML Council on the Plan 
On June 5, the ML Council met and Jinnah declared that the Viceroy 
had replied that if the Congress "decided against acceptance (of the 
plan) he would hand over the interim government to the Muslim League 
and give them all the support they required". On June 6, Jinnah spoke 
to the League Council: 
"It is now up to you as the Parliament of the Muslim Nation 
to take your decision ... I repeat ... that delay is not good 
either for the British Government or the Hindus, If they 
love freedom, if they love the independence of India, if 
they want to be tree, then the sooner they realise the better 
that the quickest way is to agree to Pakistan". 
The Council observed that "the conclusions recorded in paragraphs 
6, 7, 8, 9, to and 11 of the Statement concerning the Muslim demand for 
the establishment of a fully sovereign Pakistan as the only solution 
of the Indian constitutional problem are unwarranted, \mJustified, 
76 
and convincing" and the language of these paragraphs shows that the 
Mission was promoted to appease the Hindus in utter disregard of the 
Muslim sentiments. The Cotmcil, however, in view of the foundation of 
Pakistan inherent in the Plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping of 
the six Muslim Provinces in Sections B and C, desired to cooperate 
72. V.P, Menon, n, 2, p, 273. 
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with the constitution-making machinery" in the hope that it would 
ultimately result in the establishment of a completely sovereign Pakistan, 
and in the consummation of the goal of independence for the major nations, 
Muslims and Hindus, and all the other people inhabiting the vast 
77 
subcontinent". Thus, the Muslim League accepted the scheme by a large 
majority. Wavell noted, "Now the real battle begins, and the great 
question is whether the Delegation will stand up to Congress or not. 
78 
Parity in the Interim Government may be the main issue". The Council 
authorised Jinnah to negotiate with the Viceroy and to take such decision 
and action as he deemed fit and proper, 
Jinnah met with the Viceroy on J tune 7, and wanted the "Defence 
Portfolio for himself, and Foreign Affairs and Planning for two of his 
79 followers". This was the first and last Jinnah's expression in his own 
interest. Stanley's observation that it was "personal interest" is a 
charge without evidence and is based on conception, which he should have 
avoided. A person who fought in the interest of Muslims throughout his 
whole life and even during most of his ailing days may be regarded to 
have demanded office keeping in mind the idea for doing some good to 
the Muslims. By saying so he has tried to unknowingly inject hatred 
against Jinnah in his readers' mind and seems a champion of separatism 
81 infused by Francis Robinson. Jinnah was assured that he would remain 
"President of the Muslim League if he came into the Interim Government". 
'The Statesman' on the ML Acceptance of the plan 
The paper reported on June 7, that the League "has not given up 
its hope of a sovereign, tindivided Pakistan, and intends to work for 
83 
it during the next ten years" and "it has sturdily adopted the Cabinet 
Mission's scheme as second best". The paper wrote: 
77. Ibid. 
78. June 6, 1946, Penderel Moon, n, 40, p. 288; see also Stanley 
Wolpert, n, 68, p. 273. 
79. Penderel Moon, n. 40, p, 288. 
80. Stanley Wolpert, n. 68, p. 273. 
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"The League dislikes the division of predominantly Muslim 
areas into two zones, still somewhat dislikes the notion 
of a Union Centre at all* dislikes more the arrangement for 
one Union Constituent Assembly, and especially dislikes the 
powers given to the chairman of that body". 
Regarding the admirable leadership of Jinnah, the paper said: "He 
has fought a long, often bitter battle* his tactics have been at times 
so harsh that he has seemed irreconcilable; but with fine strategic 
judgment he has realized the right moment for an end to quarrelling, 
and this time has taken the initiative in boldly constructive courses". 
. 85 
The paper regarding the Mission Plan opines: 
"The Simla Conference having failed, the Cabinet Mission's 
olan provides the only direct and unbloodly road to Indian 
self-government, chaos and bitter suffering for the common 
people lie along all other discernible paths. To the ordinary 
man, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Scheduled Caste, whatever he may be, 
the May 16 proposals present a ready way out of frustration 
which had threatened to become permanent". 
On June 8, Jinnah wrote to the Viceroy seeking confirmation of 
his assurance that there would be 12 portfolios, namely, 5 League, 5 
Congress, 1 Sikh and 1 Indian Christian or Anglo-Indian, and that the 
most important portfolios "will be equally divided between the League 
and the Congress in the distribution thereof, further details being left 
86 
open for discussion". Jinnah warned that "any departure from this 
formula, directly or indirectly, will lead to serious consequences and 
87 
will not secure the co-operation of the Muslim League". The Viceroy,on 
J\jne 9, replied that he had not assured but had told what he had in 
mind. He hoped to reach an agreement on this poini 
88 
It. 
On June 10, Nehru and Azad vigorously argued before the Mission 
against 'parity'. Cripps suggested "two Vice-Presidents" on the Interim 
Government Cabinet - Jinnah and Nehru rotating office. Cripps met Jinnah 
on 12th night. Jinnah said: "he was not prepared to discuss parity with 
anyone". He had made the ML Council and Working Committee to accept the 
proposal promising that "he would not join the Interim Government vinless 
89 
the Muslim League had parity with Congress". He said that the moment 
85. Ibid. 
86. Papers Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India, n. 58, pp. 37-38, 
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the Congress would accept the proposals, he would put before Nehru and 
Wavell the names of his nominees with the suggested portfolios. 
On June 12, Nehru brought a list of 15 names for the Interim 
Council (4 League, 5 Congress Hindus, 1 non-Congress Hindu, 1 Congress 
Scheduled Caste and 1 Congress woman), which Wavell said would be 
unacceptable to Jinnah. On the 13th morning, Jinnah gave the Viceroy 
"some names for the Government if the League came in". Nehru returned 
the same day in the afternoon and indulged into an "outburst about 
Jinnah's refusal to meet Azad and described Jinnah as a wrecker". Later 
that evening Patel came to the Viceroy and without listening any argijment 
began to "svmg a continuous hymn or hate against Jinnah and the League" 
and declared that no Government formed by the Viceroy would be acceptable, 
Wavell charged Gandhiji for the failure of the negotiations. 
London Times observed that the Congress might have avoided the inclusion 
of a Muslim to its quota for formation of the National Government at 
93 the Centre, while the Congress circle felt that the rejection was 
impossible because by avoiding nomination of a Muslim, the nationalist 
character of the Congress would have been destroyed. 
After meeting the Secretary .- and the Viceroy, Gandhiji 
wrote to the Viceroy on June 12, that in the event of failure in reaching 
an agreement, he (the Viceroy) should announce the names of the Interim 
Government. On June 13, Gandhiji wrote to the Viceroy again: 
"You must make your choice of one horse or the other. So 
far as I can see you will never succeed in riding two at 
the same time. Choose the names, submitted either by the 
Congress or the League, For God's sake do not make an 
incompatible mixture and in tiying to do so produce a fearful 
explosion. Anyway, fix your time limit and tell us all to 
leave when that limit is over". 
90. I b i d . , p . 866. 
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On Jxme 13, Gandhiji wrote to Cripps: 
"... the Mission is playing with fire ... you will not be 
able to have your cake and eat it. You will have to choose 
between the two - the Muslim League and the Congress/ both 
your creations ... Coquetting now with the Congress, now 
with the League and again with the Congress, wearing yourself 
away, will not do ... Only stick to the programme. Stick 
to your dates even though heavens may fall", 
Wavell invited Nehru and Jinnah for joint consultation, Jinnah 
said that until the Congress had given its decision on the long-term 
plan of May 16, their discussion would be meaningless. 
The Interim Government Proposed 
On Jime 13, Maul an a Azad wrote to the Viceroy that as his proposed 
composition of the cabinet involved parity between Hindus, including 
the Scheduled Castes, and the Muslim League, the position of Hindus had 
beccxne "very unfair" eliminating the Non-League Muslims. The Congress 
position was thus worse than it was in June, 1945. Hence, the CWC was 
unable to accept the proposal. Azad said that a convention, along with 
parity, would deadlock the working of the Govemmenr. Azad suggested 
15 members to the Interim Government, As a result the Viceroy suggested 
a formula of 13 members (6 Congress including a member of the Scheduled 
Castes; 5 Muslim League and 2 representatives of the minorities). Jinnah 
proposed to place it before the ML Working Committee, if the Congress 
approved of it, but the Congress turned it down, and a complete deadlock 
ensued. To break the deadlock, the Mission and the Viceroy issued their 
own formula on June 16, 1946, according to which the reformed Council 
was to include 6 Congress (including a representative of the Scheduled 
Castes), 5 Muslim League, 1 Sikh, 1 Indian Christian and 1 Parsi, 
totalling 14 members. The Statement, xmder Clause 8, stated that 
"Should this proposal be accepted the Viceroy will aim at Inaugurating 
the new Government about the 26th June". The Statement saia: 
96. Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi; The Last Phase (New Delhi: Manager of 
Publications, Publication Division, Government of India,1956), 
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"In the event of the two major parties or either of them 
proving unwilling to join in the setting up of a Coalition 
Government cm the above lines, it is the intention of the 
Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an Interim Govern-
ment which will be as representative as possible of those 
willing to accept the Statement of May 16th". 
The Viceroy invited the following to form the Interim GovemmSftt: 
1. Sardar Baldev Singh 8, Dr. John Matthai 
2. Sir N,P, Engineer 9, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan 
3. Mr, Jagjlvan Ram 10. Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin 
4. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru 11. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar 
5. Mr, M,A. Jinnah 12, Mr. C. Rajagopalachari 
6. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan 13. Dr. Rajendra Prasad 
7. Mr, H.K, Mahatab 14. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel 
Jinnah on June 19, regretfully wrote to the Viceroy that the five 
Muslim Leaguers were invited without calling a list from the ML leader; 
that parity between the Congress and the League was substituted by parity 
between the League and the Caste Hindus; that the fourth representative, 
'Parsi' was added; and that minority representative, Jagjivan Ram, the 
Congressman, was included to add to the strength of the Congress; that 
proportion of Muslims were affected; that in view of serious changes it 
was not possible for the ML Working Committee to arrive at any decision; 
and that the distribution of portfolios should be finally decided.Jinnah 
desired the Viceroy to elucidate the following points: 
(1) whether the proposals were final or were still open to any 
change or modification; 
(2) whether the total number of 14 members vould remain unchanged; 
(3) whether the Muslim League would be consulted for filling a vacancy; 
(4) whether the proportion of members (commxmity-wise) would be 
maintained; whether representation of the four minorities viz. the 
Scheduled Castes, the Sikhs, the Indian Christians and the Parsi, 
will be adhered to without any change; and, lastly, 
(5) whether, in view of the change in the original formula "there 
will be a provision, in order to safeguard Muslim interests, 
that the Executive Council shall not take any decision on any 
major commxmal issue if the majority of the Muslim Members 
are opposed to it". ^^^ 
100. Ibid. 
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In reply, Wavell stated on June 20: 
'•(1) Until I have received acceptance from those invited ... the 
names in the statement cannot be regarded as final. But no 
change in principle will be made in the statement without the 
consent of the two major parties, 
(2) No change in the number of 14 Members of the Interim Government 
will be made without the agreement ot the two major parties. 
(3) If any vacancy occurs among the seats at present allotted to 
representatives of minorities, I shall naturally consult both 
the main parties before fil]ing it. 
(4) (a) and (b) The proportion of members by communities will not 
be changed without the agreement of the two major parties. 
(5) No decision on a major communal issue could be taken by the 
Interim Government if the majority of either of the main parties 
were opposed to it. I pointed this out to the Congress President 
and he agreed that the Congress appreciated this point. 
(6) If you agree, I will send copies of the questions in your letter 
and of paragraphs 4 and 5 of this letter to the President of 
the Congress". 
The contents of Jinnah's letter leaked out to the Press as a result 
the Viceroy sent the gist of the correspondence to Azad, However, the 
Viceroy, on June 22, in spite of strong Congress feeling, did not agree 
to include a Muslim of the Congress choice in the Interim Government, 
and referring to paragraph 5 of the 16th June statement, which assures 
that no precedent would be established, appealed to the Congress not to 
104 
press their demand. However, Azad, on June 25, wrote a long letter 
criticising almost every point raised and replied by Wavell, 
Further, the CVfC at Delhi on June 25, recording its grievances 
regarding the 'unjust parity' and power of 'veto* of a 'communal group' 
rejected the proposals for an interim Government as per 16th June scheme. 
The Committee, objecting to the 16th May Statement (Long-Term Proposal) 
felt that it fell short of immediate independence, limitation of the 
central authority, system of grouping and lonfair structure of NWFP and 
Assam and inadequate treatment of minorities notably the Sikhs,however, 
decided to join the proposed Constituent Assembly with a view to framing 
the constitution of a free, united and democratic India. Wavell, on the 
103 . I b i d . , pp, 4 6 - 4 7 . 
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same day* wrote to Jinnah that "the Congress had accepted the Statement 
of May 16th, while refusing to take part in the Interim Government 
proposed in the Statement of Jime 16th", and that "Since the Congress 
and the Muslim League have now both accepted the Statement of May 16th, 
it is the intention to form a Coalition Government including both those 
parties as soon as possible". 
Azad wrote: 
"The acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan by both Congress 
and Muslim League was a glorious event in the history of 
the freedom movement in India. It meant that the difficult 
question of Indian freedom had been settled by negotiation 
and agreement and not by methods of violence and conflict. 
It also se«ned that the communal difficulties had been 
finally left behind. Throughout the country there was a 
sense of jubilication and all the people were tmited in their 
demand for freedom. We rejoiced but we did not know them 
that our job was premature and bitter disappointment -
awaited us". 
However, Wavell's letter,of Jime 25, reached in Jinnah's hands 
in the late night. Meanwhile, the election and summoning of a Consti-
tuent Assembly as laid down in the Statement of May 16th, were going 
ahead. 
The ML. Working Committee immediately met on the same day and 
resolved "to agree to join the Interim Government on the basis of State-
ment of 16th June" and objected to the Congress adherence "to its 
108 interpretation of some of the provisions" in the statement of May 16, 
The resolution was communicated to the Viceroy the same night. 
On June 27, Jinnah, with regards to the Cabinet Delegation's 
Statements of 16th May and 25th May, urged that the "long-term plan and 
the Interim Government formula together formed one whole, and this 
formula regarding the Interim Government was an integral part of the 
109 
whole scheme", according to which the AIML had taken decision on Jxme 6, 
Thus, Jinnah concluded that by rejecting a part of the scheme the 
Congress had rejected the whole plan, and regretted the postponement 
106. Papers Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India, n,58, pp, 52-53. 
107. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, n, 11, p, 151, 
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of the formation of the Interim Government for some "mysterious reasons". 
He said that the Delegation and the Viceroy "were in honour bound to 
go ahead with the formation of the Interim Government", He, in the 
light of League's winning 90 per cent of the total Muslim seats in the 
various legislatures in the recent elections, repudiated the Congress 
claim as bogus that it represented the 'national character and charged 
it as a Hindu organization with "a handful of Muslim henchmen for the 
purpose of window-dressing" on whom they keep on harping. He also 
charged that the Congress refusal for the formation of the Interim 
Government was based on sinister motives, as they wanted to break the 
parity between the Muslims and the Caste Hindus and insisted on nomina-
ting a Congress Muslim to strike at the fundamentals of the League and 
its Muslim national representative character. Therefore, he said:"Muslim 
League cannot be a party directly or indirectly to any course of action 
which is calculated to prop up this bogus claj m.". 
Regarding the safeguards, Jinnah, in view of the Viceroy's 
assurance that "no decision on any major communal issue could be taken 
if the majority of the main parties were opposed to it", said that, as 
the number had been increased from 12 to 14, "the Muslims will be in 
a minority of little over one-third in the whole Executive"; and, hence, 
it was absolutely necessary to protect their interests. Referring to 
Clause 4(a and b) of the 20th Jvme letter from the Viceroy, he warned 
that "if there is any departure made in the principle of parity or if 
the Congress is allowed to nominate a Muslim, in either case it will 
112 be impossible for the Muslim League to agree to it ..." Jinnah concluded 
that "it was undesirable to proceed with one part i.e., the elections 
113 to the Constituent Assembly, and to postpone the other". The Viceroy 
replied that he had not gone back on their yrords and arrangements for 
elections were put into operation. The Statesman commented that the 
Mission's and the Viceroy's move was an "error", 
Care-Taker Government 
Wavell was most disappointed at the Congress acceptance of the 
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1J5 Cabinet proposals. On Jxme 25, he wrote: 
"The worst day yet ... Congress has accepted the statement 
of 16 May ... Crlpps having assured me categorically that 
the Congress would never accept the statement of May 16th, 
The Congress manoeuvres have now put us in a very difficult 
position. Both with Mr, Jinnah and the formation of an 
Interim Government .,, Unless we decide that the Congress 
is dishonest, as it is in fact, and refuse to regard it an 
acceptance", 
Hodson writes: "The Viceroy was not prepared to carry on if they 
gave way to the Congress demand", Wavell stated in his diary* "We then 
discussed the Congress letter of acceptance which is really a dishonest 
acceptance, but it is cleverly worded so that it had to be regarded as 
an acceptance", 
The same evening (Jxine 25), the Mission and Wavell met with Jinnah. 
They showed him the Congress resolution, Wavell informed Jinnah that 
he would appoint a "Care-taker Government" for a "short interval" and 
they could "go ahead with the Constituent Assembly and constitution-
making" and that the Cabinet Mission would be returning to England. 
Jinnah was shocked to hear and sai Ml: 
"Did he understand that the Delegation did not now wish 
to form an Interim Government." He had understood that if 
one party rejected the offer of Jvme 16th we should go 
ahead with the other ,,, The Muslim League had accepted". 
Wavell noted that Jinnah was in a thoroughly evil mood accusing 
them of "bad faith and of giving way to the Congress and considered that 
he should be given the opportimity of entering the Government". 
On May 9, the Viceroy's Executive Council, including the C-in-C, 
had resigned in order to facilitate the arrangements for an Interim 
Government, The Viceroy, on June 26, announced that until an Indian 
Government was framed he would set up a temporary "Caretaker Government 
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of officials to carry cai the interim period. This government continued 
to work up to August 25, 1946, when the Interim Government was formed. 
On Jxme 28, Gandhiji left Delhi, which marked the end of his 
dominant part played by him in Indian politics as differences between him 
and the Congress during the negotiations with the Mission had grown and 
he had lost influence over the decisions of the Congress Working Committee 
and was even not informed of the causes of events. 
On Jime 29, 1946, the Mission left India leaving an atmosphere 
of uncertainty, but "both the Congress and the Muslim League, had,indeed, 
accepted the long-term plan although each party had its own reservations 
120 
and interpretations of almost all the controversial i-ssues". 
Impolitic Nehru* s Stand on the Cabinet Plan 
The CWC resolution of June 25, was ratified by the AICC on July 6, 
At this session Jawaharlal Nehru was elected President and he took over 
the presidency from Maulana Azad, who was President since 1940, At the 
winding up of the proceedings of the Committee, Nehru said that they 
would remain in the Constituent Assembly so long as they thought it was 
for India's good and they would come out when they thought it was 
injuring their cause. He also said, "We are not bound by a single thing 
except that we have decided for the moment to go to the Constituent 
Assembly", 
Nehru decided to guide the coxsntTy in his ovm way. Disregarding 
Jinnah's qualities, he did not consider him"really a Muslim at all" and 
thought him an "opportunist", who had no business to demand the partition 
of India, Gi July 10, addressing a press conference, with regard to the 
Congress acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan in toto, he said as 
Congress President he "had every intention of modifying the plan". With 
regard to the grouping, he stressed that "the constituent assembly was 
a sovereign body and that in all probability there would be no groups 
at all. The non-Pakistan provinces (Section A) would decide against 
120. V.P. Menon, n, 2, p. 279; see also M.L. Gwyer and A, Appadorai, 
n. 52, Vol. II, pp. 611-12. 
121. Ibid., p. 280. 
122. Mosley's interview with Nehru, see Leonard Mosley, The Last Days 
of the British Raj (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), p,26. 
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grouping and so would the NWFP and Assam, leading to the collapse of 
the other groups as well". Agreeing to the election of candidates and 
going into the Constituent Assembly, he said, "but what we do there we 
124 
are entirely and absolutely free to determine". Regarding the Mission's 
arrangement for the minorities and the treaty between India and England, 
Nehru said that the problem of the minorities was domestic and "we shall 
no doubt succeed in solving it" and he would have no treaty with England. 
He said that these two limiting factors to the sovereignty of the 
Constituent Assembly were not acceptable to the Congress. 
It is amazing that the 57-year old Nehru, out of deep enthusiasm 
for freedom for an undivided India, failed to "read the writings on the 
wall";to appreciate the strength of the Muslim League and Jinnah, who 
had won 90 per cent of the Muslim seats in the last elections; to 
estimate the depth of demand of Sikhs leader, like Master Tara Singh, 
for an independent State - Khalistan for themselves; to recognize the 
hold of Dr. Ambedkar upon the Untouchables, who pinpointed the interests 
of minorities other than the Musalmans; and to xanderstand the opposition 
of Indian Princes, who were unwilling to reconcile to an independent 
and a xmited India, and whose Chamber of Princes emphasized separation 
and vested interests. The Chancellor of the Chamber, the Nawab of Bhopal, 
along with other Maharajas, Rajas, Nawabs and Jagirdars, was asserting 
that if the British decided to guit India, the Princely States "would 
not automatically be transferred to the newly independent State", while 
a few bigger States, like Hyderabad, who did not join him, wanted 
complete independence after the British left India, In view of these 
disintegrating forces, he could have thought of a federated India to 
bring all the factions together for immediate independence, and to 
calm down the rioti;ig elements to save life and property in India, But 
his overambitiousness marred the progress of the whole mass of community. 
Thus, Nehru's statement of 10th July were "most xjnwise, impolitic and 
1?7 128 
vmtimely", Maulana Azad writes that the "statement was wrong". Nehru's 
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biographer, Michael Brecher, described it "a serious tactical error" 
as "one of the most fiery and provocative statements in his forty years 
of public lite". It was, perhaps, the worst of all indiscreet statements 
, 130 
that were ever made by any politician. 
Jinnah's Reaction on Nehru's Statement of July 10,1946 
Jinnah exploited Nehru's remarks fully in the interest of the 
League's demand for Pakistan. It was the best excuse and an opportunity 
to withdraw from the agreement of joining the Interim Government. He made 
an uproar against the statement. Pethick-Lawrence in the House of Lords 
and Cripps in the House of Commons reiterated the Mission's interpreta-
tion and rejected the Nehru's and Congress interpretation. Jinnah convened 
the AIMI Coimcil in Bombay on July 27, and told the 450 followers, who 
were packed into a sweltering hall crowded with members of the press, 
both foreign and domestic, as well as delegates from every province: 
"The Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy ... had gone back 
on their plighted word and abandoned what was announced as 
their final proposals ... Congress really never accepted 
the long-term plan. Its conditional acceptance was communica-
ted to the Cabinet Mission by the Congress President on 
June 25 ... The Cabinet Mission like a drowning man ready 
to catch hold of a straw treated this conditional acceptance 
... as genuine ... Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as the elected 
President ... at a Press conference in Bombay on July 10, 
made the policy and attitude of the Congress towards the 
long-term proposal clear ... that the Congress was committed 
to nothing ... What is the use of imagining things and 
dreaming". 
132 Jinnah continued to say: 
"All these facts prove clearly beyond a shadow of doubt that 
the only solution of India's problem is Pakistan. So long 
as the Congress and Mr. Gandhi maintain that they represent 
the whole of India ... so long as they deny true facts and 
the absolute truth that the Muslim league is the only authori-
tative organization of the Muslims, and so long as they continue 
in this vicious circle, there can and will be no compromise 
or freedom ... Mr. Gandhi now speaks as a vmiversal adviser. 
He says that the Congress .. is the trustee for the people 
of India ... We have enough experience of one trustee that 
has been here for 150 years. We do not want the Congress to 
become our trustee. We have now grown up. The only trustee 
of the Muslims is the Muslim nation". 
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On July 28-29, the ML Council considered over a dozen of resolu-
tions. Sir Firoz Khan Noon urged that they made a mistake in accepting 
a Union and "The path of wisdom lies in the total rejection of the 
constitutional proposals .., let there be one gxiiding beacon before us -
133 
a fully sovereign,separate State of Pakistan", Maulana Hasrat Mohani, 
amidst cheers, shouted: "If the Quaid-i-Azam will only give his word, 
the Muslims of India will rise in revolt at a moment's notice", which 
was reiterated by other Maulanas, Khans and Mullahs, Raja Ghazanfar Ali 
said: "If Mr. Jinnah gave the call, Muslims from all walks of life would 
come forward to carry on the struggle for the attainment of Pakistan", 
On July 29, the Working Committee in a resolution, withdrawing the League 
acceptance of the Mission's May proposals, and declaring direct action, 
stated: 
",., and whereas it has become abundantly clear that the 
Muslims of India would not rest contented with anything less 
than the immediate establishment of an Independent and fully 
sovereign State of Pakistan .., the time has come for the 
Muslim nation to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan 
to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour and 
to get rid of the present British slavery and the contemplated 
future Caste-Hindu domination". 
135 After the resolutions were adopted, Jinnah declared: 
"... Today we have said good-bye to constitutions and 
constitutional methods. Throughout the painful negotiations, 
the two parties with whom we bargained held a pistol at us; 
one with power and machine-guns behind it, and the other 
with non-co-operation and the threat to launch mass civil 
disobedience. This situation must be met. We also have a pistol". 
Elections to the Constituent Assembly 
While the Congress-League differences on partition versus unity 
were undecided. Lord Wavell wrote to Jinnah and Nehru separately on 
July 22, to replace the Caretaker Government by an Interim Government 
as soon as possible, and placed the following for their considera 
"(a) The Interim Government will consist of 14 members. 
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(b) Six members (to include one Scheduled Caste representative) 
will be nominated by the Congress. Five members will be 
nominated by the Muslim League. Three representatives of 
Minorities will be nominated by the Viceroy; one of these 
places will be kept for a Sikh. It will not be open to either 
(the) Congress or the Muslim League to object to the names 
submitted by the other party, provided they are accepted by 
the Viceroy, 
(c) Distribution of the portfolios will be decided after the 
parties have agreed to enter- the Government and have submitted 
their names. The Congress and the Muslim League will each 
have an equitable share of the most important portfolios. 
(d) The assurances about the status of the Interim Government 
which I gave in my letter dated 30th May to Maulana Azad 
will stand". 
The Congress and the league, attracted to the invitation/ agreed 
to contest the elections. By the end of July, the elections to the 
proposed Constituent Assembly were completed in all the provinces. The 
Congress won all the general seats (209) except nine while the League 
won 73 Muslim seats except 5, out of a total of 296 seats allotted to 
British India. The election campaign followed heated and endless arguments 
among the leaders. 
Soon after the elections, Jinnah realized (in the light of Nehru' s 
speech of July 10; Congress arguments during the elections that the 
Congress would leave no chance to suppress the League* s demand for 
Pakistan and disagree to the Muslim majority provinces deciding their 
future constitutional set up) that the Assembly would be Pakistan's 
graveyard since the Congress majority in the Assembly would favour a 
united sovereign India. 
Direct Action Day 
Due to the Congress opposition, an exasperated Jinnah decided to 
achieve Pakistan by force and to settle the dispute in the streets. It 
was Jinnah's unwise action to force the Congress and the British to 
accept League's demand at the cost of flesh and blood of the masses. 
Jinnah rejected the Mission Plan and, on July 29, called upon the Muslims 
throughout India "to renounce the titles conferred on them by the British 
138 
Government" and to observe Friday, the August 16, as 'Direct Action Day'. 
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J i n n ah clalmic 2d: 
"I do not think that any responsible man will disagree with 
me that we were moved by a desire not to allow the situation 
to develop into bloodshed and civil war ... In our anxiety 
to try to come to a peaceful settlement with the other major 
party, we made this sacrifice of giving three subjects to 
the Centre and accepted a limited Pakistan ... But this has 
been treated with defiance and contempt. Then are we alone 
to be guided by reason, justice, honesty and fair play, when 
on the other hand there are perfidious dealings by the Congfessi-" 
Jinnah pointed out that the Day would not be observed to enforce 
the Pakistan demand but to explain to the Muslims all over India the 
contents of the League's July 27th resolution, and called upon the 
140 Muslims to maintain peace and "not to play in the hands of their enemy". 
A correspondent of Dally Telegraph asked as to what did he mean 
by 'Direct Action'. Jinnah replied: "there would be a mass illegal move»-
ment", but later he changed the word 'illegal' from the text shown by 
the correspondent befcre cabling home, to 'unconstitutio A l l ' . In the 
meanwhile Pethlck-Lawrence urged Wavell to meet Jinnah and press him 
to permit the League members to join the interim coalition government, 
but V^ avell, knowing Jinnah's anger, wired on August 1, to leave him 
142 
"alone'* and he remained unpurturbed, mistakenly believing that "J. has 
no real idea what to iJi". 
On August 5, Shaheed Subraw^rdy, a prominent member ot the Miwc 
and a very influential leader of Bengal Muslims, wrote to The Statesman 
"Bloodshed and disorder are not necessary eyils in themselves, if 
resorted to for a noble cause. Among Muslims today, no cause is dearer 
144 
or nobler than Pakistan", The Muslim urchins shouted in the streets 
and lanes: 
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"Lar ke Lenge Pakistan : But ke Rahega Hindustan" 
(We shall have Pakistan by fighting; India shall have to be 
partitioned). 
As directed by the Secretary of State, Wavell, on August 6,invited 
145 
Nehru to submit proposals for the formation of an Interim Government. 
Nehru replied from Gandhiji's Ashram at Wardha accepting the "responsi-
bility" offered, and wrote to Jinnah on August 13. Jinnah replied on 
August 15, 1946:-
"l£ this means the Viceroy has commissioned you to form an 
Executive Council ... and has already agreed to accept and 
act upon your advice ... it is not possible for me to accept 
such a position ... However, if you care to meet me, on 
behalf of Congress, to settle the Hindu-Muslim question and 
resolve the serious deadlock, I shall be glad to see you 
today at 6 p.m.". 
Nehru met Jinnah at 6,00 p.m. on August 15, at Jinnah's Malabar 
Hill estate, and assured that no major communal issue would be acted 
upon in the Assembly except by a majority of both parties and disputed 
points would be referred to the federal court for decision and that 
"while Congress did not like the idea of grouping and preferred autonomous 
provinces under the Centre they would not oppose grouping by provinces 
if the provinces wished ir". Nehru also offered five Muslim League seats 
on a cabinet of fourteen, but Jinnah refused to participate in the 
interim government and deferred "all action ... for six months". As Nehru 
returned, India's bloodiest civil war began. 
The Direct Action Day, commemorated on August 16, was led by 
H.S. Subrawardy, who declared it a Government policy and declared official 
holiday to arrange peaceful official demonstration as the Muslims in 
Bengal were in minority. He did not anticipate communal riots. In the 
evening of that Day riot broke out. The Muslims ignited the spark, the 
the Hindus poured oil, and the Sikhs created havoc holding up their 
taxis, resulting into thousands of funeral pyres. 
On August 16-20, 1946, in the Great Calcutta Killing, as Wavell 
informed the Secretary of State on August 21, there were 3,000 dead and 
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17,000 iniurei. The latest estimate of casualties was that "appreciably 
149 ed". The troops were confined to 
their barracks, but in view of the mounting and rotting piles of hoiman 
bodies, the Government offered to pay troops "five rupees for each 
body collected". 
The cause of the riot was that a large number of goondas from the 
suburban areas began killing, looting and burning, when Suhrawardy told 
the "immense Muslim crowd" to return home early, speaking enthusiastically 
that "the Cabinet Mission was a bluff, and that he would see how the 
British could make Mr. Nehru rule Bengal. Direct Action Day would prove 
152 
to be the first step towards the Muslim struggle for emancipation". The 
riots spread to other parts - Noakhali and Tipperah (East Bengal), The 
Hindu and Muslim workers' transient families fled to their homes in 
Bihar and told the frightful stories, often exaggerated. Murder and arson 
spread to other parts of the country - Garhmukteshwar (Western U.P.), 
Dasna, Meerut City where the Congress panda1 was burnt, Bombay and 
Ahmedabad also. Thus, the British communal policy reached a climax,while 
the Hindus and Muslims sharpened their blades to slit each others* 
throats, 
Jinnah was informed about the Great Calcutta Killing by a foreign 
news agency in August. Jinnah replied: 
"If Congress regimes are going to suppress and persecute 
the Musalmans, it will be very difficult to control 
disturbances ... In my opinion, there is no alternative 
except the outright establishment of Pakistan ... We guarantee 
to look after non-Muslim and Hindu caste-minorities in 
Pakistan, which will be about 25 millions, and ... That is 
the quickest way to India's real freedom and to the welfare 
and happiness of all the peoples inhabiting this sub-continent". 
The Congress and the League charged each other for the riots. The 
Direct Action Policy was not anti-British but it was a Muslim struggle 
148. Ibid., p. 274. 
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against the Congress. The League propagated that the Congress was a 
Hindu party and that all powers and responsibilities would be usurped 
by the Hindus from top to bottom of the administration. It may be 
concluded that the people were not fighting on political issues, but they 
were pitched in the battle in the wave of enthusiasm without anticipating 
the dangerous consequences, while the League proved to the world that 
Hindu-Muslim co-existence had become impossible and partition was the 
only course left. 
« 
Interim Government 
During the course of proceeding for setting up an interim government 
Jinnah insisted that no Muslim other than the League should be appointed 
to the interim government and if Nehru did not abide by this, he would 
not conciliate. Cn this issue the entire agreement had broken down and 
the demonstrations were held. 
Wavell wrote to the Secretary of State that the Congress should 
not be allowed to form the Government by itself. The Secretary of State 
replied that since the Muslim League had reversed its decision regarding 
the 16th May proposal, they cotiild not be allowed to enter the Cabinet, 
and further instructed that, if essential, Jinnah should be approached 
through Nehru. 
On August 24, Wavell announced that Nehru and thirteen nominated 
persons would form the new interim government in early September. A week 
later, two young Muslim Leaguers stabbed Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan seven 
times in Simla on August 25, 1946, but he survived, Jinnah announced 
that the Viceroy "has struck a severe blow to the Muslim League and 
Muslim India ,,, the step he has taken is most unwise and unstatesmanlike 
and is fraught with dangerous and serious consequences and he only 
added insult to injury by nominating three Muslims who, he knows, do 
not command either the respect or confidence of Muslim Inoia. On August 
26, Wavell once again invited the Muslim League to join the Interim 
Government. 
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In his Id message from Bombay on August 29, Jinnah appealed to 
his followers: 
"Let us stand as one united nation xinder our flag and on 
one platform and be determined and prepared to face the 
worst as a completely united and great people with our 
motto: unity, faity and discipline, God is with us and 
we are bound to succeed". 
On September 1, on the eve of the Congress taking over the interim 
government, Muslim houses hoisted blacTc flags of mourning, which caused 
communal rioting in Bombay and by September 10, more than 200 Hindus 
and Muslims were dead. There was also violence in Karachi, In Sind "both 
158 « 
commxmities were busy surreptitiously arming themselves". 
However, on September 2, interim government was formed. Gandhiji, 
after prayer in Birla House in New Delhi, said: "door to Puma Swaraj 
has at last been opened", Nehru took oath of office as Vice-President 
(virtual Prime Minister), Patel as incharge of Home Affairs(Police) and 
Baldev Singh of Defence (of War) and a Provisional National Government 
with 12 members (3 being Muslims), leaving two places for the League 
to represent'Bengal and Sind, on the basis of 6-5-3 formula i.e.6 Congres! 
men, 5 Muslim Leaguers and 3 representing other minorities. 
The Viceroy on September 8, sought permission from the Secretary 
of State to announce his plan before January 1, 1947, to make the Indians 
know that the British were ready to pull back their troops and leave 
India, Approximately 100,000 European civilians and 100,000 British 
troops had to be evacuated from India. 
The country became a stage of demonstrations, processions,meetings 
and hartals and the people clashed on the roads and streets and even 
within their own families, as Nawa-e-Wakt had already declared:".., this 
is going to be a total war which shall be fought on every front, in 
159 
every city, town, street and house" against the Congress Government. 
Throughout the country, the Leaguers hoisted black flags on their 
1 fin 
residences, places of business and mosques. Despite the League's violence, 
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Gandhijl advised the Congress ministers to work for the Hindu-Muslim 
vmity. On the other hand, the League newspapers severely c r i t i c i s e d the 
formation of the Interim Government, pawn termed the Government action 
as bet rayal and Roznama-i-Khi1afat wroi m-. 
"It is not a Government, but a Fascist gang. It is not a 
message of peace but a red flag of danger, not a ladder to 
progress but an axe for destruction", 
Jinnah called the Viceroy's action as double betrayal for its 
163 ignoring and by-passing the Muslim League, 
On September 1, Nehru invited Jinnah to participate in the Interim 
Government to settle all controversial issues, but Jinnah declined. 
Simultaneously, the Viceroy was also negotiating with Jinnah for League's 
involvement in the interim government. Nehru complained that the approach 
to the Muslim League to form the Interim Government, had been made over 
his head". On September 28, the Daily Mail reported Jinnah's statement 
that Nehru had made no definite proposals to him. In reply to Jinnah's 
letter dated October 3, 1946, containing a 9-point proposal. Lord Wavell 
wrote on October 4, categorically, offering the following 
1. The total number of the Executive Council would be 14. 
2. Of the 6 Congress nominees, one would be a Scheduled Caste 
representative and it would be ultimate responsibility of the 
Governor-General and the Viceroy in that behalf, 
3. Each party would be equally free to nominate its own representatives, 
4. In a Coalition Government it is impossible to decide major 
matters of action proposed. It would be fatal to allow major 
communal issues to be decided by vote in the Cabinet. 
5. Arrangement of alternative or rotational Vice-Presidents would 
present practical difficulty. However, arrangement would be made 
to nominate a Muslim League member to preside over the Cabinet 
in the event of the Governor-General and the Vice-President being 
absent. A Muslim League member would also be nominated as Vice-
chairman of the Co-ordination Committee of the Cabinet. 
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6. Both major parties would be consulted before filling a vacancy 
in any of these three seats. 
7, The minority representatives cannot be excluded from a share of 
the major portfolios and Jagjivan Ram would continue as Labour 
Minister. There would be equal distribution of the most important 
portfolios between the Congress and the Muslim League, Details 
would be a matter for negotiation. 
8, These arrangements would not be changed or modified \inless both 
the major parties - the Muslim League and the Congress - agree. 
9. Since the basis for participation in the Cabinet was, of course, 
acceptance of the statement of 16th May, Wavell assumed that the 
League Council will meet at a very early date to reconsider its 
Bombay resolution, 
Gandhi and Jlnnah on Comrnxmal Violence and Pakistan 
Gandhiji, then 77 year old, witnessed the communal violence and 
toured NoaTchali and Bihar to pacify the people. He wrote on October 6, 
against the partition of the country: 
"I would have no hesitation in conceding the demand of Pakistan 
if I could be convinced of its righteousness or that it is 
good for Islam, But I am firmly convinced that the Pakistan 
demand put forth by Muslim League is un-Islamic and I have not 
hesitated to call it as sinful. Islam stand for the iinity and 
brotherhood of mankind, nor for disrupting the oneness of the 
human family. Therefore, those who want to divide India into 
possibly warring groups are enemies alike of India and Islam. 
They may cut me to pieces but they cannot make me subscribe 
to something which 1 consider to be wrong", 
Gandhijl felt in private that "the League President supported the 
violence out of a desire to restore Muslim supremacy in India".However, 
he had no objection to a separate Muslim state. Discussing the nature 
of the state, which was not clear, he stated "If a Muslim state implied 
freedom to make unfriendly a treaty with the foreign powers to the 
detriment of the country as a whole, then obviously it could not be a 
matter of agreement. No one could be asked to sign an agreement granting 
freedom to another to lavmch hostilities against himself; it would be 
a suicidal policy", 
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Jinnah^ speaking against the Bihar violence, in a statement sala: 
•*... that in Pakistan minorities will enjoy the fullest 
security of life, property and honour just as the Musalmans 
themselves - may be even greater. If the Musalmans lose their 
balance and give vent to the spirit of vengeance and retalia-
tiori and prove false to the highest codes of morality and 
preachings of our great religion Islam, you will not only 
lose your title to the claim of Pakistan but also it will start 
a most vicious circle of bloodshed and cruelty, which will 
at once put off the day of our freedom". 
During September 16 to October 12, the Viceroy had protracted 
discussions with Nehru, Rajagopalachari, Gandhiji and Jinnah, On the 
other hand, there was continuous negotiation; between Jinnah and Nehru, 
more or less on the aforesaid nine points, -On October 13", Jinnah wrote 
to Wavell that the League had decided to join the Interim Government, 
The Muslim League was allowed to join the Interim Government, provided 
that it would withdraw his decision against the proposal of the Cabinet 
Mission, The Muslim League bit its tongue and abandoning the Pakistan 
proposal agreed to join the Government of Indian Federation, 
On October 14, Jinnah submitted five names and the ML members 
joined the Interim Government withoat accepting the long-term plan of 
May 16, The five League members joined the Interim Government on 
October 15, as Jinnah calculated that a Nehru-led Congress Government 
would further endanger the prospects of Pakistan, Jinnah, in an interview 
with Miss Cummings of Christian Science Monitor at New Delhi slli: 
"It would have been fatal for our interests if they had 
been left there in sole charge of the administration. We 
were, therefore, forced to nominate our five sentinals to 
watch over and safeguard Muslim interests", 
Jinnah nominated a Scheduled Caste in the Muslim League quota to 
undermine the solidarity of the Hindus, He selected those who could put 
172 
up a fight against the Congress, 
Ghazanfar Ali Khan, according to League's policy considered the 
Interim Government as part of the Direct Action Campaign. On October 19, 
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170, N, Mansergh and E.W.R, Lumby, n. 141, Vol, VIII, p. 709. 
171, Dawn (Delhi), November 10, 1946. 
172, See for details Indian Annual Register(1946),Vol,II,pp.228 and 
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m, at the Islamic College^ Lahore, he sa 
"We are goint into the interim government to get a foothold 
to fight for our cherished goal of Pakistan/ and I assure 
you that we shall achieve Pakistan ... The disturbances 
which have occurred in many parts of the cesntiy after the 
installation of the purely Congress government at the 
Centre have established the fact beyond any shadow of doubt 
that the ten crores of Indian Muslims will not submit to 
any government which does not include their true representa-
tives ,., In the interim government all our activities shall 
be guided by two considerations, that is, to convince the 
Congress that no government in India can function smoothly 
without the cooperation of the Muslim League and that the 
League is the sole representative organization of the Indian 
Muslims, The Interim government is one of the fronts of the 
direct action campaign and we shall most scrupulously carry 
out the orders of Mr, Jinnah on any front that we are called 
upon to serve ,,, There can be no peace and no progress in 
India without a settlement between the Congress and Muslim 
League on the basis of Pakistan", 
The statement made quite clear that the League had decided to 
174 
wreck the Interim Government. When Nehru pointed it out to,Wave 11 and to 
call the Assembly in session, he said that Jinnah had assured him that 
175 
the League would cooperate with the Interim Government fully. Hodson saysi 
'•Jinnah had xmdertaken, in reply, to call a meeting of the 
Muslim League Council and to reverse its decision against 
the statement of May the 16th ,,, The Working Committee 
Meeting was not summoned until more than three months later, 
and then they declined to call the League Council to reconsider 
their decision of July, 1946", 
Wavell's Stand 
Why Wavell did not accept Nehru's request.' Wavell was not happy 
with Nehru and did not like his Government despite severe reprimands from 
Pethick-Lawrence. He avoided the siommoning of the Assembly in session 
because in doing so the last part of the Plan would have been implemented 
and the entire control had gone into the hands of the Assembly and once 
the State Legislative Assemblies had been commissioned, it meant that 
the Government had accepted India's federal polity, to which Wavell was 
173. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), October 20, 1946; see also 
A,M, Zaidi, Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India,Vol.6: 
Freedom At last (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1979), v>. 470. 
174. Home Poll. 18/10/46, Fortnightly Report from New Delhi for the 
first half of October, 1946, NAI. 
175. H.V, Hodson, n. 116, p, 174. 
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opposed. He felt that if he would not agree to the Congress demand he 
would loose their cooperation than go ahead with constitution-making on 
a one-party basis. He saw the partition in the British interest. Hence, 
he created a political impasse in order to facilitate the collapse of 
the constitutional machinery and forced the Government to ask him to 
implement his Breakdown Plan. Wavell was perturbed about the titled 
Muslims, who lacked moral courage and could align themselves with the 
Congress for personal gain and believed, "he who pays the piper calls 
the tune". 
Distribution of Portfolios 
However, the tussle started over the allocation of portfolios. The 
Viceroy desired to give External Affairs, Defence and Home Affairs to 
the League, to which Nehru strongly opposed and warned on October 24,that 
if there were any change (i.e. External Affairs to the Congress, Home to 
Patel and Defence to Baldev Singh), the Congress would resign, "leading 
176 to termination of this Government". Azad supported Wavell that the League 
be given the Home Department, but Patel did not like to part vdth Ir. 
The League yielded and, therefore, the Viceroy gave Finance, Commerce, 
Communication, Health and Law to the League and they took office on 
October 26, 1946, Finance was given to Liaquat Ali Khan, who introduced 
a budget allegedly designed "to harm the industrialists and businessmen, 
the majority of whom were Hindus". This crisis was later considered by 
Lord Mountbetton in March, 1947. Further, the Finance Department was the 
life-blood of all Departments, Due to rivalism, modifications became 
frequent and complete rejections also became ,common, as a result the 
Congress Ministers felt seriously handicapped. At last, the British Govej 
ment and the Congress became almost convinced that any attempt to bring 
about a lasting cooperation and harmony between the Congress and the 
League would end in failure. 
As apprehended, the 'Congress bloc' and the 'League bloc' began 
functioning under separate leaderships and became rivals of each other. 
They neither possessed a common policy nor any effective oower in the 
explosive situation, when Jinnah, on November 12, hammered: 
176, Michael Brecher, Nehru; A Political Biography (London; Oxford 
University Press, 1959),p,324; see also Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi -
The Last Phase, Vol,II, n,96, p. 286, 
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"The Bihar tragedy has no parallel or precedent in this 
record of cold-blooded butchery of the Muslim minority in 
various parts of the country committed by the majority 
Hindu community", 
Further, as the Garhmukteswar riot also shattered the hope of 
Hindu-Muslim co-existence and even sober and thoughtful minds painfully 
accepted the partition as Indispensable, Jlnnah, on November 14, declaring 
boycott of the Assembly asserted that only "the creation of Pakistan 
and Hindustan would bring about a solution of the present communal 
situation". He called the decision to summon Constituent Assembly 
(scheduled on December 9) as a "blunder of a grave and serious character" 
and stated that the Viceroy was "blind to the present serious^ situation 
and the realities facing him" and also charged that he was "playing into 
the hands of Congress" (while in reality Wavell took the League's dlde 
as stated earlier) and did not won him that the Direct Action Day was 
also the direct action against their own government, as the League had 
become part of the Government. However, the Muslim League ratified, on 
November 21, to boycott the Constituent AssemDl^'. On November 25, 
Jinnah suggested the Central and Provincial Governments to consider 
an exchange of population as the best means for settling the communal 
strife, and rejected the Mission Plan, after which it became impossible 
for the Muslim League to remain part of the Government. Wavell, sending 
the complete report to London, said that if the Congress proposal was 
accepted the country would be plunged in a civil war. 
To break the deadlock and to streamline the working of the Assembly 
peacefully, the Viceroy, Nehru, Baldev Singh, Jinnah and Llaquat All 
Khan went to London on November 30, to meet the British Prime Minister, 
Attlee, but their discussion from December 3-6, 1946, ended in failure. 
The main upshot was the British Government's statement of December 6, 
which urged the Congress to accept the Mission's Interpretation of the 
grouping. The last para of the said statement descrlBea: 
"There has never been any prospect of success for the 
Constituent Assembly except upon the basis of the agreed 
procedure. Should a Constitution come to be framed by the 
Constituent Assembly in which a large section of the Indian 
population had not been represented, His Majesty's Govern-
ment could not, of course, contemplate forcing such a 
Constitution upon any unwilling parts of the country". 
179. N.N. Mltra, Indian Annual Register (1946), Vol, 2, p, 279. 
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The League members held that the Constituent Assembly had no 
right to alter the structure of Plan and any change in the grouping 
would alter the basis of agreement/ while the Congress representatives, 
opposing the grouping arrangement, asserted that the Constituent Assembly 
had the power to make necessary changes in the Cabinet Mission Scheme. 
Though the British participants in the parleys agreed to the League's 
view, but could not heal their wound. The leaders returned to India 
without any agreement and their attitude towards each other hardened 
still further. 
Wavell's Breakdown Plan 
The Congress suggested to bring their differences in the Federal 
Court on the Proposal of May 16, but Jinnah, as usual rejected Nehru's 
suggestion. Wavell noted: 
"They (Congress) were apparently,prepared to agree that the 
question of whether the sections make the constitution for 
the provinces or the provinces make their own, should be 
referred to the Federal Court, but this Jinnah would not 
accept". 
However, while Wavell was leaving for India, Churchill had said: 
"Keep a bit of India", which ranged in Wavell's ear and consequently 
led to his Breakdown Plan. On December 3, in England, Wavell stated in 
the Cabinet that since there was no conciliation between the Congress 
and the League, the British Government has the confrontation with the 
Congress. To meet this combat, Wavell offered his Breakdown Plan, which 
envisaged that the provinces with Congress majority should be given 
autonomy, and the British, accompanied by their entire army, should move 
to the Muslim majority provinces. The Breakdown Plan was a two-fold 
device. It sought to reduce the Congress claim of independence to 
provinces of Section A, and, on the pretext of protecting the Muslims 
and other minorities in the Muslim majority areas - Sections B and C -
prolong the lien of the British Raj, to meet any offensive from the USSR 
in the West and China in the East. Wavel] returned. His Secretary, 
George Abel, telegraphed him that the Cabinet at home had refused to have 
anything to do with the Breakdown Plan. 
181, Penderel Moon, n, 40, p. 371. 
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Ccmstltuent Assembly Convened 
However, the British Government announced that they accepted the 
League's demand of individual status of provinces i.e., the groups would 
make collective decisions. For instance, Punjab, having a greater nvimber 
of seats, was given the responsibility of Group B, and NWFP and Sind, 
having the lesser number of seats, were given the secondary status. In 
the like manner, in the East, Bengal became responsible while Assam 
became a political non-entity. 
On the above principle, the Constituent Assembly was convened on 
December 9, 1946, for the first time in New Delhi, "with dignity and 
decorum". Dr. Satchidananda Sinha was the Convening President till the 
Assembly elected Dr, Rajendra Prasad, The Muslim League boycotted the 
Assembly, with 79 of their seats remaining empty in the Assembly Hall, 
while almost 300 Congressmen and women took their places. However, the 
Congress articulated its policy regarding the Provinces and the Princely 
States, and with the exception of three Central Departments, gave all 
the other rights to the provinces. They also formed Committees for various 
departments, leaving a seat for the Muslim League candidate. 
On December 11, Attlee appealed "to all the communities in India 
to cooperation in framing a Constitution", Winston Churchill suggested a 
If" debate, which lasted for two days, Churchill saj m. 
"I warned the House as long ago as 1931 ,,, that if we were 
to wash our hands of all responsibility, ferocious civil war 
would speedily break out between the Muslims and Hindus ,.. 
more people have lost their lives or have been wounded in 
India by violence since the interim Government \jnder Mr.Nrhru 
was installed in office four months ago by the Viceroy, than 
in the previous 90 years .., These frightful slaughters over 
wide regions and in obscure uncounted villages have, in the 
main, fallen upon Muslim minorities, 
",., any attempt to establish the reign of a Hindu nximerical 
majority in India will never be achieved without a civil war 
... This war will, before it is decided, lead through unaccoxai-
table agonies to an awful abridgement of the Indian population 
.., The Muslims, nximbering 90 million, .., comprise the 
majority of the fighting elements in India .., the word 
•minority" has no relevance or sense when applied to masses of 
httman beings numbered in many scores of millions ,,," 
183, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol, 431, 
pp. 1175-76; in Stanley Wolpert, n. 68, p, 303, 
184. Ibid,, pp. 1360-67; in Stanley Wolpert, n, 68, pp. 303-304. 
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Churchill's statement encouracred Jinnah to take a more tough line 
vis-a-vis the Congress. Nehru, sensing the danger of fall of the Assembly, 
as the Muslim League had not joined, declared on December 13, 1946: 
"This Constituent Assembly declares its firm and solemn resolve to proclai 
India as an Independent Sovereign Repijblic ... 'vTherein all power and 
185 
authority ,,. are derived from the people". 
On December 10, Attlee called Lord Louis Mountbatten to 10 Downing 
186 
Street, and invited him to succeed Wavel3 and on December 19, said: 
"If we were not very careful, we might well find ourselves 
handing India over not simply to civil war, but to political 
movements of a definitely totalitarian character. Urgent 
action was needed to break the deadlock, and the principal 
members of the cabinet had reached the conclusion that a new 
personal approach was perhaps the only hope". 
After much hesitation Mountbatten accepted Attlee's invitation. 
The CWC on December 22, decided to abide by the verdict of 
the federal court and referred the matter to the AICC, which at its meeting 
in Delhi on January 5-6, advised action in accordance with the 
interpretation of the British Government, but added: "It must be clearly 
understood, however, that this must not involve any compulsion of a 
Province and that the rights of the Sikhs in the Punjab should not be 
jeopardized. In the event of any attemtJt at such compulsion. Province or 
a part of a Province has the right to take such action as may be deemed 
189 
necessary in order to give effect to the wishes of the people concemeci" . 
Further, the Sikh Pratinidhi Panthic Board at its meeting at Amritsar on 
December 24, 1946, resolved: "The statement of December 6, has been made 
to placate the intransigence of the Muslim League and is to be detriment 
of the minorities, especially the Sikhs" and decided to "carry on their 
struggle until satisfactory provision is made for safeguarding their 
interests in the future constitution of India". The Sikhs observed an 
185. Dorothy Norman (ed.), Nehru: The First Sixty_Years, 2 Vols. 
(London: The Bodley Head, 1965), Vol.fl Cl940-50r7pp. 278-86. 
186. Alan Campbell-, Johnson, Mission VTltb Mountbatten (New York: Dutton 
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Anti-Pakistan Day on March 11, and organized mass rallies throughout 
Punjab and several deaths in the ensuing disturbances were reported. In 
Multan, Amritsar, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Jallundur death-toll was high. 
However, the ML Working Committee, which met at Karachi on 
January 29-31, 1947, regarded the above AICC interpretation as yet another 
qualified acceptance and demanded the Government to dissolve the consti-
tuent assembly. The deadlock continued and once again the Congress members 
demanded resignation of the League members, who argued that since the 
191 Congress on December 9, 1946, itself did not accept the rule 63, which 
192 
assumes control of the sections, they could not ask them to do so later, 
193 
The Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State to issue a statement in that 
regard. Soon the Congress members threatened that if the leaguers would 
not resign they themselves would. Wavell was stuck and could see no way 
out, 
Menon's Proposal of Dominion Status 
Towards the end of December, 1946, and the beginning of 1947, 
V.P, Menon "had lengthy discussion with Vallabhbhai patel suggesting 
that power should be transferred to two Central governments on the basis 
194 
of dominion status". Since Patel agreed, Menon sent an outline of his 
191. K.M. Munshi had elaborated the rule 63, that "if properly framed, 
the Rules would enable the Constituent Assembly as a whole to 
exercise control over the Sections ,and Provinces so as to safeguard 
the rights of the minorities in each of them". See K.M. Munshi, 
Pilgrimage to Freedom (Bombay: Hindustan Cellulose, 1955) ,^p,117-18. 
192. See for details letter from Liaquat Ali Khan to Lord Wavell on 
the Congress Demand for the Resignation of Muslim League Members 
' from the Executive Council, February 8, 1947, in L.A. Sherwani, 
n. 51, pp. 207-10, The AICC resolution "In the view of the Muslim 
League this resolution of the Congress is in no way different in 
effect from the Congress resolution of June 25; rather it makes 
the position worse in so far as it confers a right of veto not only 
on a province but also on a part of a or evince and the Sikhs. The 
Muslim League is convinced ... that the Congress has not accepted 
the Cabinet Mission's statement of May 16 as interpreted by their 
statement of May 25 and as further interpreted by HMG*s statement 
of December 6 ... It clearly indicates that the Congress had never 
intended nor does it intend to abide by the terms of the Mission's 
Plan", Ibid., p. 209. 
193. V.P. Menon, n. 2, p. 337. 
194. C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright, n. 1, p. 577; see also 
V.P, Menon, n, 2, p. 358. 
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plan to the Secretary of State, Proposing his own thesis for conmunal 
settlement, he argued: "A \anited India vinder the Cabinet Mission Plan 
was ... an illusion; the three-tier constitutional set-up envisaged was 
unwieldy and difficult to work", and "Jinnah showed no sign of resiling 
from his demand for a separate, independent sovereign State for the 
Muslims - a demand in which the League had the sympathy, if not the 
support, of a large section of British opinion" and "the sympathy of most 
195 
of the British elements in the Services". Describing these facts, Menon 
expressed his personal view that "it was better that the country should 
be divided, rather than that it should gravitate towards civil war". 
Menon hoped that the Congress would accept this arrangement, which would 
prohibit the League to claim those portions of the Punjab, Bengal and 
Assam which were predominantly non-Muslim. 
For implementation of the scheme, Menon emphasised three advantages 
to the Congress: First, a peaceful transfer of power; secondJy,Britain 
would welcome such a move; and thirdly, the civil service, army, navy 
and air force would continue to function during the transitional period, 
197 
which would avoid endless trouble at the time of transfer of power.After 
198 
the transition of power, Menon suggested: 
"After all, the test of sovereignty was the power to amend 
one's constitution, which remained unaffected by the acceptance 
of Dominion Status. India could at any time, if she so desired, 
walk out of the Commonwealth. Moreover, the Princes, with 
their past associations with the British Crown, would be 
reassured and be more willing to negotiate". 
As the proposal was not made by any leader, Pethick-Lawrence shelved 
It for he could not believe that the Congress, which had since long been 
fighting for complete independence, would agree to Dominion Status for 
immediate transfer of power. However, Lord Mountbatten, who was preparing 
himself for the difficult assignment of Viceroyship of India and was 
studying all the material relevant to Indian political situation,studied 
Menon*s proposal carefully. 
Failure of Interim Government 
On December 22, 1946, Jinnah returned home (Karachi) "a sick man, 
195. V.P. Menon, Ibid. 
196. Ibid. 
197. See for details Ibid., pp. 358-59. 
198. Ibid., p. 359. 
199. iBTa. 
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too exhausted to say anything, lacking energy even to meet with his 
Working Committee before January 29", Pethick-Lawrence wrote to Wavell 
on January 2, 1947, "I hope that Jinnah does not interpret our Statement 
of December 6th to mean that if he only sits back and does nothing he 
201 
will get his Pakistan", The letter drew Jinnah*s attention. 
In the meanwhile, the AICC met in Delhi and endorsed the statement 
of Working Committee of December 22, and passed a resolution on January 6, 
rejecting "the procedure laid down in the December 6 statement and 
declared that it was for the Constituent Assembly alone to give inter-
pretations of the State Paper of May' ^ ? l " . 
On January 29, 1947, the League Working Committee met in Karachi 
and called upon the Government to declare that the Plan of 16th May had 
failed, and demanding that the constituent assembly should be dissolved, 
20,' 
resolvec 
3
id: 
"The Working Committee of the Muslim Leaque is, therefore, 
emphatically of the opinion that the elections to, and there-
after the svimmoning of the Constituent Assanbly, in spite of 
strong protests and most emphatic objections on the part of 
the League, were ab initio void, invalid and illegal as not 
only the major parties had not accepted the statement but 
even the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes had also not done so 
and that the continuation of the Constituent Assembly and its 
proceedings and decisions are ultra vires, invalid, and 
illegal and it should be forthwith dissolved", 
On January 31, 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru's 9-polnt Objective Resolu-
tion proclaimed India as an Independent Sovereign Republic; the territo-
ries and States forming the Indian Union; the territories "shall possess 
and ;:etain the status of autonomous Units, together vA th residuary powers, 
and exercise all powers and functions of government and administration, 
save and except such powers and functions as are vested in or assigned 
to the Union ..."; the powers shall be derived from the people; the 
people shall be guaranteed 'justice', 'equality' and 'freedom'; adequate 
safeguards shall be provided for minorities..,; integrity and sovereignty 
200, Stanley Wolpert* n, 68, p, 306. 
201, N, Mansergh and E.W.R, Limby, n, 1, Vol.IX: The Fixing of a Time 
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of the territory of the Republic shall be maintained, and this ancient 
204 land shall promote world oeace. 
On February 5, 1947, "the Viceroy received demand from Congress 
and minority members for resignation of League representatives from 
interim government 
205 I t" . 
On February 6, the Viceroy saw Liaquat Al l , On February 8, Liaquat 
All Khan wrote a long l e t t e r to the Viceroy s t a t i ng t h a t "the Congress 
had never intended nor does i t intend to abide by the terms of the 
Mission's Plan" and tha t "the Muslim League o r ig ina l ly accepted the 
Cabinet Mission's statement of May 16 in l e t t e r and in s p i r i t and in i t s 
correct In te rpre ta t ion" and thus "in the circumstances i t i s extremely 
presumptuous on the par t of the 9 non-League members of the Executive 
;
06 gn". 
On February 13, 1947, Nehru wrote to the Viceroy and again demanded 
resignation of the League members from the Interim Government, but the 
Viceroy did not agree, Vallabhbhai Patel, on February 14, wrote to the 
Viceroy that "Things have been made worse by a clear hint that matters 
207 
might take a violent turn" in view of the Finance Minister's statement 
in the Dawn regardihg Punjab atrocities. He enclosed the cutting from 
the Free Press Journal of February 7, 1947, containing speech of Ghazanfar 
" ——^-»— — — — — . 208 
All Khan at Lahore and drew his attention to the following passage: 
"Mohammed Bin Kassim and Mahmud of Ghazni invaded India 
with armies composed of only a few thousands, and yet were 
able to overpower lalchs of Hindus; God willing, a few laXhs 
of Muslims will yet overwhelm crores of Hindus". 
Vallabhbhai Patel concluded that "the central Goveimment had ceased 
to exist and that the sooner the present state of affairs is put to an 
?09 er", and subsequently threatened on February 15, that Congress 
"would withdraw from interim goveimment if League members remainea". 
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CONCLUSION 
The Cabinet Mission arrived in India in March, 1946, and 
interviewed the Indian leaders, Jinnah urged the two-nation theory 
and advocated the demand for Pakistan, to which Nehru resented. The 
Congress and the League leaders differed on the question of central 
and state powers. The Congress wanted a vinitary government and the 
League advocated Pakistan, The Mission Plan of J\me 16,1946, did not 
include the six provinces demanded by the Muslim League to be called 
Pakistan and rejected the claim of Pakistan. However, the Mission 
Plan xmder group (ii) - Pimjab,NV7FP and Sind, and group (iii)- Bengal 
and Assam gave the regions the right to make their own constitution, 
to which the Congres^^opposed, While rejecting the formation of an 
interim government, the Congress decided to join the proposed Constituent 
Assembly, Contrarily, the League decided to join the interim government 
and concluded that the Congress had rejected the whole olan. In 
consequence, the League withdrew its acceptance of the Plan and observed 
Direct Action Day on August 16, 1946. Elections were held and the 
Congress and the League won majority of seats, but they differed on 
the question of distribution of portfolios, which could not be settled 
to the desire of the contestants, as a result it caused the breakdown 
of the Cabinet Mission Plan, 
CHAPTER VIII 
MOUNTBATTEN PLAN AND PARTITION OF INDIA 
Before arrival of Mountbatten to India, there held a debate in 
England on March 5, 1947. Cripps, defending the Government's policy,said 
"It was unfortunate that "just at the moment when the Muslim 
League was about to reconsider the situation with a view, 
possibly-/ to coming into the Constituent Assembly at Karachi, 
events in the Piaijab boiled up ... We can only hope that 
tolerance and good sense will bring about some settlement ... 
This is just another one of those factors which make it so 
difficult to predict the course of events ... in India today". 
Winston Churchill, the leader of the Conservative Party,attacking 
on the "Government of Mr. Nehru", called it a "complete disaster" and 
insisted that "it was a cardinal mistake to entrust the government of 
India to the caste Hindu". Turning to the new Viceroy, Churchill argued: 
"India is to be subjected not merely to partition/ but to 
fragmentation, and to haphazard fragmentation. A time limit 
is imposed - a kind of guillotine - which will certainly 
prevent the full, fair and reasonable discussion of the great 
complicated issues that are involved. These 14 months will 
not be used for the melting of hearts and the union of Muslim 
and Hindu all over India, They will be used in preparation 
for civil war; and they will be marked continually by 
disorders and disturbances such as are now going on in the 
great city of Lahore". 
On March 8, CWC in."an emergency session resolved: 
"The transfer of power, in order to be smooth, should be 
preceded by the recognition in practice of the Interim 
Government as a Dominion Government with effective control 
over the services and administration .., The Central Govern-
ment must necessarily function as a Cabinet with full 
authority and responsibility. Any other arrangement is 
incompatible with good government and is peculiarly dangerous". 
The CWC also resolve-S: 
1. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, March,1947, 
Vol. 434, pp. 402-05. 
2. Ibid., pp. 669-73. 
3 . N. Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby ( e d s . ) . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s Between 
B r i t a i n and India :The Trans fe r of PowerUl V o l s . ) , (London: Her 
Majes ty ' s S t a t i o n e r y Off ice , 1970-82),Vol .IXt The F ix ing of a Time 
Limit , 4 November - 22 March, 1947 (1980), pp . 899-900. 
4 . N.N, Mi t ra , Indian Annual R e g i s t e r ( C a l c u t t a : Annual R e g i s t e r Of f ice ) , 
Vo l .11 , 1947/ p p . 118-19. 
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"There has been an orgy of murder and arson and Amritsar 
and Multan have been scenes of horror and devastation. These 
tragic events have demonstrated that there can be no settle-
ment of the problem in the Punjab by violence and coercion, 
and that no arrangement based on coercion can last. Therefore, 
it is necessary to find a way out which involves the least 
amount of compulsion. This necessitates a division of the 
Punjab into two provinces, so that the predominantly Muslim 
part may be separated from the predominantly non-Muslim part". 
It may be added that the above resolution was passed demanding the 
partition of Punjab in consequence of the Muslim League's bid to over-
throw the coalition government of the Unionist Party's leader,Khizar 
Hayat Khan Tiwana, riots and killings in January, 1947, and resignation 
of Tiwana on March 3, 1947, which had caused alarm among the Hindus and 
Sikhs of a Muslim League Raj in Pxjnjab. About 2,000 lives had lost in 
the commiaial riots by March, 1947. 
Attlee's Declaration for Transfer of Power 
In view of the Interim Government not working at all, the League 
boycott of the Constituent Assembly, the failure of the London Conference, 
antagonism and disagreement between the Congress and the League, communal 
orgy, arson and destruction in recurrent riots leading to a state of 
civil war in India and law and order deteriorating fast, Attlee, in the 
House of Commons on February 20, 1947, had declared: 
"The present state of vincertainty is fraught with danger 
and cannot be indefinitely prolonged. His Majesty's Government 
wish to make it clear that it is their intention to take 
necessary steps to effect the transference of power to 
responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June^1948" 
(June 30, 1948) . 
He also added: 
"If by June, 1948, a constitution was not framed by a fully 
representative Constituent Assembly, His Majesty's Government 
will have to consider to whom the power of the Centtral Govern-
ment in British India should be handed over on the due date; 
whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for 
British India or in some areas to the existing Provincial 
Governments, or in some other way as may seem most reasonable 
and in the best interests of the Indian people". 
On March 8, the Congress Working Committee, welcoming the above 
declaration, resolved calling for the partition of Pxjnjab and Bengal on 
5. R.C, Majumdar, Struggle for Freedom (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 
1969), p. 757. 
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commiaial lines and inviting the Muslim League to direct negotiations. 
The Congress welcomed the announcement as "wise and courageous" but 
Gandhiji remarked that it would lead to Pakistan for those provinces or 
portions which may want Ir. 
As Wavell failed to implement the policies properly in order to 
solve the Indian tangle, the British Cabinet resolved to replace Wavell 
by Lord Louis Mountbatten and scheduled his arrival in India on March 22, 
1947. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, on March 9, while forwarding the resolution of 
March 8, to the Viceroy, said: 
"... we ... have also suggested the division of the Punjab 
into two parts. This principle would, of course, apply to 
Bengal also ... Recent events in the Pxmjab have demonstrated 
... that it is not possible to coerce the non-Muslim minority 
in the Province, just as it is not possible or desirable to 
coerce the others ... In the event of the Muslim League not 
accepting the Cabinet Delegation's scheme and not coming into 
the Constituent Assembly, the division of Bengal and Punjab 
becomes inevitable". 
Thus, the Congress accepted Pakistan, but including only Muslim 
majority districts. Jinnah, addressing the Muslim journalists in Bombay 
9 
on March 12, proclaimed: 
"... our ideology, our goal, our basic and fundamental principles 
... are not only different from the Hindu organisations but 
are in conflict ... There is no common ground for co-operation 
... There was a time when the idea of Pakistan was laughed at, 
but let me tell you this there is no other solution which will 
decredit and bring honour to our people ... Insha Allah (God 
Willing), we shall have Pakistan". 
There were severe riots in Lahore, Amritsar, Multan and Rawalpindi. 
Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab, estimated 1,000 dead and many of its 
multiple injured. In Amritsar, Master Tara Singh declared that the "Civil, 
6. N. Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby, n. 3, Vol. IX, pp. 899-900. 
7. Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase (Ahmedabad: Navjivan 
Publishing House, 1958), Vol. II, p, 206. 
8. Nehru to Wavell, March 9, 1947; N. Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby, n.3. 
Vol. IX, p. 898. 
9. N. Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby, n, 3, p. 927; see also M,H.Shahid(ed.), 
Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad All Jinah (Speeches, Statements, Writings, 
Letters), (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1976), pp. 50-51. 
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War" had already begijn, while Baldev Singh, the Sikh Defence Member, 
wrote to Wave 1}= 
"I make no secret of my conviction that Muslim League's 
onslaught on the Coalition Ministry had been engineered in 
the way it was because the League had despaired of being 
able to defeat it by constitutional methods", 
Mountbatten almost daily consulted the Cabinet in London on the 
thorny problems in India and opined that "the Indian leaders themselves 
would sooner or later realise that the retention of the Indian Army under 
central control was vital both to the external security of India and to 
12 the maintenance of internal law and order", and planned that "he would 
not allow them (the Interim Government) to use British bayonets to keep 
13 law and order, but only to protect British lives". 
Cn March 13, 1947, V, Krishna Menon in London briefed Mountbatten 
a Congress's suggested solution on the question of Muslim League demand. 
He, proposing two "Pakistans", including the districts of East Bengal 
which were predominantly Moslem, and certain areas of Assam,partitioning 
Bengal, saia: 
"I believe that partition is the price that will have to be 
paid for any stability in Bengal .. any solution which hands 
over Calcutta to Pakistan,will be unstable and impractical ... 
On the other hand, the League has to be given a port on the 
East, and the solution is that as part of the compromise 
settlement India should build a large-sized city and port in 
Chittagong, that is, nrovide the money for it however many 
millions it may cost". 
On March 15, Woodrow Wyatt, suggesting the transfer of Central 
Government system intact to the Interim Government, said that the decision 
taken after four days of debate in both House of Parliament was Irrevocable 
and the only means to force the Indian to work out their own solution 
for themselves and that the suggestion of the Advisory Committee on 
Minorities will be binding on all the sections when approved by the 
Assembly, Regarding the granting of the right to Provincial Legislatures 
to formulate their views on the wisdom of forming group constitutions, 
10. Jenkins to Wavell, March 10, 1947, N, Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby, 
n. 3, Vol. IX, p, 912, 
11. Baldev Singh to V^ avell, March 11, 1947, Ibid,, pp. 914-16. 
12. Cabinet Meeting, March 13, 1947, 5:14, Ibid., p. 940. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Krishna Menon to Mountbatten, March 13, 1947, Ibid,,pp, 948-49. 
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he said that the entire argument about grouping should be opened all 
over again. He advised that the Muslim League should be "warned that 
if they no longer hold their portfolios by June of next year, the power 
will be given to the Congress Interim Government/ on which the onus would 
then fall of reaching as settlement with the Muslim League - whatever 
constitution had been produced" by the Assembly, 
Syatt further says that to emphasize the British determination 
of power, the Government should declare that the Army could not be handed 
over to anyone "but a Central Government" and further "British troops 
must be utterly isolated from further contact with commxmal disturbances" 
so that the Indians may learn that the problem of law and order had to 
be dealt with by themselves, Wyatt, regarding the partition, proposed; 
",., the British should declare xmequivocally that complete 
authority cannot be handed over to any Provincial Government 
in a province where the minority amotants to nearly half the 
total population. The Muslim League must be quickly disillusioned 
of the belief that they could capture the whole of Bengal and 
the Punjab through our good offices. On the same principle, 
which might prevent complete nower from beinq given to Congress 
at the Centre because the British cannot be a party to imposing 
a constitution on xinwilling parts of the country, the Muslim 
League should only get control of the areas where they are 
in undisputed majority". 
17 On March 15, Attlee stated in the House of Commons: 
"India herself must choose what will be her future Constitution. 
What will be her position in the world. I hope that the 
Indian people may elect to remain within the British Common-
wealth ... The British Commonwealth and Empire is not bound 
together by chains of external compulsion. It is a free 
association of free peoples". 
Attlee also made it clear that the British Government "cannot allow 
a minority to place a veto on the advance of the majority" and any 
attempt "to persist with old methods would lead not to a solution, but 
a deadloci ^l". 
On March 18, at the time of departure of Mountbatten, the Prime 
15. "India-What Next", The New Statesman and Nation (London), 
March 15, 1947, o. 170: ' ~" 
16. Ibid. 
17. George Bennett (ed.). The Concept of Empire, 1774-1947 (London: 
Adam and Charles Blac, 1962), pp, 4 20-21. 
18. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1946-1948, p, 7785, 
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Minister stated: 
II It is the definite objective of His Majesty's Govern-
ment to obtain a unitary Government for India and the Indian 
States, if possible within the British Commonwealth, through 
the medium of a Constituent Assembly ... and you should do 
the utmost in your power to persuade all Parties to worlc 
together to this end ... If by October 1, you consider that 
there is no prospect of reaching a settlement on the basis 
of a unitary government ,., you should report to HMG on the 
steps which you consider should be taken for the handing 
over of power on the due date •I 
On March 22, 1947, Lord Mountbatten reached New Delhi, and on the 
same day, met with Wavell and said, "he thought there must be some strong 
authority to which (he has) to hand over (pov/er) in India, and that any 
20 
solution must be based on the Indian Army".^Mountbatten was directed by 
Attlee that the transfer of power must be in accordance with Indian 
defence requirement, impressing the importance of avoiding a break in 
the continuity of Indian army and the need of continued collaboration 
with the HMG in the security of the Indian Ocean, 
Wavell briefed *rhat had happened since the Mission left, and the 
rift inside the Interim Government, In view of the short time left for 
the transfer of power, Motmtbatten wanted some sort of solution. About 
partition, Wavell wondered whether "the partition of Punjab and Bengal 
21 
could take place inside the Cabinet Mission's Plan", As the Indian leaders 
were not realising the intensity of the problem of transfer of power, 
Wavell advised, in order to make the leaders realize the reality, "to 
have a list of awkward questions which would be put to them in all 
22 
discussions", which Movoitbatten followed to reach an early solution. 
Besides, he also kept in mind Attlee's directives that "there can be no 
question of compelling either major party to accept any plan to be offered 
and "there should be the fullest co-operation with the Indian leaders 
in all steps that are taken as to the withdrawal of British power so 
that the process may go forward as smoothly as possible". 
19. Attlee to Mountbatten, March 18, 1947, N. Mansergh and E,W,R.Lumby, 
n. 3, Vol. IX, pp. 972-74, 
20. N, Mansergh and E.W,R, Lumby, n,3. Vol, IX, pp. 1011-12, 
21. MB 196, Misc. Meetings (Minutes March-August, 1947), Meeting of 
Wavell with Viceroy-Designate, March 22, 1947; in Manmath Nath Das, 
Partition and Independence of India : Inside Story of the Mountbatten 
Days (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1982) . 
22. Ibid. 
2 3 . N, Mansergh and E,W.R,Lxamby, n , 3 , V o l , IX, p . 9 7 4 . 
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Mountbatten collected an overall information abcut the political 
situation in India. The HMG had decided to withdraw from India with or 
without finding a solution to the communal tangle, which could have 
left a perpetual strife among the commtinities. To avoid this problem, 
Mosley had suggested the withdrawal "block by block. Province by 
Province" so that the "Indians would be faced with ,the responsibility 
of settling their own future and making their own peace with each 
24 
other". Accordingly, Wavell had sent a plan to Attlee, but Attlee's 
declaration appeared without considering Wavell's scheme. Moreover, 
there was great upheavel in almost all parts of India. The Congress 
Party was demanding "Quit India" and the League had proclaimed the 
watchword, "Divide and Quit". In such a circtjmstance, Mountbatten was 
sent to India. Mountbatten, later on November 14, 1968, while delivering 
the second Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Lecture at Cambridge, revealed 
the fact that he was sent "to expedite the withdrawal" and was given 
the power to make his ovm decisions in India, and that he v;as given 
25 
"plenipotentiary powers". 
First, he had to resolve the budgetary crisis. On March 24,1947, 
the Lord was sworn in. He met Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, who were the 
greatest rivals on the question of taxing policy. He could reach an 
agreement and the tax was substantially reduced. To solve the second 
problem of bringing about a truce betveen the Congress and the League 
for peaceful transfer of power. Lord Mountbatten had already written 
to Gandhiji and Jinnah in New Delhi. Gandhiji came, but Jinnah was ill 
in Bombay. Moxintbatten asked Nehru about his estimates of Jinnah.Nehru 
gave a negative assessment, which showed his hatred against Jinnah. 
Nehru, submitting the Congress resolution, explained at length the 
need for the partition of the Pxjnjab and Bengal, and the new Viceroy 
assured Nehru "to approach the problem in an atmosphere of stark 
26 
realism". While Nehru was talking with the Viceroy, Gandhiji, in Bihar, 
was declaring before 50,000 men aid women: "he could not give consent 
e" 
because the partition would make the communal trouble a permanent feature, 
24. Leonard Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj (London: 
Weidenfeld, 1961), p. 50. — 
25. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 15, 1968. 
26. MB 191, Interview No.3, Nehru, 24 March, 1947, n. 21. 
27. The Tribune (Lahore), March 14, 1947 (Gandhiji's speech on 
March 13, 1947) . 
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Next came Liaquat Ali Khan to meet the Viceroy. The Viceroy 
charged that the league was involved in disturbances in several 
provinces in order to advance their demand for Pakistan and warned 
him that "in their own interests they should either resign or refrain 
from taking any active part in the Committee of Action". On the 
Viceroy's question, whether the League would agree to the Cabinet 
Mission Plan, if the Congress adherence would be forthcoming, Liaquat 
28 
Ali smilingly replied: 
"Since my dealings with the Congress Members of the Interim 
Government, I have come to realise that they are utterly 
impossible people to work with, since there is no spirit of 
compromise or fair play in them, and the majority are thinking 
only of ways and means by which they can do down the Muslim 
League and improve their own position". 
Liaquat Ali also explained that in view of the extreme communal 
strife, there was no chance of any united effort under the Cabinet 
Mission Plan. Regarding the smooth transfer of power, Liaquat Ali 
repliec M. 
"I consider the position now so intolerable that if your 
Excellency was only prepared to let the Muslim League have 
the Sind Desert, I would still prefer to accept that and 
have a separate Muslim State in those conditions than to 
continue in bondage to the Congress with apparently more 
generous concessions". 
The Viceroy, from the disgusted expression of Liaquat, realised 
that the Muslim League's greater Pakistan could be reduced to its 
appropriate size. It seems Liaquat Ali 'Khan was impressed by the 
Viceroy's personality and expressed acceptance of Pakistan even that 
of 'the Sind Desert'. Had Jinnah was interviewed before Liaquat Ali 
Khan, the impression could have been reversed, as Jinnah might have 
demanded the larger Pakistan including the six provinces ^and Calcutta, 
and Liaquat Ali had to follow suit. 
Mountbatten inf ormed the situation to the Secretary of State, 
who cautioned him that he had to face the toughest Jinnah "whose 
Pakistan Day message suggests that even in the new circumstances he 
28, MB 191, Interview No. 26, Liaquat, April 3, 1947. 
29, Ibid, 
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does not contemplate a conciliatory move, at any rate in the first 
instance" and in view of the information being received about the 
desirability of the partition of Pakistan as partition of India, he, 
30 
giving him the green signal, said: 
"... it seems to me that, in spite of its grave practical 
difficulties and dangers, the partition of the Punjab to 
such degree and in such form as will satisfy the rival 
nationalisms in the Province is really unavoidable from the 
political point of view of the transfer of authority in 
June 1948. If, however, we were to go for partition in the 
Pxanjab, we should, I think, have to go for it also in 
Bengal for broadly similar reasons". 
Pethick-Lawrence anticipated that if Calcutta would be given to 
Hindustan, perhaps the Muslim League would not accept the solution. He, 
therefore, suggested the Viceroy to consult the Governors of Punjab 
and Bengal and from the leaders with an All-India point of view. 
Patel and Azad were the other very important Congress figures. 
31 Vallabhbhai Patel, on March 4, 1947, had already written: 
"If the League insists on Pakistan, the only alternative 
is the division of the Punjab and Bengal. They cannot have 
the Pxmjab as a whole or Bengal ... I do not think that the 
British Government will agree to division. In the end, they 
will see the wisdom of handing over the reins of Government 
to the strongest party. Even if they do not ... a strong 
Centre with the whole of India - except Eastern Bengal and 
a part of the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan - enjoy full 
autonomy under the Centre will be so powerful that the 
remaining portions will eventually come in". 
While Sardar Patel and Hehru had agreed to the partition inevitably, 
Maulana Azad still hoped that there was any possibility of a united 
India under the Cabinet Mission Plan and requested Mountbatten to try 
"deflating Mr. Jinnah, partly by flattering him and partly because he 
really has nothing to stand on". Mountbatten, finding division of 
opinion among the Congress leaders, was mentally perplexed. He had also 
heard of Gandhiji's Patna speech of March 13, in which he had opposed 
30. MB 176, SS to Mountbatten, April 3, 1947. 
31. Vallabhbhai Patel to Kanji Dwarkadas, letter dated March 4, 1947, 
in U.N, Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi : The Last Phase, Vol, II 
(Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, February, 1958), p. 83. 
32. MB 191, Interview No. 14, Azad, March 27, 1947. 
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the partition. He thought that Gandhiji, like Jinnah, would be a hard 
nut to crack, in view of the 5,000 casualties alone in Rawalpindi riots 
and League's 'Swordam' being continued with a vengeance against the 
Non-Muslims, which was an eye opener that in case the Hindus and Muslims 
would be put in a coxmtry in which a fighting situation had deeply 
strengthened and in that case the Muslims would not be less weaker to 
revenge, in one province, and the Hindus in a number of provinces.Jinnah 
had shown the League's strength and Gandhiji was indulged in watering 
down its ill-effects. Thus, Jinnah was sacrificing the Muslims for 
achieving Pakistan and Gandhiji was sacrificing the Hindus by not 
accepting the partition as early as possible to end the communal riots. 
The Viceroy wondered that even in such a critical situation, Gandhiji 
and Azad still persisted for a united India. 
Gandhiji arrived in New Delhi on March 31, to meet Lord Mountbatten. 
Maulana Azad went to see him, Gandhiji remarked: "Partition has now 
become a threat. It seems Vallabhbhai and even Jawaharlal have surren-
dered. What will you do now? Will you stand by me or have you also 
changed". Azad replied: 
"I have been and am against partition. Never has my opposi-
tion to partition been so strong as today. I am, however, 
distressed to find that even Jawaharlal and Sardar Patel have 
accepted defeat and in your words, surrendered their arms. 
My only hope now is in you. If you stand against partition, we 
may yet save the situation. If you, however, acquiesce, I am 
afraid India is lost". ' 
Gandhiji said: 
"What a question to ask? If the Congress wishes to accept 
partition, it will be over my dead body. So long as I am 
alive, I will never agree to the partition of India, Nor 
will I, if I can help it, allow Congress to accept it". 
The opinion of the Congress leaders was changing fastly.Sardar 
Patel, who had, addressing a public meeting in Lucknow, once observed: 
"The earth may split and the heavens may fall, but India will not be 
33. A.K. Azad, India Wins Freedom (Calcutta: Orient Longmans,1959), 
pp. 186-87. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid, 
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divided", had falleri in line with the partition group, but Maulana 
Azad felt, "instead of removing communal fears, partition would 
perpetuate them by creating two states based on communal hatred".Why 
Azad favoured a united India reflects his far-sightedness. He visualised 
that the non-Muslim majority areas in Bengal and Pimjab would never 
agree to be included in Pakistan and,if forcibly included, would revolt 
and, thus, in the circumstance, Pakistan would be a weak and small 
country. Therefore, he preferred to live in India along with the 
nationalist Muslims to tie the Congress tongue to charge the Muslims 
disloyal to the Congress Government, 
Chiefs of Staff on Defence of India and Pakistan 
The Prime Minister on February 20, 1947, had also said:"Although 
the final transfer of authority may not take place until Jtme, 1948, 
preparatory measures must be put in hand in advance. It is important 
that the efficiency of the civil administration should be maintained 
38 
and that the defence of India should be fully provided for",Considering 
the defence implications of the Partition scheme, the Chiefs of Staff 
39 (India), on April 1, 1947, resolved: 
"(a) We consider that if Pakistan and Hindustan are to have 
separate defence forces the combined total of these forces 
must inevitably be greater than that of Defence Forces 
designed to serve India as a whole, since the administrative 
overheads' must be duplicated and there is no flexibility. 
(b) Pakistan covers all the important land frontiers of India 
and the Army and Air Forces reqxiired to defend Pakistan from 
external aggressors are virtually the same as those required 
to defend India as a whole, 
(c) It will be impossible for Pakistan to maintain defence forces 
of the proper size .., 
(d) Hindustan could raise and maintain the forces she needs for 
her own purposes without difficulty,except in the case of 
the higher rates in the RIN, 
(e) We consider that the proposal to have separate defence forces 
for Pakistan and Hindustan in economically wasteful and 
36. D.C. Gupta, Indian National Movement (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 
1970), p. 267. 
37. A,K, Azad, n, 33, p. 185. 
38. Statement made by Prime Minister Attlee in the House of Commons, 
February 20, 1947, Clause 11, 
39. I.A. Sherwani (ed.), Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, 1940-1947 
(Delhi: Daya Publishing House, 1985), pp. 220-21. 
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quite impracticable, since Pakistan is in fact quite 
incapable of maintaining the forces required". 
These were the points which echoed in Menon's mind and he had 
proposed its solution, which later became the foundation stone of the 
partition. However, Menon added the concept of Dominion Status for 
two sovereign countries - Hindustan and Pakistan. 
Moimtbatten talked with Gandhiji for over ten hours in private 
at five separate meetings from March 31 through April 4, during which 
40 
the Mahatma put forth the suggestion he had made a year ago: 
"Mr, Jinnah ... be given the option of forming a Cabinet ... 
If Mr, Jinnah accepted this offer, the Congress would 
guarantee to cooperate freely and sincerely, so long as 
all the measures that Mr. Jinnah's Cabinet bring forward 
are in the interests of the Indian people as a whole ... 
sole referee of what is or is not in the interests of 
India as a whole will be Lord Mountbatten .. Mr, Jinnah 
must stipulate, on behalf of the league ... that, so far 
as he or they are concerned, they will do their utmost to 
preserve peace throughout India ... There shal3 be no 
National Guards or any other form of private army ... 
Within the framework hereof Mr. Jinnah will be perfectly 
free to present for acceptance a scheme of Pakistan, even 
before the transfer of power, provided, however, that he 
is successful in his appeal to reason and not to the force 
of arms which he abjures for all time for this purpose. 
Thus, there will be no compulsion in this matter over a 
Province or part thereof ... If Mr, Jinnah rejects this 
offer, the same offer to be made mutatis mutandis to Congress", 
The Viceroy staggered on this proposal and asked whether Jinnah 
would agree to it, Gandhiji replied that he was entirely sincere in 
41 
his suggestion. Surqly, Jinnah might have dismissed this proposal 
immediately, but Gandhiji's this King Solomon solution could have 
appealed Jinnah's ego. However, as the proposal involved the replacement 
of Nehru as Premier with the Quaid-i-Azam, he was shocked and told 
Mountbatten that the proposal was "unrealistic" as Gandhiji was away 
40, Annex II to Mountbatten's "Personal R'^ port", No, 2, April 9,1947, 
India Office Library, London, L/P.0/433/31 (Mountbatten's 
Personal Report). 
41. Record of Mountbatten-Gandhi Interview, April 1, 1947, in 
N, Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby, n. 3, Vol, X: The Mountbatten 
Viceroyalty, Formulation of a Plan 22 March - 30 May 1947 (1981), 
p. 69, 
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42 for four months and was out of touch with current events at the Centre, 
When the talk between Mountbatten and Gandhiji was going on^ 
Nehru met the Viceroy on April 1, 1947, and reiterated the Congress 
partition plan. In response to the Viceroy's apprehension of heavy 
bloodshed in case of implementation of partition plan, Nehru described 
the continued commxmal tension and riots, the League's dangerous 
activities across the borders of Bengal into Assam and Abdur Rab 
Nishtar's active role being played as part of the 'Direct Action' policy, 
He argued that "a decision which was acceptable to most Indians and 
43 
communities was the only viable one at that hour". Further v/hen Azad 
met Moimtbatten after Gandhi ji, the Viceroy said: "If Congress accepted 
Gandhiji's suggestion, partition could still be avoided", but Nehru 
44 
and Sardar Patel forced Gandhiji to withdraw the suggestion, as a result 
Gandhi ji wrote to Mountbatten on April 11, 1947, rejecting the proposed 
plan: 
"I do know that, having failed to carry both the head and 
heart of Pandit Nehru with me, I would have wanted to carry 
the matter further. But Panditji was so"good that he would 
not be satisfied until the whole plan was discussed v/ith the 
few members of the Congress Working Committee who were 
present, I felt sorry that I could not convince them of the 
correctness of my plan from every point of view. Nor could 
they dislodge me from my position although I had not closed 
my mind against every argument. Thus, I have to ask you to 
omit me from your consideration. Congressmen, who are in the 
Interim Government are stalwarts, seasoned servants of the 
nation and, therefore, so far as the Congress point of view 
is concerned, they will be complete advisers". 
However, Mountbatten talked with Gandhiji on the line of Nehru's 
argximents, Gandhiji did not object to Mountbatten's cunning suggestion 
for transfer of power "to the areas in accordance with the wishes of 
the majority of the residents in those areas". And "Broadly speaking 
this could make a Hindu India with a Congress Government in Delhi, a 
trtjncated Pakistan, f^ nd the large States like Mysore, Travancore, Kashmir, 
42. Ibid., p. 70. 
43. MB 191, Interview No. 20, Nehru, April 1, 1947. 
44. A.K. Azad, n. 33, p. 187. 
45. U.N. Pyarelal, n. 31, pp. 79-84. See also MB 82, Gandhi to 
Mountbatten, April 11, 1947. 
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Hyderabad and groups of States, each having separate pov^ er turned 
over to them, owing allegiance to a Central authority for Defence, 
External Affairs, communications, and possibly food". Thus, Gandhiji 
was also convinced to the idea of partition^ but he persisted to say 
that whatever the decision be talcen should be implemented as early as 
possible. In subsequent meetings, the Viceroy referred Gandhiji's 
acceptance of partition and told Azad that the Mahatma was not against 
partition. Azad was shocked to see that Gandhiji "began to repeat the 
47 
arguments which Sardar Patel had already used", "For over two hours", 
Azad writes, "I pleaded with him but could make no impression on him". 
On April 5, 1947, Mountbatten met Jinnahand found him "most 
frigid, haughty and disdainful". At the time of photograph in the garden 
between the Lord and Lady Motmtbatten, Jinnah's comment, "A rose between 
50 two thorns" shows his mind working faster than the Viceroy. On April 6, 
the Viceroy invited Jinnah and his sister at dinner. Jinnah,giving a 
fearful account of "Muslim massacres by Congress Hindus",said that 
51 the Congress could do anything to "deprive me of Pakistan", Jinnah also 
said that if India was not divided there will be an unending riots and 
complete breakdown of law and order. This possibility was backed by 
52 
reports received from the Viceroy's Secretary. Thus, the most popular 
and strongest argument of Jinnah was "violence" and "riots", which 
proved the reality of the "Two-Nation Theory" and conflict between two 
cultures - the two hostile and antagonistic communities. Further, Jinnah, 
afraid of being deprived of Pakistan, kneeled down before the Viceroy 
forgetting that Christianity is the sweet poison of Islamic Faith and 
the same blunder is being committed by Pakistan wholly relying on the 
US assistance, through externally good, but internally most harmful. 
46. Ibid,, No. 23, Vide Viceroy's Discussion v;ith Gandhi, April 2,1947. 
47. A.K. Azad, n. 33, pp. 186-87, 
48. Ibid, 
49. "Top S e c r e t " , In t e rv i ew, MotJntbatten-Jinnah, Apr i l 5-6, 1947/ see 
N. Mansergh and E,W,R, Liomby, n , 41 , Vol , X, p . 137. 
50. S tan ley Wolpert, J i nnah of Pak i s t an (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y 
P r e s s , 1984), p . 317. 
5 1 . Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (London: Robert 
Hal l L t d . , 1951), p . 56. 
52 . I b i d . 
364 
Mountbatten recordsj 
"Mr. Jinnah claimed that there was only one solution -
a "surgical operation" on India, (titherwise India would 
perish together ... He gave me an account (which worries 
me a great deal) about his previous negotiations with 
Mr, Gandhi ... He emphasized, and tried to prove from 
this account/ that on the Muslim side there was only one 
man to deal with, namely himself ... But the same was not 
true of the representatives of Congress ... there was no 
one man to deal with on their side. Mr. Gandhi had openly 
confessed that he represented nobody ... had enormous 
authority with no responsibility. Nehru and Patel represented 
different points of view within Congress - neither could 
give a categorical answer on behalf of the party as a whole 
... Pie also spo'ke of the emotionalism of the Congress 
leaders ... He accused Congress leaders of constantly 
shifting their front ... They would stoop to anything...". 
On April 6, Lord Ismay wrote: "We are still running round like 
squirrels in a cage and are certainly nowhere nearer a solution than 
when we arrivec %••. 
On. April 7, Jinnah met again with Mountbatten, while Lord Ismay 
joined the discussion. The Viceroy tried "by every means" to get Jinnah 
accept "the Cabinet Mission Plan and enter the Constituent Assembly", 
56 but Jinnah remained adamant, and said: 
"That was impossible. It was quite valueless entering the 
Constituent Assembly or trying to go back to the Cabinet 
Mission Plan since the whole basis of that plan was 
co-operation and mutual trust. Now a year later, the 
atmosphere, far from improving, had taken a serious turn 
for the worse and it was clear that Congress had no 
intention of accepting either the spirit or the letter 
of that plan", 
Jinnah proposed the Viceroy to hand over the power as soon as 
possible "preferably Province by Province, and let the Provinces 
57 themselves choose how they formed into groups". 
53. N. Mansergh and E.W.R, Lumby, n. 41, Vol. X, pp. 138-39. 
54. H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide : Britain-India-Pakistan (London: 
Hutchinson & Co. Publishers ltd., 1969), p. 289. " 
55. Manmath Nath Das, n, 21, p. 83, 
56. Ibid. 
57. MB 191, Interview No. 38, Jinnah, April 7, 1947. 
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On April 8, Moiintbatten asked Jirjnah as to what he would adopt 
if he were in the Viceroy's place, Jinnah immediately said that he 
would have accepted the demand for Pakistan and the splitting of the 
Defence Forces. The Viceroy/ trapping Jinnah in the web of his own 
doctrine, pointed out that "his remarks applied also to the partition 
of the Punjab and Bengal, and that by sheer logic if I accepted his 
argxjments in the case of India as a whole, I had also to apply them in 
the case of these two Provinces". These words to Jinnah came like a 
bolt from the blue and shook him. He became extremely dismayed and 
distressed, but abruptly appealed to Mountbatten "not to destroy the 
unity of Bengal and the Punjab, which had national characteristics in 
common: common history, common ways of life; and where the Hindus have 
stronger feelings as Bengalis or Punjabis than they have as members of 
59 the Congress". He also said: "this demand for partitioning the Punjab 
and Bengal was a bluff on the part of Congress to try^and frighten him 
off Pakistan. He was not to be frightened off so easily". Jinnah left 
Viceroy's residence at 8.00 PM quite disturbed and distraught state 
of mind as a horrible shadow loomed over his grand vision of Pakistan, 
while the Viceroy was feeling relief that he was succeeded to mend a 
totally vmbending Jinnah. Jinnah, however, could not feel rest and on 
April 9, frantically appealed to the Viceroy "not to give him a moth-
eaten" and "truncated" Pakistan". The Viceroy replied: 
"I simply could not visualise being so inconsistent as to 
agree to the partition of India without also agreeing to 
partition within any Provinces in which the same problem 
arose". 
Mountbatten continued to say that only to meet his (Jinnah's) 
wishes, he was going to meet the tragedy of giving up his dream of a 
united India, Painting a rosy picture of the greatness of India, 
Mountbatten sala: 
58. MB 191, Interview No, 41, Jinnah, April 8, 1947, 
59, Ibid, 
60, Ibid.J see also N. Mansergh and E.W.R, Lumby, n. 41, Vol. X, 
pp. 159-69; see also H.V. Hodson, n. 54, p, 227, 
61, MB 191, Interview No. 4 2, Jinnah, April 9, 1947; see also 
H.V. Hodson, Ibid. 
62. Interview No, 42, Ibid. 
63. Ibid, 
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"Four hxmdred million people of different race? and creeds 
vinder a Central Union Government, and all the economic 
strength that would accrue to them from increased industrializa-
tion, would offer India a great position in world affairs 
as the single most progressive country in the Far East". 
Mountbatten further records: 
"I finally said that I found that the present Interim 
Coalition Government was every day wor'king better and in 
a more co-operative spirit; and that it was a day-dream of 
mine to be able to put the Central Government under the 
Prime Ministership of Mr. Jinnah himself". 
After 35 minutes, Jinnah referred that the Viceroy had said that 
he wanted him to be the Prime Minister, but as he had opposed the Mission 
Plan, the chances were no more of it. This thought, created by the 
Viceroy, greatly tickled his vanity. Jinnah, in view of the Gandhiji's 
famous scheme, had kept in mind that he would be the Prime Minister. 
But by that time all his hopes had vanished. Mountbatten further observes: 
"Nevertheless he gives me the impression o'*^  a man who has 
not thought out one single piece of the mechanics of his 
own great scheme, and he will have the shock of his life 
when he really has to come down to earth and try and make 
his vague idealistic proposals work on a concrete basis", 
66 
Mountbatten, expressing his opinion about Jinnah, says: 
"He gave the impression that he was not listening. He was 
impossible to argue with ... He was, whatever was said, intent 
on his Pakistan - which could surely only result in doing the 
Muslims irreparable damage ... until he had met Mr, Jinnah he 
(Mountbatten) had not thought it impossible that a man with 
such'a complete lack of sense of responsibility could hold 
the power which he did". 
However, Jinnah went back thinking the gloomy picture of Pakistan 
which was taking shape in the Viceroy's mind, and to dispel that shadow, 
he began to carve other arguments. On April 10, the Viceroy declared: 
67 
"Mr, Jinnah was a psychopathic case". 
64, Ibid. 
65, Record of Interviews, N, Mansergh and E.VJ.R, Lvmiby, n. 41,Vol.X, 
p. 164; see also H.V, Hodson, n, 54, p, 229. 
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Meanwhile, the papers and people discussed various interpretations 
of the donnand for a partition within partition, in India and outside. 
Manchester Guardian commented: "The object in view, clearly stated by-
many pro-Congress journals is to reduce the Muslim majority provinces 
to such small dimensions that the idea of Pakistan should no longer 
appear workable or attractive to the most ardent Muslim", This observa-
tion is based on exaggeration. However, it may be a truth that Jinnah's 
high hopes of a grand Pakistan were raised to the ground and he was 
feeling secluded in comer. But Jinnah was a man ot great courage and 
wanted to be successful in some way. 
On April 10, Jinnah demanded 'viable' Pakistan citing example of 
Poland, which came into existence for practical reasons. The Viceroy 
said that he was bound to work on principles and expressed willingness 
to discuss only on the limitations of Pakistan, which would be "a State 
containing Sind, half of the Punjab, and probably the North-West 
Frontier Province in one group,and part of Bengal in another group". 
Jinnah denanded the partition of Assam also. The Viceroy agreed to this 
without hesitation. Jinnah complained that without Calcutta, Pakistan 
would be economically very imcertain, if not completely unsound. The 
Viceroy agreed to Jinnah's acceptance that the "moth-eaten Pakistan", 
which he offered, was almost unworkable. Mountbatten asked Jinnah why 
he was not prepared "to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, which gave 
him the whole of the Punjab, the whole of Bengal including Calcutta 
and the whole of Sind, with complete autonomy ... a really worthwhile 
and workable Pakistan". The Viceroy tried to convince Jinnah that under 
the Mission Plan, he would gain much under a limited, weak and joint 
Centre at Delhi and would control defence, communication and external 
affairs while enjoying virtual independence in all his provinces. He 
concluded that "he had thrown away the substance for the shadow" and 
was going "to get an almost tmworkable truncated Pakistan which would 
still be obliged to share a common organisation at the Centre to arrange 
71 
overall defence", Jinnah stuck to his guns being totally distrustful 
68. MB 114, Conf. Pap., No, 23, Vide Manchester Guardian, April 9,1947. 
69. MB 191, Interview No. 46, Jinnah, April 10, 1947. 
70. Ibid. 
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of the Congress leadership and disbelieving that an autonomous Pakistan 
under the Cabinet Plan would actually work with such freedom as held 
out in theory. He also anticipated with fear that the so-called weak 
Centre could change itself into a strong Centre as no constitution was 
agreed upon to work for ever. On April 11, Ismay expressed his belief 
that "the dominating feature in Mr, Jinnah's mental structtire was his 
loathing and contempt of the Hindus, He apparently thought that all 
Hindus were svib-human creatures with whom it was imoossible for the 
72 
Muslims to live". The news of Pakistan accepted reached to Jagjivan Ram, 
who informed the Viceroy that "the creed of Pakistan was being preached 
73 
even in the mosques", 
On April 11, Mountbatten told Nehru that Jinnah had demanded 
partition of Assam also. Nehru gave his consent forthwith as "this was a 
74 
perfectly reasonable request and could easily be agreed to". Likewise, 
Liaquat Ali also agreed to it. He stated: "I would in no circumstances 
prevent the Provinces from being partitioned if I accepted the principle 
75 
of Pakistan", He also said: "If your Excellency was prepared to let the 
Muslim League have only the Sind desert, I would still be prepared to 
accept It", Patel asserted that Jinnah could yet accept the Mission Plan 
and announce that the people of Bengal and Punjab miaht possibly revolt 
77 
against partition of their provinces and desert the Muslim League.Patel 
felt happiness that Jinnah was in trouble. Azad was grieved that Jinnah 
did not accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, which after all gave him the 
right to secede from the rest of India at the end of ten years if they 
wished. However, Azad saw in the truncated Pakistan a disaster for the 
Mussalmans and Jinnah's "commiting suicide". He tried his best that the 
Viceroy could make Jinnah to agree to the Cabinet Mission Plan. Since 
the Viceroy made all efforts for accentance of the Plan by both the 
parties, the British could not be held resnonsible for the partition. 
72. N. Mansergh and E,W.R.Lumby, n,41. Vol. X, p. 190, 
73. MB 191, Interview No. 47, Jagjivan Ram, April 11, 1947, 
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The Viceroy to implement his plan, had to first level the ground 
for coming the Congress and the league to a point o-F agreement/ and 
that was partition of India and the partition of Bengal and the Punjab. 
The problem he faced was that he had to deal only with Jinnah, who was 
authorised by his Working Committee to reach such an agreement he deems 
fit. But, it was not so with the Congress, There were three most important 
leaders - Gandhi, Nehru and Patel, Further, there was the newly elected 
Congress President - Acharya Kripalani, who had no faith in the British 
and liked to call, possibly the United Nations, to arbitrate,which had 
disturbed the Viceroy, as the UN interference could have certainly 
delayed the transfer of power within the stipulated time, during which 
the country was sure to deteriorate irreparably. With this view, he 
had asked Kripalani on April 10, "Whether he as President, Pandit Nehru 
as a leader of Congress in Government, and Mr, Gandhi as the spiritual 
father behind Congress, would be sufficient for me to negotiate with 
when it came to proclaiming the Congress view". Kripalani failed to 
79 give any categoric answer. 
The dramatic change in the League attitude and the Congress 
acceptance of Pakistan on April 11, led to the position that if Jinnah 
accepted the truncated Pakistan, so far so good, if not, it was better 
still. Arriving at this stage, Mountbatten decided to take decision. 
He was a man of quick inference and judgment. He had adopted the practice 
that as soon an interview with a leader finished, he used to dictate 
a resume of the talk and circulated its copy to each member of his 
staff, with whom he held conferences, sometimes twice and even thrice 
every day and their discussions on the events helped him to shape his 
opinion. Among his staff were the Governor-General's normal staff in 
India - three Secretaries i.e. Secretary (Personal), Secretary (Public) 
and Secretary (Reforms) besides his own staff brought from England 
consisting of Lord Ismay (his Chief of Statf), Sir Eric Mieville, 
Captain R.V, Brockman (as Personal Secretary), Lt.Col.V.F. Erskine Crxim 
(as Conference Secretary) and Alan Campbell-Johnson (as Press Attache). 
Mountbatten's First Partition Scheme 
In consultation with the above staff, Mountbatten devised a plan, 
which provided that "the members of the Legislative Assemblies of 
79, MB 191, Interview No. 45, Kripalani, April 10, 1947. 
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Bengal and the Punjab should meet separately in two parts i.e. represen-
tatives of the predominantly Muslim areas, and representatives of the 
predominantly non-Muslim areas; and if both sections of each of these 
Assemblies voted for partition, then that province would be partitioned. 
Under the plan, in the event of the partition of Bengal, the predominan-
tly Muslim district of Sylhet in Assam would have the option of joining 
80 the Muslim province". To place the responsibility of the partition on 
the shoulders of Indian people, he "envisaged the holding of an election 
in the North-West Frontier Province to ascertain the wishes of the 
people of that province". The Governor of the Frontier, Olaf Kirkpatrick 
Caroe, presented a proposal to the Central Government that "fresh 
elections should be held so that the new members may decide about the 
81 future of the province". The Chief Secretary, Lt. Col, de Lafarque, 
expressed his view that "a free and clean election ih the province was 
more likely to return the Congress to power than the League, even if 
Section 93 was imposed", Therefore, Mountbatten gave up the idea of 
holding the elections, as that could result in Khudai Khidmatgar victory 
and he wanted to transfer power of NWFP to the Muslim League so as to 
create a barrier between India and the tribal passes vrhich led to Russia 
by way of Afghanistan in view of Congress anti-Western and pro-Socialist 
policy, which was manifest from Gandhiji's speeches in South Africa 
and,in 1927, Nehru's participation in the International Congress 
Against Imperialism and said that "the burden of freedom was heavier 
than that of the imperialist Further, Nehru convened an Asian 
Relations Conference in Delhi in March,1947, and pleaded Gandhiji's 
view: "India wants to be independent of everybody who wants to own this 
84 
country", which was very near to the policy of the Soviet Union. 
When Nehru intended to visit the Frontier Province, Caroe was 
alarmed, as he pleaded that all tribals were anti-Congress and pro-
80, V,P. Kenon, The Transfer of Power in India (Bombay: Orient 
Longmans, 195i), pi 354, 
81, Wall Khan, Facts are Facts : The Untold Story of India's Partition 
(Translation by Dr. Sayeda Salyidain Hameed), (New Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House Pvt,Ltd,, 1987), p. 116. 
82, Ibid,, pp. 116-17; see also H.V. Hodson, n, 54, p. 283. 
83, 'Gandhi-Nehru Legacy and Indira Gandhi', in D.P. Chattopadhyaya(ed.), 
77th Plenary Session - Indian National Congress (Calcutta: 
Surendranagar, 1983), p. 45, 
84, Attar Chand, Nonaligned States; A Great Leap For\-/ard (Delhi: UDH 
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Pakistan. The British had employed Pirs and Faqirs^ who could be used 
to create unrest among the tribals. On April 20, 1946, Masood Malik 
Gulab Khan, for instance, had written a letter to Jinnah assuring armed 
help for the achievement of Pakistan and to send a Masood armed escort 
85 
as Jinnah's bodyguard, but Jinnah had declined. However, when Nehru 
86 
toured, he and his party were attacked. 
On April 15 and 16, 1947, at a conference called by the Viceroy, 
Sir Evan Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab, opined that "partition of the 
87 P\injab would be disastrous". Sir Frederick Burrows, the Governor of 
Bengal, was against the partition o:^  Bengal, because there were many 
Muslims against it and if Bengal "were divided, there was no doubt that 
88 
East Bengal would become a rural slxjm". Mountbatten was put in a great 
trouble. On the one hand, the Governors were against the partition and, 
on the other, "The greater the insistence by Jinnah on his province-wise 
Pakistan, the stronger was the Congress demand that he should not be 
allowed to carry unwilling minorities with him". On April 17, the Viceroy 
informed the Secretary of State that a "partition is probably inevitable". 
On April 17, Acharya Kripalani agreed to the partition of Punjab and 
91 
Bengal "in a fair manner". 
On April 20, Jawaharlal Nehru declared: "The Muslim League can 
have Pakistan, if they wish to have it, but on the condition that they 
92 
do not take away other parts of India which do not wish to join Pakist^ n^", 
and on April 28, Rajendra Prasad, President of the Constituent Assembly, 
expressing doubt, said that the Union, under the May 16 Statement, may, 
perhaps, not comprise all provinces; hence, a constitution for part of 
it would h^ve to be framed. He addec 
• ^ : 
"In that case, we can and should insist that one principle 
will apply to all parts of the country and no constitution will 
be forced upon any xmwilling part of it. This may mean not only 
the division of India, but a division of some provinces". 
85. Erland Jansson, India-Pakistan and Pakhtoonistan, p. 175; in 
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On April 22, Krishna Menon warned Mountbatten against America's 
"object in I-ndia". Mountbatten proved more shrewd than Menon, Nehru's 
adviser on foreign affairs, while he said that Pakistan would soon 
build up "armed forces immensely superior to those of Hindustan" and 
"Karachi would become big naval and air base within the British Common-
94 
wealth". Menon, being shuddered, said that he would convince Nehru and 
Patel to request for "Dominion Status for India" instead of a "comoletely 
95 
independent sovereign State". 
Meanwhile, the Bengal Chief Minister, Suhrawardy, began to advocate 
"independent national status for united Bengal". He argued: "We Bengalis 
have a common mother tongue and common economic interests, Bengal has 
very little affinity with the Punjab. Bengal will be an indeoendent state 
96 
and decide by herself later whether she would link up with Pakistan", 
This movement lost Influence as neither the Congress nor the League 
supported it. Moreover, the extremist Sikhs started an agitation for a 
separate State called "Khalistan", while a separate 'Pathan State' in 
NWPP, and self-determination for Muslims in certain areas in U.P, and 
Bombay were being mooted. It seems that the Muslims and the Sikhs under-
estimated the importance of independence and the seriousness of the 
problem for transfer of power and had planned to break India into pieces. 
Serious communal outbreaks, incidents of stabbing and arson 
continued in Piinjab disturbing conditions in Delhi. In the NWFP, the 
Muslim League was agitating against the Congress ministry. As Mountbatten 
intervened, the League prisoners were ordered to be released, but, backed 
by Jinnah, the league leaders in detention refused to accept their 
freedom. Though Mountbatten visited the province towards the end of 
April and calm down the agitation, but soon the Muslim League continued 
the civil disobedience. The Viceroy felt that if power would not be 
transferred soon, there would be no authority to whom power could be 
transferred. 
Meanwhile, on April 23, Jinnah, pleading that Punjab and Bengal 
should not be partitioned, s^ id, fi rst/ that it would be "a most dangerou 
94. Interview with Krishna Menon, April 22, 1947, in N. Mansergh and 
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proposition and botJnd to lead to troiible as it was not based on wisdom 
and foresight, but born of bitterness and spitefulness. It would loose 
terrible forces and was suicidal". Mountbatten records, "Without 
hesitation", Jinnah replied, "I should be delighted. What is the use 
of Bengal without Calcutta? They had much better remain united and 
independent". Secondly, in Western Bengal the Caste Hindus were only 
37% of the total population, and, in case of partition, the 63% Schedule 
Caste Hindus would be ruined being cut off from those in Eastern Bengal. 
Thirdly, the "Congress wanted to seize power by a coup d* etat. This 
could only be prevented by a quick decision to split the Army. The 
longer the Army was kept unified, the more was the position endangered. 
A few days before, the General Secretary of the Congress Party had 
stated publicly that he (Jinnah) and Mr, Liaquat Ali Khan would be the 
99 first to be taken prisoner". Mountbatten dismissed these arguments and 
Lord Ismay assured that the coup cannot be succeed but it would be 
possible as a result of a long drawn-out civil war. Mountbatten ceased 
to hear any arguments or proposals from either side, and decided to 
take decision. 
Before final decision, Mountbatten consulted with Nehru and other 
Congressmen, who supported the partition of Bengal and Punjab. The 
Viceroy informed Patel that Jinnah had requested him not to press him 
to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan. Pgtel replied: "All right, don't 
ask him". The Viceroy said that history would blame him if he would 
not accept Jinnah's request. Patel assured the Viceroy that "history 
had already exonerated the British, since their statement of 20th 
February . Jinnah, on the other side, refusing the proposal of unity 
and arguing to remain within the British Commonwealth, said to the 
Viceroy:^°^ 
"In fact the leaders of Congress are so dishonest, so crooked, 
and so obsessed with the idea of smashing the Muslim League, 
that there are no lengths to which they will go to do so; and 
the only way of giving Pakistan a chance is to make it an 
'independent nation of the British Commonwealth, with its own 
army, and the right to argue cases at any Central Council on 
this basis". 
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On April 26, the Viceroy informed Jinnah about Suhrawardy's hope 
that "he miqht be able to keep a united Bengal on condition that it 
102 joined neither Pakistan nor Hindustan", Jinnah replied instantly: 
"I should be delighted. What is the use of Bengal without 
Calcutta; they had much better remain united and independent; 
I am sure that they would be on friendly terms with us". 
1Q3 
Liaquat Ali also informed Sir Eric Mieville: 
"that he was in no way worried about Bengal as he was 
convinced in his own mind that the province would never 
divide. He thought it would remain a separate state,joining 
neither Hindustan nor Pakistan'.' 
Further, Jinnah tried his utmost, inducing the Sikh leaders - the 
Maharaja of Patiala and Baldev Singh - that they join Pakistan, while 
Nehru and Patel offered more as a result Baldev Singh continued to 
retain control over the Defence Ministry in ITehru's Cabinet, Liaquat 
Ali said that "Sikhistan might join up with Pakistan, and that the Muslim 
104 League would offer them very generous terms". However, Jinnah tried to 
avert the sub-division of Bengal and Punjab and extricate Pakistan's 
Northwestern provinces from the Indian Union, thus uniting the Punjab 
and Bengal to make Pakistan a larger country. 
105 On April 28, The Statesman wrote: 
"Partition of India now seems settled. The details have not 
been worked out, but the Viceroy who has had free conversa-
tions with leaders of political parties is expected to 
incorporate the results in a report next week. In all 
probability. Lord Ismay, Adviser to the Viceroy, will fly 
to London to submit His Excellency's findings to the Cabinet". 
On April 30, Eric Mieville showed Jinnah a draft of a statement, 
which was too traumatic for Jinnah to accept. Suggesting a plebiscite 
absolutely necessary, Jinnah insisted that the Scheduled Castes and 
Tribes in Bengal and Assam should also be represented in the Legislative 
102, Interview with Jinnah, April 26, 1947, in N. Mansergh and 
E.W.R. Lxjmby, n, 41, Vol, X, pp. 45 2-53, 
103, Mieville to Mountbatten, April 29, 1947, in N. Mansergh and 
E,W.R, Lymby, n, 41, Vol, X, p. 479, 
104. Mountbatten's Personal Report, No, 5, May 1, 1947, in N.Mansergh 
and E.W.R. Lumby, n. 41, Vol. X, pp, 537-38, 
105. The Statesman(Calcutta), April 28, 1947. 
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Assemblies. He said the whole plan otherwise "would lead to terrible 
complications - to confusion - bitter confusion - and bloodshed", He 
said that minority communities should be allowed to "move to their 
homelands if they vjished to do so i.e. Hindus to Hindustan and Muslims 
to Pakistan". He also presented two proposals: (1) "the existing 
Constituent Assembly should be dissolved at once" as it was the creation 
of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which was not accepted by either party" 
and (2) "the power should be transferred to the provinces as they 
existed at that time" so that they could either "group together or 
remain separate ^s they wis 
Mountbatten's Revised Plan 
The state of tension and suspicion had very much tro^ ibled the 
108 
Viceroy, who, on May 1, 1947, wrote to London: 
"The more I look at the problem in India the more I realise 
that all this partition business is sheer madness and is 
going to reduce the economic efficiency of the whole country 
immeasurably". 
On April 10, Mountbatten, in consultation with his staff had 
devised a plan. He revised this plan and secretly sent it to London 
with Lord Ismay and George Abell on May 2, when Lord Pethick-Lawrence 
was succeeded by Lord Listowel. Though the plan was kept absolutely 
secret, but it was published in The Hindu on May 2, and The Hindustan 
Times on May 3, The Viceroy was astonished and angi^ as such a leakage 
was serious, Jinnah complained to the Viceroy against this leakage as 
the plan was against the Muslim interests and that was the reason why 
the League papers were silent about it. However, Mountbatten reasoned 
that "since Patel had had disagreed with the proposal to dissolve the 
Congress Ministry in NWFP or to hold fresh election prior to the transfer 
of power as a part of the partition plan", the Sardar was "most probably 
responsible for this leakage". The Hindustan Times on May 3, commen 
106. MB 84, Vide E.G. Mieville to Viceroy, April 30, 1947. 
107. MB 84, Vide E.G. Mieville to Viceroy, April 30, 1947. 
108. Mountbatten's Personal Report, No. 5, May 1, 1947, in N. Mansergh 
and E.W.R. Lumby, n. 41, Vol. X, p. 540. 
109. MB 114, Annex to Minutes of Viceroy's 25th Staff Meeting, 
May 3, 1947. 
110. The Piindustan Times (New Delhi), May 3, 1947. 
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"For the first time, since Lord Moiintbatten assxjmed 
Viceroyalty/the feeling that he may not be playing fair 
has come among some Congressmen and Sikh leaders. The 
reason for this is the Viceroy' s reported attitude towards '' 
the Frontier Ministry and his plan to divide the Punjab 
into 12 non-Muslim and 17 Muslim districts thereby dealing 
a blow to Sikh interests", 
111 
However, the main features of the Mountbatten Plan were as follows; 
"1. Both the Congress and the League consider division of India 
inevitable, 
2. The division will involve district-wise partition of the Punjab 
and Bengal, and the apx}ointment of a boundary comniission. 
3. Before division is carried out Members of the Legislative 
Assemblies of the districts concerned should be given the 
opportunity to decide whether they would prefer to remain in 
the Indian Union or have a separate State for their areas. 
4. If the M.I,As. decide in favour of partition thdn they will be 
asked to elect new representatives to a Constituent Assembly 
or Constituent Assemblies for their joint or separate areas on 
the basis of one representative for each million. The present 
Constituent Assembly for the Indian Union will remain intact. 
Only the members representing the partitioned areas will cease 
to be its members., 
5. If partition is to take place,the N,W,F.P, should have fresh 
elections to decide whether its people would desire to remain 
in the Indian Union or join Pakistan or become an independent 
territory", 
As the plan- was published, it was a matter of wide discussion in 
the country. Mountbatten observing the reactions of the CKC to the 
112 proposals, reported to the Secretary of State on May 3/ 1947, as follows; 
"1,- The Congress would have favoured a strong united India but 
considers that the division of the country is the best solution 
in the circumstances. But the division should be absolute and 
complete since that alone will give the majority of the people 
of India the opportunity of building up a powerful State with 
a strong centre, 
2. There must be partition of the Punjab and Bengal giving chance 
to the non-Muslim areas to join the Indian Union, 
3, The method of violence used in the North-West Frontier Province, 
the Punjab and Assam to settle political issues must be put an 
end to. The Congress vjill resist to the utmost any attempt to 
force issues by methods of intimidation and violence. 
111. Manmath Nath Das, n, 21, t?, 91. 
112. MB 114, No. 235-GT, Viceroy to SS, May 3, 1947. 
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4. The Congress has no objection to a separate Constituent Assembly 
or Assemblies being siammoned for those areas that choose to 
stand out of the Indian Union but hopes that such areas will 
have the opportianity to decide for themselves whether they would 
remain independent or form union with other parts. 
and 
5, There is no occasion for any change in the Frontier. The last 
election was fought on the issue of Pakistan and the verdict 
having been given by the electorate the present M.I.As of the 
Frontier Assembly are competent to decide the future of the 
province", 
The Viceroy in his communication had urged that HMG's approval 
should be communicated to him by May 10, and wanted to call a meeting 
of party leaders on May 17, to ascertain their reactions aaainst his 
proposals, which was the first stage towards the transfer of power. 
The Congress left arguing but the press did not. 
Challenging Jinnah's claim to Assam, The Tribune wrote: 
"Mr. Jinnah is in the habit of flying in the face of facts 
and figures and making preposterous demands with Hitlerian 
confidence and fervour. In Assam there are only 32,08,325 
Muslims as against 69,96,408 Hindus and others. But in 
dictatorial accents he asserts that that province has a 
predominantly Muslim population and is a homeland of Mussalmans 
where the league should be allowed to reign supreme ...We 
are not at all surprised to find that while he says that the 
Muslims being one-fourth of the Indian population should get 
one-fourth of the Indian land, he has by including Assam, 
Bengal, Sind, Baluchistan, the Frontier Province and the 
Punjab in his list of Pakistan vinits planned to grab 40 per 
cent of Indian territory". 
On May 5, Gwyer and Mountbatten agreed that the Cabinet Mission 
Plan had become completely out of date. Panriikar congratulating the 
Viceroy said; 
"... he positively welcomed Pakistan, since it would 
enable a really strong Centre to be formed at Delhi, which 
the inclusion of Muslim majority Provinces would have 
rendered impossible", 
Gandhiji met Jinnah at the latter's residence on Kay,5,and even 
after a three-hour talk could not alter Jinnah's decision. On May 8, 
113. The Tribune (Lahore), May 4, 1947. 
114. MB 193, Interview No. 130, K.M. Pannikar, May 5, 1947. 
115. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), May 7, 1947. 
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he wrote to the Viceroy to refrain from implementing any plan of 
dividing India, Rajendra Prasad wroi U6 >te: 
"Mahatmaji feared that the results of that acceptance (of 
Partition) would be disastrous ... But when he realised 
that those who were entrusted with the responsibility of 
administration found that it was not possible to carry on 
and that there must either be partition or open war with 
the league, he decided to keep quiet and not to oppose 
partition in any way". 
Simla Plan 
On May 1, Mountbatten flev/ up to Simla with V.P. Menon and Mieville, 
taking Nehru and his daughter, Indira, as house guests, having made the 
Nehrus real friends with Mountbattens. On May 10, the Viceroy received 
approval of the plan sent through Ismay and Abell on May 2. The approval 
contained some important modifications, that is, to break up India into 
several tjnits, which put the Viceroy into a terrible dilemma. The 
Viceroy showed it to Nehru the same night, Nehru was frightened. On the 
117 
next morning, Nehru charged vehemently: 
"In the new proposals the v.'hole approach has been changed 
completely and is at total variance with our own approach 
in the course of recent talks. The proposals start with the 
rejection of an Indian Union as the successor to power and 
invite the claims of large numbers of succession States who 
are permitted to unite if they so wish in two or more States". 
Nehru concluded: 
"It appears to me that the inevitable and obvious consequences 
of the proposals and the approach in them are: (a) to invite 
the Balkanisation of India; (b) to provoke certain civil 
conflict and to add to violence and disorder; (c)' to a further 
breakdown of the Central authority which alone can prevent 
the chaos that is growing; (d) to demoralise the army, the 
police, and the central services". 
Nehru also denounced the British designs to converting some of 
the major princely States into independent kingdoms. In view of the 
deprivation of essential character and power of the existing Constituent 
Assembly, v^ hich included all elements except League, Nehru inferred 
116. Rajendra Prasad, India Divided (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1946),p.303. 
117. MB 160, Transfer of Power, Procedure etc., note of Nehru, 
May 11, 1947. 
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an outright favour to the League and warned that it would be 'disastrous' 
amounting to a new 'and complete deadlock. 
Patel's demand that all power should immediately be transferred 
to the Central Government for maintaining peace and order, in view of 
London 'approval', had no force. Nehru hoped that Jinnah would also not 
accept the approval, Contrarily, Jinnah announced: "The Muslim League 
will never agree to such a monstrous proposal as the one put forward 
by Mr. Patel, to restore peace, which is only a dream of nis". Jinnah, 
raising the question of the fate of Muslims and non-Caste Hindus in 
the Hindu majority provinces, suggested a partition of most Indian 
provinces, though he knew that it would lead to their fragmentation and 
it could not be morally supported, but by saying so he wanted to prevent 
partition of the Muslim majority provinces, which, he believed, would 
be absolutely destructive and 'dangerous for the present but more so 
in the future. 
However, referring the Congress and the League statements, the 
Viceroy hurriedly sent a telegram to the Secretary of State on May 11, 
120 
saying: "You can imagine the bombshell this has been" and suggested 
"redrafting of the plan", which Attlee in confusion upheld and asked 
Mountbatten to fly home immediately, 
V.P. Menon's Proposal 
Meanwhile, V,P, Menon, in Simla, said to the Viceroy that "the 
Congress would accept Dominion Status in return for a very early transfer 
of power". Menon, on May 1, had already conveyed to Mountbatten through 
Mleville that "Patel might be ready to accept an offer of Dominion 
121 Status for the time being". Putting Patel's condition for accepting 
Dominion Status, Menon said to the Viceroy that the power should be 
transferred in two months. Pyarelal writes that in the second halt of 
April, 1947, it was p\st to Patel that "if the Congress could accept 
Dominion Status as an aid interim arrangement, it would be possible to 
118. I b i d . 
119. MB 114, Statement by J innah , May 11, 1947. 
120. MB 160, No, 56-SC, Viceroy t o SS, May 11, 1947. 
121. Alan Campbell-Johnson, n . 51 , p . 8 1 . 
122. U.N. P y a r e l a l , n . 31, Vol . I I , p . 154. 
380 
anticipate the date of the British withdrawal. It would further talce 
away from the Muslim League its bargaining power with the British". 
This arrangement was, on May 1, was reoorted by the Secretary of the 
124 so. Jinnah, on April 12, 1947, had already expressed his 
willingness to the Viceroy that he would accept to remain in the Common-
wealth, while the Congress was persisting to have a sovereign independent 
Republic, which meant leaving the Commonwealth. But now the Viceroy, 
whose aim was to bring the Indian Union also into the Commonwealth,jumped 
125 
at Menon's proposal. He wrote to V.P, Menon: 
"... you were the first person I met who entirely agreed 
with the idea of Dominion Status, and you found the solution, 
which I had not thought of, of making it acceptable by a 
very early transfer of power. History must always rate that 
decision very high, and I owe it to your advice, advice given 
in the teeth of considerable opposition from other advisers". 
On May 7, at the Mountbatten's staff meeting, V.P. Menon confirmed 
Patel's and Nehru's approach. On May 8, Patel and Nehru reached there, 
Krishna Menon said: "Nehru is attracted to the concept, if only because 
it may give Mountbatten opportunity to bring his influence to bear on 
J26 es". On May 10, Mountbatten held a meeting 
attended by Nehru, Mieville and V.P. Menon. They decided that "the 
Muslim majority areas should be separated from India and that the transfer 
of power should be to two central Governments, India and Pakistan, on 
127 the basis of Dominion Status, each having its own Governor-General".Nehru 
stressed that the transfer should be as soon as possible. The Viceroy 
expressed doubt that "there would for some time to come be no authorities 
in Pakistan to whom power could be transferred" . Menon assured to soive 
.this problem, Mountbatten, however, was anxious to say: "As far as 
Pakistan is concerned we are putting up a tent. We can do no mofl". 
They agreed that the Indian Union would succeed the British India and 
"Pakistan would be in the position of territories that had seceded from 
the parent country and would start with enormous handicaps, without an 
organized administration, without armed forces, without records, without 
123. Ibid,, p. 166. 
124. Ibid. 
125. Leonard Mosley, n. 24, p. 127. 
126. Alan Campbell-Johnson, n. 51, p. 86. 
127. V.P. Menon, n. 80, p, 360. 
128. Alan Campbell-Johnson, n . 51 , p , 87 . 
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eqiiipment or military stores. It is difficult to imagine conditions 
more calculated to bring about a breakdown in Pakistan. 
On May 10, the Viceroy showed a plan to Nehru, who angrily 
seemed to throw it but soon collected himself. Later, in a meeting on 
May 16, they discussed all aspects of a good plan and lastly agreed to 
Menon's plan of Dominion Status. Menon was called the same day and was 
asked to draw a draft, "Heads of Agreement", which he completed within 
four hours ending at 6.00 P.M., the main features of which are, as 
stated by V.P, Menon himself, ar^ as follows: 
"(a) That the leaders agree to the procedure laid down for ascertain-
ing the wishes of the peoole whether there should be a division 
of India or not; 
(b) That in the event of the decision being taken that there should 
only be one central authority in India, power should be 
transferred to the existing Constituent Assembly on a Dominion 
Status basis; 
(c) That in the event of a decision that there should be two 
sovereign States in India, the central Government of each State 
should take over power in responsibility to their respective 
Constituent Assemblies, again on a Dominion Status basis; 
(d) That the transfer of power in either case should be on the 
basis of the Government of India Act of 1935, modified to 
conform to the Dominion Status position; 
(e) That the Governor-General should be common to both the Dominions 
and that the present Governor-General should be reappointed; 
(f) That a Commission should be appointed for the demarcation of 
boundaries in the event of a decision in favour of partition; 
(g) That the Governors of the provinces should be appointed on the 
, recommendation of the respective central Governments; 
(h) 
In the event of two Dominions coming into being, the Armed 
Forces in India should be divided between them. The xmits 
would be allocated according to the territorial basis of 
recruitment and would be under the control of the respective 
Governments. In the case of mixed units, the separation and 
redistribution should be entrusted to a Committee consisting 
of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck and the Chiefs of the 
General Staff of the two Dominions, under the supervision of 
a Council consisting of the Governor-General and the two 
Defence Ministers. This Council would automatically cease to 
exist as soon as the process of division was completed". 
129. L.A. Sherwani, n, 39, p. 225. 
130. V.P. Menon, n. 80, p. 366. 
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Menon took the draft 'Agreement' to Nehru, Patel and Baldev 
Singh and Sir Eric Mieville to Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. Then, the 
Viceroy consulted with Nehru and Patel, on behalf of the Congress; 
Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan on behalf of the Muslim League; and Baldev 
Singh on behalf of the Sikhs. The Viceroy desired their acceptance in 
writing. Nehru readily signed, but Jinnah and Liaquat Ali refused, 
though seemed to accept the Agreement in principle. On May 15, the 
Viceroy, showing the proposed plan, asked Liaquat Ali Khan whether the 
Muslim League would finally accept the partition of Pxmjab and Bengal. 
Liaquat Ali replied: "We shall never agree to it/ but you may make us 
bow to the inevitable". Jinnah's reaction was more negative. He said: 
"The Muslim League cannot agree to the partition of Bengal 
and the Pvinjab. It cannot be justified historically, 
economically, geographically, politically or morally. These 
provinces have built up their respective lives for nearly 
a century .., and the only ground which is put forward for 
the partition is that the areas where the Hindus and Sikhs 
are in a majority should be separated from the rest of the 
provinces .., the results will be disastrous for the life 
of these two provinces and all the commtmities concerned .. . 
if you take this decision - which in my opinion will be a 
fateful one - Calcutta should not* be torn away from the 
Eastern Bengal ... if worst comes to worst, Calcutta should 
be made a free port". 
Jinnah described also the derivation of the word, 'Pakistan' -
P for Punjab; A for Afghan (i.e. Pathan or NWF), K for Kashmir, the 
letter 'I' is not represented with any letter in writing Pakistan in 
Urdu; to say that 'I' does not exist in Urdu is to express no knowledge 
of Urdu script; S for Sind and 'Tan' means 'place'. If red in combining 
the letters, 'Pak'-i-'stan', it means 'Pure land'. However, with this 
meaning, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan insisted that the name of the new 
country in the plan should be stated as 'Pakistan'. 
Thus, Jinnah had accepted the plan verbally. Mountbatten flew 
to London on May 18, 1947. On May 19, Mountbatten informed Attlee and 
his Cabinet colleagues; "It had become clear that the Muslim league 
would resort to arms if Pakistan in some form were not conceded". 
131. MB 193, Record Interview No,135, with Liaquat Ali, May 15,1947. 
132. Jinnah's note. May 17, 1947; in N. Mansergh and E.W.R.Lumby, 
n. 41, Vol, X, p, 825. 
133. MB 193, Interview No. 140,Jinnah and Liaquat Ali,May 17, 1947. 
134. Cabinet Minutes, May 19, 1947; in N.Mansergh and E.W.R* Limiby, 
n. 41, Vol. X, p. 896. 
383 
Demand for a Corridor 
When Reuters interviewed/ on May 20^ Jinnah demanded an 800-mile 
long "corridor" to link West and East Pakistan, promising a "really 
beneficial" relationship between Pakistan and Britain, and offering 
135 
"Hindustan" a "friendly and reciprocal alliance" and wired the Cabinet 
that "before Bengal and the Punjab were partitioned, a referendum 
should be held in each province to determine will of its people in 
this vital regard". The Viceroy went against it and said that it "would 
137 
merely result in delay", to which the Cabinet agreed, 
Krishna Menon flew on May 21, to London to inform Mountbatten 
that Nehru and Patel were "ready to accept" Dominion Status if it were 
offered to India in 1947, Nehru wrote to Moxaitbatten from India House 
in the message: 
"If Mr. Jinnah wants a total separation, and that straight 
away, and if we agree to it for the sake of peace and 
dismember our country, we want to be rid of him, so far as 
the affairs of what is left to us of our country are concerned. 
I feel sure you will appreciate this, and also that it is 
not a matter of detail, but is fiindamental", 
In view of Jinnah's claim, the Congress had begxm fear that they 
would loose the Eastern Punjab and Sikh support as well as Western 
Bengal and Calcutta and also more of the princely states especially 
Hyderabad and Bhopal, At last, tired of arguing, Nehru conceded 
Pakistan on the theory that by "cutting off the head we will get rid 
139 
of the headache". 
When Mountbatten reached London, the Independence of India Bill 
was to be discussed by the British Parliament, Attlee feared that the 
opposition of Churchill and his Conservative Party could delay the 
finalisation of the Bill in a prolonged and acrimonious Coironons debate. 
Therefore, Mountbatten went to seek Churchill in bed, Churchill 
135. Reuter's Report, May 21, 1947, vide Stanley Wolpert, n. 50,p,325, 
136. Stanley Wolpert, Ibid. 
137. Cabinet Minutes, May 20, 1947? in N. Mansergh and E.i;\\R. Lumby, 
n. 41, Vol, X, p. 922, 
138. Krishna Menon to Mountbatten, May 21, 1947; in N,Mansergh and 
E,W,R, Lumby,Ibid., p. 940. 
13 9, Alan Campbell-Johnson, n. 51, p, 98 (Moiontbatten, June 1, 1947). 
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advised: "To begin with you must threaten. Take away all British officers. 
Give them military units without British officers. Make it clear to 
them how impossible it would be to run Pakistan without British help". 
This was a Churchill's "personal message" to Jinnah. "This is a matter 
of life and death for Pakistan, if you do not accept this offer with 
140 both hands". However, Churchill assured support of the Opposition, 
In India, at the same time, Jinnah had created differences among 
the members of the Interim Government on the question of partition of 
Punjab and Bengal and Corridor, and the Congress was opposing more 
violently than the inclusion of Calcutta in East Pakistan. Dawn, the 
League's spokesman, on May 22, wrote: " We shall fight against partition 
of Pakistan, splitting of Provinces detrimental to interests of all, 
corridor to link east and west Muslim areas essential". The Hindustan 
Times, taking side of the Congress, retorted on May 23: "If existence 
of Pakistan is dependent on the corridor, it will never come into being", 
Jinnah and Nehru were being kept informed of the deliberations 
going on in London, The Viceroy's opposition to "referendum" invoked 
Jinnah to assert that the Muslim League "would never agree to any change 
in the position, functions or powers of the present Interim Government 
either by convention or otherwise, and that the Interim Government must 
be dissolved as soon as the two Constituent Assemblies were formed, and 
all power immediately transferred to them". Demanding justice to the 
100 million Muslims, Jinnah charged that "in spite of his very strong 
objections, the partition of Bengal and the Punjab was being contemplated 
J41 on". Nehru strongly reacted and said: "It is clear, however, 
from what Mr, Jinnah says that he does not accept the very basis of 
the proposals with regard to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab ,., 
He has also added a demand for a corridor from the North-West to the 
North-East, In view of the attitude taken up by Mr, Jinnah, we cannot 
give a one-sided agreement to any proposal which does not lead to a 
142 full settlement", Nehru further argued that if he did not accept the 
partition of the two provinces, he must agree to a united India \ander 
the Cabinet Mission Plan. Further, he rejected the League's claim that 
140, Record of Churchill-Moxmthatten Interview, May 22, 1947; in 
N. Mansergh and E.W.R, Lumby, n, 41, Vol, X, pp, 945-46. 
141, lOL, File No. 115, Note from Jinnah, May 20, 1947. 
142, lOL, File No.ll65-S, For Mountbatten from Mieville, May 26, 1947, 
containing Nehru's letter of th^ same date. 
385 
it ha<3 right to deny ' powers to the Interim Government' voider the 
Dominion Status, since "Dominion Status necessarily carried this right; 
otherwise it is not Dominion Status". He wrote to the Attlee Government: 
"... during the past few years it has been our repeated 
experience that Mr. Jinnah does not commit himself jto anything 
and.does not like coming to a settlement. He accepts what 
he gets and goes on asking for more. We have arrived at a 
stage when this kind of thing will do good to nobody/ and 
we are not prepared to have one-sided commitments in future". 
However, Mountbatten's staff in Delhi informed him that there 
was not much substance in Jinnah's outbursts, which he aimed to create 
for himself a strong position to negotiate the details. The staff also 
reported that Jinnah was "unlikely to throw away the chance of getting 
145 
a limited Pakistan in an attempt to get the whole", Rajendra Prasad and 
Sankar Rao Deo criticised the demand for 'corridor', The Dawn propounaed: 
"The demand for a corridor is not a new one, Quaid-e-Azam 
Jinnah has many times in the past raised that point which 
is so vital in the context of Pakistan, If Pakistan is to 
be real, solid and strong the creation of a corridor link-
ing up its eastern and northern areas is an indispensable 
adjxmct. Be that as it may, we have no doubt, how§ver, that 
if Muslims can win Pakistan - as indeed they have already 
won it - they can just as well build a corridor somewhere 
for the linking up of the two segments of Pakistan", 
Nehru replied: 
"I regret, I cannot enter into public controversy with 
Mr, Jinnah at this stage when vital matters are \jnder 
consideration and final decisions are going to be taken 
.,, The demand for a corridor is fantastic and absurd. 
We stand for a Union of India with the right to particular 
areas to opt out. We envisage no compulsion. If there is 
no proper settlement on this basis without further claims 
being advanced, then we shall proceed with making and 
implementing the constitution for the Union of India". 
From May 25, Gandhiji began to preach his thesis of a united India 
declaring, if necessary, to impose the Mission Plan by force, 
143. Ibid. 
144. Ibid. 
145. Ibid. 
146. lOL, F i l e No. 1170-S, From Alan Campbell-Johnson for E r s k i n e -
Criom, May 26, 1947, con ta in ing passage from Dawn, 
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Mountbatten returned to India on May 31,1947. On the same day 
he issued a circular to all Provincial Governors briefing them their 
last phase of duties: "The posts of Governors will continue ... but they 
may have to be replaced if there is a demand for a change. ... If the 
Punjab and Bengal are partitioned there will have to be new Governors 
148 for the two new Provinces". The Governors of Bengal and Punjab were 
asked to ascertain the wishes of their legislatures regarding partition. 
The Governor of NWFP was directed to prepare for a referendum. Then he 
drafted his personal message to the people of India. This shows his 
firm deterpaitiatiou to manage transfer of power as early as possible as 
he thought that the parties might repeat their arguments and also there 
was very real risk of escalating violence and bloodshed. 
149 On May 18, Gandhiji had asserted: 
"If we confront madness by sanity, their madness will go, 
the Pakistan demand will go, or the whole of India will 
become Pakistan - if Pakistan means what its name implies, 
the land of pure". 
On Jione 1, 1947, Gandhiji in a state of great mental anguish sa 
"Today I find myself all alone. Even the Sardar and 
Jawaharlal think that my reading of the situation is wrong 
and peace is sure to return if Partition is agreed upon 
... They did not like my telling the Viceroy that even 
if there was to be partition, it should not be through 
British intervention or British rule ... Let it not be said 
that Gandhi was party of India's vivisection " 
fS: 
• • • 
On Monday, t he JtJne 2, 1947, t h e Viceroy he ld a conference of 
seven. The Indian l e a d e r s v/ent t o t h e v i c e r o y ' s house in New D e l h i : 
Li^quat (ML) and N i s h t a r (Pakhtoon) accompanying J i n n a h ; P a t e l and 
J . E . Kr ipa l an i (Congress P re s iden t t o r the year) wi th Nehru; and Baldev 
Singh r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e S ikhs , The Viceroy expressed d i s t r e s s over t h e 
impending p a r t i t i o n of the Pionjab, which was i n e v i t a b l e , because " i f 
a t t empts were made t o work for the n a t i o n a l p a r t i t i o n on any p r i n c i p l e 
o t h e r than d i v i s i o n between the ma jo r i ty Muslim and majo r i ty non-Muslim 
a r e a s " , i t s consequences were t o be very f r i g h t f u l . He assured t h a t t h e 
Boundary Commission would t ake the Sikh i n t e r e s t s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
148. lOL, F i l e No. 1223-S, Viceroy t o Governors, May 31, 1947. 
149. U.N. P y a r e l a l , n . 44, Vol. I I , p . 204. 
150. I b i d . , pp . 210-11 . 
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The suggestion for holding a referendvim over the future of 
Calcutta was considered meaningless, because in the Calcutta riots, 
the Scheduled Castes had taken sides with the Hindus. Therefore, it 
was sure that the Scheduled Castes would support the Hindu candidate. 
The Viceroy announced that Independence of India Bill would be 
passed, transfer of power would be implemented, and Dominion Status 
would be implemented very soon, as the British had committed to help 
India obtain power as early as possible. 
153 
The leaders were then given the draft of the Partition Plan 
for study and getting approved from their Working Committies. Nehru 
said: "there could never be complete approval of the plan from Congress, 
154 but, on the balance, they accepted it". Nehru and Sardar Patel committed 
themselves to the plan, step by step, without consulting the Congress 
President and they had taken the responsibility upon themselves 
because of the peculiarity and urgency of the situation. 
Sardar Patel was the greatest supporter of partition "out of 
irritation and injured vanity", because he was frustrated by Liaquat 
Ali Khan as Finance Minister, who vetoed his proposals at every step. 
He was convinced "that the new State of Pakistan was not viable and 
could not last ... Pakistan would collapse in a short time and the 
provinces which had seceded from India would have to face untold 
difficulty and hardsMp". 
The Sikh leaders did not conceal their anger against the partition 
of Punjab, Master Tara Singh exhorted his followers "to go out and 
smite the Amalekites", distributed inflammatory leaflets and instructed 
the Sikhs to prepare themselves for action. They planned to attack 
trains, dynamite headworks, ambush refugees, drive Mus]ims from their 
homes and to assassinate Jinnah in Karachi on August 14. Jenkins saw, 
a few miles away from Amritsar, three hundred Sikhs drilling with 
rifles and tommy-guns. Their targets were "diunmies of Muslim men, 
156 
women and children". 
152. Ib id . 
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Jinnah refused to sign consent as the Muslim League was a 
democratic organisation and/hence^ he pleaded: "he and his Working 
Committee would have to go before their masters^ the people, for a final 
157 
decision". It was Jinnah* s vain argximent because the ML Working Committee 
had already authorised him to take decision himself whatsoever he would 
like suitable, Mountbatten characterised him a dictatorial in the garb 
of a tJTue democrat. However, the Viceroy impressed upon him that there 
158 
should not be 'No' from the League, Jinnah, however, from his own side 
was right to take decision of the ML Working Committee on such an important 
matter ;; thus, he did not like to be wholly responsible for the partition 
Jinnah visited the Viceroy,as promised, at 11.00 P.M. and about the 
acceptance of the plan, he used the word, 'hopeful' and said that he 
has cal2ed an urgent meeting of the AIML Council next Monday, The Viceroy 
realised that so much delay would be absolutely fatal to to his aim at 
that stage. Moxintbatten reports; "I finally asked him whether he felt 
I would be justified in advising the Prime Minister to go ahead and make 
159 
the announcement, to which he replied very firmly, "Yes". Actually, he 
was using the tactic of delaying the matter. 
The Viceroy, immediately after the conference on Jtine 2, communica-
ted the approval of the plan by all parties to London, It may be worth-
while to mention that the Viceroy in his draft of the partition plan 
sent to London had hinted that "the great decisions regarding India* s 
future had Gandhi* s implicit approval, and were in harmony with his 
noble principles of the supremacy of popular will and non-coercion of 
others". The Secretary of State scented trouble in case Gandhiji 
disapproved the plan. Therefore, Attlee cabled to Mountbatten: 
"Quite apart from technical difficulties I feel that it 
would be preferable not to make two insertions you propose. 
We do not feel sure that Gandhi would unreservedly accept 
either proposition and experience in past suggests that it 
is dangerous to attribute opinions to him. It seems Gandhi 
is at logger-heads with Working Committee at the moment and 
it may be that anything you achieve will be result of Working 
Committee rejecting Gandhi's opinions. If that is position 
157, Viceroy's Meeting with Indian Leaders, June 2, 1947, Minutes, 
158, June 5, 1947, Mouintbatten's Personal Report, No, 8, p. 115, 
159, Ibid,, p, 117. 
160, Manmath Nath Das, n, 21, p. 375, 
161, lOL, File No. 1491-S, SS to Viceroy, June 2, 1947, 
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your reference to him may give Gandhi a platform for some 
pijblic reply which will embarrass Congress leaders and may 
even harden stability of any settlement. I have consulted 
Prime Minister who concurs. Please let me know whether you 
agree". 
In view of the above direction from home, Mountbatten decided 
to omit Gandhiji's name from his announcement. 
However, soon after the conference, Movmtbatten saw Gandhiji,who 
was preaching in his prayer meetings aaainst the idea of partition.The 
Viceroy "pointed out those features in the plan which conformed to 
Gandhiji's ideas" and in the end "he was able to persuade Gandhiji that 
16 2 
the plan was best in the circumstances". Jvme 2, 1947, was Gandhiji's 
'Day of Silence'; hence, he in a friendly note assured the Viceroy of 
his support. On the same day, the CVJC decided to accept the plan. 
Kripalani, the Congress President, wrote a long letter to the Viceroy. 
He stated: "This is dependent- on the acceptance of the proposals by the 
Muslim League and a clear \inderstanding that no further claims will 
be put forwarc ^«:l". 
On June 3, 1947, Mountbatten, making futile efforts to make Jinnah 
164 
accept the plan, said to him: 
"If that is your attitude, then the leaders of the Congress 
Party and Sikhs will refuse final acceptance at the meeting 
in the morning; chaos will follow, and you--will lose your 
Pakistan, probably for good". 
Mountbatten also told him, "Mr. Jinnah, I do not intend to let 
you wreck all the work that has gone into this settlement". Jinnah 
1^ 6 
replied: "What must be, must be". Then, the Viceroy persisted to^ay: 
"Since you will not accept for the Moslem League, I will 
speak for them myself ... I have only one condition, and 
that is that when I say at the meeting in the morning, 
'Mr, Jinnah has given me assurances which I have accepted 
and which satisfy me', you wil] in no circumstances contradict 
that, and that when I look towards you, you will nod I I 
1 6 2 . V . P . Menon, n . 8 0 , p . 3 7 5 . 
1 6 3 . I b i d . , p . 376 . 
164 . Alan C a m p b e l l - J o h n s o n , n . 5 1 , p p . 1 0 2 - 0 3 . 
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Jinnah replied favourably to the proposition. The conversation 
infers that "neither the Muslim League nor Jinnah accepted the decision 
167 
of partition better known as the "Plan of 3rd June". Thus, whether the 
Viceroy crabbed this initiative or the Muslim League gave this authority 
to him is still an untold story. 
Baldev Singh, accepting the plan for partition of Ptinjab, stressed 
that "care should be taken to meet their demands when framing the terms 
168 
of reference for the Boundary Commission". 
Acceptance of the Partition Plan by the Indian Leaders 
On June 3, 1947 (morning), the Viceroy held a conference with 
the leaders and said that he had received written assurances from the 
Congress and the Sikhs, and a verbal assurance from the Muslim League, 
He turned towards Jinnah, who nodded in assent and, thus, concluded 
169 an. Moimtbatten 
observed that "the plan represented as near 100% agreement as it was 
possible to get, and that in his judgment, what was being done was in 
the best interest of the people of India". As best way to implement 
the partition, the Viceroy requested the leaders to transcend all 
feelings of past hostility and appealed to them to request their followers 
to refrain from speeches of recrimination to avoid violent reactions. 
Regarding acceptance of the partition plan by Gandhijl, Patel 
opined that "once the decision was taken, Mr, Gandhi would accept it 
loyally". The Viceroy also hoped that since the decision were taken, 
Gandhiji would re-emphasise the need for non-violence, Liaquat All 
charged that Gandhiji's recent statement that "the people should not 
look to the Viceroy and the leaders for a decision" instead they should 
"do as they suggested the people to protest if they felt that 
India should not be divided, Patel replied that "no such inference 
173 
could be drawn from Gandhi's titterances", Jinnah thought that Gandhiji's 
167. Wall Khan, n. 81, p.126, 
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such statements would make an impression go round that the people 
should not agree to the decisions taken by the present conference. 
Therefore, he advised that although Gandhijl's intentions might be the 
best, but "in fact the language which he had adopted recently had 
insinuated that Muslim League were going to get Pakistan by forci". 
The Viceroy did not allow further discussion on Gandhiji's acceptance 
of the partition plan, but he expressed hope that Patel and Nehru 
would influence the Mahatma to accept the inevitable. In the course of 
discussion, Jinnah "reiterated his personal support to him (Viceroy) 
175 
and promised to do his best to get the plan accepted by his followers". 
The Viceroy made it clear that the- Partition Act should be implemented 
not later than August 15, 1947. He felt that the leaders were thinking 
only about the implementation of partition plan and not about the 
I7f problems ahead. He obseirvec 1 6
"It was clear from the reactions at the meeting that none 
of the leaders present had even begxin to think of the 
complications with which we are all going to be faced. 
Perhaps this is lucky, since it will enable us to hold 
the initiative in Viceroy's House during the coming 
difficult period". 
Churchi11* s Statement 
Immediately after the morning conference, Mountbatten communicated 
to the Secretary of State the assurances given by Nehru, Jinnah and 
Baldev Singh about the acceptance of the partition plan and, in 
consequence, Attlee announced the plan in the House of Commons on 
June 3 (day), which came to be known "the June 3rd Plan". Speaking on 
,behalf of the Opposition, Churchill said that the two conditions i.e. 
"agreement between the Indian parties, and a period of Dominion Status 
in which India or any part of it might freely decide whether to remain 
in the British Commonwealth or not "would be fulfilled by the proposal. 
He assured that the Opposition "would not oppose any Bill to confer 
Dominion Status on the various parts of India on the basis of HMG's 
177 
Statement". 
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Mountbatten's Annoxmcement 
On June 3 (Evening), Mountbatten broadcast over the All-India 
Radio. Highlighting the cause of partition, he saJ 11a: 
"To my great regret it has been impossible to obtain 
agreenent either on the Cabinet Mission Plan, or on any 
plan that would preserve the vinity of India. But there 
can be no question of coercing any large areas in which 
one community has a majority to live against their will 
under a Government in which another community has a majority. 
And the only alternative to coercion is partition". 
Mountbatten further said that the League demanded partition of the 
country while the Congress demanded, in the event of partition of India, 
partition of certain Provinces also. These arguments were xjnassailable 
because neither of the parties were willing to leave a sxibstantial area 
in which their commxinity had a majority, Expressing his grief on account 
of the partition, he said: "I am, of course, just as much opposed to the 
partition of Provinces as I am to the partition of India herself".However, 
he said, that the people of India should decide the question of partition 
themselves. 
Regarding the procedure enabling the Indians to decide themselves 
as to whether they want the British to hand over pov/er to one or two 
Government?v;as set out in the Statement, He made it clear that though 
the peoplfe of Punjab, Bengal and part of Assam would lay down the bounda-
ries between the Muslim majority areas and the remaining areas, but 
ultimate decision would be taken hy^ a Boundary Commission, Considering 
the Sikh position, Mountbatten sa3 Ml. 
"This va l ian t commvinity forms about one-eighth of the popula-
t ion of the Punjab, but they are so d i s t r i bu t ed tha t any 
pa r t i t i on of t h i s Province wi l l inevi tably divide them. All 
of us who have the good of the Sikh community a t hear t are 
very sorry to think tha t the p a r t i t i o n of the P\mjab, which 
they themselves des i re , cannot avoid s p l i t t i n g them to a 
greater or l e s se r extent . The exact degree of the s p l i t wi l l 
be l e f t to the Boundary Commission on which they wi l l of course 
be represented". 
17 8. H.E, Lord Louis Mountbatten, Viceroy of I n d i a ' s Broadcast and 
Statement by His Majesty's Government, dated 3rd June, 1947 
(Lahore: Publ ic i ty Department, Punjab Government), pp. 1-3. 
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The Viceroy further announced that HMG's Government had decided 
to "transfer power immediately to one or two Governments of British 
India, each having Dominion Status" and that the HM Government had 
already taken in hand the drafting of the necessary legislation, which 
would be introduced in the Parliament during the current session. He 
further said that HM Government had no intention to impose the legisla-
tion "either on India as a whole, or on the two States if there were 
partition, to decide in the future their relationship to each other 
and to other member States of tire British CommonwealtR", The Viceroy's 
speech was followed by His Majesty's Government's Statement confirming 
182 
the Plan. 
Indian Leaders Broadcast 
After the Viceroy, Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh broadcast their 
183 
speech. Nehru, referring the Viceroy's announcement, said: 
"It envisages, on the one hand, the possibility of these 
areas seceding from India; on the other, it promises a big 
advance towards complete independence. Such a big change 
must have the full concurrence of the people before effect 
can be given to it, for it must always be remembered that the 
future of India can only be decided by the people of India, 
and not by any outside authority, however friendly". 
About the acceptance of the Plan, Nehru said that the proposal 
would soon be placed before representative assemblies of the people for 
consideration and they had accepted the plan and recommend the people 
to accept. 
After Nehru, Jinnah in the broadcast said that "we must galvanize 
and concentrate all our energies to see that the transfer of power is 
effected in a peaceful and orderly manner, I most earnestly appeal to 
every community and particularly to Muslim India to maintain peace and 
184 185 
order". Jinnah without giving clear acceptance of the Plan, said: 
"the Plan does not meet in some important respects our point 
of view; and we cannot say or feel that we are satisfied or 
that we agree with some of the matters dealt mth by the Plan. 
It is for us now to consider whether the Plan as presented to 
us by His Majesty's Government should be accepted by us as a 
compromise or a settlement". 
Ilk W^-.Mlt«, n/'/'pf'sIr ^^*""= Appendix Xtnj^e 3ra Plan. 
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Regarding acceptance of the Plan by the AIML^ Jinnah said that 
he had called the AIML Council to meet on Monday, 9th of Jime, and was 
hopeful of the acceptance of the Plan by the Council. Commending the 
Viceroy^ he said that Mountbatten "was actuated by a high sense of 
fairness and impartiality" and the people should help his mission of 
transferring power in a peaceful and orderly manner. He further said 
that according to paragraph 11 of the Statement, a referendiom would be 
made to the electorates of the then Legislative Assembly in the NWFP 
and they would choose which of the two alternatives in paragraph 4 they 
would like to adopt, that is, whether they would join the Pakistan 
Constituent Assembly or the Hindustan Constituent Assembly. He requested 
the "provincial Muslim League of the Frontier to withdraw the movement 
of peaceful civil disobedience which they had perforce to resort to" 
and expressed confidence that the people of the Frontier would vote to 
join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. 
Baldev Singh expressed acceptance of the plan reluctantly. He 
characterised the plan a settlement and not as a compromise. He said 
the plan "does not please everybody, not the Sikh communit>^^anyway, but 
it is certainly something worthwhile. Let us take it at 
Viceroy's Press Conference 
tAl l " . ' 
The Viceroy addressed a press conference on Jxone 4, 1947, He 
emphasised that "independence through Dominion Status was complete and 
that the different administrations were at liberty to opt out of the 
187 
Commonwealth whenever they pleased". Of the numerous questions, three 
were of special interest: (1) What would happen if the Muslim League 
rejected the planj- (2) Whether the basic determining factor in drawing 
the boundaries of the provinces would be the communal majority of the 
population, or whether other considerations,such as, property, economic 
viability, etc. would also be included in the terms of reference? and 
(3) What would be the method of referendum in the NWFP, Replying the 
first, the Viceroy said that it was a 'hypothetical question'. As regards 
the second. His Majesty's Government would not agree the partition on 
the basis of landed property. With regard to the third, the Viceroy said 
that there were heavier minority weightage i.e, 12 seats out of 50, 
186. V.P. Menon, n, 80, p, 380, 
187. Ibid., p. 381. 
395 
though they were 5% of the population. He assured that the referendum 
would be perfectly straightforward under supervision of the British 
officers/ selected by him, who would be completely impartial. On the 
question of immediate devolution of power on the basis of Dominion 
Status under paragraph 20, the Viceroy explained that under the British 
Commonwealth of Nations each State would be completely independent to 
decide their own future and they cannot be forced to stay in if they 
wanted to go out. He explained the term 'Dominion Status* as 'absolute 
indeoendence in every possible way, with the sole exception that the 
188 
member States were linked together voliintarily". Further, in an answer 
to a question regarding the British withdrawal in June, 1948, the 
Viceroy said: "The date of the transfer of power is going to be much 
189 
earlier ... I think the transfer could be about the 15 August". 
On June 4, Mountbatten met Gandhiji also and convinced him that 
all the salient features of the plan had been based on the principle 
suggested to him by the Mahatma himself. The Viceroy told Gandhiji 
that in earlier days he v;as not averse to Dominion Status. Gandhiji 
agreed and later sent to the Viceroy a copy of Harij an dated December 16^  
1939, containing the words: "Similarly, I have said to a friend that 
if dominion status was offered, I should take it, and expect to carry 
191 India with me". However, Gandhiji, who had been preaching in his prayer 
meetings for the united India, was also approached by Krishna Menon 
and V.P, Menon, as advised by the Viceroy, and, at last, he never 
afterwards openly opposed the Viceroy's plan. 
On June 5 (morning), Mountbatten held a meeting with the political 
leaders in his office. Jinnah was at pains to explain that both States 
192 
would be independent and equal in every way". Nehru said that the 
dissident Provinces, which were to be allowed to secede, must not 
interrupt the work of the Government of India or its foreign policy. 
On the one hand, there v/as stil] suspicion in the hearts of the Congress 
and the League leaders and, on the•other, the Working Committee of the 
188. Ibid., p. 382. 
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Hindu Mahasabha, which met in Delhi, resolved with stress calling even 
193 
for an all-India 'Anti-Pakistan Day': 
"India is one and indivisible and there will never be peace 
\inless and until the separated areas are brought back into 
the Indian Union and made Integral parts thereof". 
Further, the Khaksars, a group of militant Muslims, who demanded 
a Pakistan stretching from Karachi to Calcutta, staged demonstrations 
at the AIML Coxjncil meeting in Delhi (Jvine 9-10, 1947) . Moreover, the 
Commxmists, who had been backing Jinnah's demand for Pakistan, changed 
their attitude and said that "partition and Dominion Status together 
194 
would enable Britain to maintain her control over Inaia", but they did 
not explain as to how it would be possible. Perhaps, they meant that 
India and Pakistan being member of the British Commonwealth of Nations 
would always seek economic and teclinical assistance for development 
purposes and, thus, would indirectly be controlled by the British. They 
might have anticipated the British neo-colonialism in India. However, 
the partition and independence plan were much applauded by the press in 
India and abroad. V.'alter Lippmann wrote in The Washington Post; "Attlee 
and Mountbatten have done a service to all mankind by shov/ing what 
statesmen can do not v;ith force and money but with lucidity, resolution 
and sincer The Guardian reported that the partition of India was 
not imposed by the British Government and hoped India and Pakistan 
would unite and "there is the possibility that Moslem and Hindu Bengal 
may reunite to form a separate Bengali nation". But in view of the 
previous notorious, inefficient and unstable government, a "separation 
of Hindu and Moslem Bengal may produce a healthier political life". 
Further, though the Moslem Pathans regarded the Moslem Punjabis as 
their ancestral enemies, they would possibly decline to unite with the 
196 Ptinjab and "prefer to federate with the more distant Hindustan". 
In a meeting on June 7, 1947, with the seven leaders, the Viceroy 
discussed the problem and procedure for transfer of power. Jinnah 
did not like to leave the territorial division in the charge of Nehru-
Patel dominated Government, was anxious to know the members of the 
193*. V.P, Menon, n. 80, p. 382. 
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Bo\mdary Commissions^ and was fearful of the principles by which the 
boxxndaries were to be demarcated. The Viceroy assured that the Commiss-
ion would be appointed by the U.N.O. with the representatives of the 
197 Congress and the league and other parties as expert assessors. Nehru, 
on Jxme 10, opposing the 'principle of population transfer' said that 
it was impossible to transfer the Sikh religious shrines in India, He, 
in other sense, wanted the Indian boundary including the Sikh religious 
places. The Viceroy assured that Jinnah had promised Sikh access to 
their religious shrines, but Patel doubted the validity of Jinnah* s 
198 
undertaking. 
Last AIMP Meeting, Delhi 
The AIML meeting held on June 9-10, 1947, in New Delhi's Imperial 
Hotel, attended by 425 delegates, to consider the Mountbatten's plan 
of partition, when a group of militant Muslims - orthodox Mullahs, 
mighty landed barons who had to lose from the Punjab partition, and 
mercantile magnates who opposed the giving of Calcutta to their Hindu 
rivals cried out angrily against the plan calling it "betrayal" and 
a "tragedy for Pakistan". On June 9, Khaksars rushed into the hotel 
loiinge "brandishing belchas, or sharpened spades .. . shouting ' Get 
Jinnah'. Before the League National Guards could turn them back, the 
199 
police tear-gassed to bring the disturbance to an ena. About fifty 
Khaksars would-be assassins of Jinnah were arrested, Jinnah, however, 
continued the proceedings of the meeting untrammelled by the disturbance 
on the ground floor. The Khaksar demonstrators clashed with the Muslim 
League National Guards,"broke furniture and smashed glass panes ,,. a 
few persons sustained injuries". Inside the grand ballroom, Jinnah, 
when he was hailed as "Shahanshah-e-Pakistan" (Emperor of Pakistan), 
insisted to say: "i am a soldier of Pakistan, not its Emperor".However, 
the League Coimcil gave "full authority to Presidsnt Quaid-i-Azam 
M.A, Jinnah to accept the fundamental principles of the Plan as a 
compromise, and to leave it to him, with full authority, to work out 
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all the details of the Plan in an equitable and just manner ..,". 
The Congress protested against the League resolution using the 
word "compromise" and demanded the announcement by the League as a 
"settlemeni ^??. 
On Jxme 12, the first meeting of the Interim Government was held. 
There was almost a fight between Nehru and Liaquat All Khan when the 
Congress forced to appoint Nehru's sister, Madame Pandit, as an ambassador 
The leaders went so mad that they did not care when the Viceroy shouted: 
"Gentlemen, what hopes have we of getting a peaceable partition if the 
first discussion leads to such a disgraceful scene as tnis", Mountbatten 
realised that the Indians' nature and habit cannot be assessed by their 
education and intellect and sensed fear that the plan might collapse, 
and hurried to make arrangement for transfer of power, and to leave 
India as early as possible. 
On June 14, a joint conference of Sikh organizations in Lahore. 
welcomed the division of the Punjab, The AICC meeting in Delhi ratified 
204 the CWC acceptance of the plan with 29 votes in favour and 15 against, 
which revealed the thinking of the people en masse. They accepted the 
partition resolution with heavy heart and mental reservations. It was 
inevitably accepted due to insidious communal propaganda, while there 
was being said that "the Hindus in Pakistan need have no fear as there 
would be 45 millions of Muslims in India and if there was any oppression 
of Hindus in Pakistan, the Muslims in India would have to bear the 
205,, 
consequences". 
Between June 19 and 23, Mountbatten visited Kashmir, On June 20, 
Bengal Legislative Assembly opted for partition. On June 23, Pxjnjab 
Legislative Assembly also opted for partition. On June 26, Sind Legisla-
tive Assembly and Baluchistan Legislative Assembly opted to join Pakistan, 
In July, Sylhet decided to join East Bengal anc^  NV/FF to join Pakistan, 
On June 27, Jinnah reported: "Thus, we can now look upon the creation 
201. Ibid., p. 568, 
202. June 12, 1947, Mountbatten's Personal Report, No, 9, p. 125. 
203. Ibid., p. 127. 
204. N.N. Mitra, n. 4, pp. 122-23. 
205. A.K. Azad, n. 33, pp.. 197-98. 
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of Pakistan on the 15th August as legally decided upon". Cn July 2, 
Moxintbatten showed the draft Indian Independence Bill to the Indian 
leaders. Jinnah told Mountbatten that he himself desired to be Governor-
General of Pakistan. On July 4, the Indian Independence Bill was 
introduced into the House of Commons. On July 10, a debate on second 
reading of Indian Independence Bill in the House of Commonp vas held. 
C.R. Attlee, refuting the charge that the communal problem in India was 
"created by ourselves in order to perpetuate our own rule", said that 
they "have all wanted to maintain the unity of India, to give India 
complete self-government and to preserve the rights of minorities", but 
it was found unpracticable. However, he hoped that "this severance may 
not endure, and that the two new Dominions which we now propose to set 
up may, in course of time, come together again to form one great member 
207 State of the British Commonwealth of Nations". 
On July 16, the Indian Independence Bill was passed at its third 
reading. On this occasion. Lord Listowel, describing the deadlock 
between the Congress and the League as a formidable obstacle in the 
path of constitutional advance, hoped that "when the disadvantages of 
separation have become apparent in the light of experience, the two 
Dominions will freely decide to reionite in a single Indian Dominion". 
On July 18, the Indian Independence Act received the Royal assent, as 
a result on July 19, Mountbatten announced establishment of two separate 
provisional governments, one for India and the other for Pakistan. 
The Hindustan Times commented: "When it is placed on the Statute 
Book, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, will rank as the noblest and 
209 the greatest law ever enacted by the British Parliament". The Dawn 
wrote: "On the eve of independence of the peoples of India, on which 
this last enactment of the British Parliament sets its final seal. 
Great Britain is entitled to the highest praise from all the freedom 
loving peoples of the world". Mountbatten, after consultation with 
206. Mountbatten's Personal Report,No. 10, p. 139, 
207. See for details C.R. Attlee's Speech in the House of Commons, 
Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. I, 439, Cols, 2444-45. 
208. See tor details Lord Listowel's Speech in the House of Lords, as 
reproduced in Sir Maurice Gwyer and A, Appadorai, Speeches and 
Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-47, Vol, II (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1957 ), pp. 686-87. 
209. MB 114, No. 473-GT Viceroy to SS, Paper Comments. 
210. Ibid. 
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London decided to remain in New Delhi for almost another year, as 
originally planned. 
On July 13, Jinnah assured the minorities in the would-be Pakistan 
domain that they would have "protection with regard to their religion, 
faith, life, property and culture. They would, in all respect, be 
citizens of Pakistan without any discrimination ... The same principle 
... would apply to the minorities in India as well". He sincerely hoped 
the Indo-Pak relations cordial and friendly. 
Two Interim Governments and Governors-General 
The Interim Government consisted of both Congress and the League 
representatives. For administrative reasons, the League members withdrew 
all the portfolios so that the Congress wing in the Cabinet could take 
charge of all the affairs pertaining to the Dominion of India, while 
the League members took over corresponding portfolios concerning 
Pakistan. Thus, two Interim Governments with Congress and League cabinets 
were created. However, matters of common concern to both the Dominions 
was decided to be dealt with jointly by both Wings under the Chairman-
212 
ship of the Governor-General. Jinnah first agreed that Mountbatten would 
be the common Governor-General of India and Pakistan on August 15,1947, 
but, later, Jinnah insisted to be the Goveimor-General of Pakistan 
himself and Mountbatten of India. Replying sadly to the latter, Jinnah 
admitted, "It may cost me several crores of rupees in assets", while 
Mountbatten added "It may cost you the whole of your assets and the 
213 
future of Pakistan". However, a'commxinique', confirming these arrange-
ments wase announced by the Viceroy on July 19, 1947, A similar procedure 
was adopted in the Pxinjab and Bengal legislative assemblies before 
partitioning of these States. 
Partition Committee and Partition Council 
W.H.J, Christie, Addl, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, prepared 
a note on procedure for division of staff organizations and records, 
services and institutions, assets and liabilities of the Government of 
India; future economic relations, domicile, diplomatic relations etc.. 
211. M.H, Shahid (ed.), Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah Speeches 
(Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, Publications, 1^761, p, 82, 
212. See for details Wali Khan, n. 81, pp. 133-40, 
213. Ibid,, pp. 134-35. 
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developing into a 33-page document entitled^ "The Administrative 
Consequences of Partition", which was produced by the Viceroy on June 1, 
before the party leaders, and a Partition Committee consisting of 
Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Liaquat Ali Khan and Abdur Rab 
Nishtar with Lord Mountbatten as Chairman was set up. On June 27, the 
Committee gave way to Partition Council, which composition was altered 
to include two members drawn from each of the Dominion Cabinets.India's 
representatives were Patel and Rajendra Prasad and Pakistan's represen-
tatives were such ministers which were able to attend meetings in Delhi, 
Arbitral Tribunal 
On June 30, an Arbitral Tribunal was set up under the Presidentship 
of Sir Patrick Spens, ex-Chief Justice of India, for settlement of such 
guestions on which the two Governments might fail to agree. It was 
composed of one representative each of India and Pakistan. A few 
matters, referred to it, were investigated. Mountbatten helped in 
reaching a mutual agreement. The issues were remitted to Chaudhurl 
Mahomed Ali and H.M. Patel, who evolved formula acceptable to both 
parties and, thus, all references to the Tribunal were withdrawn. 
Division of Armed Forces 
On Jxine 30, the Partition Council decided the procedure for 
division of armed forces and separate committees were set to work for 
partition of the army and other administrative elements, Auchinleck 
was appointed to remain as supreme commander after August 15, 1947, 
under a Joint Defence Council. The Partition Council decided that "from 
15'August the Indian Union and Pakistan would each have within its 
territories forces londer its own operational control, composed predomi-
nantly- of non-Muslims and Muslims respectively". Field Marshal Sir 
Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief, was re-designated as Supreme 
Commander from August 15, imder the Joint Defence Council vinder the 
Chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten and the Defence Ministers of India and 
Pakistan as members. The Cotmcil continued to function till April 1,1948, 
but the Supreme Commander ceased to work from December 1, 1947, when 
his post was abolished, as Patel questioned his impartiality. The 
British troops started withdrawing from India on August 17, 1947, and 
the last contingent, Somersetshire Light Infantry, left the Indian shore 
on February 28, 1948. 
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Partition of Provinces 
The• Boxindary Awards' was preceded by arrangement of implementa-
tion of the Mountbatten's partition plan. To decide whether the provinces 
would like to join the existing Constituent Assembly being in force in 
New Delhi or to join a separate new Constituent Assembly to be formed 
in Karachi or Lahore, according to the June 3rd Plan, the Provincial 
Constituent Assemblies in Bengal, Pionjab, Sind and NWFP were required 
to vote, while to decide the fate of Baluchistan the members of the 
Quetta Municipality, which comprised of Shahi jlrga and non-ofticial 
members, were required to vote. The region of Sylhet v^ as controversial, 
where a referendum in General, Muhammadan and Indian Christian consti-
tuencies was held. East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP and 
Sylhet decided to join Pakistan; and West Bengal, and East Punjab,which 
were strategic, and seven other provinces - Assam, Bihar, Bombay,Central 
Provinces, Madras, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, which were Hindu-majority 
provinces, voted in favour of India, Separate description of the 
strategic provinces is given below: 
215 
(1) Bengal : The Bengal Provincial Legislative Assembly met on June 20, 
and decided by 126 votes to 90 in favour of joining Pakistan, The members 
of the non-Muslim majority areas of West Bengal, then, decided by 58 to 
21 votes that the provinces should be partitioned and should join India; 
while the members of the Muslim majority areas of East Bengal decided 
by 106 to 35 votes that the provinces should not be partitioned and to 
join Pakistan, amalgamating Sylhet, 
(2) Ptmjab : The Pimjab Legislative Assembly, xmder strong police guard 
du^ to communal disorders, met and decided by 91 to 77 votes to join 
Pakistan. The members of Muslim majority areas of West Punjab decided 
by 69 to 27 votes that the province should not be partitioned and to 
join Pakistan, while the members of the non-Muslim majority areas of 
East Pijnjab decided by 50 to 22 votes that the province should be 
partitioned and to join India, 
(3) Sind: The Sind Legislative Assembly met on June 26 and decided 
by 30 to 20 votes to join Pakistan, 
214. Ibid., pp. 141-44. 
215. See for details "Bengal in Disaster: Unity to Division", in 
Manmath Nath Das, n, 21, pp. 114-49. 
216. See for details "Devastation of the Punjab", in Manmath Nath Das, 
n. 21, pp. 152-85, 
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(4) Baluchistan : As decided by the Viceroy, the Shahi jirqa and the 
non-official members of the Quetta Municipality met and decided to Join 
Pakistan. 
(5) Sylhet 5 As the Muslims in the region formed 60,7% of the popula-
tion but were only 54.27% on the electoral list, Liaquat All Khan 
suggested that "the number of Muslim votes should therefore be multiplied 
by a factor which would equate the voting strength of the Muslims with 
their population strength", while the Congress claimed that "the voters 
in the Labour and in the Commerce and Trade constituencies of the district 
should be allowed to participate in the referendum. At last,referendum 
was held in the General, Muhammadan and Indian Christian constituencies 
in early July, 1947. The majority of voters - 239,619 to 184,041,decided 
separation and joining East Bengal. 
218 
(6) NWFP : Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a close associate of Gandhiji, 
objecting to the voters being said to vote on communal question, said 
that they should be allowed to vote also for an independent Pathanistan 
besides to vote according to Jtine 3rd Flan, The Congress supported and 
Jinnah opposed this view. The Viceroy decided that the procedure cannot 
be changed without consent of both the parties. As Jinnah characterised 
Pathanistan as 'insidious and spurious' and assured full autonomy of 
NWFP in Pakistan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan did not concede and appealed 
219 his followers to boycott the referendum. However, the referendum was held 
from July 6 to 17, and of the total electorates - 572,798, only slightly 
over 50 per cent voted - 289,244 in favour and 2,874 against joining 
Pakistan. 
220 
The Princely States 
There were 565 big and small princely states. The big Muslim states 
were Hyderabad, Bhopal and Rampur, where the majority of inhabitants 
were non-Muslims; and one or two states in Kathiawar, Junagarh and Manawar 
were in a similar predicament. The rulers of Jodhpur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, 
217. V.P. Menoh, n. 80, p. 388. 
218. See for details, "The Fate of the Frontier", in Manmath Nath Das, 
n. 21, pp. 188-218, 
219. B.N. Pandey, The Break-up of British India (London: Macmillans, 1969), 
p, 204? see also for details Wall Khan, n, 81, pp. 126-32. 
2'/'C. See for details Wali Khan, n, 81, DD. 145-46. 
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Baroda,&Patiala were Hindus. The ruler of Kashmir was a Hindu and the 
majority of its inhabitants were Muslims. One-fifth of the Indian 
territory was under the princely rule and the population comprised of 
two-fi-Pth of the total population of India i.e. out of forty crores 
they totalled sixteen crores. 
The policy of the Cabinet Mission Plan on May 12, 1946, was 
reiterated by Mountbatten's announcement of June 3, 1947,which stated: 
"When the British withdraw from India, paramountcy would 
lapse and the rulers of the Indian states would become 
technically and legally independent; they could enter 
into any relationship with the successor government or 
governments; or they could remain independent; and they 
were free to decide all this at their convenience". 
The Congress pleaded that as 'paramountcy' came into existence 
as a fact and not by agreement, the Congress or the successor authority 
will rule over the states after Independence and the princes would have 
222 
no right to declare independence or decide to accede to India or Pakistan. 
The Congress policy was that the'people' of every state should decide 
their own destiny, while the Muslim League took the stand that the right 
either to accede to India or Pakistan should be vested to the'rulers'. 
The League did not consider it necessary to give the right to the people 
of the states to express their opinion. The League wanted the accession 
of Muslim states to Pakistan on the basis of Islam. In this case the 
Muslim League could have got Hyderabad, Bhopal and Rampur, but the 
geographical position of these states v;as such that it was not possible. 
Moreover, on this principle, they could have lost Kashmir, which Raja 
waq a Hindu, They could not have rationalized the double standards. 
Further, the Muslim League had agreed to accept the verdict of the 
Boundary Commission as final. The Commission gave India the district 
of Gurdaspur, which boundary touched with India and Kashmir. Thus,India 
had got a direct accession to Kashmir. If Gurdaspur was not given to 
India, there was a problem for the Maharaja of Kashmir to accede to 
India. As the League's policy was 'accession declared by the ruler', 
Pakistan has no right, morally or legally, to the accession of Kashmir 
to Pakistan. Had Jinnah adopted the policy as demanded by the Congress 
221. S.R. Mehrotra, Towards India's Freedom and Partition (New Delhi: 
Vikas Publishing House Pvt.Ltd,, 1979), p. 247. 
222, See Nehru's statement. The Leader (Allahabad), June 16, 1947. 
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i.e. "accession as decided by the people of the state", Kashmir would 
have gone to Pakistan. Jinnah failed to realize that the geographical 
position of the Muslim states in India was not such that they could 
have a strong and permanent footing for accession to Pakistan. Thus, 
in principle, Pakistan lost Kashmir and other MusDim states in India. 
The Chancellor of the Chamber o^ Princes was HH Hamidullah Khan, 
the Nawab of Bhopal, a strong anti-Congress element, trying to create 
a front in association with a number of small states. Constitutionally, 
the Interim Government and the States had no link. The States had their 
own laws and ministers. The Viceroy was the only link between then.The 
Viceroy wanted an early settlement between the Interim Government and 
the States, The Chancellor put in a state of dilemma, when a number 
of Hindu states decided to join the Indian Constituent Assembly. On 
March 24, 1947, the Chancellor said to Mountbatten during his 75-minute 
meeting that the States or Group of States should be granted Dominion 
Status and to establish relationships with other countries like the 
USA, and to purchase arms from USA and UlC. Describing the split among 
the Princes, the Chancellor said that the Sikh Maharaja of Patiala was 
223 in the Congress pocket and requested for the delay in transfer of power. 
On the same day the Maharaja of Bikaner, HH Sri Sadul Singhji Bahadur, 
•met with the Viceroy. From him, the Viceroy felt that the States of 
Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Patiala, Baroda and Gwalior would join the 
Centre. The Maharaja, however, said that they would follow the Congress 
224 
lead. The Viceroy to form a strong Centre, rejected the plea of the 
Dewan of Travancore for granting Dominion Status to the States and 
their admission to the British Commonwea 
The Nizam of Hyderabad, HH Nawab Mir Usman Ali Khan, thought 
Jinnah and Churchill his allies, but his Prime Minister, Mirza Ismail, 
disagreed to his policy. VThen the Nawab invited and intrigued with 
226 Jinnah, the Mirza resigned. 
Disturbed vrith the anti-Congress actions of Hyderabad and Bhopal, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, at the All-India States People's Conference,presided 
223. MB 191, Interview No.1, Nawab of Bhopal, March 24, 1947. 
224. MB 191, Interview No. 2, Maharaja of Bikaner, March 24, 1947 
225. Ibid., Ramaswami Aiyar, March 26, 1947. 
226. MB 192, Interview Nn. 57, Mirza Ismail, April 14, 1947. 
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over by Sheikh Abdullah at Gwalior on April 18^ 1947, threatened that 
"those States that did not join the Constituent Assembly now would be 
227 
regarded as hostile States ...", as a result the Maharaj-Rana of Dholpur, 
who suffered "from a belief in the divine right of kings" and the Nawab 
of Rampur complained to the Viceroy against the Nehru's threat of 
hostility. The Viceroy, adopting rather an anti-Congress posture, stated 
that the "States would have complete freedom of choice as to which 
Constituent Assembly they would join, independent of geographical consi-
228 derations", but supported Patel's stand at every step. The Nawab of 
Bhopal sought right to arm his state v/ith modem armaments, forgetting 
that the real threat was not from external invasion but from the long-
oppressed people of the state. In early May, Baroda and its associated 
States decided to join the Constituent Assembly, 
Clause 7 of the Indian Independence Bill ended the British 
suzerainty over the Indian states. The Nizam of Hyderabad, perhaps, was 
the most affected. The Viceroy said to the Nawab of Chattari, who led 
229 
a delegation, that "the states would be absolutely free after 15th August 
On July 12, the Maharaja Jiwaji Rao Scindia of Gwalior and the Maharaja 
230 
of Jodhpur welcomed the Congress policy, in view of Patel's statement of 
July 5, that the Congress "wish them and their people under this aegis 
231 
all prosperity, contentment and happiness", which made the princes hope 
that they would continue to enjoy their internal freedom as before. 
However, the Nawab of Bhopal signed the Instrument of Accession on 
August 7, 1947. On August 8, the Nawab of Rampur, Saiyid Raza Ali Khan 
Bahadur, accompanied by his Chief Minister, Zaidi, visited the Viceroy 
and complained that "Jinnah had been bringing every possible pressure 
to bear on him personally to stop him from acceding to the Dominion of 
232 
India". Zaidi pleaded with Liaguat Ali Khan that his moral support would 
not be sufficient in case of show-down with India. The Muslim Leaguers 
created serious riots in Rampur, but the Viceroy's troops restored order. 
227. The Statesman (Calcutta), April 20, 1947. 
228. MB 196, 6th Misc. Meeting, April 22, 1947. 
229. MB 70, Vide Minutes of Meeting, Hyderabad Delegation,July 11,1947. 
230. MB 194, Interview No, 161, Maharaja of Gwalior, July 12, 1947. 
231. SD, Patel's Statement on Indian States, July 5, 1947. 
232. MB 213, Personal Report No, 16, August 8, 1947. 
233. Ibid. 
407 
The Hindu Maharaja of Indore, HH Yashwant Rao Holkar^ was under 
the influence of the Nav/ab of Bhopal. Mountbatten told Holkar that he 
had told the Maharajas of Baroda and nwalior that the Viceroy's letter 
of invitation represented a threat and thus he charged him with "lack 
234 
of responsibility". 
On August 11, Shahaji Chhatrapati of Kolhapur signed the Instru-
235 
ment of Accession as a "Standstill agreement". The Maharaja of Travancore, 
HH Bala Ram Varma, was proclaiming indeTJendence, supported by his Dewan, 
C.P, Ramaswami Ayar. When he was stabbed by some revolutionary, the 
Maharaja cabled the Viceroy to sign the Instrument of Accession, The 
Muslim Nawab of Junagadh, HH Mahabat Khan Rasulkhanji, who had 800 pet 
dogs, each looked after by one man, and spent three lakh rupees on the 
occasion of wedding of his two dogs, had signed an accession with 
Pakistan. He fled to Pakistan when the Indian army entered the State, 
whose 80 per cent population vras Hindu, and the State was surrounded 
by Hindu States. 
The Maharajas and Nawabs signed the Instrument of Accession in 
great distress. The Maharaja of Bikaner signed in a 'dramatic gesture'. 
The Maharaja of Baroda wept like a child. One of the princes suffered 
a heart attack. The Maharaja Hanwant Singh of Jodhpur and the Maharaja 
of Jaisalmer had secret meetings with Jinnah, but they helplessly signed. 
The Maharajas of Indore and Dholpur signed on August 14, 1947, in an 
intolerable situation. The problem of Hyderabad and Kashmir remained. 
In West Punjab, the Hindus and Sikhs believed that Lahore would 
fall in India, but when they knew that Lahore would fall in Pakistan, 
they fled to the east in panic seeking only to save their lives. 
Mountbatten flew to Lahore on Sunday, July 20, and suggested the Punjab 
Partition Committee that "the new government of east Punjab's 'unessen-
tial personnel" all be moved out to Simla by August 10, but Radcliffe's 
final award would remain top secret till the eve of nartition and 
T ^ ^ 236,, Independence". 
234. MB 194, Interview No. 177, Maharaja of Indore and Nav/ab of 
Bhopal, August 4, 1947. 
235. MB 144, Shahaji Chhatrapati to Viceroy, August 11, 1947. 
236. Stanley Wolpert, n, 50, p. 334. 
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On August 5, Khwaja Nazimuddin, assuring cordial attitude to the 
minorities in East Pakistan, said: "I can assure Dr. Ghosh and the 
members of the minority community living in the Eastern Pakistan State 
that insha allah (God willinq) ve wil] not only give them protection/ 
but we shall be generous towards them and we shall make them feel that 
237 
they are one of us", 
On August 7, before departure to Pakistan, Jinnah, seeking excuse 
for being unable to reply individually to the thousands of messages of 
greetings and good wishes on the establishment of Pakistan owing to 
enormous pressure of work involved in the division of India, stated: 
"I bid farewell to the citizens of Delhi amongst whom I had many friends 
of all communities and I earnestly appeal to every one to live in this 
great and historic city with peace. The past must be buried and let us 
start afresh as two independent sovereign States of Hindustan and 
238 
Pakistan". He wished Hindustan prosperity and peace. 
Jinnah and his sister, Fatima, flew out of New Delhi in the 
Viceroy's Dakota on the morning of August 7, 1947. They reached Karachi 
where thousands of admirers cheered them with slogan of "Pakistan 
Zindabad", The first constituent assembly of Pakistan met in Karachi on 
August 11, and unanimously elected Jinnah to preside over its meetings, 
Jinnah thanked the assembled delegates for electing him as the first 
President of Pakistan, He emphasised that the partition was "unprecedente( 
cyclonic revolution, which has brought about the plan of creating and 
establishing two independent Sovereign Dominions in this sub-continent... 
This mighty s\ab-continent with all kinds of inhabitants has been brought 
239 
under a plan which is titanic, unknown, unparalleled ...". 
Birth of India and Pakistan 
Mountbatten reached Karachi on August 13, 1947, and inaugurated 
the Dominion of Pakistan on August 14, 1947. Delivering the message of 
241 greetings to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, Mountbatten saini 
237. The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), August 8, 1947. 
238. I b i d . 
239. S tan ley Vfolpert, n . 50, p . 337. 
240. See for more d e t a i l s Wall Khan, n . 8 1 , pp . 167-76. 
241. H.V. Hodson, n . 54, p , 387, 
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"Tomorrow two new sovereign states will take their place 
in the Commonwealth; not yoxong nations, but bears of old 
and proud civilisation ... not immature governments or 
weak, but fit to carry their great share of responsibility 
for the peace and progress of the world". 
Jinnah was sworn in as Governor-General of Pakistan and Mount-
batten as Governor-General of India. Pakistan cabinet was headed by 
Liaquat Ali Khan. In September, as desired by Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan 
moved the Cabinet to Lahore. 
After addressing the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, the Viceroy 
flew back to New Delhi, and inaugurated the Dominion of India on August 
15, 1947. Thus, the British Raj came to an end in India leading to the 
freedom of one-fifth of mankind, Commxanieating the message of goodwill 
and greetings from the British Crovm to the Indian Constituent Assembly, 
Mountbatten, paid homage to Gandhiji as the architect of India's 
2< freedom through non-violence and saj \n. 
"Your first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, you 
have a world renowned leader of courage and vision. His 
trust and friendship have helped me beyond measures in my 
task. Under his able guidance, assisted by the colleagues 
whom he has selected, and with the loyal cooperation of 
the people, India will now attain a position of strength 
and influence and take her rightful place in the comity of 
nations". 
Dr. Rajendra Prasad was elected President of the Assembly and 
the Indian Cabinet was headed by the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 
who made a famous broadcast at midnight of August 15, 1947: 
"At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, 
India will awake to life and freedom ,..". 
Maulana Azad had saiS: 
"The division is only on the map of the country and not in 
the hearts of the people, and I am sure it is going to be 
a short-lived partition". 
242. I b i d . , p . 3 9 5 . 
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R a d c l i f f e ' s Boundary Awarcls %f
Mountbatten handed the Radclifte Award to the leaders of both 
dominions in Delhi on August If), 1947. 
On June 27,1947, the Viceroy invited Jinnah, Nehru, Patel,Liaquat 
and Baldev, and proposed a Boundary Commission consisting of four high 
court judges, two chosen by Congress and two by the League, to sit on 
each commission for partitioning the Punjab and Bengal. As sugqested 
by Jinnah, the British Barrister, Sir Cyril Radclifte, was invited to 
chair both the Commissions. Radcliffe reached New Delhi on July 8, 1947. 
During July 16-24, the Bengal Boundary Commission, and during July 21-31, 
the Punjab Boundary Commission, were in session. In view of disturbances 
and bloodshed, the Partition Council announced a Punjab Boundary Force 
to be set up and both the governments pledged themselves to accept the 
awards of the Boundary Commission and guaranteed protection of the 
minorities. On August 1, the Punjab Boundary Force was set up to protect 
the refugees. During August 4-6, the Bengal Boundary Commission considered 
the partition of Sylhet, and on August 6, the Partition Council met 
for the last time. On August 13, the Radcliffe Award was ready and 
made public on August 16, 1947. The terms of reference of either Commiss-
ion were to demarcate the boundaries "on the basis of ascertaining the 
contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, In doing so, it 
246 
will also take into account other factors". 
The partition ^a.s made according to 1941 census of the districts. 
The Muslim majority districts in general which formed East Pakistan 
were: in Chittagong Division - Chittagong, Noakhali and Tippera; in 
Dacca Division - Bakarganj, Dacca, Faridpur and r-iymenslng; in Presidency 
Division - Jessore, Murshidabad and Nadia; and in Rajshahi Division -
Bogra, Dinajpur, Malda, Pabna, Rajshahi and Rangour, Two-thirds portion 
of Nadia (Muslims 61.4%) and Malda (Muslims 56.2%), about one half of 
Dinajpur (Muslims 50.2%), two oolice stations ot Jessore, four police 
stations of Sylhet, and the whole district of Murshidabad (Muslims 56.6%) 
were transferred by Radcliffe to India. According to terms of reference, 
245, See for details Appendix XlV (Sir Cyril Radcliffe's Boundary 
Awards) . 
246, Reports of the Members and Awards of the Chairman of the Boundary-
Commissions (Allpore; Superintendent, Government Printing, West 
Bengal Government Press, 1950), p, 153 (Bengal Sylhet) and 
p. 303 (Punjab), 
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in case the referendum in Sylhet was in favour of Pakistan/ Muslim 
247 
majority areas of "the adjoining d i s t r i c t s of Assam" were to be awarded 
to Pakistan, but Radcliffe did not t ransfer to Pakistan even an inch 
of such areas, although there were a number of such a reas . The non-Muslin 
majority d i s t r i c t s in Bengal, which were t ransfer red to East Pakistan 
were: the Chittagong Hil l Tracts (Total population - 247,053; 94,5% 
t r i b e s , 3% Muslims and 2.5% Hindus and o thers ) , Khulna (Muslims 49.36% 
and non-Muslims 50,64%) and from Ja lpa igur i three Muslim majority and 
two non-Muslim majority pol ice s t a t i o n s . 
The Muslim majority d i s t r i c t s in the Piinjab, which cons t i tu ted 
West Pakistan were: in Lahore Division - Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore, 
Sheikhupura, and Sia lkot ; in Rawalr^indi Division - Attock, Guj r a t , 
Jhelum, Mianwali, Rawalpindi and Shahpur; and in Multan Division - Dera 
Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan and Muzaffargarh, The 
por t ions which were t ransferred to India out of the d i s t r i c t s of 
Gurdaspur and Lahore were: 
Gurdaspur - Non-Muslim majority t e h s i l ( sub-d i s t r i c t ) of Pathankot 
and two Muslim majority t e h s i l s - Gurdaspur (Muslims 
52.1%) and Batala (Muslims 55.1%)-joining Kashmir. 
Lahore - A portion of Muslim majority t e h s i l of Kasur (Muslims 
57.2%), 
Radcliffe may be charged as victim of an t i - I s lamic pathogenic 
s p i r i t when we find no reason why he did not t r ans fe r to Pakistan the 
Muslim majority port ions of the Non-Muslim majority d i s t r i c t s of the 
borders of Ferozepore, Amritsar and Jullijndur, given below:-
Fero2eTX)re - Zira Tehsil (Muslims 65,6%) and Ferozepore Tehsil 
(Muslims 55.2%). 
Amritsar - Ajnala Tehsil (Muslims 59.4%). 
Jullundur - Nakodar Tehsil (Muslims 59.4%); Ju]lundur Tehsil 
(Muslims 51.1%). 
The transfer of the above Tehsils to India cut off the Muslim 
majority state of Kanurthala from the Pakistan border line. 
247. Ibid., p. 153. 
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Comments on the Awards 
Dewan Bahadur S.p, Singha wrote: "It is a one-sided award, and 
most unfair to Pakistan. The principles of the contiguity of majority 
248 
areas have been completely overloOKea". Abdur Rab Nishtar said: "It is 
extremely xinfair and unjust to Pakistan and is based on no principles, 
249 
We believe it is a parting kick of the British", flasan Ispahan! remarked: 
"The award is abominable. It violates the tundamental and accepted 
principles of contiauous majority areas. It is devoid of justice and 
250 251 
Muslims have been the sufferers", Jinnah spoKe: 
"No doxibt, we feel that the carving out of this great 
independent, sovereign Muslim State has suffered injustices. 
We have been squeezed in as much as it was possible and 
the latest blow that we have received was the Award of the 
Boundary Commission. It is an unjust, incomprehensible and 
even perverse Award. It may be wrong, unjust and perverse 
and it may not be a judicial but political award, but we had 
agreed to abide by it and it is binding upon us". 
The Pakistan Times,at length,wrote that Radcliffe took undue 
advantage of the clause "other factors" and militated against the Muslims 
252 
while dividing Bengal and the P\injab. The paper writesr 
"...where the Muslim right to non-Muslim territory on 
grounds of "other factors" was fully established as for 
instance over certain canal head-works this brilliant 
lawyer has suggested joint control and we fail to see why 
similar joint control could not have worked for the non-
Muslims ... The final line, however,* while it has taken 
away a lot from the Muslims, has done little for the Sikhs. 
They still remain more or less equally divided between 
Pakistan and India, their shrines for which so much noise 
was made In India and in London still remain In Pakistan", 
The paper further observes that the British purpose of the "wrong, 
unfair and imjust" award was to fish in troubled waters of weakened 
Pakistan/ which could ever depend on the goodwill and help of the British 
248. The Times (London), August 18, 1947. 
249. The Statesman (Calcutta), August 19, 1947. 
250. Ibid. 
251. From speech broadcast from Radio Pakistan, Lahore, on October 30, 
1947, Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed All Jinnah: Speeches as Govemor-
GeneraT of Pakistan, 1947-1948 (Karachi: Pakistan Pxiblications) , 
pp. 32-33. ^ 
25 2. The Pakistan Times (Lahore), August 19, 1947. 
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and the Hindu capitalism and tension between Pakistan and India. The 
Kashmir and Indus River water issues are permanent threat of war between 
the two countries. The motive of the Viceroy and Radcliffe was othen^/ise 
towards Pakistan. They had nlanned earlier to accede Kashmir to India 
and for this Durpose they intentionally qave Gurdaspur to India.Accord-
ing to the 'Instructions', the district should have oone to Pakistan 
being a Muslim majority district. This is a good example for Indians 
and Pakistanis to realise that the Britishers were not their friends 
as they laid seeds of communal disharmony on the land of Gurdaspur. 
This finds support on the fact that instead of determining the boundary 
line according to natural barriers like rivers, mountains, canals or 
hills, he went from village to village sowing seeds of entemal discord 
between the two Dominions. However, the resultant boundary gave to 
East Pakistan was 54,501 sq. miles vdth 41.8 million population; to 
West Pakistan 8,03,943 sq. miles and India 32,87,782 sg. miles. 
Impact of the Partition 
Before coming into existence of the two dominions, there were 
already communal violence, loot, arson, massacre, bloodshed, loss of 
life and property and continuous disorder and riots, the roots o^ which, 
may be said, was the Direct Action Policy of Jinnah. The situation in 
Punjab and Bengal,due to its plan of partition, was most serious.There 
was even a Sikh Plan to assassinate Jinnah on the day Pakistan was bom, 
but the Viceroy brought him back with himself in an open carriage.When 
they reached inside the Government House, the Viceroy said:"Thank God 
253 
I was able to bring you back alive" . '--"hile the Armed Sikhs in Amritsar 
began killing every Muslim they could find, the Muslim gangs - many of 
them 'police', stabbed and gunned down every Hindu and Sikh in Lahore. 
The entire trainloads of refugees were gutted and turned into rolling 
coffins and funeral pyres, smokes and flames everywhere in Punjab 
darkened the skies. In Bengal, Gandhiji held fast on the Indenendence 
Day, when all business houses were closed in Calcutta. The Hindu Mahasabha 
raised black flags against the vivisection of Mother India- Akhand 
Bharat. The Calcutta Muslims fled and hid in panic anr' crovrded in 
predominantly Muslim areas. General Tuker rerorte'^: "deserter', lea'^erless, 
254 denressed and on the de-fensive". "owever, peace '>;as restored v/hen 
253. Stanley Wolpert, n. 50, p. 342. 
254. Ibid., pp. 342-43. 
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Gandhiji undertook a fast-unto-death recalling to stop killing of the 
innocents. The Ramazan ended on August 18, 1947, and Jinnah in his Id 
255 
Message rejoiced the establishment of Pakistan. He, on receipt of 
reports of mass killing, rape, arson and looting, wept and "his handker-
256 
chief furtively often went to his moist eyes ...". 
The horror stories told by the Hindu and Sikh refugees gave vent 
to the Sikhs of the Akali sect and the Hindu fanatics of the RSS in 
Delhi to launch a v;ave of terror on the morning of Seoternber 3, 1947, 
the day Gandhiji ended his fast in Calcutta. Max Olivier Lacamp saw the 
Hindus looting Muslims' shops and butchering owners and Nehru above 
their heads "in a white Congress cap whirling a lathi, beating the 
rioters, showering them with curses, trying by his actions to arouse 
257 
the dozen indifferent policemen behind him". The RSS burnt a Muslim 
woman at the gate of Nehru's York Road residence "as a protest against 
258 
their Prime Minister's efforts to orotect India's Moslems". The collapse 
of order in Delhi had menared the v^ hole sub-continent. T^ the evening 
of September more than 1000 had died. Nehru in anger called P-dkistan 
259 
" a 'carbuncle' that had settled on the back of India's body politic". 
Pakistan After Independence 
The Christie's note had defined the formula for sharing all pre-
partiticn assets of the British raj, but Patel and Baldev Singh "were 
specially loathe to "arm" Pakistan vrith the wherev/ithal to fight India-
260 
whether in the Punjab, Sind, Kashmir, or Bengal", and, in consequence, 
Pakistan's position vras very precarious. Jinnah guarded each rupee. 
He once told Begum Shah Nawaz that he had "only t^ e^nty crores (200 
million) rupees in the treasury and nearly rupees forty crores of bills 
255. Speeches by Quaid-i-Azam Mohamed Ali Jinnah, Governor-General of 
Pakistan; 3rd Jiine 1947 to 14 August 1948 (Karachi; n.d.),p.l6. 
256. M.A. Jinnah, "My Brother", in Stanley Wolpert, n.50, P. 34 3. 
257. See for details of riots, Larry Collins and Dominique lapierre. 
Freedom At Midnight (Nev; Delhi; Vikas Publishing House, Pvt.Ltd., 
1981), p. 311. 
258. Ibid., p. 312. 
259. D.H, Bhutani, The Future of Pakistan (New Delhi: Promilla and 
Company, Publishers, 1984), p. ix (Introduction). 
260. Stanley VJolpert, n. 50, p. 344. 
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lying on the table". Jinnah on August 24, 1947, issued a statement to 
the press urging calm in the face of the "grave unrest" assuring people 
to "give succour and relief to the victims". The people "kept their 
heads cool and lived amicably". As the goods and services due to over-
flowing of bureaucrats, refugees, workers and merchants were in high 
demand, their prices skyrocketed and property values soared. However, 
Sind began to blossom with Karachi. On the other hand, "the sick and 
dying brought every need, demand and physical blight with their battered 
bodies to a city v/hose housing shortage had been tripled by arson and 
v/hose water supply was infested with the worst diseases of dead and 
disintegrating corpses thrown into its arteries. Its spacious mosques 
and once beautiful Mughal gardens were turned into crowded camr>s for 
26 2 
Muslim refugees fleeing Sikh persecution". Had India not withheld the 
agreed share of Reserve Bank's cash balances amounting to some Rs.55 
crores, Pakistan could not have suffered this serious blow of the 
circumstance, Ismay reported that "Jinnah was full of wrath against 
Congress, saying that he could never understand these men's hatreds and 
was now beginning to feel that there was no alternative but fight it out". 
The Fate of Hyderabad 
The Wizam of Hyderabad was trying to nurchase "armaments in 
Czechoslovakia". Sir VJalter Monckton resigned as Constitutional Adviser 
to the Nizam as he was being attacked by the Hyderabad press. Kasim 
Razvi declared that Hyderabad would never surrender her independence and 
if plebiscite would be enforced, the sword would be the final arbiter. 
The Nizam became so indifferent that he even did not like the Viceroy 
tq visit Hyderabad. The Nizam by two ordinances prohibited export of 
previous metals from Hyderabad to India and acceptance of Indian currency 
in Hyderabad, Further, the Hyderabad Government advanced a loan of 
Rs,20 crores to Pakistan, at the moment when India hoped that Pakistan 
would die due to their acute economic and financial crises. The leaders 
261. Begum Shah Nawaz, "The Quaid As I Knew Him", in Khurshid Khan(ed.), 
Quaid-i-Azam and Muslim Women (Karachi: National Book Foundation, 
1976), p. 18. 
26 2. Stanley Wolpert, n. 50, D, 344, 
263. I b i d . , p . 347. 
264. Alan Campbell-Johnson, n . 51 , September 8, 1947, p . 183. 
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of India v;ere "furious over It". The Razakars, led by Kasim Razvi,began 
to invade Madras, Bombay and Central Provinces. It was said that the 
Razakars ruled by day and the Communists ruled by night. K.M. Mtonshi, 
who was sent to Hyderabad under a 'Standstill Agreement' signed on 
November 29, 1947, between India and Hyderabad, was imprisoned in his 
house. On March 31, 1948, Razvi urged the Razakars to march for^-ard with 
the Koran in one hand the sword in the other to hound the enemy, and 
that "the forty-five million Muslims in the Indian Union would be our 
266 
fifth columnists in any showdown". On April 12, 1948, he declared "The 
day is not far off v;hen the waves of the Bay of Bengal will be washing 
267 
the feet of our Sovereign" and Asaf Jahi Flag would fly on the Red Fort. 
He threatened that if India would invade Hyderabad, they would find 
only the bones of Ih crores of Hindus. Lord Mountbatten left India on 
June 21, 1948, without solving the problem of Hyderabad. There spread 
a reign of terror and killing of Hindus forced India to invade. The 
Indian army entered Hyderabad on September 13, and the Hyderabad army 
surrendered on September 17, 1948. On September 19, Kasim Razci was 
arrested and Razakars were disbanded. 
Accession of Kashmir 
The strategic importance of Jammu and Kashmir was alluring to 
India and Pakistan. In the State of the three million voiceless subjects, 
the Muslims were in majority (75%) and in Ladakh the Eud^^hists.Maharaja 
Hari Singh's Prime Minister, in 1947, was Pt, Ram Chandra Kak. Like other 
rulers of the princely states, the Maharaja had also to accede to one 
or other dominion. He refused to join either dominion. He feared that 
Jinnah would dethrone him for religious reasons and hated "Nehru with 
a bitter hatred" because of his socialist proclivities and democratic 
268 
demands". Nehru, Gandhi and Patel, who v;ere not allowed to visit Kashmir, 
had lost patience with him, while the Maharaja went on his way quite 
265. Mir Laik Ali, "Reminiscences of the Quaid", in Ziauddin Ahmad(ed.), 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Karachi: Ministry of In-formation and 
Broadcasting, 1976), pp. 61-70. 
266. V 
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unconcerned. Gandhiji went to Kashmir on August 1/ but the Maharaja 
stood his ground/ due to which Kak resigned and Major-General Nanak 
Singh was appointed in his place on August 11, 1947, The new Prime 
Minister was inclined towards India. Pro-Conaress Sheikh Abdullah was 
in prison and Nehru wanted his release to influence upon the Maharaja 
to accede to India. After the announcement of Jijne 3rd Plan, Mountbatten 
had visited Kashmir and assured the Mahar^^ja that Patel v;ould have no 
objection to his joining Pakistan. But his mission failed. After Augxas t 
15, Lord Ismay also persuaded him, but he also could not succeed. The 
Maharaja was in a state of mental dilemma. If he joined India, the 
Muslim population had threatened to revolt, and if he joined Pakistan, 
the Hindus of Gilgit and other places had adversely acted. He,therefore, 
announced to enter into Standstill Agreements both v;ith India and 
Pakistan, and signed a Standstill Agreement vd th Pakistan. 
The flood of refugees brought blood-curdling tales of tragedy, 
that fired the Frontier Muslims, famous for bravery, zeal and Islamic 
brotherhood, who demanded revenge against the "infidels" i.e. the Hindus 
in India. As a rex'enge they planned to occupy Kashmir and dethrone the 
Maharaja (who, they afraid, could accede to India being a Hindu) and, 
thus, to make Pakistan stronger and able to take revenae o-^  killings of 
Muslims coming to Pakistan, Meanwhile, Poonch revolted against the 
Maharaja, who sent forces to crush the uprising. The Frontier Muslims 
(tribes) occupied the highway roads that served transit of petrol and 
other vital needs which Pakistan had to supply to Kashmir under the 
'Standstill Agreement' v/ith her. Further, the Pakistani Muslim.s (Frontier 
tribals) crossed the Poonch border to help their co-religionists and 
by mid-October all supplies from Pakistan was stopped. Jinnah sent 
his British Military Secretary thrice to Srinagar, wrote himself to 
Hari Singh, and also sent Major Shah to Kashmir, to incude the Maharaja 
to accede to Pakistan, but failed. Under this circumstance. Justice 
Mehr Chand Mahajan took over as Prime Minister of the State. Mahajan, 
on October 15, complained to the British Minister about the breach of 
'Standstill Agreement' as supplies had discontinued and pointed out 
that the State border from Gurdasnur to Gilgit was threatened by Pakistan 
with invasion, but received no response. VThen complained to Jinnah, he 
charged the tone and language. 
To relieve the State from material crisis, India sent salt. 
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270 kerosene and sugar to "blockaded" Srinagar/ disregarding the "Standstill 
Agreement" of Kaslimir with Pakistan. Pakistan sensed it a pretext of 
India for occupying Kashmir. Therefore, Pakistan invaded India with 
5000 armed Pathan Afridi, Waziri and Mahsud tribesmen of the NWP, who 
committed acts of rape and pillage. Belgian !1other Sunerior, Sister 
271 Mary Adeltrude succumed to her wounds. On October 24, Pakistan i'-iformed 
New Delhi that "tribal volunteers" had "entered" Kashmir. "Their advance 
272 guard ... only 35 to 40 miles from Srinagar". On October 24, the 
raiders had occupied the Mahura Power House and had plimged Srinagar 
in darkness. They declared to reach Srinaqar on October 26, and celebrate 
the Id celebrations in the Srinagar Mosque. On October 24, the Maharaja 
appealed to India for help. India did not take any action on the 
information and appeal. However, on October 25, 1947, as decided by 
the Defence Committee meeting, presided over by Mountbatten, sent 
V.P. Menon to Srinagar to-study the situation, Menon met with Mahajan 
and sent the Maharaja from Srinagar to Jammu as there were nev/s that 
the raiders had started infiltration in Srinagar. Menon returned to 
New Delhi in the morning of October 26, 1947, and brought Mahajan with 
himself. Menon reported to Nehru and Patel that the Maharaja "had gone 
to pieces completely" and could "come to no decision". Mahajan recalls: 
"I requested immediate' military aid on any terms ... 
Give us the military force we need. Take the accession and 
give whatever power you desire to the popular party. The 
army must fly to save Srinagar this evening or else 
will go to Lahore and negotiate terms with Mr. Jinnah". 
Nehru angrily said, "go", but Patel consoled and Sheikh Abdullah 
supported him, Nehru became peaceful. The result of the morning discuss-
ion Was that the Indian Cabinet agreed to accede Kashmir to India and 
send its army on October 27th morning. Menon and Mahajan again flew to 
Jammu and met with the Maharaja, who after some discussions, signed the 
Instrument of Accession to accede to India. Menon took the documents 
immediately back to India, Patel took them from the aerodrome and went 
straight to the meeting of the Defence Committee, which finally decided 
to accede Kashmir to India subject to a plebiscite later on. 
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As decided by the Defence Council, the First Sikh Battalion ot 
329 flew from New Delhi to Srinagar in the night and landed at dawn on 
October 27, and at 9.00 A.M. news of their action came to New Delhi. 
Jinnah hearing the news of Kashmir's accession to India, ordered General 
Gracey, the Acting Commanding-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, to send 
troops to Kashmir, but the latter refused as in that case the British 
officers were to be withdrawn; hence, Jinnah cancelled the plan and 
on October 30, 1947, issued a statement that accession of Kashmir to 
274 
India was "based on fraud and violence and as such cannot be recognised" 
and declared establishment of her control over Gilgit which v/as a part 
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. On January 1, 1949, a ceasefire 
v/as ordered by the United Nations. Since then many efforts have been 
made to solve this dispute, but they have not succeeded. 
Conclusion 
On February 20, 1947, Attlee declared the intent to transfer 
power not later than June 1, 1943, and if the Indians failed to form 
a fully representative Constituent Assembly, the British Government 
v;ould hand over power as desired by them and replaced Wavell by Lord 
Mountbatten in Mgrch, 1947. Mountbatten called the le'aders at Simla. 
Menon's proposal for 'Dominion Status' to both India and Pakistan 
became acceptable. The Congress and the League accepted the partition 
of the sub-continent. The Viceroy on June 3, 1947, in a broadcast 
declared August 15, 1947, ^ or Independence of India and Pakistan and 
the Congress and the League leaders declared their acceotance. Two 
Interim Governments- one for India and the other for Pakistan were 
formed. The Partition Council divid'?d the armed forces. On August 14 
and 15, 1947, Pakistan and India respectively came into being. Radcliffe 
handed over the 'Boundary Awards' on August 16, to India and Pakistan. 
The princely states joined India. Hyderabad v/as forcibly accessioned 
to India and Kashmir agreed her accession to India. 
274. November 7, 1947, Mountbatten's Personal Report, pp. 347-52. 
CONCLUSICN 
In the -Foregoing chapters, various aspects of socio-political/ 
religious and constitutional issues leading to the partition of 
India have been studied. The events and nolicies pertainirg to the 
Conaress and the MusDim league raise ? number o^ questions in mind 
with respect to the right or vrong meanur^is ?nd reactionary steps 
of the tv'o parties and their responses to the ^lem^n^s and asi^irations 
of the other. The voice of other minorities - Sikhs, Depressed 
Classes and Parsis, was considered neoligible in the hue and cry 
of partition politics. VThile the causes o^ the partition of the 
sub-continent are numerous, some of the most important ones involving 
the Indian National Congress and the ."luslim league, on thr one hand, 
and the leadership and mass response^ of the tvTo comm\inities on the 
other, have been perused throuah these panes. 
During the second ha]f of the nineteenth century, due to 
Dev Nagri movement. Sir Syed Ahmad I'han, who was once a great pronhet 
of Hindu-Muslim unity, realized that the Hindus and the I»Iuslims 
"would not be able to participate in any work v;ith a since'-e heart". 
The Congress which was dominated by the Hindus was not favoured by 
Sir Syed. His opposition to the Congress v/as because of Muslim 
backwardness. He wanted that the Hindus and Muslims should go r-ide 
by side in all v/alks of life and he did'' not like any interference 
in his programme from any comer. Not to say the Conoresf, Sir Syed 
even opposed the Central National Hohammadan Ascoci:ticn c^ Justice 
Ameer Ali v;ho stood for r^olitical training to the Muslims, To Sir 
Syed only the academic pursuits were needed by the Muslim community 
and when they were well-up in academics, oolitics v/ould itself find 
its course in Muslim community. On the other hand, Muslim Conferences 
evolved pan-Islamism and even Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan contemplated 
to launch an Islamic movement in recognition of the religious 
2 
temperament of the Pushtu nation. This situation was militant "against 
1, Altaf Husain Hali, Hayat-i-Jawaid (Urdu),(lahore: Lahore Academy, 
1965), p. 142. 
2. S. Farioh Bukheri, Bacha Khan (Peshawar: 1957), r>. 95; in Moin 
Shakir, Khilafat to Partition (Mev/ Delhi: Ajanta, 1970), n. 257. 
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3 
the improvement of communal relationships in other directions and led 
to the Muslims' demand of a 'separate identity'. 
The influential groups of ulema end Muslim religious institutions 
played an imoortant role in the partition politics, Ghulam Ahmed 
Qadiyani, Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, Mau]ana Ashraf Ali Thanvi,Al]ama 
Mashriqui, Dr. Hamidullah, who were anti-modem, led the ' reactionary 
revivalism' and strengthened the idea of Muslim communalism. The 
ulema of Eareilly School (of Maulana Ahmad Reza IChan) , Madarsa Nizamia 
at Firangi Mahal (of Maulana Abdul Bari), Darul-Uloom of Deoband (of 
Maulana Mahmudul Hasan), Bahrul-Uloom. at Firangi Mahal at Lucknovj (of 
Abdul Majid and Abdul Hamid - brothers), Nadwat~ul-Ulema, Lucknow 
(of Maulvi Abdul Karim Khan(orthodox)) and Dar-ul-Musannafin,Azamgarh 
(of Maulana Shibli Nomani) turned the 'Muslim communalism' into 'Muslim 
nationalism' and developed the concept of a separate identity of Muslims. 
The reactionary ulema regarded the Qur'an as the most per-^ ect, 
precise and correct Divine booK. superior to all other scriptures, such 
as, Bible, Ved and Gita. Their orthodoxism lined the Hindus and the 
Christians against them. The Hindus regarded the sub-continent as 
their ' Bharat Mat a' and they v/anted to liberate it from the British at 
all costs. These Muslims did not regard India religiously as pious, 
spiritual and attached to their, as the Hindus. Ghulam Ahmad Qadiyani 
advocated obedience and loyalty to the British Government. Maudoodi 
favoured Islamic rule, prejudicial to the Hindu Raj. Maulana Thanvi 
and Dr. Karnidullah suoported the British. Allama Mashriaui thouaht 
independence of India as "wishful thinking". He said that the British 
tule, was "far better and it '-'as the duty of the Muslims to convince 
the British government that they should never accept the rule o-^  the 
3. Clifford Manshradt, The Hindu-Muslim Problem in India (London: 
1935), p. 126. 
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Moin Shakir, n. 2, D. 250. 
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majoritv. The real inheritors of nover were Muslims and not the 
7 
Hindus". The aim of his Khaksar "tovement T./as "to be once aaaln kings. 
rulers, vrorld conquerers and su^r-^me masters on earth" . The Hindus 
became conscious of these sentiments and they organised themselves 
to counter the Muslims. This Hindu-Muslim divide influenced at 
every step the course of political process up to the partition of 
the sub-continent. 
The liberal reformists in their ovm v/ay contributed towards 
the development of religious and political separatist i^eas. Sir Syed, 
a great guide and inspirer, criticised the orthodox u^ema for 
9 
misleading the community. He justified that "politics anH relicion 
are tvo different entities and that they should keep apart". He used 
the term 'nationalism' to denote the oeople and regarded all the 
12 
Indians as "one single nation". Sir Syed, however, in 1893, characterise^ 
13 Hindus and r!uslims as two "dif^"erent nationalities", when Jmnah was 
practising law in London. Iqbal and Jinnah were inspired by this 
view of Sir Syed and they ma^e it their ideological basis. Jinnah, 
at the 1938 Muslim League Session remarked that although a few Muslims 
in the past had seriously thought about the Muslims' interest, but 
their contributions _must be gratefully ocVno^ -1 rdf-r''. 
Hasrat Mohani published Urdu-e-Mualla propagating anti-British 
ideas an^ ^ was expelled •''rom the Aliaarh CoLlpoe '^n 1903. Hakim Ajmal 
Khan, Maulana Abul Kamal Azad, Dr. r^ .A. Ansari, Syed Mahmud and 
Dr. Zakir Husain -^'er^^^  the other prominent nro-Conf^ress Muslims. 
Viqar-ul-Mulk and Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the right and left arms nf_ Sir Syed, 
were afraid o'^  the risina extremist activities of the Congress and 
wanted to save Muslims from indulging in the Congress. To save the 
7. Allama M^shrioui, Hukumat ki Bunyad (UrdM),^.10; in Moin Shakir, 
n. 2, p. 251. 
8. V7.C. Smith, Modem Islam in India (Lahore: 1943), o. 278. 
9. Moin Shakir, 'Political Ideas of Sir Syed', Quest (Bombay),Sorinn, 
1968, p. 59. 
IC . Sir Syed; Magalat-e-Sir Syed (ed. S.f. Ismail), (Urdu) , (I ahore: 
1951), o, 4. 
11. Moin Shakir, n. 7, n. 253. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Stanley -^rolnert, Jinnah o-^  Pakistan (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984'^, n. IQ. 
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Muslim interests which v/ere not being given due consideration in 
the Congress the I'luslim leaders like The Age'' 7han, :'ohsin-u]-Mulk 
and Viq^.r-ul-Mulk were in search of a political platform to highlight 
the Muslim grievances. Viqar-ul-Mulk said: "V.'e ... being in the 
minority* have our own special needs and require some means through 
which we can place them be-^ore the Government". In 1906, the Mus?im 
Address given to lord J^nto contained a warning that if the represen-
tative institutions were not adopted v:ith care and caution, it was 
likely, among other evils, to place 'our (Muslims) national interests 
at the mercy of an unsympathetic majority' (Hindus), and had, hence, 
appealed to the British rulers for help. They requcstc^d for reservation 
of separate seats for Muslims on Vicerenal and provincial councils, 
high court benches, and municipalities, as v;ell as on university 
senates and syndicates. 
The Hindu organizations also added to the cause of partition. 
First, the Arya Samajists d^^clared anainst cow-slaughter and promulgated 
' Suddhi Movement', v;hich became a source of chronic feud betv/een 
Hindus and Muslims. The Hindus were waiting for the day v/hen they 
would settle their account with Moslems and the Britishers. Secondly, 
they found in English education a means of getting rid cf tho reign 
of Muslim Nav;abs. Thirdly, the teaching of Vivekanand that the Hinduism 
is the spiritual master of all the v;orld aave them a pride and honour, 
while the Muslims, v/ho had lost land, offices and honour and were 
avoiding to learn English, were reduced to a state ot utter poverty 
and ignorance, but the fall of their former greatness rankled in their 
hearts. 
The cause of the differencr^s between the Hindus and thn Muslims 
are also deeoly rooted in the false and t^ -asted reprerontation of 
historical facts, such as, Muhammad Ghauri captured Delhi a-^ ter killing 
Prithvi Raj Chauhan and Ghaznavi attacked Somnath having hatred against 
the Temple; 3,000 Brahmins committed suicide as Tipnu v/anted to convert 
them forcibly into the fold of Islam; Aurangzeb order demolition of 
Vishv;anath temple o^ Varanasi; Shivaji (the Hindu) was a sore enemy 
of Aurangzeb (the Muslim) ; the battle o-^  Haidighati between Rana Pratap 
14. Advocate (Lucknow) , August 22, 1903, UPNNR, 1903. 
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Singh and Akbar vas a relinious var; an'^  Guru Govind Sirrh '-^as an 
enemy o" Muslins. All these t';ist~d stories were made public by the 
British to activate their policy of Divine and Rule, which lasted 
until independence. 
IR 
The Muslim religious schools v;ere either pro-Britirh or anti-
15 
B r i t i s h . The ulema o*" B a r e i l l y School and Bahrul-Uloom of Lucknow 
v;ere p r o - B r i t i s h . Madarsa Mizamia (Lucknov;) , Deoband School/ Mazharu] 
Uloom (Saharanpur) and Qasimul-Uloom (M.oradabad) were a n t i - B r i t i s h . 
The?e i n s t i t u t i o n s played insicmi"^icant r o l e in p a r t i t i o n p o l i t i c s , 
bu t t he F i r a n g i Mahal ulema, led by Haulana Abdul Ba r i , c rea ted such 
an atmosphere, in ' ' 'hich the Muslim began t o b r e a t h t h e comi'^unal 
p o l i t i c s , Abdul Bari founded the Maj l i s - e - M u l d - u ] - I s l a m mainly vrith 
the aim to e s t a b l i s h the i n j u n c t i o n s of the s h a r i a t ; a l s o founded the 
Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba t o p r o t e c t t h e holy p l ace s dur ina the F i r s t 
World VJar and i o n i t e d the K h i l a f a t Mo^^ement in a s s o c i a t i o n with t h e 
All Bro thers and Gandh i j i . Dr. M.A. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal ^Tian wanted 
a r e l i g i o u s sanc t ion for the demands concerning the Khila-^at and 
Holy P l a c e s , v/hich Abdul B~i'i endor-'ed an^ ^ g r adua l l y enter-^d the 
Muslim league and dominate^ the Muslim p o l i t i c s . At th--^  Conaress X-mas 
Sess ion , 1920, a t Nagpur, of t he 4,582 ( inc lud ing Congressmen) de] e a a t e s , 
72 per cent were Muslims ( includin- ' Hasra t M.ohani) , which gave i t a 
"Muslim co lou r" . The Muslims (Ulema) supported t h e adoption of Non-
Cooperation led by Gandh i j i . In p r o t e s t J innah res igned from the 
Congress due t o harsh a t t i t u d e of Gandh i j i , This v;as the f i r s t shock 
t o J i n n a h ' s h e a r t , v;hich made him to oppose the Congress making 
pathway t o P a k i s t a n . 
P r e s s u r i s e d by the Khila-^ 'a t is ts , Gan'^hiji launched tho C i v i l 
Disobedience Movement .on Frbruary 6, 19 2 2, but due t o Chauri Chaura 
i n c i d e n t he c a l l e d off t he movement on "February 11-12, 1922, a t Bardo l i 
The ICh i l a f a t i s t s urged Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr.M.A. Ansari to begin 
the c i v i l d i sobedience mcement , but s ince they refused, they were 
t h r e a t e n e d with extreme measure. In conseguence, both the n a t i o n a l i s t s 
r e s i aned from the : : h i l a f a t Committee. Mot i l a l Nehru warned Abdul Bari 
t o rp-^rain meddlina in p o l i t i c s and to ro back to the ma^rasas and 
15. See for d e t a i l s F ranc i s Robinson, Separat ism (De lh i :Vikas ,1975) . 
16. C. Khallquz:^aman, Pathv;ay to _Pakistan ( l a h c r e : lonT^.^inG Green 
& Co, , 1961), P, 57, 
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maktabs. At last ulema took to sprcadina their viev/s from mosaue 
to Tiosrrue anc villane to villaae and up to the remotest and farthest 
to propagate that the Congress was an enemy of the Muslims,which 
created a gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims on the Indian 
sub-continent. 
The role o-^  the Princely states in the politics of partition 
was very shady and distinctly conducive to dismemberment of the 
country. After the Great Revolt, the Rajas, Maharajas and Navrabs 
accepted the British Rule in India. Durinc 1940s, there v^ ere 565 
Princely States - all subseirvient allies of the Kina Emperor George VI, 
under supremacy o"^  the Viceroy, to v/hich the Secretary of State said 
"admits of no dispute". The princes, who aclcno'-'ledged the paramountcy 
o-^  the British Crown only, were enjoying the status and luxuries of 
monarchs vdthin their ovm knogdoms. The Congress ideologies threatened 
the very basis of the r)rincely order. The princes had made a cause 
with the British Government that political pov/er, after Independence, 
would be retained by ^hem. The Nehru Committee, commenting the Butler 
Committee Report (1927) charged that the British Government v/as seeking 
to convert the Indian States into an Indian iJlsteT^ . At the Round Table 
Con-Pefences, the Maharaja o^ Bikaner demanded ' eqxial status' and 
'dominion status'. The Nawab o-*^  Bhopal declared: "We can only federate 
with a self-governing and federal British India". The Indian states 
\<!ere not agreeable to accession with the federation according to the 
scheme of 1935 Act and their continued opposition delayed the prospects 
of not only freedom but even autonomy in India, Their tangible and 
intangible blessings and patronage to the revivalist and communal 
movements and organizations in the country did strengthen the communal 
interests. Being apprehensive of absorption of their states to free 
India, they supTX)rted the Muslim League. The Muslim Lea7ue acceoted 
t^eir supoort to meet its ends though it, like the Congress, regarded 
the Rulinrj Princes "as reactionaries, autocratic and enemies of 
democracy'. 
The factor of separate electorate and reservation is also of 
17. Reginald Coupland, The Constitutional Problem in India, Part II 
(Madras: Oxford University 'p'ress, 1945)', p7 3. 
18. R.C. Majumdar, Struggle for Freedom (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya 
Bhavan, 1969), p. 575. 
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crucial Significance. In 1889, Charles Braudlaugh moved a bill in 
the British Parliament for establishment of a responsible government 
in India and reconrrended 'joint electorate'. Heck, the Aliaerh 
College Principal, got 20,735 signatam" o^ Muslins, rncresenting 
that the Hindus v/anted to stop cow slaunhter an--"' pent it to ^he 
19 
Goverhment demanding 'separate e]fctorate'. The Muslims demanded 
egual number of seats because if the Hindus had "numerical superiority", 
20 
the Muslims had "historical position". The Morley-Minto Reforms(1909) 
conceded separate electorate to the Muslims. The Congress rejected 
the Act as it had provided for separate representation to the Muslims 
21 
as a comr'unity. Further, according to the Lucknov; Pact in December, 
1916, the Congress and the league agreed to 40'^ representation to 
the Muslims in Bengal and 30'^  in TJ.F., to which Malaviya and Chintamani 
were ooDOsed. The Pact ensured tha': i-^  in c.py nro^'ince t'^ 'o-tv-iirds 
of a community was aaainst anv measure or bill it should be dropped 
29 
by both the comrpunities. The Go-^/emment made assertive provision for 
separate electorate in the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, 
v;hich lasted up to 1947. The Government conceded to communal electorate 
to drive a wedge bet^veen Hindus and Muslims, which inescapably caused 
partition of India. 
The question arises whether the Nehru Report or Jinnah's 
amendments thereto abetted partition? The Report pror^osed joint 
electorate with reservation of seats for minorities on poonlation 
basis '^dth the right to contest ari^ '^itional seats. No seats were 
reserved for any community in the Punjab and Bengal. Protection to 
Muslim religious and cultural interests v^ ere given. Muslim majority 
and Hindu majority provinces v/ere to be created on linquistic basis. 
In 1927, Jinnah's resolution for amendment were: (l) one-third of 
the elected representatives of both the Houses of the Central legislature 
should be Muslims; (2) reservation of seats in Bengal and the Punjab 
19. I. Prasad and S.X. Subedar, Hindu-Muslim Problems (Al]ahabad: 
Chuge Publications, 1974), o. 15. 
20. Rafiq Zakaria, Rise o-^  Muslims _in _Indian Politics; An Analysis 
of Developments from 1885-1905 rEombay: Somiya Publications,1970), 
pp. 138-42. 
21. K.H.Qadiri,Hasrat Mohani (Delhi: Idara-i-Adabiyat-e-Delli, 
1st edn., 1985), p. 212; see also I.Prasad and S.K.Subedar, n.l9, 
p. 27. 
22. The Leader (Allahabad), December 28-29, 1916. 
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on population basis for ten years, having no right to contest acWitior.al 
seats; (3) residuary pov/ers should vest in the provinces. These were 
lost though Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru pressed the conference to accept, 
which M.R. Jayakar prejudicially oooosed. Jinnah, disheartened by 
this Congress attitude, presented his Fourteen Point demand in 1929 
to safeguard the rights and inter-sts of the Muslims, 
Jinnah' s emergence as the stron'^est r.po''<esman of the Muslims 
v/as another important factor with a direct bearino on partition. 
Jinnah in December, 1938, at Fatna threatened direct action. Nehru 
and Bose negotiated v;ith Jinnah, who made the novel demand that the 
Muslim League should be recognised as the one and only organization 
that represented the entire Muslim community in India and that the 
Congress should speak only on behalf of the Hindus, Nehru claimed 
that there were about 100,000 Muslims on the Congress rolls and he 
could not accede to Jinnah' s argimients. Hov/ever, Jinnah exploited 
the Muslim sentiment and the Congress at last had to yield to 
Jinnah's claim. 
Not a religious leader by personal disposition, Jinnah exploited 
the ulema for achieving the league's objectives, Jinnah's arsociation 
v;ith the ulema like Maulana Shaukat Ali and Bahadur Yar Jang was not 
secular and v/as not in accord v.'ith Ir^bal's desire "to humanize 
23 
politics through religion". Jinnah claimed to be the heir of Sir Syed's 
rational and progressive thouaht on religion and politics; The essence 
which came to Jinnah was that politics and Islam are the same.Therefore, 
he did not hesitate in propagating that the Congress domination would 
mean a great harm to Islam. Forcing Muslim children in schools to 
sing Bande Mataram song, Hindi-Urdu controversy, music before mosque 
etc. strengthened Jinnah's proclamation. Religion became 'big -Dolitics'. 
To keen aloof the Muslims from the Congress, he created a feeling 
of hatred in the hearts of Muslims against the Hindus and raised the 
slogan "Isl-m in danger" dxaring the 1937 by-election, on the cround 
24 
o-^  false allegations of Conaress atrocities. Nehru v;as shocked.Jinnah 
23. y..:i. Rahman, Fakiston Review, Anril, 1954, n. 27. 
24. See for retails The Hindustan Times (New Dal'-ii) , NovembGr 7,198S, 
under the head, 'League Spread Lies - Azad'. 
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ignited the Muslim passion for the safeguards of Muslim interests 
in India, Jinnah followed this policy and vron success, which proves 
that Pakistan is not based on facts or nrinciples but it has all 
the romance of a battle-cry and all the potentiality of a crusade. 
If Jinnah introduced religion in nolitics, the Congress, the 
Hindu Mahasabha and the RS3 are also responsible for creatina an 
euphoria of a Hindu Raj. Arvindo and Pal argued that th" neople 
should v/orship Bharat Mata. The Arya Samaj movement ^^ or cow protection 
v/as associated with oolitics. The Muslim important papers - Comrade, 
Zamindar, Tauhid, Muslim Gazette, Al-IIilal etc. and the Hindu imnortant 
papers - Bengalee, Amrita Bazar Fatrika (old) , Yuqantar, Sandhya, 
Vandamatram (new) etc. aroused the '-luslim and Hindu sentiments 
respectively and lined up the Con-trress and the League against each 
other. Further, the speeches of Muslim and Hindu orthodox leaders 
drew a barrier between the Muslims and the Hindus. The Connress 
objection to the Muslims joinina the league ('^ ual rnGmbershin) and 
allov/ance to the Hindus joining the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha 
strengthened the idea that the Congress wanted to wipe out the Muslim 
League as a Muslim political platform. The leaders of RSS and Hindu 
Mahasabha - Malaviya, Lajpat Rai, Moonj e and Jayakar - jointly forced 
the Congress nationalists - Nehru, Sapru and Gandhi - to be gxjided 
by them. The concept of Hindu supremacy in religion and culture, 
Gandhiji's using Hindu symbols and values and the Congress -flight for 
majority interests on the pretext of retaining India's unity made 
Jinnah to a great extent to fight vigorously -For a senarate Muslim 
nation. "Gandhiji more than anyone else helped to trans-^orm Jinnah 
25 from a keen Indian nationalist into the architect of Pakistan". 
Jinnah's personal factor and oessimism also appear to have 
promr^ted him to pursue the goal o"^  Pakistan. Jinnah's first vrife, 
Emibai, died when he v/ent to Enrrland. His second wife, a Parsi girl 
younger to him by tv;enty years, died in 1929, after separation. In 
1928, he -Failed to secure any supnort -^ or his ^d. evj at the All-Parties 
Conference and his oroposals an-^  position vrere challenged. He v/ith 
Of 
tears in his eyes said: "Ja-^ nshed, this is the r^irtin^ o"^  the wavs" . 
25. Gunnar f^yrdal, Asian Drama : An Inquiry into the Poverty of 
nations (New York: Pantheon, 1968), VoK I, pp. 236-37. 
26. H. Bolitho, Jinnah: Creator o-F Pakistan (London: John Murray, 
1954), D. 95. 
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Suffering from humiliation/ he -^ elt himself very lov; and v/as in a 
state of utter hopelessness. In 1934, Ginnali ',7^3 of-f'ered the League's 
Presidentship and he returned to India in 1935. Though he was quite 
hopeless about netting any concession -From the Congressmen, he was 
pleased at the prospects of reconciliation between the Conaress and 
the Muslim league, but having failed, he desparately decided 'once 
and for ever', for creation of a separate Muslim homeland i.e.Pakistan, 
Did the inef•^'ectiveness of the Federal Flan of the Government 
of Indir Act, 1935, helped partition.-' It is understood that the Act 
meant to give freedom and unity, but in reality it 'yas not so. It 
meant to divert the demand of the Congress and the Indian Liberals 
for an early transfer of power at the centre. The Act envisaged 
central resoonsibility with reservation and safeguards uoon the 
27 
creation of an A13-India Federation, but none was gi^ ren a palpable 
share of power. It was not practically possible, as the Congress 
aimed a federation to control the provinces and the Muslim League 
and the British wantec' a -f^ ederation v;hich be unable to control the 
provinces. The Congress, after the 1937 elections, began to favour 
the Federal Scheme, but opposing the Act, inviting the Princely States 
to enter the Federation to strengthen the Conorr->ss nosition, because 
there were more Hindu States than the Muslims. Cn the other hand, 
the Muslim League favoured the Act but ooposed the Federal Scherre. 
In October, 1938, the Muslim league had resolved for the division of 
India on the basis of tv/o federations - the federation of Muslim 
states and the federation of non-Muslim states. The League overambi-
tiously demanded full independence of the Muslim majority states and 
permission to admit any other Muslim State beyond the Indian frontiers 
to join the federation. The league further demanded a block of 
autonomous states in the east and north-west and an extremely loose 
federation of sovereicrn states. Taturally, the Congress coulc? not 
accept it and the federation failed to materialise. 
27. R,J. Moore, 'The Making of India's Paper Federation, 1927-1935', 
in C.H. Philips and f'.D. Wainwricht (eds,). The Partition of 
India; Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947 (London: George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 1970), o, 63. 
28. M. Gv-yer an^ ^ A. Appadorai/eds.) , Speeches and Documents on the 
Indian Constitution, 1921-47 (Bombay: London: Oxford University 
Press, 1957), Vol. I, nn. 178-79; 198-200. 
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The political atmosphere had been rendered bitter. The Muslim 
league established committees, v;hich reportod atrocities against 
Muslims in states where the Conaress had ^'or-r.ed its minis'-ry. The 
29 
allegation was, as Azad states, "wrong". Thus, it was a planned 
activity of the league to appeal the Muslims to desist from the 
Conaress rule and defame the Coni-^ ress nationalist nolicy. T-Iov;ever, 
tv;o incidents shocked the Muslims. First, after tliel937-elections, 
Nariman, a Parsi, v^ as an acknowledged leader of the Congress Party 
in Bombay and it v;as expected that he viould be elected as Chief 
Minister, but the majority of the members being Hindu in the Conaress 
Assembly Party, Sa^dar Vallabhbhai Patel brought B.C. Kher into the 
picture and elected h-'.m the leader of the Conqress Assembly Party in 
Bombay. The responsibility of this tragic event rests with Nehru, 
who was afraid of Patel's criticism. Secondly, in Bihar, Dr. Syed 
Mahmud, then General Secretary of the AICC, was the top leader and 
was expected that he woul'^ be elected Chief Minister, hut instead 
Sri Krishna Sinha and Anugraha Sinha v/ere called back to Bihar and 
Dr. Rajendra Prasad groomed them to the position of Chief Minister. 
These incidents spread a feeling that the Congress nationalism was 
doubtful and the position of Muslims v/ould always be at stake under 
the Congress rule. In consequence, the League vion all the Muslim 
seats in 1946, and by implic'-tion a sort of verdict -^ rom the comi-punity 
in favour of partition. 
vrhether Nehru's rejection of the League's proposal to form the 
coalition ministry in 1937 helped partition? Obviously, one rejects 
the others proposal due to some di-F-Ferences and opposition. It 
applies to Nehru's rejection too. The Congress and the League had 
contradictory urges: the Conaress stood for democracy, secularism 
and comrr.on Indian nationality, while the Muslim League claimed to 
safeguard the interests o^ Muslims in India Q.<: a senarate political 
entity. Further, the^e were heated exchange of statements between 
Nehru and Jinnah during the 1937 election campaign. In spite of 
differences, Khaliquzzaman (Ml) helmed Rafi Ahmad Kidwai (Congress) 
29. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 7, 1988; Azad's 
'30-Page document'. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
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to return in U.F. They created an -understcnciinn betv.'een the Congress 
and the league and, hence, the league looked forvard to forming 
a coalition ministry in U.P., but the Congress, after its unexpectedly 
sweeping victory in TJ.P. also, became power-mad and refused to give 
even tv;o seats in the Cabinet to the Muslim League and rather started 
32 
a 'Muslim mass contact', pressed for v;inding up of the League and 
imposed unacceptable conditions u^on the leaaue to join the coalition 
ministry, which caused great antagonism betweon the two -oarties and 
resulted in the resignation of the Congress Ministry. It -further 
established that the Congress would not cooperate with the League 
in forming a coalition ministry, which proved a nail in the plank 
of future constitutional development and rendered partition inevitable. 
In fact, Nehru made a grave mistake of refusing to take the Muslim 
League and the communal problem seriously. Had the Congress been 
generous enough to take the two league members in the U.P. Cabinet, 
the Muslim League v;ould have been disintegrated in U.P., v/hich v/as 
its stronghold. Thus, gradually, becoming v/eaker and weaker it could 
have been lured to either merge V7ith the Congress or at least there 
would have been no demand for Pakistan. In view of this, Maulana 
Azad in his 30-Daae document has held Nehru rcsncnsible for the 
partition. 
The differences betwren the Congress and the Muslim League on 
important issues were also conducive to partition. Although the 
•Election Manifestos' of the Congress and the League released during 
the 1*537 elections were accidentally identical because both promised 
all sorts of things to all sorts of men, they differed in many ways. 
34 35 
Jinnah' s four and fourteen point demands were not acceptable to the 
Congress. They were in complete disagreement on imoortant issues 
also: separate electorate, the communal award, the safeguards for 
the minorities, the Act of 1935, the idea of a constituent assembly 
32. See for details The Leader (Allahabad), August 4, 1937; see also 
S.R. Mehrotra, 'The Congress and the Partition of India', in 
C.K. Philips and M.D. Wainwright, n. 27, op. 198-99. 
33. See for details The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), October 30, 1988 
(Sionday'* . 
34. See p. 57, Chapter II. 
35. See pp. 62-63, Chapter II. 
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Br i t i sh sometimes lured the Congrpss and sometimes the Muslim League 
to have t h e i r support in the War Aims. The Muslim League gave uncondi-
t iona l support hoping Br i t i sh favour. The Congress tended to support 
on condition o^ ^ immediate t ransfer o-^  r^ov;er. A'- the in'^er>endence '''as 
not forthcoming, Gandhiji launched the 'Quit India ' or 'Do or Die' 
Movement, opposed by th-^ ::uslim League, v;hich thought i t a forced 
pressure on the Br i t i sh for t ransfer of pov/er to the Hindu majority, 
while Jinnah wanted the t ransfer a f te r full cons t i tu t iona l se t t lement . 
38 Further, V'ave]l's February, 1944 declara t ion emphasised a '\anited 
India',- which Jinnah opposed. VThile the Congress x-zanted a strong 
centre , the League wanted a loose cen t re . The Br i t i sh conld have 
solved the problem on some pr inc ip les and norms such as tha t in the 
United States or in the USSR. However, the Br i t i sh policy only inflamed 
the Hindu-Muslim antagonism. 
The nev.'spapers a lso, perhaps inadvertent ly , l en t c red i t to the 
League's demand for Pakistan. The lahore Resolution did not mention 
'Pak i s t an ' , as a s ingle Muslim s t a t e or two separate 'autonomous' 
independent s t a t e s . I t was the Indian press , which next day, headlined 
the 'Lahore Resolution' as ' Pakisten Resolut ion ' , which v;as so re ta ined . 
However, i t was "a very effect ive response to Congress as i t torpedoed 
the Congress claim to speak -^ or India" . 
'^he Lahore Resolution was the offshoot of in tense Connross-
league d is in tegra t ion and i l l - f e e l i n g aa i in s t each o ther . The Resolution 
embodied J innah ' s decision that pa r t i t i on v;as the only long-term 
solution of Ind i a ' s foremost communal problem. The e f for t s of the 
Congress leaders to reconcile Jinnah fa i led . Actually, the root of 
the resolut ion lay in the League's grievances against the Congress 
a t r o c i t i e s and i t s leaders s teadfastness for a united India sac r i f i c ing 
the Muslim i n t e r e s t , v/hich vras i n to l e rab le to Jinnah, and v/hich had 
se t rhem pol 'S apar t . J innph 's two-nation theory and h i s demand for 
40 divis ion of India into "autonomous nat ional Cltatos" resulted in 
38. See p.215, Chapt-r V (Xavell 's declarat ion) and his opinion,p.219. 
39. John llendevon. The Viceroy at Bav:Lord Tinlithoow in_Indira 
1936-1943 (london: C o l l i n s , ' l 9 7 i r r "o; 167. ' '"^"' 
40. S.S. Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan : All India Muslim Learruo 
Documents, Vol. I I (1924-4Tn fKarachi: National Publishing 
Tlouse, 1969), CP. 335-37. 
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partition. The Congress refusal to the league's demand gave momentum 
to the demand for Pakistan. 
It is alleged that Jinnah vas solely resoonsible ^or the 
partition. In fact, the idea o^ dividing thp co\intry vas not nev/. 
The partition scheme vas based on th^ assamntion that Hindu-Muslim 
41 dif-^erences v/ere irreconciliable. The "terrible suffering" of the 
Muslims during the Congress ministri'="S (1937-39) strengthened the 
fears of the Muslims that their religion and culture vrould be unsa-f^ e 
in the united India, dominatf^d by the Hindus. Therefore, Khaliquzzaman 
T^ as the first to convert Jinnah to the ideal of Pakistan in May, 1939, 
on the around that partition was the c^^y solution to the communal 
42 
"-roble-n. Therefore, the partition of India should be viev/ed "against 
the backaround and in the context of nationalism as a livina ideal 
43 
or force"^. As other leaders vrere also voicing the same feelina, 
44 Jinnah became convinced of the idea of partition, Jinnah wanted a 
separate .Muslim homeland to preserve Islamic instincts. He said: 
"I do not wish to quarrel vrith any community. We want to preserve 
and guard our inherent rights. Some Hindu leaders are, however, out 
45 to crush .''luslims and I must warn them that this cannot be tolerated". 
Pandit Sunderlal held the Hindus responsible for the creation of 
46 
Pakistan. Earlier, Jinnah did like a united India. Vrhen his demand 
for one-third of Muslims' representation in the Central legislature 
\'as rejected, he said: "I am not speaking on this question as a 
Mussalman but as an Indian ... The communities have got to be 
reconciled, united and made to feel that their interests arc- common 
... We are sons of this land, we have to live together, we have to 
work together and v/hatever our differences may be let us not arouse 
bad blood, ^ 7ot•^ ing will make me more happy than to see Hindus and 
Muslims xmited". But it was Gandhiji who ma'^ e Jinnah disaooointed. 
41. Dav.Ti (Nev; Delhi', November, l'^ 45; auoted by A.P.. Rajput, Maul an a 
Abul '^ alam Azad (Lahore: 1945\ n. 198. 
42. Ch. Khaliquzzaman, n, 16, pp. 210-11. 
43. Al-!Tanza, Pakistan : A Nation , p. 127; in Moin Shakir,n. 2, p. 192. 
44. Ch. Khaliquzzaman, n. 15, P. 132. 
4b. The Times of India (New Delhi), January 24, 1940, p. 7. 
4^-. D.C. Tendulkar, Mahatma, Vol. I^ '^ '1920-1929), (New Delhi: 
Government o-^  India Publications Division, 1969), P. 191. 
47. '-'anji EH-.-arkadas, India' s Fight /=or ^r^edom (Bombay: 1966), -. 341. 
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^\:\ DuTiasia says: "It '-'as ^ 'r. Ganrihi \-'^o "as the -^ ather of r^^istan, 
48 
not Xr. Jinnah. *'". Grndhi hac^  driven ever^ /bc^ '^ y to derp-rati on" . 
'.'That vas the su^rort structure o"*^  Jinnah' s demand for P^kist~n? 
The Muslims in the hioh'^r strata were divided into two groun^-educr ted 
and lan'^lords; and at the lower strata v/ere the artisans and traders. 
The former was rich, forceful and influential in society and noli tics, 
while the latter, living throughout the length and breadth of the 
country, vras "financially bankrupt, economically zero and educationally 
49 
at the bottom of the ladder". The bulk of the rural Muslims of lov;er 
strata were ignorant o-P the iDoli'ical game being played for the 
partition o-^  the countr^r. They were only the onlookers guided by some 
'eminent person'^. Only a very few wore able to ourchase and read the 
newspapers. There-^ore, Jinnah, for their emcncipation spoke "o-^ " the 
50 
-conomic and soci^ il grievances of the Muslims, because without their 
assistance, the Pakistan Resolution could not be materialised. "The 
Muslim bourgeoisie class v;as not haony about the competition vzhich 
51 
it had to face from its Hindu counterpart". Jinnah to attract the 
latter group to the league's objective of Pakistan declared: "I am 
an old man. God'has oiven me enou-fh to live comfortably at this age, 
why should I turn my blood into ;^ater ... run about and take so much 
trouble. \'ot -^ or the caoitalists, but for you, the poor people". In 
194S, he assured 'decent livina' to all those v7ho did not get food 
even once a day. Jinnah was assisted by the educated peoole to fu? fil 
this task. Thus, the Muslim Leaaue paid lip ser^ '^ices to the ideal 
of social-''sm for the welfare of the people. The Raja of Mahmoodabad 
at the League Ses'-sion inrLuctoow declared: "the Muslims should follow 
the socialist programme for that would be in accordance with the 
Islamic principle" to attract the averaae Muslims in the name of 
Islam. Those who advocated Jinnah' s socialism '^ere "big landlords. 
48. The Times of India (New Delhi), December 3, 1941, p. 6. 
49. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, P.ecent Speeches and Writings o-^  Kr. Jinnah 
(Lahore: Ashraf, 196177 Vol. II rr943'-1947) , o. 127. 
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title-holders and selfish people, who looked to their class and 
54 ' • 
personal interests". Thus, the object of the establishment of 
Pakistan to a great extent v^ as determined "by the class affiliations 
of the leadership" and not "by the bouraeoisie class". 
The British favour to the Muslim League rroved a milestone 
in the history of creation of Pakistan, '^on'-i^-'i 1 i and "^ajendra Prasad 
met Jinnah in Nev; Delhi on November 1, 1939, but a new roijnd on 
communal talks did not last long. Gandhiji remarked: "Janab (Mr.) 
Jinnah Saheb (Sir) looks to the British power to safeguard the Muslim 
rights. Nothing that the Congress can do or concede will satisfy 
him". Further, the British August Offer (1940) assured the Teaoue 
that no constitutional development would be made without the consent 
of the Muslim League. The League declared that the British masters 
were better than the Congress and the Hindus; hence, there could be 
no unity between the Muslims and the Hindus. CripDS also favoured 
the Muslim League. Cripps explained that "in case a majority of less 
than 60 per cent of members of Provincial Assembly voted in favour 
of accession or non-accession, the minority legislators vrould have 
the right to demand a plebiscite ...". The Muslim league accepted 
the proposal, but Nehru and the Conaress leaders refused to accept 
it, as they thought that the Muslim majority provinces would acrord 
accession to form Pakistan. Had the Congress accepted the Cripps 
proposal, the Muslim majority provinces and many Princely States, 
at later stage, could have joined the Congress. Ilov^ e^ver, the Cripns 
Mission formally accepted the principles of Pckisten for the first 
time and soiN/ed the seeds of partition. 
After the departure of the Cripps Mission, the Congress and 
the League began to accuse each othor and the gulf of differences 
got very much widened. Rajagopalachari recognised that the root of 
all the catastrophe was the Congress-Leaoue differences on the 
guestion of Pakistan. Therefore, he began to advocate the acceptance 
o^ Pakistan. -Rajaji's acceptance o-^  P'-^ kistan paved the way for other 
54. Ch. Khaliquz7,aman, n. 15, n. 141. 
55. Moin Shakir, n. 2, p. 197. 
56. October 30, 1939, CVMG (ill, 15^, Vol. IXX, pp.318-19. 
57. See p. 179, Chapter IV. 
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leaders to present their own proposal for solution of this problem 
and the Congress began to tend tov/ards the acceptance of Pakistan. 
Another question v/hich comes to one's mjnd is whether Jinnah's 
rejection of the Federal Srheme, v/hich he once accepted, was a 
58 
political intrigue for partition? Jinnah in his fourteen points had 
demanded a federal system and provincial autonomy. Gandhiji and 
I-laulana Azad agreed to the transfer of Txswer to the League and 
59 
offered the August, 194 3 proposal, which envisaged the formation of 
government by Jinnah and the largest measure of autonomy to the 
federal states with the right for secession; thus, accenting the 
basic demand of the league included in Jinnah's fourteen points. The 
Congress anticipated that in case of injustice, there would be riots 
and the league government would become impracticable. Further, the 
Hindu majority states could have joined together and the Muslim 
majority states, being weak, could have been forced to join the 
Congress federal states. Moreover, there was no assurance that the 
Muslim majority states would join together under the leadership of 
Jinnah; hence, Jinnah oooosed the proposal at the cost of India's 
unity in order to save his position and the Muslims in India,at large. 
Gandhi-Jinnah talks com-ienced on September 9, 1944, and ended 
on 27th. Before the talks, the Hindu Mahasabha severely opposed the 
league's demand for Pakistan, and both the Hindu Mahasabha and the 
Muslim league threatened 'direct action', but none of them ventured 
beyond duelling in words. On the other hand, the British Government 
was antagonised with the Congress policies against the British Vfar 
Aims and Gandhiji was denied interview v/ith the Viceroy. Gandhiji 
realised that the only solution lay in an agreement with Jinnah on 
the basis of Rajagopalachari's formula, which Jinnah had turned do^Ti. 
Therefore, Gandhiji negotiated vith Jinnah to talk with him on the 
basis of partitioning India, v;hich caused nrovocati^n of Hindus and 
the Sikh m.inorities in Punjab. Savarkar asserted: "The Indian provinces 
V7ere not the private rsroperties of Gandhi ji and Rajaji so that they 
could make a gift of them to anyone they liked". Gandhiji did his 
58. See p. 62, Chapter II. 
59. See p. 212, Chapter V. 
60. R.C. Majumdar, n. 18, p. 713. 
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best to bring Jinnah down to a settlement but Jinnah rejected all 
the proposals of Gandhiji, V7hich had even the slightest possibility 
of de-crecating the creation of Pakistan. 
The Vicerov held that though communo] 1"=;TI "a^ Hcr-]orHibl e, but 
it vas a standing fact. He aimed at tho protection of minorities. 
'•7avell had to carry out Churchill' s directives that no constitutional 
agreement should be made without the consent of the Muslim league. 
Thus, Jinnah had thp power of vetO/ «^'hich he exploited shrevfdly 
to ensure the creation of Pakistan. Jinnah's manipulation of the 
power of veto caused an impasse to constitutional development. Jinnah 
proposed the number of representatives in the Executive Council for 
formina an interirn government i.e. 5 Iluslims, 5 Hindus, one Sikh, 
one Scheduled Caste end two others, with tho assertion to retain 
the right to nominate all the Muslim membeis, to v/hich the Conqress 
objected as it claimed the right to include in their quota members 
of all communities. Jinnah demanded that all the five Muslims shcu Id 
be taken from the Muslim League and "no decision objected to by 
the Muslims should be taken except by a clear t\70-thirds majority, 
or something of the kind". As the Congress did not agree to it, the 
Simla Conference failed to reach an agreement. The cause of the 
failure of the Conference was that it did not inc]ude representatives 
o-F the Hindu Mahasabha, tho Krishak Proja Party, "onins etc., and 
the other leaders nlayed, more or less, the part o-^  dumier:. However, 
the failure of the Conference, al] the more, immensely sfrngthened 
the position of the league, which could make or mar the fortunes of 
the Muslims in India. Therefore, the Muslim leaders had no chance 
of a political career in future remaining outside the leanue's circle. 
The Muslim League became the only door for the Muslims to enter into 
positions of power and profit. Consequently, 'wavering and middle-
of-the-door Muslim politicians tended to gravitate to the Muslim 
league, ^^ rhich helped in the procesr of the partition of the country. 
The Muslim Leanue had acquired a mass Muslim follov;ing by the 
end of 1945. In the 1945-46 elections to the Central Legislative 
Assembly, the league v;on 95.6 per cent of the total votes cast in 
the Muhammadan constituencies and the Congress secured 91.3 per cent 
61. See p. 263, Chapter VI. 
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of t h e t o t a l v o t e s c a s t i n t h e non-?Iuhammarien c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . The 
r e s u l t s of t h e e l e c t i o n s of t h e P r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i v e Co^inci ls 
e s t a b l i s h e d t h e C o n - r e s s and t h e l e a g u e as t h e t^^o major p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s in I n d i " ; . The s u c c e s s of t h e Muslim Leanue " l o a d e d t h e d i c e 
h e a v i l y i n f avour of P a k i s t a n " , v'h-'le t h e Congres s hoped t o t h w a r t 
t h e Muslim Leaoue even a f t e r c r e a t i o n of F a k i s t c n t o make a ioni ted 
I n d i a . But s i n c e t h e Muslim League r e f u s e d t o t a k e p a r t i n t h e I n t e r i m 
Government , t h e B r i t i s h s e n t a P a r l i a m e n t a r y D e l e g a t i o n t o e n v i s a a e 
p r i n c i p l e f o r s e t t l e m e n t . At l a s t , A t t l e e on March 15, 1946, d e c l a r e d 
t h a t " i t would be a g r e a t m i s t a k e t o s t a k e o u t t h e c l a i m s of r i v a l 
communi t i e s* , which ended t h e v e t o power of J i n n a h on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
o r o c e s s . Had A t t l e e ' s d e c l a r a t i o n come in t h e t h i r t i e s , t h e l e a g u e 
b e i n g weaker cou ld h a v e come dov/n t o a s e t t l e m e n t p r e s e r v i n g t h e u n i t y 
of I n d i a . Hov/ever, s i n c e C h u r c h i l l ' s government d i d n o t i n t e n d t o 
g r a n t i n d e p e n d e n c e b e f o r e t h e end of t h e ^''ar and t h e Congre s s and 
t h e l e a g u e and o t h e r m i n o r i t i e s cou ld n o t rcr--h a r-or-^ion s o l ^ : t i o n , 
J i n n a h ' s power of v e t o made t h e League so s t r o n g t h a t even a f t e r 
A t t l e e ' s d e c l a r a t i o n t h e p a r t i t i o n became i n e v i t a b l e . 
As t o t h e l o n g - t e r m p l a n (May 16, 1946) of t h e C a b i n e t M i s s i o n , 
t h e C o n g r e s s and t h e League f i r s t a c c e n t e d b u t l a t e r s h i e d avray 
from i t . F i r s t , t h e P l an vTas n o t a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e Muslim League as 
i t d i d n o t e n v i s a g e f o r m a t i o n of P a k i s t a n i n c l u d i n g t h e s i x p r o v i n c e s 
(Assam, Benga l , t h e P u n j a b , S ind , Nir?P and B a l u c h i s t a n ) . The l e a n u e 
a l s o d i d n o t a g r e e t h a t P a k i s t a n s h o u l d c o n s i s t of o n l y t h e Muslim 
m a j o r i t y a r e a s . The Muslim lieague t h r e a t e n e d ' D i r e c t A c t i o n ' , i f power 
vras t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e Congress- . S e c o n d l y , Maulana A z a d ' s viev7 t h a t 
t h e I n d i a n f e d e r a t i o n shou ld d e a l v/i th d e f e n c e , f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and 
corn-nunications g r a n t i n a maximum autonomy t o t h e -orovincer. , v:as a c c e n t e d 
by G a n d h i j i , b u t was opposed by S a r d a r P a t e l . The M i s s i o n had t o 
r e c o n c i l e t h e s e tv^o r i v a l s t a n d o o i n t s . C r i p p s c o i n e d t h a t " t h e g u l f 
be tween t h e s e tv;o p o i n t s o:^  viev.' i s by no means u n b r i d r e a b l e " . The 
Muslim Leacrue v/anted com.mon s u b j e c t s l i k e d e f e n c e and f o r e i o n a f f a i r s 
t o be d e a l t w i t h by t r e a t y a r r a n g e m e n t , and t h e C o n g r e s s wantcri a 
5 2. See p. 293, Chapter VI. 
53. Sudhir Ghosh, Gandhi's Emissary (Calcutta: Rupa & Co., 1967),P.196, 
64. Ibid. 
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federal centre for adrinistering these tv7o si^DJects, On April 29, 
1946, AIMI hac" forwarded a resolution to the Mission reiterating 
the Pakistan demand, but in his proposal forv;arded on May 11, he 
did not provide for the oartition of India, but for a confederation 
of Pakistan and the rest of India. On 'Cay 6, 1946, the Congress 
informed the Mission that it totally opnosed the idea of sub-federation 
v/ithin a -Federation, and on I4ay 12, communicated that "groups of 
Provinces may be formed". Gandhiji stated that the constituent assembly 
to be set up under the Congress-Ieaque aqrecment would not be bound 
by the terms of settlement but would be free to alter them. "However, 
as the league did not agree to a 'bigoer Pakistan' within a constitu-
tion of 'Indian Union', and the Congress did not agree to 'Indian 
Unity' at the risk of division of India into many parts, the Long-
Term Plan failed. However, the Shor^--Term Plan for establishment of 
a constituent assembly and the interim central government, was 
implemented. 
On July 7, 1946, Nehru, regarding the acceptance of the Cabinet 
Mission Plan in toto, in a militant tone said: "We are not bound by 
a single thing exceot that '-^e have decided for a moment to go to the 
Constituent Assembly". Azad ridiculed that "he (Nehru) had every 
68 
intention of modifyina the Plan". With regard to goinq to the Consti-
69 
tuent Assembly, Ndiru, on Ju]y 10, emphasised the sovereign character 
of the Constituent Assembly and said: "but v/hat v^ e do there we are 
70 
entirely and absolutelv free to determine". He also stated that the 
65. Papers R'^lating to the Cabinet Mission to Indi^, 1946 (Delhi: 
Manager o-*^  Publications, Government of India, 1946) , r.. 13. 
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pp. 154-55; see also Nehru's statement, M.A.H, Ispahani,'Factors 
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70. V.P. Menon, n. 67, p, 280. 
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problem of minori t ies v?as domestic. Nehru macle a great t a c t i c a l 
blunder in making these statements. Maulana Azad says tha t " th i s 
was not the f i r s t time tha t he did immense harm to the nat ional cause. 
He had committed an alm>ost equal blunder in 1937". Jinnah l a t e r 
s t a ted : "The Congress and the League v;ere both n a r t i e s to the agree-
ment/ and i t v/as on the basis of d i s t r ibu t ion among the Centre, the 
provinces and the groups that the league had accepted the Plan. 
Congress was ne i ther v/ise nor r ight in ra is ing doubts. I t should have 
accepted the Flan unequivocally i f i t stood for the unity of India" . 
Vaci l la t ion gave Jinnah t^e opportunity to divide Ind ia . 
Nehru's statement caused J innah ' s uproar and the AIML Council 
on July 27, vathdrew i t s acceptance, and drew up a plan of d i r ec t 
act ion, v;Mch ul t imately led to the -failure of th? interim government 
and the nission Flan. Had the Congress and "-h^ lea^me accepted the 
Ilission Flan fa i th fu l ly , as Maulana Azad s ta ted, ' the h i s tory mioht 
have been dif-=erent' . Stalvad deplored tha t the Mission Plan was 
smashed by the 'vjobling and v a c i l l a t i n g a t t i t u d e ' of the Congress 
leaders . He comrented: "The cherished boon of a United India had fal len 
into t h e i r lap, but they by- t h e i r o\-m want of p o l i t i c a l wisdom thre\7 
i t out and made i t beyond t h e i r reach". The Mission also i s to be 
blamed for changing i t s stand which caused disappointment to Jinnah, 
who had thought tha t the Plan would be a stepping stone to an 
independent Pakistan. 
To say tha t as the object of the Muslim League was no less than 
the i n s t i t u t i o n of Pakistan and, hence, they would not have worked, 
in any case, to r the goal of preserving the unity of India, does not 
hold ground in viev; of the fact t h a t the League accepted the Mission's 
Long-Term Plan with groups of provinces, v/hich had to re ta in the unity 
of India, but due to outbursts of the Congress leaders , Jinnah changed 
h i s mind and stuck to the determination for having Pakistan, The 
League had ant ic ipated tha t , at thr l a t e r stage, th-^ oro^ps of Muslim 
provinces would opt for creation of Pakistan, but the Connrens adhered 
71 . The Hindustan Times (Nev Delhi) , November 7, 1988. 
72. Ib id . 
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to its policy of 'united India'being nroud o^ their majority position 
and its hold on Assam and NUFP. The Congress accepted the 'grouping' 
74 
as optional because the Mission proposal, being deliberately vague, 
had at one place stated that it might form groups (i.e. optional 
grouping) and at other place stated would form groups (i.e.compulsory 
grouping). The Muslim League accepted the compulsory grouping.However, 
the British Government supported the leaaue's interpretation to make 
its position stronger. The Congress made a wise decision by rejecting 
the comnulsory grouping. Had the Congress accepted it, the provinces 
in aroups (?) and (c) v7ou]d have given thr^  T'lusl-'m I eaaue after ten 
years a 'big Pakist-n' and India would have been left with a weak 
minimal centre. 
The British interest in partition is also viable. The British 
wanted to create Pakistan to make India and Pakistan a weak country 
to exploit their economic resources in their o\-m Interest. The Indians 
had realised that the British foreign policy v;as reactionary and 
interventionist. The Soviet liberal ^olicy towards China and Persia, 
economic planning and social welfare attracted the Indian socialists. 
They recognised the Britirh as capitalist and exnloitative; and the 
Soviet Union as progressive standing ^or peace and freedom. The Indians' 
hope vras dashed to the ground vhen the US President Roosevelt, remained 
silent when the Soviet Union advocated at the U^T San Francisco 
Conference (April, 1945) for freedom of Asia and African countries. 
The members of the British Cabinet v;ere divided on the auestion of 
aranting independence to India. The Par] iamentary Delegation had 
recommended acceptance of Pakistan, the sooner the better, v^ hile 
Arthur Bottomley wanted to preserve Pritish trade interests in India 
and Tumbull desired an economic price for acceding tc ."toslem demand 
for Pakistan. Therefore, Attlee and the Cabinet Mission docided to 
divide India and accordingly made their declaration. Cn the one hand, 
they v/anted to retain the British interests to revitalise their 
economic position, which had become poor after the Second World Vlar 
74. S.R. Mehrotra, Tov-ards India' s '^ Ireedom and Partition (Hew Delhii 
Vikas Publishina I-'ouse, 1'?79),''~D. 23"1.'" 
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and, on the other hand, they saw that India v/as boycotting the 
British goods and the Muslim League had expressed willingness to 
have trade relations v/ith the British. The British anticipated that 
they would exnloit Pakistan as it v/ould be too weak to defend its 
boundaries and to strengthen its economic position. This policy 
affected the Pakistan boundary, reducin ^  it to a ' rr.oth-eaten Pakistan'. 
The failure of the interim oovernipent, the League's boycott of 
the Constituent Assembly, tha -^ci lure of the London Conference, 
antaaonism and disagreement between the Congress and the Muslim 
Leaaue, communal org\'', arson and destruction in recurrent riots had 
created a state of civil war beyond control during 1940s. Therefore, 
to hand over pov;er as early as i^ossible, Attlee on February 20, 1947, 
declared that power \-.''o^rld be trans-^erred to responsible Indian hands 
by a date not later than June, 1948, without entertaining veto of 
any party. Mountbatten succccde'^ in bringing the Congress and the 
League and leaders of other minorities to agree to a partition plan 
and preponed the date of independence to August, 194 7. 
During March 31 and April 4, 1947, Gandhiji had proposed to 
r'ountbatten that Jinnah shoi.:ld be given the option to form a Cabinet 
and the Congress \\'ould guarantee its cooperation freely and sincerely. 
If Jinnah rejects this offer, thp same offer to be made mutatis 
mutandis to the Congress. The sugaestion involved replacement of 
Jinnah in place of Nehru; hence, Jav/aharlo] Iv^ ehni an-^  Sardar Patel 
called the proposal 'unrealistic' and forced •'~;andhiji to v/ithdraw. 
As a result Gandhiji on April 11, 1947, withdrev; the proposal. Mad 
the proposal been put into action a-^ ter acceptance by Jinnah, the 
partition could perhaps still have been avoided. Further, with the 
passage of time, Jinnah's government, being that of minority, could 
have v;eakened after the British had left, and the power could have 
come to the Congress hand, but Nehru and Patel did not like to wait 
so long. If on the one side Jinnah wanted power in forming Pakistan, 
Nehru and Patel wanted their rule in India as early as possible. 
Some critique charged Jinnah that his failure in life v;as the 
cause of transferring his private motives into public purposes. His 
role in politics proves, as the criti-ues accept, that he was "a man 
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of ambition", which has the cha rac t e r i s t i c s of being "strong-headed, 
ins i s tence , hard won", whose "mind raced years ahead of most of 
77 h is conte-Tiooraries, Br i t i sh and Indian a l ike" , which helped him 
to gain Pakistan. 
To sijm up most important causes o^ the pa r t i t i on of India, 
among others , in short , a re : the deep rooted antagonism between the 
Hindus and the Muslims, fundamental differences between them i . e . 
difference in cul ture and c i v i l i z a t i o n , language and l i t e r a t u r e , 
a r t and a rch i tec ture , name and nomenclature, sense of values and 
proportion, laws and jurisprudence, social and moral codes, customs 
and calender, h is tory and t r a d i t i o n s , apt i tudes and ambitions, outlook 
on l i f o , mentality etc.,v7hich mar'.e the Congress and the League 
antagonis t ic to each other causing, on the one hand, J innah ' s r i s e 
as an uncompromising leader of the Muslims an."', on the other, Nehru' s 
and F a t e l ' s zest for power, and, ul t imately , t he pa r t i t i on of the 
Motherland. 
7 7. Stanley Volpert, r.. n , n. 48 
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APPENDIX I. 
SALIENT FEATURES OF SCHEME OUTLINED BY SIKANDER HYAT KHAN 
In 1937 
"(1) Instead of bringing British Indian Provinces and Indian States 
into the Federation as two distinct components, it provided for 
their entering it together on a regional basis which would be 
conducive to the solidarity of the country and the stability 
of the central government. 
(2) It would encourage collaboration between contiguous tinits, including 
British Indian Provinces' and Indian States, whose geographical 
proximity, common language and affinity of economic and other 
interests formed natural ties to bind them together. For instance, 
(a) In administrative matters, partioalarly those pertaining 
to law and order, this scheme would encourage the various 
units in a zone to maXe reciprocal arrangements and when 
necessary to devise a common line of action, 
(^ ) In the economic field it would enable the units to share 
in common arrangement for the establishment of institution 
for industrial and agricultural research, for experimental 
and demonstrative forms and other similar matters. 
(3) By thus encouraging collaboration between British Indian Provinces 
and Indian States it would tend to reduce causes and occasions 
for friction which would otherwise be constantly present if 
British Indian and Indian States ijnits were kept in two watertight 
compartments, 
(4) By confining the jurisdiction of the Federal Executive and 
Legislature to a few specified subjects of common concern, -it 
would enable both the British Indian units and the Indian States 
to enter the Federation on a uniform basis. At the same time it 
would allay the doubts and misgivings of the units by eliminating 
the possibility of undue interference by the Centre in their 
internal affairs. 
(5) It would ensure the willing and loyal co-operation of the units 
with the Federal Centre and thus avoid the grovrth of any 
fissiparous tendency among the units. 
(6) It would effectively safeguard the integrity and autonomy of 
Btitish Indian and Indian States units; and 
(7) It would give to the Minorities a greater sense of security. 
For the establishment of an All-India Federation on a regional 
basis, the country was to be demarcated into seven 'zones' as underi-
Source: Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism (New Delhi: Mahonar 
Book Service, 1977), pp. 155-57. 
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Zone 1 : Assam and Bengal (minus one or two Western Districts in 
order to reduce the size of the 'Zone' with a view to 
approximate it to other zones) Bengal States and Sikkim. 
Zone 2 : Bihar and Orissa (olus the areas transferred from Bengal 
to orissa) . This wolITd benefit Orissa which was handicapped 
to some extent on account of its limited resources and 
area. 
Zone 3 : United Provinces and U.P. States. 
Zone 4 : Madras, Travancore, Madras States and Coorg. 
Zone 5 : Bombay, Hyderabad, V7estem Indian States, Bombay State?, 
Mysore and C.P. States, 
Zone 6 : Rajputana States (minus Bikaner and Jaisalmer), Gwalior, 
Central Indian States, Bihar and Orissa States, C.P. and 
Berar, 
Zone 7 ; Punjab, Sind, NWF Province, Kashmir, Punjab States, 
Baluchistan, Bikaner and Jaisalmer". 
"... there would be a regional legislature for such zone consisting 
of both British Indian and Indian States units. One-third of the total 
number of members of the various regional legislatures were to constitute 
the Central Federal Assembly". 
1. Henry Craik to Linlithgow, June 5, 1938, Linlithgow Collection, NAI, 
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APPENDIX II 
SALIENT FEATURES OP SCHEME OUTLINED BY SYED ABDUL LATIF OF HYDERABAD 
in 1939 
"He contended that India was not a composite nation and Hindus 
and Muslims belonged to two distinct social orders and prescribed the 
division of India into four cultural zones for the Muslims and eleven 
zones for the Hindus. The Indian States were to be distributed between 
the different zones in accordance with their natural affinities. Each 
zone would form a homogeneous State with a highly centralized form of 
government. The following zones were demarcated to be assigned to the 
Muslims: 
1. North-West Blo"k; There was a great Muslim block in the North-East 
consisting of Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, North-West Frontier 
Province and Kashmir, the Indian States of Khairpur and Bhhawalpur. 
This area might be converted into a single autonomous state formed 
on the basis of federal relationship between the six units thereby 
allowing over 25 million of Muslims a free home of their own, 
2. North-East Bloc"kt Right on the other side of India, the North-East, 
there was also a solid block of Muslims in Eastern Bengal and Assam 
of over 30 millions, who might be assigned a free political existence. 
3. Delhi-Lucknow Block; In between the two blocks mentioned above the 
Muslims were unevenly distributed. Those of this area living close to 
each of the two blocks should be attracted for neutralization to the 
one nearer to them. The rest, the great bulk, belonging to the United 
Province and Bihar numbering about 12 million might be concentrated 
in a block extending in a line from the eastern border of Patiala to 
Lucknow and rounding up Rampur on the way. The block was carved out 
to allow the Hindu nationality to keep within its zone all its great 
religious centres like Banares, Hardwar, Allahabad and Mathura. To 
shift it on to any other part of the North would defeat that purpose. 
4. The Deccan Block; The case of the Muslims below the Vindhyas and 
Satpuras called for a special consideration. They were scattered all 
over the South in colonies of varyir>g size and exceeded 12 million 
in number. From them a zone was to be carved. The Dominion of Hyderabad 
might provide such a zone with a strip of territory in the South 
running through the districts of Kumool, Cuddapah, Chitoor, North-
Arcot and Chingleput down to the city of Madras, Such a strip with 
ah opening to the sea would be found absolutely necessary to settle 
the large Muslim mercantile and marine community living tor ages on 
the Coromandel and Malabar coasts. 
According to this scheme, exchange of population was also desired 
"to assure Hindus and Muslims freedom to live their own cultural lives 
in homelands of their own and to promote the cause of India's unity". 
Source: Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, op.cit,,pp.157-58 
1. The Indian Annual Register, 1939, Vol. I, pp. 366-70. 
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APPENDIX III 
SALIENT FEATURES OF THE ALIGARH SCHEME PROPOSED BY SYED ZAFRUL HASAN 
AND MOHAMMAD AFZUL HUSSAIN QADRI IN 1939. 
The scheme "aimed at the division of the country into Hindu India 
and Muslim India',' The principles on which it was based were as follows: 
(1) The Muslims of India were a nation by themselves. They had a 
distinct national xmity wholly different from the Hindus and other 
non-Muslims. Indeed, they were more different from the Hindus 
than the Sudetan Germans were from the Czechs, 
(2) The Muslims of India had a separate national future and had to 
make their own contributions to the betterment of the v/orld. 
(3) The future of the Muslims of India lay in complete freedom from 
the domination of the Hindus, the British, or for the matter of 
that, any other people. 
(4) The Muslim majority provinces could not be permitted to be enslaved 
into a single All India Federation with an overwhelming Hindu 
majority at the Centre, 
(5) The Muslims in the minority provinces should not be allowed to 
be deprived of their separate religious, cultural and political 
identity and should be given full and effective support by the 
Muslim majority provinces. 
The scheme envisaged the division of India into severa] whol3y 
independent and sovereign states: 
1. Pakistan comprising the Punjab, NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan and the 
States of Kashmir and Jammu, Mandi, Chamba, Saket, Sumin,Kapurthala, 
Malerkotla, Chitral, Dir, Kalat, Loharu, Bilaspur, Simla Hill 
State", Bahawalpur etc. 
Population - 3,92,74,244 
Muslims - 2,36,97,538; 60.3 per cent 
2. Bengal (excluding Howrah, and Midnapore districts), Pumea 
district (Bihar), Sylhet division (Assam): 
Population - 5,25,19,232 
Muslims - 3,01,18,184; 57,0 per cent 
3. Hindustan comprising the rest of India and Indian States 
(excluding Hyderabad, Pakistan, Bengal and the States included 
therein): 
Population - 21,60,00,000 
Muslims - 2,09,60,000; 9.7 per cent 
Source: Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, op. cit,, pp, 160-6 2, 
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APPENDIX III 
SALIENT FEATURES OF THE ALIGARH SCHEME PROPOSED BY SYED ZAFRUL HASAN 
AND MOHAMMAD AFZUL HUSSAIN QADRI IN 1939. 
The scheme "aimed at the division of the coimtry into Hindu India 
and Muslim India'.' The principles on which it was based were as follows: 
(1) The Muslims of India were a nation by themselves. They had a 
distinct national unity wholly different from the Hindus and other 
non-Muslims. Indeed, they were more different from the Hindus 
than the Sudetan Germans were from the Czechs, 
(2) The Muslims of India had a separate national future and had to 
make their own contributions to the betterment of the world. 
(3) The future of the Muslims of India lay in complete freedom from 
the domination of the Hindus, the British, or for the matter of 
that, any other people. 
(4) The Muslim majority provinces could not be permitted to be enslaved 
into a single All India Federation with an overwhelming Hindu 
majority at the Centre. 
(5) The Muslims in the minority provinces should not be allowed to 
be deprived of their separate religious, cultural and political 
identity and should be given full and effective support by the 
Muslim majority provinces. 
The scheme envisaged the division of India into several wholly 
indeoendent and sovereign states: 
1. Pakistan comprising the Punjab, N^ -TFP, Sind, Baluchistan and the 
States of Kashmir and Jammu, Mandi/ Chamba, Saket, Sumin,Kapurtha3a, 
Malerkotla/ Chitral, Dir, Kalat, Loharu, Bilaspur, Simla Hill 
State", Bahawalpur etc. 
Population - 3,9 2,74,244 
Muslims - 2,36,97,538; 60,3 per cent 
*^ Bengal (excluding Howrah, and Midnapore districts), Pumea 
district (Bihar), Sylhet division (Assam): 
Population - 5,25,19,232 
Muslims - 3,01,18,184; 57.0 per cent 
3. Hindustan comprising the rest of India and Indian States 
(excluding Hyderabad, Pakistan, Bengal and the States included 
therein): 
Population - 21,60,00,000 
Muslims - 2,09,60,000; 9.7 per cent 
Source; Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, op. cit,, pp. 160-6 2. 
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4. Hyderabad comorising Hyderabad, Berar and Kamatak (Madras 
and Orissa) : 
Population - 2,90,65,098 
Muslims - 21,44,010; 7.4 per cent 
(a) Delhi Province including Delhi, Meerut Division, RohilTchand 
division and the district of Aligarh (Agra division)s 
Population - 1,26,60,000 
Muslims - 35,20,000; 28.0 per cent 
(b) Malabar Province consisting of Ma]Qbar and adjoining areas i.e. 
Malabar and South Kanara: ' 
Population - 49,00,000 
Muslims - 14,40,000; 27.0 per cent 
The author of this scheme also desired that the three States of 
Pakistan, Bengal and Hindustan should enter into a defensive and 
offensive alliance on the folJov/ing basis:-
1. Mutual recognition and reciprocity. 
2. That Pakistan and Bengal be recognized as the homeland of Muslims 
and Hindustan as the homeland of Hindus to which they could 
migrate respectively if and when they wanted to. 
3. In Hindustan the Muslims were to be reco<5nised as a nation in 
minority and part of a larger nation inhabiting Pakistan and 
Bengal. 
4. The Muslim minority in Hindustan and the non-Muslim minority in 
Pakistan and Bengal would have: 
(i) representation according to population, and 
(ii) separate electorates together with effective safeguards 
guaranteed by al] the three States. 
(iii) separate representation according to population might be 
granted to all considerable minorities in the three states, 
e.g., Sikhs, non-caste Hindus, etc, 
5. An accredited Muslim political organization would be the sole 
official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan. 
Each of the three independent states of Pakistan, Hindustan and 
Bengal v;as to have separate treaties of alliance with Great Britain and 
separate Crown representation. There would be a joint court of arbitra-
tion to settle any dispute that m.ight arise between the different states 
or between them and the Crown. Unlike the other schemes which treated 
Hyderabad also as one of the Indian states, it claimed for it a 
1 
sovereign status. 
1. Rajendra Prasad, Pakistan (Bombay and Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 
1940), (edited by Yusuf Meherally), pp. 38-41. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Extract from M.A. Jinnah's Presidential Address at the Twenty-seventh 
Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League, Lahore, March 22-24,1940, 
(elucidating 'Two Separate Nations in India) 
... The British Government and Parliament, and more so the British 
nation, have been for many decades past brought up and nurtured with 
settled notions about India's future, based on developments in their own 
country which has built up the British constitution, functioning now 
through the Houses of Parliament and the system of cabinet. Their concept 
of party government functioning on political planes has become the ideal 
with them as the best form of government for every coxmtry, and the one-
sided and powerful prooaganda, which naturally appeals to the British, 
has led them into a serious blunder, in producing a constitution envisaged 
in the Government of India Act of 1935. We find that the most leading 
statesmen of Great Britain, saturated with these notions have in their 
pronouncements seriously asserted and exoressed a hope that the passage 
of time will harmonise the inconsistent elements in India, 
A leading journal lilce the London Times, cornrenting on the Govern-
ment of India Act of 1935, wrote that "undoubtedly the difference betvreen 
the Hindus and Muslims is not of religion in the strict sense of the word 
but also of law and culture, that they may be said indeed to represent 
two entirely distinct and separate civilizations. However, in the course 
of time the superstitions will die out and India will be moulded into a 
single nation'. (So according to the London Times the only difficulties 
are superstitions), These fundamental and deep rooted differences, 
spiritual, economic, cultural, social and political have been euphemised 
as mere 'superstitions'. But surely, it is a flagrant disregard of the 
past history of the sub-continent of India as well as the fundamental 
Islamic conception of society vis a vis that of Hinduism to characterise 
them as mere 'superstitions'. Notwithstanding thousand years of close 
contact, nationalities which are as divergent today as ever, cannot at 
any time be expected to transform themselves into one nation merely by 
means of subjecting them to a democratic constitution and holding them 
forcibly together by unnatural and artificial methods of British Parlia-
mentary statutes. What the unitary government of India for 150 years had 
failed to achieve cannot be realised by the imposition of a central 
federal government. It is inconceivable that the fist or the writ of a 
government so constituted can ever command a willing and loyal obedience 
throughout the sub-continent by various nationalities except by means 
of armed force behind it. 
The problem in India is not of an intercommunal character, but 
manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such. So 
long as this basic and fimdamental truth is not realised, any constitution 
that may be built will result in disaster and will orove destructive and 
harmful not only to the Mussalmans, but to the British and Hindus also. 
If the British Government are really in earnest and sincere to secure 
peace and happiness of the people of this sub-continent, the only course 
open to us all is to alDow the major nations separate homelands by 
Source;- All-India Muslim League Lahore Session, March, 1940;Presidential 
Address by Mr,M.A, Jinnah and Text of Resolution on the Future Constitu-
tion of India and the Position of Mussalmans under it Together with 
Brief Summary of Speeches Delivered on the Occasion (Delhi:1940),pp,19-25. 
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dividing India into 'autonomous national states'. There is no reason 
why these states should be antagonistic to each other. On the other 
hand, the rivalry and the natural desire and efforts on the part of 
one to dominate the social order and establish political supremacy 
over the other in the government of the country wil] disappear. It 
will lead more towards natural good wil3 by international pacts between 
them, and they can live in complete harmony with their neighbours. 
This will lead further to a friendly settlement all the more easily 
with regard to minorities by reciprocal arranaements and adjustments 
between Muslim India and Hindu India, which will far more adequately 
and effectively safeguard the rights and interests of Muslim and 
various other minorities. 
It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends 
fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are 
not religious in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, 
different and distinct social orders and it is a dream that the Hindus 
and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconc^tion 
of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of 
most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to 
revise our notions in tirtie. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two 
different religious philosophies, social customs, literature. They 
neither intermarry, nor interdine together and, indeed they belong to 
two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas 
and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It 
is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from 
different sources of history. They have different epics, different 
heroes and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of 
the other and, likewise their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke 
together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical 
minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent 
and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the 
government of such a state. 
History has presented to us many examples such as the Union of 
Great Britain and Ireland, Czechoslovakia and Poland. History has also 
shown to us many geographical tracts, much smaller than the sub-continent 
of India, which otherwise might have been called one country but which 
have been divided into as many states as there are nations inhabiting 
them. Balkan Peninsula comprises as many as 7 or 8 sovereign states. 
Likewise, the Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the Iberian 
Peninsula, vmereas under the plea of \niity of India and one nation 
which does not exist, it is sought to pursue here the line of one 
central government when we know that the history of the last 12 hundred 
years has failed to achieve unity and has witnessed, during these ages. 
India always divided into Hindu India and Muslim India. The present 
artificial unity of India dates back only to the British conquest and 
is maintained by the British bayonet, but the termination of the British 
regime, which is implicit in the recent declaration of His Majesty's 
Government, will be the herald of the entire break up with.worse 
disaster than has ever taken place durina the last one thousand years 
under Muslims. Surely that is not the legacy which Britain would bequeath 
to India after 150 years of her rule, nor would Hindu and Muslim India 
risk such a sure catastrophe. 
Muslim India cannot accept any constitution which must 
necessarily result in a Hindu majority government. Hindus and Muslims 
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brought together under a democratic system forced upon the minorities 
can only -nean Hindu Raj Democracy of the "kind with which the Congress 
High Command is enamoured would mean the complete destruction of 
what is most precious in Islam. We have had ample experience of the 
working of the provincial constitutions during the last two and a half 
years and any repetition of such a Government must lead to civil war 
and raising of private armies as recommended by Mr. Gandhi to Hindus 
of Sukkur when he said that they must defend themselves violently 
or non-violently, .blov; for blow, and if they could not they must 
emigrate. 
Mussalmans are not a minority as it is corrmonly known and 
understood. One has only got to look round. Even today according to 
the British map of India, out of 11 provinces 4 provinces, where 
the Muslims dominate more or less, are functioning notwithstanding 
the decision of the Hindu Congress High Command to non-co-operate 
and prepare for civil disobedience. Mussalmans are a nation according 
to any definition of a nation and they must have their homelands, 
their territory and their state. We wish to live in peace and harmony 
with our neighbours as a free and independent people. We wish our 
people to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, 
social and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance 
with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people.Honesty 
demands and vital interest of millions of our people impose a sacred 
duty upon us to find an honourable and peaceful solution, which would 
be just and fair to all. But at the same time we cannot be moved or 
diverted from our p^ jrpose and objective by threats or intimidations. 
We must be prepared to face al] difficulties and consequences, make 
all the sacrifices that may be required of us to achieve the goal we 
have set in front of us ... 
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APPENDIX V 
HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S DRAFT DECLARATION CN THE FUTURE OF INDIA 
(March , 1942) 
His Majesty's Government, having consirlered the anxieties expressed 
in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made 
in regard to the future of India, have decided to lay dovm in precise 
and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the 
earliest possible realisation of self-government in India, 
The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall 
constitute a Dominion/ associated with the United Kingdom and the other 
Dominions, by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in 
every respect, in no way subordinate in any respect of its domestic 
or external affairs. 
His Majesty's Government, therefore, make the following declaration: 
(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be 
taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an 
elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution 
for India. 
(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation 
of the Indian States in the constitution-making body. 
(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement 
forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to: 
(i) The right of any province of British India that is not 
prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present 
constitutional position, provision being made for its 
subsequent accession if it so decides. 
With such non-acceding provinces, should they so desire. 
His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a 
new Constitution, giving them the same full status as the 
Indian Union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to 
that here laid down. 
(ii) The signinf of a treaty which shall be negotiated between 
His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. 
This treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of 
the complete transfer of responsibility from British to 
Indian hands; it will make provision, in accordance with 
the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government, for the 
protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not 
impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to 
decide in future its relationship to other Member States 
of the British Commonwealth. 
Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the 
constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision 
of its Treaty arrangements so far as this may be required 
in the new situation. 
Source: The Civil and Military Gazette/Lahore), 30 March 1942. 
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(d) The constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless 
the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree 
upon some other form before the end of the hostilities: 
Immediately upon the result being known of the provincial 
elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the 
entire membership of the lower Houses of the Provincial Legis 
latures shall, as single electoral college, proceed to the 
election of the Constitution-making body by the system of propor-
tional representation. This new body shall be in nximber about 
1/lOth of the number of the electoral college. Indian States 
shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same propor-
tion to their total population as in the case of representatives 
of British India as a whole and with the same powers as the 
British Indian members, 
(e) During the critical period which now faces India and until the 
new constitution can be framed. His Majesty's Government must 
inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain the control 
and direction of the defence of India as part of their World 
War effort, but the task of organising to the full the military, 
moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility 
of the Government of- India with the co-operation of the people 
of India, 
His Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate 
and effective participation of the leaders of the principal 
sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, 
of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they will 
be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the 
discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future 
freedom of India, 
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APPENDIX VI 
fcRIPPS MISSICN SCHEME 
(March^ 194 2) 
The Ob jec t 
"The object of His Majesty's Government is the creation of a 
new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion associated with the 
United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the 
Crown but equal to them in every respect and in oo way subordinate in 
any aspect of its domestic or external affairs". 
The Terms of the Declaration 
"(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be 
taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an 
elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution 
for India, 
(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation 
of the Indian States in the constitution-making body. 
(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement 
forthwith the Constitution so framed subject only to: 
(i) the right of any Province of British India or princely 
States that is not prepared to accept the new constitution 
to retain its present cons-t-itutional position, provision 
being made for its subseauent accession if it decides so. 
With such non-acceding provinces, should they so desire. 
His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a 
new Constitution giving them the same full status as Indian 
Union, and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that 
here laid down; 
(ii) the signing of a Treaty which shall be negotiated between 
His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. 
This Treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of 
the complete transfer of responsibility from British to 
Indian hands; it will make provision, in accordance with 
the undertaking given by His Majesty's Government, for the 
protection of racial and religious minorities; but will 
not impose any restriction on the pov;er of the Indian Union 
to decide in the future its relationship to the other 
Member States of the British Commonwealth, Whether or not 
an Indian state elects to adhere to the Constitution, it 
will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its Treaty 
arrangements, so far as this may be required in the new 
situation. 
Source: The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), March 30, 1942. 
1. Sandhya Chaudhri, Gandhi and the Partition of India,pp. 72-74; see 
also N, Mansergh, The Transfer o^ Power, 1942-47,Vol.1,pp.462-63. 
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(d) The constitution-making body shall be composed of as follows; 
unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities 
aqree upon some other form before the end of hostilities: 
Immediately uoon the result being knov/n of the provincial 
elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, 
the entire membership of the lower Houses of the Provincial 
Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to 
the election of the constitution-making body by the system of 
proportional representation. This new body shall be in number 
about one-tenth of the nulhber of the electoral college, 
Indian States shall be Invited to appoint representatives 
in the same proportion to their total population as in the 
case of the representatives of British India as a whole, and 
with the same powers as British Indian members. 
(e) During the critical period, which now faces India and until the 
new constitution can be framed His Ilajesty's Government must 
inevitably bear the resx^onsibility for and retain control and 
direction of the defence of India as part of their world war 
effort but the task of organising to the full the military, 
moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility 
of the Government of India with the cooperation of the peoples 
of India. His Majesty's Government desire and invite the 
immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the 
principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their 
country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations".2 
2. Sandhya Chaudhri, Gandhi and the Partition of India, pp. 72-74; 
see also Nicholas Mansergh (Chief Editor), The Transfer of Power, 
1942-47, Vol. I, pp. 565-66. 
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APPENDIX VII 
RESOLUTION OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE WORKING COMT^ ITTEE ON THE 
DRAFT DECLAP.ATION ANNOUNCED BY MR. CHURCHILL, THE BRITISH 
PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 11 APRIL 1942. 
"The Committee appreciate that the British Prime Minister, in 
his pronouncement, made it clear that the Draft Declaration embodied 
only the proposals of I-iis Majesty's Government and not their decision, 
and that they are subject to agreement betv?een the main elements in 
India, thus maintaining the validity of the Declaration of the 8th of 
August, 1940# which had promised to the Musalmans that neither the 
machinery for the framing of the constitution should be set up, nor the 
constitution itself should be enforced without the approval and consent 
of Muslim India. 
The Committee, while expressing their gratification that the 
possibility of Pakistan is recognised by implication by providing for 
the establishment of two or more independent Unions in India, regret 
that the proposals of His Majesty's Government, embodying the fundamen-
tals, are not open to any modification and therefore no alternative 
proposals are invited. In view of the rigidity of the attitude of His 
Majesty's Government with regard to the fundamentals not being open to 
any modification, the Committee have no alternative but to say that the 
proposals in their present form are unacceptable to them for reasons 
given below: 
(1) The Musalmans, after 25 years of genuine efforts for the recon-
ciliation of the two major commxanities and the bitter^experience of 
the failure of such efforts, are convinced that it is neither just nor 
possible, in the interest of peace and happiness of the two peoples, 
to compel them to constitute one Indian Union, comoosed of the two 
principal nations - Hindus and Muslims which - appears to be the main 
object of His Majesty's Government, as adumbrated in the preamble of 
the Draft Declaration, the creation of more than one Union being relegated 
only to the realm of remote possibility and is purely illusory. 
(2) In the Draft Declaration a constitution making body has been 
proposed with the primary object of creating one Indian Union. So far 
as the Muslim league is concerned, it has f^ inally decided that the only 
solution of India's constitutional problem is the partition of India 
into independent zones, and it wild, therefore, be unfair to the Musalmans 
to compel them to enter such a constitution-making body, whose main 
object is the creation of a new Indian Union. With conditions as they 
are, it will be not only futile but on the contrary may exacerbate 
bitterness and animosity amongst the various elements in the country. 
Besides, the machinery which has been proposed for the creation 
of the constitution-making body, namely, that it wil] consist of members 
elected by the newly elected Lower House of the eleven provinces, uoon 
the cessation of hostilities, as a single Electoral College by the 
system of proportional representation, is a fundamental departure from 
Source;- Resolutions of the Al] India Muslim league from April 1942 
to May 1943 (published by (Nawabzada) Ilaguat Ali Khan, M.A. 
(Oxon.), M.I.A.(Central), Barrister-at-Law, Honorary Secretary, 
Al]-India Muslim league, Delhi, pp. 1-6. 
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the right of the Musalmans hitherto enjoyed by them, to elect their 
representatives by means of separate electorates, which is the only 
sure way in which true representatives of Musalmans can be chosen. 
The constitution-making body will take decisions by a bare majority 
on all questions of most vital and paramount character involved in the 
framing of the constitution, which is a departure from the fundamental 
principles of justice and contrary to constitutional practice so far 
followed in the various countries and Dominions; and the Musalmans, by 
agreeing to this will, instead of exercising their right and judgment 
as a constituent factor, be at the entire mercy of the constitution-
making body, in which they will be in a minority of about twentyfive 
per cent, 
(3) The right of non-accession to the Union, as contemplated in the 
Draft Declaration, has been conceded, presumably, in response to the 
insistent demands by the Musalmans for the partition of India, but the 
method and procedure laid down are such as to negative the professed 
object; for, in the Draft proposals, the right of non-accession has 
been given to the existing provinces, which have been formed from time 
to timie for administrative convenience and on no logical basis. 
The Musalmans cannot be satisfied by such a Declaration on a 
vital question affecting their future destiny, and demand a clear and 
precise pronouncement on the subject. Any attempt to solve the future 
problem of India by the process of evading the real issue is to court 
disaster. 
In the Draft proposals no procedure has been laid down as to how 
the verdict of the province is to be obtained in favour of or against 
accession to the one Union; but in the letter dated the 2nd of April 
from the Secretary of Sir Stafford Cripps, addressed to the President 
of the All India Muslim League, it is stated that "a province should 
reach the decision whether or not to stand out of the Union by a vote 
in the Legislative Assembly on a resolution to stand in. If the majority 
for accession to the Union is less than sixty per cent, the minority 
v;il] have the right to demand a plebiscite of the adult male population." 
In this connection it must be emphasised that in the provinces where 
the Musalmans ai-e in a majority, as in the case of the major provinces 
of Bengal and the Punjab, they are in a minority in the legislative 
Assemblies, and in the Assemblies of Sind and the North-West Frontier 
Province, the total number, namely sixty and fifty respectively, is 
so small and weightage given to the non-Muslims so heavy that it can 
be easily manipulated, and a decision under such conditions cannot be 
the true criterion of ascertaining the real opinion of the Musalmans 
of those provinces. 
As regards the suggested plebiscite in the provinces in which the 
Musalmans are in a minority, in the event of the requisite majority 
not being available in the legislative Assmblies, the procedure laid 
down is that reference shal] be made to the v^ hole adult population of 
the provinces and not to the Musalmans alone, which is to deny them 
the inherent right to self-determination, 
(4) With regard to the Indian States, it is the considered opinion 
of the Committee that it is a matter for them to decide whether to 
join or not to join or form a Union. 
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(5) With regard to the treaties to be negotiated between the Crox-m 
and the Indian Union or Unions, the proposals do not indicate as 
to what would happen in case of disagreement on the terms between 
the contracting parties; nor is there any provision made as to what 
would be the procedure when there is a difference of opinion in 
negotiating a revision of treaty arranaements with the Indian States 
in the new situation. 
(6) With regard to the interim arrangement, there is no definite 
proposal except the bare statement that His Majesty's Government 
desire and invite the effective and immediate participation of the 
leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the coionsels 
of their cotmtry, of the Commonwealth, and of the United Nations, 
The Committee are, therefore, unable to exoress their opinion until 
a complete picture is available. Another reason X'^hy the Committee are 
lanable to express their opinion on the interim arrangements for 
participation in the counsels of the country is that Sir Stafford 
Cripps has made it clear that the scheme goes through as a whole or 
is rejected as a whole, and that it would not be possible to retain 
only the part relating to the immediate arrangements at the Centre 
and discard the rest of the Draft scheme; and as the Committee has 
come to the conclusion that the prooosals for the future are lonacceptable, 
it will serve no useful purpose to deal further with the question of 
the immediate arrangements. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
RESOLUTION OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE WORKING COMMITTEE ON THE 
CONGRESS 'QUIT INDIA' RESOLUTION OF AUGUST 8, 1942 
(Auaust 20,1942) 
The Working Committee of the All India Muslim League, having 
given their deep and anxious consideration to the present political 
development in the country, denlore the decision arrived at by the 
Al]-India Congress Committee on August 8, 194 2, to launch an 'open 
rebellion' by resorting to a mass civil disobedience movement in 
pursuance of their objective of establishing Congress-Hindu domination 
in India, which has resulted in la^ -'lessness and considerable 
destruction of life and property. 
It is the considered opinion of the Working Committee that 
this movement is directed not only to coerce the British Government 
into handing over power to a Hindu oligarchy and thus disabling them 
from carrying out their moral obligations and pledges given to the 
Mussalmans and other sections of the peoples of India from time to 
time, but also to force the Mussalmans to submit and surrender to the 
Congress terms and dictation. Ever since the beginning of the war 
and even prior to that the sole objective of Congress policy has been 
either to cajole or coerce the British Government into surrendering 
power to the Congtess - a Hindu body with a microscooic follov/ing 
of other communities - in utter suppression of one hundred millions 
of Mussalmans, besides millions of other peoples of this vast sub-
continent of India, KTnile claiming the right of self-deteirmination 
for 'India', which is a mere Congress euphemism for a Hindu majority, 
it has persistently opposed the right of self-determination for the 
Muslim nation to decide and determine their own destiny. 
On May 1, 194 2, the All-India Congress Committee, by their 
resolution emphatically repudiated the Muslim league demand for the 
right of self-determination for Muslims and thus closed the door 
for the settlement of the communal oroblem, which is a condition 
precedent to the attainment of the freedom and indenendo-i ce of India. 
The Congress had also recognised this as an indis-pensable condition 
and had, therefore, made it a prominent plank in the Congress 
proaramme for over 20 years, but by their recent decisions have 
suddenly thrown it overboard and substituted the fantastic theory 
that the solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem can only follow the 
withdrawal of British power from India. 
The negotiations of Sir Sta-^ford Cripps with the Congress broke 
down not on the issue of independence but because of the refusal of 
the British Government to hand over the Muslims and the minorities 
to the tender mercies of the Congress, Any acquiescence in this on 
the part of the British would have been strenuously resisted by the 
minorities and particularly by the Muslim nation, vdth memories of 
tyranny in the Congress governed provinces still fresh and vivid 
in their minds. 
461 
Baul]<ed in t^eir ef-^ ort to cajole Sir Stafford Cripps to aqreo 
to the transfer of pov/er to the Congress caucuS/ they decided upon 
a slogan - 'Quit India' - arcompanied by the threat of mass civil 
disobedience. This slogan is a mere camouflaae and what is really 
aimed at is supreme control of the Government of the country"'by the 
Congress. 
The Muslims are not a whit less insistent on freedom for the 
country and the achievement of independence of the people of India, 
which is the creed of the All India Muslim League, They are, however, 
firmly convinced that the present Congress movement is not directed 
for securing the independence of all the constituent elements in the 
life of the country but for the establishment of a Hindu Raj and to 
deal a death blow to the Muslim goal of Pakistan. 
... The Muslim League, as it has been repeatedly made clear, 
stands not only for Pakistan and the freedom of Muslims, but also 
for the freedom and independence of Hindustan and Hindus. 
The Muslim League has been and is ready and v/illing to consider 
any proposals and negotiate with any party on a footina of eguality 
for the setting up of a provisional Government of India in order to 
mobilize the resources of the country for the purpose of the defence 
of India and successful prosecution of the war provided the demands 
of Muslim India, as indicated above, are conceded unequivocally. 
In these circumstances, the VJorking Committee of the All India 
Muslim League, after anxious and care'ful consideration, call upon the 
Muslims to abstain from any participation in the movement initiated 
by the Congress and continue to pursue their normal peaceful life. 
The Working Committee hope that no attempt shall be made from any 
quarter to intimidate, coerce, molest or interfere in any manner v;ith 
the normal life of the Muslims, other\'dse the Muslims would be 
compelled to offer resistance and adopt all such measures as m.ay be 
necessary for the protection of their life, honour and property. 
462 
APPENDIX IX 
SUGGESTED POINTS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CaTGRESS & 
THE MUSLIM LEAGUE PUT FORWARD BY THE CABINET MISSION, 
May 8, 1946 
1. There shall be an All-India Union Government and Legislature 
dealing with Foreign Affairs, Defence, Commimications, Fundamen-
tal Rights and having the necessary powers to obtain for itself 
the finances it requires for tlie se subjects. 
2. All the remaining powers shall vest in the Provinces. 
3. Groups of Provinces may be fopined and such groups may determine 
the Provincial subjects which they desire to take in common. 
4. The groups may set up their own Executives and Legislatures, 
5. The Legislature of the Union shall be composed of equal proportions 
from the Muslim-majority Provinces and from the Hindu-majority 
Provinces whether or not these or any of them have formed them-
selves into groups; together with representatives of the States. 
6. The Government of the Union shall be constituted in the same 
proportion as the Legislature.. 
7. The constitutions of the Union and the groups (if any) shall 
contain a provision whereby any Province can by a majority vote 
of its Legislative Assembly call for a reconsideration of the 
terms of the constitution after an initial period of 10 years 
and at 10-yearly intervals thereafter. 
For the purpose of such reconsideration a body shall be 
constituted on the same basis as the original Constituent Assembly 
and with the same provisions as to voting and shall have power 
to amend the constitution in any way decided upon. 
8. ' The constitution-making machinery to arrive at a constitution on 
the above basis shall be as follows:-
A. Representatives shall be elected from each Provincial Assembly 
in proportion to the strengths of the various parties in 
that Assembly on the basis of l/lOth of their numbers. 
B. Representatives shall be invited from the States on the basis 
of their population in proportion to the representation from 
British India. 
C. The Constituent Assembly so formed shall meet at the earliest 
date possible in New Delhi. 
Source: Papers Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India, 1946 (Delhi; 
Manager of Publications, 1946), pp. 14-15. 
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D. After its preliminary meeting at which the general order 
of business will be settled it will divide into three 
sections, one section representing the Hindu-majority 
Provinces, one section representina the Muslim-majority 
Provinces and one representing the States. 
E. The first two sections will then meet separately to decide 
the Provincial constitutions for their group and, if they 
wish, a group constitution. 
F. When these have been settled it will be open to any Province 
to decide to opt out of its original group and into the 
other group or to remain outside any group. 
G. Thereafter the three bodies will meet together to settle 
the constitution for the Union on the lines agreed in 
paragraphs 1-7 above. 
H. No major point in the Union constitution which affect the 
communal issue shal] be deemed to be passed by the Assembly 
unless a majority of both the two major communities vote 
in its favour. 
9. The Viceroy shall forthwith call together the above constitution-
making machinery which shall be governed by the provisions 
stated in paragraph 8 above. 
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APPENDIX X 
.TERMS OFFERED BY THE MUSLIM LEAGUE AS A BASIS OF AGREE!4ENT 
May 12, 1946 
1. The six Muslim Provinces (Punjab, Nortb-West Frontier Province, 
Baluchistan/ Bind, Bengal and Assam) shall be grouped together as one 
group and will deal with all other subjects and matters except Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Communications, necessary for Defence, which may 
be dealt with by the constitution-making bodies of the two groups of 
Provinces - Muslim Provinces (hereinafter named Pakistan Group) and 
Hindu Provinces - sitting together, 
2. There shall be a separate constitution-making body for the six 
Muslim Provinces named above, which will frame constitution for the 
Group and the Provinces in the Group and will determine the list of 
subjects that shall be Provincial and Central (of the Pakistan Federatfor) 
with residuary sovereign powers vesting in the Provinces, 
3. The method of election of the representatives to the constitution-
making body will be such as wou]d secure oroper representation to the 
various communities in proportion to their population in each province 
of the Pakistan Group. 
4. After the constitutions of the Pakistan Federal Government and the 
Provinces are finally framed by the constitution-making body, it will 
be open to any Province of the Group to decide to opt out of its Group, 
provided the wishes of the oeople of that Province are ascertained by 
a referendum to opt out or not. 
5. It must be open to discussion in the joint constitution-making body 
as to whether the Union will have a legislature or not. The method of 
oroviding the Union with finance should also be left for decision of the 
joint meeting of tho tv/o constitution-making bodies, but in no event 
shall it be by means of taxation. 
6. There should be parity of representation between the two Groups 
of Provinces in the Union Executive and the Legislature, if any. 
7. No major point in the Union constitution which affects the communal 
issue shall be deemed to be passed in the joint constitution-making body, 
unless the majority of the members of the constitution-making body of 
the Hindu Provinces and the majority of the members of the constitution-
making body of the Pakistan Group, present and voting, are separately 
in its favour, ^ J 
? V 2° decision, legislative, executive or administrative, shall be 
taken by the Union in regard to any matter of controversial nature 
except by a majority of three-fourths. 
9. In Group and Provincial constitutions fundamental rights and 
safeguards concerning religion, culture and other matters affecting the 
different communities will be provided for. 
10. The constitution of the Union shall contain a provision whereby 
any Province can, by a majority vote of Its Legislative Assembly,call for 
reconsideration of the terms of the constitution, and willh have the 
liberty to secede from the Union at any time after an initial oeriod of 
ten years. 
Source: Bapfirs Relating to the d^^inet Mission to Indila, 1946,pp.20-il, ~ 
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APPENDIX XI 
TERMS OFFERED BY THE CONGRESS AS A BASIS OF AGREEMENT 
May 12, 1946 
1. The Constituent Assembly to be formed as follows:-
(i) Representatives shall be elected by each Provincial Assembly 
by proportional representation (single transferable vote). 
The number so elected should be one--Pifth of the number of 
members of the Assembly and they may be members of the 
Assembly or others. 
(ii) Representatives from th^ ^ States on the basis of their Dopula-
tion in proportion to the representation from British India. 
How these representatives are to be chosen is to be considered 
later. 
2. The Constituent Assembly shall draw up a constitution for the 
Federal Union, This shall consist of an All-India Federal Government and 
Legislature dealing with Foreign Af-Pairs, Defence, Communications, 
Fundamental Rights, Currency, Customs and Planning as well as such other 
subjects as, on closer scrutiny, may be found to be intimately allied to 
them. The Federal Union v;ill have necessary powers to obtain for itself 
the finances it requires for these subjects and the power to raise revenues 
in its own right. The Union must also have never to take remedial action 
in cases of breakdov.-n of the constitution and in grave public emeroencies. 
3. All the remaining powers shall vest in the Provinces or Units. 
4. Groups of Provinces may be formed and such groups may determine 
the Provincial subjects which they desire to take in common. 
5. After the Constituent Assembly has derided the constitution for 
the All-India Federal Union as laid down in paragraph 2 above, the 
representatives of the Provinces may form groups to decide the Provincial 
constitutions for their group and, if they ''dsh, a group constitution. 
6. No major point in the All-India Federa] Constitution which affects 
the communal issue shall be deemed to be passed by the Constituent Assembly 
imless a majority of the members of the community or communities concerned 
present in Assembly and voting are separately in its favour. Provided 
that in case there is no agreement on any such issue, it will be referred 
to arbitration. In case of doubt as to v/hether any point is a major 
comminal issue, the Speaker v;il] decide, or, if so desired, it may be 
referred to the Federal Court. 
7. In the event of a dispute arising in the process of constitution-
making, the specific issue shall be referred to arbitration, 
8. The constitution should provide machinery for its revision at any 
time subject to such checks as may be riesired. If so desired, it may be 
specifically stated that this whole ronstituti-^n may be reconsidered 
after ten years. 
Source: Papers R-latino to the Cabinet Mission to India, 1946, pp.22-23. 
466 
APPENDIX XII-
THE CABINET ^^ ISSIQ^ T PLAN 
May 16, 1946 
1, On the 15th March last, just before the riispatch of the Cabinet 
to India, Mr. Attlee, the British Prime Minister, used these words: 
"My colleagues are goint to India with the intention of using 
their utmont endeavours to help her to attain her freedom as speedily 
and fully as possible. What form of government is to replace the present 
regime is for India to decide; but our desire is to help her to set 
up forthwith the machinery for making that decision ... 
"I hope that the Indian people may elect to remain whtin the 
'British Commonwe?lth, I am certain that she will find great advantages 
in doing so ... 
"But if she does so elect, it must be by her own free v;ill . The 
British Com-^onwealth and Empire is not bound together by chains of 
external compulsion. It is a free association o^ " free peoples. I^, on 
•-' e other hand, she elects for indenendence, in our view she has a right 
to do so. It win be for us to help to make the transition as smooth 
and easy as possible". 
2, "... This statement is made with the full aooroval of His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom. 
3, "We have accordingly decided that immediate arrangements should 
be made wheretjy Indians may decide the -Putura constitution of India, and 
an Interim Government may be set UP at once to carry on the administra-
tion of British India until such time as a nev; constitution can be 
brought into being II 
4. It is not intended in this statement to review the voluminous 
evidence which has been submitted to the Mission; but it is right that 
v7e should state that it has shown an almost universal desire, out'^ide 
the sunporters of the Muslim League, for the iJinity of India. 
5. This consideration did not, however, deter us from examining 
closely and impartially the possibility of a partition of India; since 
we were greatly impressed by the very genuine and acute anxiety of the 
^^aslims lest they should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Hindu-
majority rule. This feeling has become so strong and widespread amongst 
the Muslims that it cannot be allayed by mere paper safeguards. If there 
is to be internal peace in India it must be secured by measures which 
will assure to the Muslims a control in all matters vital to their 
culture, religion and economic or other interests. 
6 T VJe therefore examined in the first instance the question of a 
separate and fully independent sovereiijn state of Pakistan as claimed 
by the Muslim League. Such a Pakistan would comprise two areas: one in 
Source: Papers Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India, 1946, pp.1-7. 
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the North-West consisting of the provinces of the Punjab, Sind, North-
west Frontier an-? British Baluchistan; the other in the North-East 
consisting of the Provinces of Bengal and Assam, The League were prepared 
to consider adjustment of boundaries at a later stage* but insisted 
that the principle of Pakistan should first be acknowledged. The 
argument for a separate state of Pakistan was based, first, upon the 
right of the Muslim majority to decide their method of government 
according to their v/ishes, and, secondly, upon the necessity to include 
substantial areas in" which Muslims are in a minority, in order to make 
Pakistan administratively and economically workable. 
The size of the non-Muslim minorities in a Pakistan comorising 
the v;hole of the six Provinces enumerated above would be very considerable 
as the following figures show: 
North-Estem Area Muslim Npn-Muslim 
Punjab 16,217,242 12,201,577 
North-West Frontier Province 2,783,797 249,270 
Sind 3,208,325 1,326,683 
British Baluchistan 438,930 62,701 
22,653,294 13,840,231 
(6 2,07%) (37.93%) 
North-Eastem Area 
Bengal 33,005,434 27,301,901 
Assam 3,442,479 6,762,254 
36,447,913 34,063,345 
(51,69%) (48,31%) 
The Muslim minorities in the remainder of British India number 
some 20 million dispersed amongst a total population of 188 million. 
These figures show that the setting up of a separate sovereign 
state of Pakistan on the lines claimed by the Muslim League would not 
solve the communal minority problem; nor can v;e see any justification 
for including within a sovereign Pakistan those districts of the Punjab 
and of Bengal and Assam in which the population is predominantly 
non-Muslim, Every argument that can be used in favour of Pakistan can 
equally, in our view, be used in favour of the exclusion of the non-
Muslims areas from Pakistan. This point would particularly affect the 
position of the Sikhs, 
7. We, therefore, considered whether a smaller sovereign Pakistan 
confined to the Muslim-majority areas alone might be a possible basis 
of compromise. Such a Pakistan is regarded by the Muslim League as quite 
impracticable because it would entail the exclusion from Pakistan of 
(a) the whole of the Ambala and Jullundur Divisions in the Punjab; 
(b) the whole of Assam except the district of Sylhet; and (c) a large 
1. All population figures in this statement are from the most recent 
census taken in 1941, 
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part of Western Bengal, including Calcutta, in which city the percentage 
of the Muslim population is 23,6 per cent. We ourselves are also 
convinced that any solution which involves a radical partition of the 
Punjab and Bengal, as this would do, would be contrary to the wishes 
and interests of a very large proportion of the inhabitants of these 
provinces, Bengal and the Punjab each has its own common language and 
a long history and tradition. Moreover, any division of the Punjab 
would of necessity divide the Sikhs, leaving substantial bodies of Sikhs 
on both sides of the boundary. We have, therefore, been forced to the 
conclusion that neither a larger nor a smaller sovereign state o"P 
Pakistan would provide an acceptable solution for the communal problem. 
8. Apart from the great force of the foregoing arguments there are 
weighty administrative, economic and military considerations. The whole 
of the transportation and postal and telegraph systems of India have 
been established on the basis of a united India. To disintegrate them 
would gravely injure both parts of India. The case for a united defence 
is even stronger. The Indian Armed Forces have been built up as a whole 
for the defence of India as a whole, and to break them in two would 
inflict a deadly blow on the long traditions and high degree of efficiency 
of the Indian Army and would entail the gravest dangers. The Indian 
Navy and Indian Air Force would become much less effective. The two 
sections of the suggested Pakistan contain the two most vulnerable 
frontiers in India and for a successful defence in depth the area of 
Pakistan would be insufficient. 
9. A further consideration of imoortance is the greater difficulty 
v/hich the Indian States would find in associating themselves with a 
divided British India. 
10. Finally, there is the geographical fact that the two halves of 
the proposed Pakistan State are separated by some seven hxindred miles 
and the communications between them both in war and peace would be 
dependent on the goodwill of Hindustan. 
11. We are therefore unable to advise the British Goverhment that 
the power which at present resides in British India should be handed 
over to two entirely separate sovereign States. 
12. This decision does not, however, bind us to the very real Muslim 
apprehensions that their culture and political and social life might 
become submerged in a purely unitary India, in which the Hindus 
with thei-r greatly superior nuijibers must be a dominating element. To 
meet this the Congress have put forward a scheme under which provinces 
would have full autonomy subject only to a minimum of Central subjects, 
such as Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. 
Under this scheme provinces, if they wished to take part in 
economic and administrative planning on a large scale, could cede to 
the Centre optional subjects in addition to the comnulsory ones mentioned 
above. 
13. Such a scheme would, in our view, present considerable constitu-
tional disadvantages and anomalies. It would be very difficult to work 
a Central Executive and Legislature in which some ministers, who dealt 
with compulsory subjects, were responsible to the whole of India while 
other ministers, who dealt with optional subjects, would be responsible 
only to those provinces who had elected to act together in respect of 
such subjects. This difficulty would be accentuated in the Central 
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Legislature, where it would be necessary to exclude certain members 
from speaking and voting when subjects \i;ith v'hich their provinces were 
not concerned were under discussion. Apart from the difficulty of 
working such a scheme, we do not consider that it would be fair to ^eny 
to other provinces, which did not desire to take the optional subjects 
at the Centre, the right to form themselves into a group for a similar 
purpose. This would indeed be no more than the exercise of their 
autonomous powers in a particular way. 
14. Before nutting forward our recommendations we turn to deal with 
the relationship of the Indian States to British India. It is quite 
clear that with the attainment of independence by British India, whether 
inside or outside the British Commonwealth, the relationship which has 
hitherto existed between the Rulers of the States and the British Crown 
will no longer be possible. Paramountcy can neither be retained by 
the British Crown nor transferred to the new government. This fact has 
been fully recognized by those whom we interviewed from the States. 
They have at the same time assured us that the States are ready and 
willing to co-operate in the new development of India. The precise 
form which their cooperation will take must be a matter for negotiation 
during the building up of the new constitutional structure and it by 
no means follows that it will be identical for all the States. V7e have 
not therefore dealt with the States in the same detail as the Provinces 
of British India in the paragraphs which follow, 
15. We now indicate the nature of a solution which in our view would 
be just to the essential claims of all parties and would at the same 
time be most likely to bring about a stable and practicable form of 
constitution for all India. 
We recommend that the constitution should take the following 
basic form: 
(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British 
India and the States which should deal with the following 
subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications; 
and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances 
required for the above subjects. 
(21,. The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature 
constituted from British Indian and States' renresentatives. 
Any question raising a major communal issue in the 
Legislature should require for its decision a majority of 
the representatives present and voting of each of the two 
major commimities as well as majority of all the members 
present and voting, 
(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary 
powers shall vest in the provinces, 
(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than 
those ceded to the Union. 
(5) Provinces should be free to form groups with Executives 
and legislatures, and each group could determine the 
provincial subjects to be taken in common. 
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(6) The constitutions of the Union and the groups should 
contain a provision whereby any province could be a mao|ority 
vote of its Legislative Assembly call for a reconsideration 
of the terms of the constitution after an initial period 
of ten years and at ten-yearly intervals thereafter, 
16. It is not our object to lay out the details of a constitution on 
the above programme but to set in motion machinery v/hereby a constitu-
tion can be settled by Indians for Indians. 
It has been necessary, however, for us to make this recommenda-
tion as to the broad basis of the future constitution because it became 
clear to us in the course of our neqotiations that not until that had 
been done was there any hope of getting the tv;o major communities to 
join in the setting up of the constitution-making machinery. 
17. V/e now indicate the constitution-making machinery, which we propose 
should be brought into being fortwith in order to enable a new constitu-
tion to be worked out. 
18. In forming an assembly to decide a new constitutional structure 
the first problem is to obtain as broad-based and accurate a represen-
tation of the whole population as is possible. The most satisfactory 
method obviously would by by election based on adult franchise, but any 
attemot to introduce such a step now would lead to a wholly unacceptable 
delay in the formulation of the new constitution. The only practicable 
course is to utilize the recently elected Provincial legislative Assemblies 
as electing bodies. There are, however, two factors in their composition 
which make this difficult. First, the numerical strengths of Provincial 
Legislative Assemblies do not bear the same proportion to the total 
population in each province. Thus, Assam, with a population of 10 million, 
has a Legislative Assembly of 108 members, while Bengal, with a popula-
tion six times as large, has an Assembly of only 250, Secondly, owing 
to the weightage given to minorities by the Communal Award, the strengths 
of the several communities in each Provincial Legislative Assembly are 
not in proportion to their numbers in the province. Thus the number of 
seats reserved for Moslems in the Bengal Legislative Assembly is only 
48 per cent of the total, although they form 55 per cent of the provincial 
population. After a most careful consideration of the various methods by 
which these points might be corrected, we have come to the conclusion 
that the fairest and most practicable plan would be: 
(a) to allot to each province a total number of seats propor-
tional to its population, roughly in the ratio of one to a 
million, as the nearest substitute for representation by 
adult suffrage; 
(b) to divide this provincial allocation of seats between the 
main communities in each province in proportion to their 
population; 
(c) to provide that the representatives allocated to each 
community in a province shall be elected by members of that 
commvmity in its Legislative Assembly. 
We think that for these pu-poses it is sufficient to recognize 
only three main communities in India, General, Moslem and Sikh, the 
"General' community including al3 persons who are not Moslems or Sikhs. 
As smaller minorities would upon a population basis have little or no 
471 
representation, since they would lose the weightage which assures them 
seats in Provincial Legislatures, we have made the arrangements set out 
in paragraph 20 below to give them a full representation upon all 
matters of special interest to minorities, 
19. (i) We therefore propose that there shall be elected by each 
Provincial Legislative Assembly the follov;ing numbers of 
representatives, each part of the Legislative Assembly (General, 
Moslem or Sikh) electing its own representatives by the method 
of proportional representation with single transferable vote: 
TaVile of Representation 
Section A 
Provinces 
Madras 
Bombay 
United Pro^ 
Bihar 
Central Pre 
Orissa 
Section B 
Provinces 
Punjab 
North-West 
Province 
Sind 
Section C 
Provinces 
Bengal 
Assam 
/inces 
)vinces 
Total 
Frontier 
Total 
Total 
Total fo 
Maximum 
General 
45 
19 
47 
31 
16 
9 
167 
General 
8 
0 
1 
9 
General 
27 
7 
34 
ir British 
for Indian 
Tot 
Indi 
Sta 
al 
Muslim 
4 
2 
8 
5 
1 
0 
20 
Muslim 
16 
3 
3 
22 
Muslim 
33 
3 
36 
a 
tes 
Sikh 
4 
0 
0 
4 
292 
93 
385 
Total 
49 
21 
55 
36 
17 
9 
187 
s 
Total 
60 
10 
70 
Total 
28 
3 
4 
35 
Note;- In order to represent the Chief Commissioners' Provinces 
there will be added to Section A the member representing Delhi in 
the Central Legislative Assembly, the member representing Ajmer-
Merwara in the Central Legislative Assembly and a representative 
to be elected by the Coorg legislative Co^ ancil. 
To Section B wil] be added a representative of British Baluchistan 
(ii) It is the intention that the States would be given in the 
final Constituent Assembly appropriate representation which would 
not, on the basis of the calculation of population adopted for 
British India, exceed 93; but the method of selection wil] have 
to be determined by consultation. The States would in the 
preliminary stage be represented by a negotiating committee. 
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(iii) Representatives thus chosen shall meet at New Delhi as 
soon as possible. 
(iv) A preliminary meeting wil] be held at which the general 
order of business will be decided, a chairman and other 
officers elected and an Advisory Committee (see paragraph 
20 below) on rights of citizens^ minorities and tribal and 
excluded areas set up. Thereafter the provincial represen-
tatives will divide up into three Sections shown xxnder A, 
B and C in the Table of Representation in sub-paragraph(i) 
of this paragraph. 
(v) These Sections shall proceed to settle provincial Constitu-
tions for the provinces included in each Section and shall 
also decide whether any group constitution shall be set up 
for those provinces and if so with what provincial subjects 
the group should deal. Provinces should have power to opt 
out of groups in accordance with the provisions of sub-
clause (viii) below. 
(vi) The representatives of the Sections and the Indian States 
shall reassemble for the purpose of settling the Union 
constitution. 
(vii) In the Union Constituent Assembly resolutions varying the 
provisions of paragraph 15 above or raising any major 
communal issue shall require a majority of the representa-
tives present and voting of each of the two major communities. 
The Chairman of the Assembly shall decide which, if any, 
resolutions raise major commimal issues and shall, if so 
requested by a majority of the representatives of either of 
the major commxinities, consult the Federal Court before 
giving his decision, 
(viii) As soon as the new constitutional arrangements have come 
into operation it shall be open to any province to elect to 
come out of any group in which it has been placed. Such a 
decision shall be taken by the lerrislature of the province 
after the first general election under the new Constitution, 
20, The Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens, minorities and 
tribal and excluded areas will contain due representation of the interests 
affected and their function will be to report to the Union Constituent 
Assembly ur>on the list of fundamental rights, clauses for protecting 
minorities, and a scheme for the administration of tribal and excluded 
areas, and to advise whether these rights should be incorporated in the 
provincial, the group or the Union constitution, 
21, His Excellency the Viceroy will forthwith request the provincial 
legislatures to oroceed with the election of their representatives and 
the States to set up a negotiating committee. 
It is hoped that the process of constitution-rraking can proceed 
as rapidly as the complexities of the task permit so that the interim 
period may be as short as possible, 
22, It will be necessary to negotiate a treaty between the Union 
Constituent Assembly and the United Kingdom to provide for certain 
matters arising out of the transfer of oower. 
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23. VThile the constitution-making oroceeds the administration of India 
has to be carried on. We attach the great importance therefore to the 
setting up at once of an Interim Government having the support of the 
major political parties. It is essential during the interim period that 
there should be the maximum of co-operation in carrying through the 
difficult tasks that ^ace the Government of India, Besides the heavy 
tasks of day-to-day administration, there is the grave danger of famine 
to be countered, there are decisions to be taken in many matters of 
post-war development which will have a far-reaching effect on India's 
future and there are important international conferences in which India 
has to be represented. For all these purposes a government having 
poTDular support is necessary. The Viceroy has already started discussions 
to this end and hopes soon to form an Interim Government in which all 
the portfolios, incluiing that of the VJar Member, will be held by Indian 
leaders having the full confidence of the people. The British Government, 
recognizing the full significance of the changes, will give the fullest 
measure of co-operation to the Government so formed in the accomplishment 
of its tasks of administration and in bringing about as rapid and smooth 
a transition as possible, 
24. To the leaders and people of India, who now have the opportunity 
of complete independence, we would finally say this. We and our Govern-
ment and coiantrymen hoped that it would be possible for the Indian 
people themselves to agree upon the method of framing the new Constitu-
tion under which they will live. Despite the labours which we have 
shared with the Indian parties and the exercise oF much patience an'i 
goodwill by all, this has not been possible. We, therefore, now lay 
before you proposals which, after listening to all sides and after much 
earnest thought, we trust will enable you to attain your independence 
in the shortest time and with the least danger of internal disturbance 
and conflict. These proposals may not, of course, completely satisfy 
all parties, but you will recognize with us that, at this supreme moment 
in Indian history, statesmanship demands mutual accor^modation and v;e ' 
ask you to consider the alternative to the acceptance of these proposals. 
After all the efforts which we and the Indian parties have made together 
for agreement, we must state that, in our view, there is small hope of 
a peaceful settlement by the agreement of the Indian parties alone. The 
alternative would, therefore, be a grave danger of violence, chaos and 
even civil war. The gravity and duration o^ such a disturbance cannot 
be foreseen, but it is certain that it v;ould be a terrible disaster ^or 
many millions of men, v;omen and children. This is a possibility which 
must be regarded with equal abhorrence by the Indian people, our own 
countrym.en and the world as a whole. We, therefore, lay these proposals 
before you in the profound hope that they will be accepted and operated 
by you in the spirit of accommodation and goodwill in which they, are 
offered, V7e appeal to all who have the future good of India at heart 
to extend their vision beyond their own comm-onity or interest to the 
interests of the v/hole 400 millions of Indian people. 
V7e hope that the new independent India may choose to be a member 
of the British Commonwealth. Vie hope, in any event, that you will remain 
in close an^ T friendly association with our people. But these are matters 
for your own free choice. Whatever that choice may be, we look forward 
v;ith you to your ever-increasing prosperity arnong the greatest nations 
o^ the world and to a -Future mere glorious thon your past. 
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APPENDIX X l l l 
^PROPOSAL FOR THE If^lEDIATE TRANSFER OF POVJER 
J u n e 3 , 1947 
INTRCDUCTI ON 
1. On 20th February, 1947, His Majesty's Government announced that 
their intention of transferring power in British India to Indian hands 
by June, 1948. His Majesty's Government had hoped that it would be 
Dossible -for the major parties to co-operate in the working-out of the 
Cabinet Mission's Plan of 16 May, 1946, and evolve for India a consti-
tution acceptable to all concerned. This '^ ODe has not been fulfilled. 
2. The majority of the representatives of the Provinces of Madras, 
Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Berar, 
Assam, Orissa and the North-West Frontier Province, and the represen-
tatives of Delhi, Ajmer-Merwara and Coorg have already made progress 
in the task of evolving a new Constitution, On the other hand, the 
Muslim League Party, including in it a majority of the representatives 
of Bengal, the Punjab and Sind, as also the representatives of British 
Baluchistan, has decided not to participate in the Constituent Assembly. 
3. It has always been the desire of His Majesty's Government that 
power should be transferred in accordance with the wishes of the Indian 
people themselves. This task would have been greatly facilitated if 
there had been agreement among the Indian political parties. In the 
absence of such an agreement, the task of devising a method by which 
the wishes of the Indian people can be ascertained has devolved on His 
Majesty's Government. After full consultation with political leaders 
in India, His Majesty's Government have decided to adopt for this 
purpose the plan set out below. His Majesty's Government wish to make 
it clear that they have no intention of attempting to frame any ultimate 
constitution for India; this is a matter -for the Indians themselves. 
Nor is there anything in this plan to preclude negotiations between 
commijnities for a united India. 
1. It is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to interrupt 
the work of the existing Constituent Assembly. Now that provision is 
made for certain Provinces specified below. His Majesty's Government 
trust that, as a consequence of this announcement, the Muslim League 
representatives of those Provinces, a majority of whose representatives 
are already participating in it, will now take their due share in its 
labours. At the same time, it is clear that any Constitution framed 
by this Assembly cannot apply to those parts of the country which are 
unwilling to accept it. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that 
the procedure outlined below embodies the best practical method of 
ascertaining the wishes of the people of such areas on the issue whether 
their Constitution is to be framed*-
(a) in the existing Constituent Assembly; or 
(b) in a new and separate Constituent Assembly consisting of the 
representatives of those areas which decide not to participate 
in the existing Constituent Assembly. 
Source: Manmath Nath Das, Partition and Independence of India,pp.311-16. 
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When this has been done, it will be possible to determine the 
authority or authorities to whom power should be transferred. 
BENGAL AND THE PUNJAB 
5. The Provincial legislative Acsemb]ies o^ Bengal and the Punjab 
(excluding the European members) will therefore each be asked to meet 
in two parts; one representing the Muslim majority districts and the 
other the rest of the Progince. For the purpose of determining the 
population of districts, the 1941 census figures will be taken as 
authoritative. The Muslim majority districts in these two Provinces 
are set out in the Appendix to this Announcement. 
5. The members of the two parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting 
separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the Province should 
be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favour 
of partition, division will take place and arrangements will be made 
accordingly. 
7. Before the question as to the partition is decided, it is desirable 
that the representatives of each part should know in advance which 
Constituent Assembly the Province as a whole v/ould join in the event of 
the two parts subsequently deciding to remain united. Therefore, if 
any member of either Legislative Assembly so demands, there shall be 
held a meeting of all members of the Legislative Assembly (other than 
Europeans) at which a decision will be taken on the Issue as to which 
Constituent Assembly the Province as a whole would join if it were 
decided by the two parts to remain united. 
8. In the event of partition being decided upon, each part of the 
Legislative Assembly will, on behalf of the areas they represent, decide 
which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to adopt. 
9. For the immediate purpose of deciding on the issue of partition, 
the members of the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab 
will sit in two parts according to Muslim majority districts (as laid 
down in the Appendix) and non-Muslim majority districts. This is only 
a preliminary step of a purely temporary nature as it is evident that 
for the purposes of final partition of these Provinces a detailed 
investigation of boundary question will be needed; and, as soon as a 
decision involving partition has been taken for either Province, a 
Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor-General, the member-
ship and terms of rererence of which will be settled in consultation 
with those concerned. It will be instructed to demarcate the boundaries 
of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the 
contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. It will also be 
instructed to take into account other factors. Si-nilar instructions 
will be given to the Bengal Boundary Commission. Until the report of 
a Boundary Commission has been put into effect, the provisional bounda-
ries indicated in the Appendix will be used. 
SIND 
f 
10. The Legislative Assembly of Sind (excluding the European members) 
will at a special meeting also take its own decision on the alternatives 
in paragraph 4 above. 
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NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PRO\''INCE 
11. The position of the North-West Frontier Province is exceptional. 
Two of the three representatives of this Province are already parti-
cipating in the existing Constituent Assembly. But it is clear, in view 
of its geographical situation^ and other considerations, that, if the 
whole or any part of the Punjab decides not to join the existing 
Constituent Assembly, it will be necessary to give the North-West 
Frontier Province an opportunity to reconsider its position.Accordingly, 
in such an event, a referendum will be made to the electors of the 
present Legislative Assembly in the North-West Frontier Province to 
choose which of the alternatives mentioned in paragraph 4 above they 
wish to adopt. The referendum will be held under the aegis of the 
Governor-General and in consultation with the Provincial Government. 
BRITISH BALUCHISTAN 
12. British Baluchistan has elected a member but he has not taken 
his seat in the existing Constituent Assembly. In view of its geographical 
situation/ this Province will also be given an opportunity to reconsider 
its position and to choose which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 
above to adopt. His Excellency the Governor-General is examining how 
this can most appropriately be done. 
ASSAM 
13. Thoush Assam is predominately a non-Muslim Province, the district 
of Sylhet which is contiguous to Bengal is predominately Muslim. There 
has been a demand that, in the event of the partition of Bengal, Sylhet 
should be amalgamated with the Muslim part of Bengal. Accordingly, if 
it is decided that Bengal should be partitioned, a referendum will be 
held in Sylhet district, under the aegis of the Governor-General and 
in consultation with the Assam Provincial Government, to decide whether 
the district of Sylhet should continue to form part of the Assam Province 
or should be amalgamated with the new Province of Eastern Bengal, if 
that Province agrees. If the referendum results in favour of amalgama-
tion with Eastern Bengal, a Boundary Commission with terms of reference 
similar to those for the Punjab and Bengal will be set up to demarcate 
the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet district and contiguous Muslim 
majority areas of adjoining districts, which will then be transferred 
to 'Eastern Bengal. The rest of the Assam Province will in any case 
continue to participate in the proceedings of the existing Constituent 
Assembly. 
REPRESENTATION IN CCMSTITUENT ASSEKBI lES 
14. If it is decided that Bengal and the Punjab should be partitioned, 
it wil] be necessary to hold tresh elections to choose their represen-
tatives on the scale of one for every million of population according 
to the principle contained in the Cabinet M.ission's Plan of 16th May' 
1946. Similar elections will also have to be held for Sylhet in the 
event of its being decided that this district should form part of East 
Bengal. The number ot representatives to which each area would be 
entitled is as tollows:-
Province General Muslims Sikhs Total 
Sylhet D i s t r i c t 
'.•Test Bengal 
East Bengal 
West Pxinjab 
East Punjab 
1 
15 
12 
3 
6 
2 
4 
29 
12 
4 
N i l 
N i l 
N i l 
2 
2 
3 
19 
41 
17 
12 
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15, In accordance with the mandates given to thera, the representa-
tives of the various areas will either join the existing Constituent 
Assembly or form the new Constituent Assembly, 
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS 
16, Negotiations will have to be initiated as soon as possible on 
administrative consequences of any partition that may have been decided 
upon:-
(a) Eetv/een the representatives of the respective successor authorities 
about all subjects now dealt with by the Centra] Government,including 
Defence, Finance and Communications, 
(b) Between different successor authorities and His Majesty's Govern-
ment for treaties in regard to matters arising out of the transfer of 
power, 
(c) In the case of Provinces that may be partitioned as to adminis-
tration of all provincial subjects such as the division of assets and 
liabilities, the police and other services, the High Courts,provincial 
institutions, and c. 
THE TRIBES OF THE NORTH-WEST FRCWTIER 
17, Agreements with tribes of the North-VJest Frontier of India will 
have to be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority. 
THE STATES 
18, His Majesty's Government wish to make i t c lear t h a t the decisions 
announced above r e l a t e to Br i t i sh India and tha t t h e i r policy towards 
Indian Sta tes contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May, 
1946, remains unchanged, 
NECESSITY FOR SPEED 
19, In order that the successor authorities may have time to prepare 
themselves to take over power, it is important that al] the above 
processes should be completed as quickly as ooscible. To avoid delay, 
the different Provinces or parts o-^  Provinces will proceed independently 
as far as practicable within the conditions of this plan, the existing 
Constituent Assembly and the New Constituent Assembly (it formed) will 
proceed to frame Constitutions for their respective territories? they 
will of course be free to frame their own rules. 
IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF P0V7ER 
20, The major political parties have repeatedly emphasised their 
desire that there should be the earliest possible transfer of power in 
India, With this desire His Majesty's Government are in full sympathy, 
and they are willing to anticipate the date of June, 1948, for the 
handing over of power by the setting up of an independent Indian Govern-
ment or Governments at an even earlier date. Accordingly, as the most 
expeditious, and indeed the only practicable, way of meeting this desire 
His Majesty's Government propose to introduce legislation during the 
current session for the transfer of power this year on a Dominion Status 
basis to one or tv/o successor authorities according to the decisions 
taken as a result of this announcement. This will be without prejudice 
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to the right of Indian Constituent Assemblies to decide in due course 
whether or not the part of India in respect of which they have authority 
will remain within the British Commonwealth. 
FURTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS BY GOVERNOR-GENERAL 
21. His Excellency the Governor-General will from time to time make 
such further announcements as may be necessary in regard to procedure 
or any other matters for carrying out the above arrangements. 
APPENDIX 
Muslim Majority Districts 
the 1941 Census: 
of Bengal and the Punjab according to 
1. BENGAL 2. THE PUNJAB 
Chittaqong Division 
Chittaaong 
Noakhaii 
Tippera 
Dacca Division 
I^ ahore Division 
Guj ranwala 
Gurdaspur 
Lahore 
Sheikhupura 
Sialkot 
Bakarganj 
Dacca 
Faridpur 
Mymensingh 
Presidency Division 
JesEore 
Murshidabad 
Nadia 
Rawalpindi Division 
Attook 
Gujarat 
Jhelum 
Mianwali 
Rawalpindi 
Shahpur 
Multan Division 
Rajshahi Division 
Doqra 
Dinajpur 
Malda' 
Pabna 
Rajshahi 
Rangpur 
Dera Ghazi Khan 
Jhong 
Lyalipur 
Montgomery 
Multan 
Muzaffargarh 
4 7 9 
APPENDIX X l y 
' S I R CYRIL RADCLIFFE'S BOUNDARY AWARDS 
A u g u s t 1 2 - 1 3 , 1947 
1 
BENGAL 
"10. ... The demarcation of the boundary line is described in detail 
in the schedule which f orrp.s Annexure A to this award ... 
New Delhi 
The 12th August, 1947 
The Schedule - Annexure I f t 
1. A line shall be drawn along the boundary between the thana of 
Phansidewa in the district of Darjeeling and the thana Tetulia in the 
district of Jalpaiguri from the point where that boundary meets the 
Province of Bihar and then along the boundary between the thanas of 
Tetulia and Rajganj; the thanas of Pachagar and Rajganj/ and the thanas 
o"f Pachagar and Jalpaiauri, and shal] then continue along the northern 
comer of the thana Debiganj to the boundary of the State of Cooch Behar. 
The district of Darjeeling and so much of the district of Jalpaiguri 
as lies north of this line shall belong to West Dengal, but the thana 
of Patgram and any other portion of Jalpaiguri district which lies to 
the east or south shal] belong to East Bengal. 
2. A line shall then be drawn from the point where the boundary 
between the thanas of Hariour and Raiganj in the district of Dinajpur 
meets the border of the Province o^ Bihar to the point where the boundary 
between the districts of 24-^ 'arganas and Khulna meets the Bay of Bengal, 
This line shall follow the course indicated in the following paragraphs. 
So much of the Province of Bengal as lies to the west of it shal] belong 
to V?est Benoal. Subject to what has been provided in paragraph 1 above 
with regard to the districts of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, the remainder 
of the Province of Bengal shall belong to East Bengal, 
3. The line shall riin a]ong the boundary between the following thanas: 
Haripur and Raiganj; Hariour and Kemtabad; Ranisankail and 
Hemtabad; Pirganj and Hemtabad,* Pirganj and Kaliganj ; 
Bochaganj and Kaliganj; Biral and Kaliganj; Biral and 
Kushmundi; Biral and Gangarampur; Dinajpur and Gangarampur; 
Dinajpur and Kumarganj; Chirirbandar and Kumarganj; Phulbari 
and Kumarganj; Phulbari and Balurghat, 
It shall terminate at the point where the boundary between Phulbari 
and Balurghat meets the north-south line of the Bengal-Assam Railway 
in the eastern comer of the thana of Balurghat. The line shall turn 
down the western edge of the railway lands belonging to that railway 
and follow that edge until it meets the boundary between the thanas 
of Balurghat and Panchhibi. 
4. From that ooint the line shall run along the boundary between 
the following thanas: 
1. Rerorts of the Members and Aw§rds of the Chairman of the Boundary 
Commission(Alipore; Superintendent, Government Printing, West Bengal 
Government Press, 1950), pp. 116-20. 
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Balurghat and Panchbibi; BaJurghat and Joypurhat; Balurghat 
and Dhamairhat; Tapan and Dhamairhat; Tapan and Patnitala; 
Tapan and Porsha; Bamangola and Porsha; Habibpur and Porsha; 
Habibpur and Gomastapur; Hablbour and Bholahat; Malda and 
Bholahat; English Bazar and Bholahat; English Bazar and 
Shibganj; Kaliachak and Shibganj; to the point where the 
bovmdary between the tv;o last mentioned thanas meets the 
boundary between the districts of Malda and Murshidabad on 
the river Ganges, 
5. The line shall then turn south-east down the river Ganges along 
the bovindary between the districts of Kalda end Murshidabad; Raj shahi 
and Murshidabad; Paj shahi and Nadia; to the '--oint in the north-western 
comer of the district of Nadia where the channel of the river 
Mathabanga takes off ^ 'rom the river Ganges, The district boundaries, 
and not the actual course of the river Ganges, shall constitute the 
boundary between East and West Bengal. 
6. From the point on the river Ganges where the channel of the river 
Mathabanga takes off, the line shall run along that channel to the 
northern-most- point where it meets the boundary between the thanas of 
Daulatpur and Karimpur^ The middle line of the main channel shall 
constitute the actual boundary. 
7, From this point the boundary between East and V/est Bengal shall 
run along the boundaries between the thanas of Daulatapur and Karimpur; 
Gangani and Karimpur; Meherpur and Karimpur; Meherpur and Tehatta; 
Meherpur and Chapra; Damurhuda and Chapra; Damurhuda and Krishanganj; 
Chudanga and Krishanaganj; Jibannagar and Krishnaganj; Jibannagar and 
Hanskhali; Maheshpur and Hanskhali; Maheshpur and Ranaghat; Maheshpur 
and Bongaon; Jhikargacha and Bongaon; Sarsa and Bongaon; Sarsa and 
Gaighata; Gaiqhata and Kalaroa; to the point where the boundary between 
these thanas meets the boundary between the districts of Khulna and 
24-Parganas, 
8, The line sha]1 then run southwards along the boundary between 
the districts of Khulna and 24-Parganas, to the point where the boundary 
meets the Bay of Bengal. 
1 
SYLHET 
• • • 
10. Out o^ 35 thanas in Sylhet, e ight have non-Muslim major i t i e s ; 
but of these eight , two - Sul]a and Ajmiriganj (which i s in any event 
divided almost evenly between Muslims and non-Muslims), are en t i r e ly 
surrounded by preponderantly Muslim areas, and must therefore go with 
them to East Bengal. The other s ix thanas comprising a population of 
over 530,000 people s t re tch in a contiguous l ine along par t of the 
southern border of Sylhet d i s t r i c t . They are divided between two sub-
div is ions , of which one. South Sylhet, comprising a population of over 
515,000 people, has in fact a non-Muslim majority of sone 40,000;while 
the other, Karim>ganj, with a population over 568,000 people, has a 
Muslim majority tha t i s a l i t t l e l a rge r . 
11. With regard to the d i s t r i c t of Cachar, one thana, I-Iailakandi, has 
a Muslim majority and i s contiguous to the •Tuslitn thanas of Badarpur 
1, Reports of the Members and Awards of the Chairman of the Boundary 
Commissions/Alipore; Superintendent, Government Printing,West 
Bengal Government press , 1950), pp, 153-55, 
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and Karimganj in the district of Sylhet. T M s thana forms, with the 
thana of Katlichara immediately to its south, the sub-division of 
Haila"kandi, and in the sub-division as a whole Muslims enjoy a very 
small majority being 51 per cent of the total population. I think that 
the dependence of Katlichara on Hailakandi for normal communications 
makes it imoortant that the area should be under one jurisdiction, and 
that the Muslims would have at any rate a strong presumptive claim 
for the transfer of the sub-division of Halakandi, comprising a popula-
tion of 156,536 from the Province of Assam to the Province of East 
Bengal. 
12. But a study of the map shovrs, in my judgment/ that a division on 
these lines would present problems of administration that might gratvely 
affect the future welfare and happiness of the whole district, not only 
would the six non-Muslim thanas of Sylhet be completely divorced from 
the rest of Assam if the Muslim c"" aiyn to Haila^ -;andi were r^^cognised, 
but they form a strip running east and west whereas the natural division 
of the land is north and south and they ef-^ -'ect an awkward severance 
of the railway line through Sylhet, so that, for instance, the junction 
^or the tovm o^ Sylhet itself, the capital of the district would lie 
in Assam, not in East Bengal. 
13. In those circumstances, I think that some exchange of territories 
must be ef-^ected if a workable division is to result. Some of the non-
MusliTi thanas must go to East Bengal and some Muslim territory and 
Hailakandi must be retained by Assam. Accordingly I decide and award 
as follows: 
A line shall be drawn from the point where the boundary betv^ecn 
the thanas of Patharkandi and Kulaura meets the frontier of Tripura 
State and shall run north along the boundary between those thanas, then 
along the boundary between the thanas of Patharkandi and Barlekha,then 
along the boundary between the thanas of Karimganj and Earlekha, and 
then along the boundary between the thanas of Karimganj and Beani Bazar 
to the point where that boundary meets the river Kusiyara. The line 
shall then turn to the east taking the river Kusiyara as the boundary 
and run to the point where that river meets the boundary between the 
districts of Sylhet and Cachar. The centre line of the main stream or 
channel shall constitute the boundary. So much of th^ district of Sylhet 
as lies to the west and north of this line shall be detached from the 
Province of Assam and transferred to the Province of East Bengal. No 
other part of the Province of Assam shall be transferred. 
New Delhi 
The 13th August, 1947 
1 
PUNJAB 
7. ... The demarcation of the boundary line is described in detail 
in the schedule which forms Annexure A, to this award, and in the map 
attached thereto. Annexure B2. The map is annexed for purposes of 
illustration, and if there should be any divergence between the boundary 
as described in Annexure A anr' as delineated on the map in Annexure B, 
the descriotion in Annexure is to prevail. 
1. Reports of the Members and _Awards of the Ch^ rT.an of the Boundary 
Commissions (Alipore; Superintendent, Government Printing,' West 
Bengal Government Press, 1950), rp. 303-07. 
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12, I am conscious too that the award cannot go far towards satis-
fying sentiments and aspirations deeply held on either side but 
directly in conflict as to their bearing on the placing of the boundary, 
If means are to be -Found to gratify to the full those sentiments and 
aspirations, I think that they must be found in political arrangements 
with which I am not concerned, and not in the decision of a boundary 
line drawn under the terms of reference of this Commission. 
New Delhi 
The 12th August, 1947 
The Schedule - Annexure'A' 
follow the line of that river down the western boundary of the 
Tehsil to the point v;here the Pathankot, Shakaraarh and Gurdaspur 
tehsils meet. The tehsil boundary and not the actual course of the 
Ujh river shall constitute the boundary'' between the East and VJest 
Punjab. 
2. From the point of meeting the three tehsils above, mentioned, 
the boundary the East and West Punjab shall follow the line of the 
Ujh river to its junction with the river Ravi and thereafter the line 
of the river Ravi along the boundary between the tehsils of Gurdaspur 
and Shakargarh, the boundary between the tehsils of Batala and Shakar-
garh,' the boundary between the tehsils of Batala and Narowal, the 
boundary between the tehsils of Ajnala and Narowal, and the boundary 
between the tehsils of Ajnala and Shadara, to the point on the river 
Ravi where the district of Amritsar is divided from the district of 
Lahore. The tehsil boundaries referred to, and not the actual course 
of the river Ujh or the river Ravi, shall conrtitute the boundary 
betv/een the East and West Punjab. 
3. From the point on the river Ravi where the district of Amritsar 
is divided from the district of Lahore, the boundary between the East 
and Vfest Punjab shall turn southwards following the boundary bet^ ?^een 
the tehsils of Ajnala and Lahore and then- the tehsils of Tarn Taran 
and Lahore, to the point where the tehsils of Kasur, Lahore and Tarn 
Taran meet. The line will then turn south-westward along the boundary 
between the tehsils of Lahore and Kasur to the point where that boundary 
meetis the north-east comer of village Theh Jharolian. It will then 
run along the eastern boundary of that village to its junction with 
village Chatianwala, turn along the northern boundary of that village, 
and then run down its eastern boundary to its junction ^^i th village 
V.'aigai. It will then run along the eastern boundary of villarre V'aigal 
to its junction with village Kalia, and then along the southern 
boundary of village Waigal to its junction with village Panhuwan. The 
line will then run down the eastern boundary of village Panhuwan to 
its junction with village Gaddoke. The line will then run down the 
eastern border of village Gaddoke to its junction with village Nur\-7ala. 
It will then run ' along the southern boundary of village Gaddoke to 
its junction with village Katluni Kalan. The line will then run down 
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the eastern boundary of v i l l a g e Katluni Kalan to i t s j imction with 
v i l lages Kals and Mastgarh. I t wil l tben run along the southern boundary 
of v i l l age Katluni Kalan to the north-west comer of v i l l age Kals, 
I t wi l l then run along the western boundary of v i l l age Kals to i t s junction with v i l l age Khem Karan. The l ine wi l l then run along the 
western and southern boundaries o^ v i l l age Khem Karan to i t s junction 
with v i l l age "aewala. I t wi l l fren run dovm the western and southern 
boundaries of v i l l age Maewala, proceeriinq eastward alona the boundaries 
between v i l l age Mahaidenur on t'^e north and v i l l ages Sheikhupura, 
^uhna, Kamapuran, Fatehwa]a and Mahewala. The l ine wi l l then turn 
northward along the western boundary o^ v i l l age Sahjra to i t s junction 
with v i l l ages Mahaidepur and ^achhike. I t wi l l then turn north-eastward 
along the boundaries between v i l l ages Machhike and Sahjra and then 
proceed along the boundary between v i l l ages Rattoke and Sahjra to the junction between v i l l ages Rattoke, Sahjra and Mabbuke. The l ine will 
then run nor th-eas t between the v i l lages Rattoke and Mabbuke to the junction of v i l l ages Rattoke, Mabbuke and Gaj ja l . From tha t point the 
l ine wi l l run along the boundary between v i l l ages Mabbuke and Gajjal, 
and then turn south along the eastern boundary of v i l l age Mabbuke to 
i t s junction with v i l l age Nagar Aimanpur. I t wi l l then turn along 
the north-reastem boundary of v i l l age Nagar Aimanpur, and run along 
i t s eastern boundary to i t s junction v/ith v i l l age Masteke. From there 
i t wi l l run along the eastern boundary of v i l l age Masteke to where 
i t meets the boundary between the t e h s i l s of Kasur and Ferozepore. 
4 . The l i ne wil l then run in a south-westemly d i rec t ion down the 
Sutlej River on the boiandary between the d i s t r i c t s of Lahore and 
Ferozepore to the point where the d i s t r i c t s of Ferozepore, Lahore and 
Montgomery meet. I t wi l l continue along the boundary between the 
d i s t r i c t s of Ferozenore and Montgomery to the point whete t h i s boundary 
meets the border of Pahawalpur S ta t e . The d i s t r i c t boundaries, and 
not the actual course of the Sutlej River, shall in each case cons t i tu te 
the boundary betv/een the East and V.'est Punjab. 
5. I t i s my intent ion tha t t h i s boundary l ine sbonlr' ensure tha t 
the canal headworks at Sulemanke wil l t a l l within the t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i sd ic t ion ot the VJest Punjab. If the exis t ing del imita t ion of 
boundaries of Montgomery D i s t r i c t does not ensure t h i s , I award to 
t,he West Punjab so much ot the t e r r i t o r y concerned as covers the 
Headworks, and the boundary shal l be adjusted accordingly. 
6. So much of the Punjab Province as l i e s to the west of the l ine 
demarcated in the preceding paragraphs sha l l be the t e r r i t o r y of the 
West Punjab. So much of the t e r r i t o r y of the Punjab Province as l i e s 
to the eas t of tha t l ine shal l be the t e r r i t o r y ot the East Punjab. 
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